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Abstract
Intellectual property rights, mostly in the form of patents and plant variety
protection, have increasingly become an integral part of plant improvement
efforts. With the advent of the TRIPS Agreement and the dominant interpretative
implementation of its minimum standards, actors who use, conserve and improve
agricultural biodiversity are faced with a strong property rights paradigm, which
has been thoroughly criticised in the doctrine. However, these critics have not
created the advocated regulatory shift. The dissertation defends that this is
due to the lack of socio-technological contextualisation of applicable laws and
judicial interpretation. Indeed, the intellectual property paradigm applies to very
different innovation contexts and confronts plant improvement actors stretching
from mass selectors, small-scaled private conventional plant breeders, public
molecular researchers, specialised start-ups and integrated biotechnology giants.
By applying the paradigm to such contexts, ...
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"It seems to me that men cannot live conveniently where all things are common: how can there be 
any plenty, where every man will excuse himself from labour? For as the hope of gain doth not 
excite him, so the confidence that he has in other men's industry may make him slothful: if people 
come to be pinched with want, and yet cannot dispose of anything as their own;  
what can follow upon this but perpetual sedition and bloodshed?" 
Thomas MORE, Utopia 
 
 
INTRODUCTION 
The diversity of life is primordial to all societies. Agricultural plant biodiversity is the foundation 
of undoubtedly the most critical human right of all, that of food, as seeds represent the paramount 
input for food and feed cultivation. Plant genetic diversity is in this context the foundation of all 
crop improvement endeavours, which not only attempt to respond to our nutritional needs but also 
to ever-greater biotic and abiotic stresses. The conservation, use and development of 
agrobiodiversity are primordial to offset the growing pressure put on land by a soaring human 
population and changing climate. Agriculture is definitively under growing pressure, stemming not 
only from soaring population growth estimates, from the shrinking availability of cultivated land, 
but also from changing and increasingly more difficult climatic conditions. The debate on the 
strategic choices and postulates of the “agriculture of the future” takes place in this context of 
mounting environmental and socio-economic pressure, divided in two seemingly contradictory but 
possibly harmonious approaches. Emphasis is on the one hand put on the necessity to increase 
yields or useful resistances through high-technology infused crop improvement programs relying 
on enriched germplasm pools
1
. On the other hand, focus is put on the need for multi-faceted 
approaches incorporating concerns over economic profitability, but also ecological suitability and 
social acceptability
2
. The latter approach takes the plea of bottom-up participatory or agro-
                                                                    
 
1
 MARK TESTER and PETER LANGRIDGE, "Breeding Technologies to Increase Crop Production in a Changing World," 
Science 327, no. 5967, 2010., where the authors highlight the importance of new molecular breeding techniques for 
the future need of yield improvements, conditional however to the necessary widening of the general germplasm pool 
and enrichment of the improved resources pool through landraces or wild relatives. See also the International Seed 
Federation’s “Agriculture under Pressure” video, hinting that the solution for population and environmental pressures 
will come from modern crop improvement, through the hands of breeders and molecular biologists: 
http://www.worldseed.org/isf/agriculture_under_pressure.html (accessed July 2011). 
2
 See for instance Pashupati CHAUDHARY’s response to the aforementioned article by TESTER and LANDRIDGE, 
where the author stresses the importance of local innovation based on the selection of appropriate traits by the 
custodians and caretakers of agrobiodiversity: PASHUPATI CHAUDHARY, "Bottom-up and Need-Based Approach for 
Crop Improvement," ibid.published 27 April 2010. In a parallel stance, the 2009 multi-stakeholder expert led 
“International Assessment of Agricultural Knowledge, Science and Technology for Development: Agriculture at a 
Crossroads (IAASTD)” also promotes the need to embrace the “multi-functionality” of agricultural production and 
knowledge, addressing the distributional impacts of currently dominant narratives focused on high-technlogy laden 
productivity gains. 
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ecology-based
3
 crop improvement systems, and so-called “socio-ecological production 
landscapes”4.  
Biodiversity is used for cultivation and innovation in a framework of fierce competition between 
industrialised and emerging economies, where economic development has arguably been granted 
the status of human right, and where steadily increasing population figures have propelled an 
urging need to increase agricultural production. Stepping away from the quite depreciatively 
described "backward repository of unskilled people locked in traditional ways of living"
5
, 
discoveries related to agricultural plant genetic resources have revolutionised food production and 
cultivation. They have produced impressive results in terms of yield or uniform performance, 
increasing all the while opportunities for land sparing and for controlling environmental stresses
6
. 
Albeit the initial impetus which guides research activities that use and create new agricultural 
genetic diversity, neither farmers nor consumers have unreservedly benefited from the 
revolutionary added values of agricultural technological strides. Technological progresses have 
brought about challenging societal and structural issues, transforming the entire organisation of 
agricultural input production, professionalising the development of plant varieties and production 
of seeds, and distancing them from farms. The ecological and socio-economics benefits brought by 
the worlds of genetics and genomics have been levied by high costs and sacrifices on the field. The 
modern biological information quests lying behind the groundbreaking discoveries of genomics 
and genetics science bear significant industrial impacts, with distributional effects in terms of 
access to technology and assimilation capacity
7
. Opposition movements
8
 fearing for farmers' 
livelihoods and the ecological downfalls of homogenisation have considerably tainted both the 
revolutionary hybrids of the Green Revolution and the subsequent "pro-poor biotechnology" 
narratives
9
. Detrimental effects have been raised in social allocation, pointing to the significant 
                                                                    
 
3
 The approach has for instance been advocated by the latest United Nations Special Rapporteur on the Right to Food, 
OLIVIER DE SCHUTTER, "Agroecology and the Right to Food", Report presented at the 16th Session of the United 
Nations Human Rights Council, A/HRC/16/49, 2011.  
4
 This idiom has been studied and advocated by the United Nations University Institute of Advanced Studies; see 
NADIA BERGAMINI et al., "Indicators of Resilience in Socio-Ecological Production Landscapes (Sepls)", 
http://www.ias.unu.edu/resource_centre/Indicators-of-resilience-in-sepls_ev.pdf, 2013.  
5
 ROBERT E.  EVENSON, "Besting Malthus: The Green Revolution," Proceedings Of The American Philosophical 
Society 149, no. 4, 2005. (pp. 469)  
6
 For a quick and complete overview of the benefits brought about by plant breeding and the growing use of genetic 
improvement in general, see MARCEL  BRUINS, "The Evolution and Contribution of Plant Breeding to Global 
Agriculture," in Responding to the Challenges of a Changing World: The Role of New Plant varieties and High 
Quality Seeds in Agriculture, Proceedings of the Second World Seed Conference (Rome, September 8-102009). pp.18-
31, especially at pp. 23-27, where the author underlines the contributions of methodical selection and breeding in 
terms of yield, nutritional quality, biotic stress resistance, abiotic stress tolerance and land sparing.  
7
 See the results of the workshop on Environmental Policy, Agriculture and Technology held in Rome in May 2000 as 
related by TIMOTHY SWANSON, The Economics of Managing Biotechnology  Dordrecht: Kluwer, 2001. Preface, 
whereby the author distinguishes the environmental impacts of biotechnological innovation (in terms of resistance, 
unintended effects and irreversible uncertainties) and those related to industrial structure (in terms of efficiency and 
distribution). For environmental impacts, see Parts B and C of the aforementioned monograph (pp. 99 – 197) and see 
Part D for the industrial impacts (pp. 197-250), as well as TIMOTHY  SWANSON, Biotechnology, Agriculture and the 
Developing World: The Distributional Impacts of Technological Change  London: Edward Elgar, 2002. 
8
 The most notable voice with regards to the concerns of the detrimental effects of all private sector induced genetic 
improvement, whether through hybridisation or biotechnological tools such as genetic engineering is without a doubt 
Vandana SHIVA and the Grain association; VANDANA  SHIVA, The Violence of the Green Revolution: Third World 
Agriculture, Ecology and Politics: Ecological Degradation and Political Conflict  London: Zed Books, 1991. 
9
 See for instance respectively assessments with regards to the first modern varieties and to the promise of 
biotechnology, M. LIPTON and R.  LONGHURST, New Seeds and Poor People: Routledge Library Editions: 
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 decreases in farm income attributed to the higher costs of obtaining more expensive seeds and 
accompanying chemicals.  
Agricultural production, in order to be ecologically and economically sustainable, needs to be 
carried out through various channels and economic models, driving away from a “one-size-fits-all” 
approach. The annihilation and depreciation of biodiversity maintainers on farm or in conventional 
breeding programmes, cannot serve objectives of sustainability, even in the most modern crop 
innovation chains. Agricultural production cannot at any time, destroy the genetic diversity that it 
creates or is derived from. Indeed, plant improvement steadily relies on a sound influx of new 
genetic variability, stemming primarily from improved varieties but also from resources selected 
and maintained on farm. Furthermore, a forced homogenisation in innovation models cannot serve 
the collective good unequivocally. Indeed, cultivation schemes and seed development should 
remain genuine choices, adapted to local socio-economic and environmental conditions, focusing 
either on farm-based selection, or more conventional plant breeding activities sustained through 
small or medium enterprises, or the currently dominant molecular-based integrated industry. It is 
therefore in this delicate yet vital framework of sensitiveness, anchored in pleas for biodiversity 
conservation on the one hand, and for equitable rights to development and the survival of adequate 
economic realities on the other, that a set of complex, but for many agrobiodiversity users crucial, 
problems have emerged concerning the appropriate legal frameworks that allocate property rights 
to agricultural plant genetic resources.  
Policies need in this sense to bear multiple layers, addressing all components of plant genetic 
diversity, from improved stable varieties to landraces and wild relatives10. They also need to 
concede the diversity of actors relying on, improving and using living organisms, which is not 
only primordial to all democratic but also sustainable societies. Based on such premises, our focus 
will lie on the management of agricultural biodiversity, more specifically on the promotion of 
innovative yet sustainable and equitable variety development activities. The argumentative 
constructs revolve around the actors and stakeholders who conserve, use and improve 
agrobiodiversity (A) and thereby contribute to social welfare in different socio-technological 
contexts of innovation. In the political economy tradition, the stakeholders active in the so-called 
“PGRFA system”11 are customarily understood to encompass international organisations, national 
States (whether in the bioresource-rich South or knowledge-rich North), non-governmental 
organisations representing specific interests (whether lobbying or environmental groups), and 
farmers. We argue that such an approach, albeit providing useful insights as to the influences that 
carve the content of regulatory regimes, has inherent limitations and fails to inform on the concrete 
means through which the goods in questions are produced. That is why we believe that the starting 
point of an analysis that strives to highlight the concrete shortcomings of a specific regulatory 
regime, and as a result provide efficient adjustments to such regime, should be grounded on the 
                                                                                                                                                                                                                              
 
Development 1989 (second edition 2011)., and M.  LIPTON, "Reviving Global Poverty Reduction: What Role for 
Genetically Modified Plants?," Journal of International Development 13, 2001. 
10
 While improved stable plant varieties are produced by the industrialised seed development model relying on modern 
plant breeding techniques, landraces are the result of millena of both intentional and unintentional cultivation and 
crossings in fields, and designate populations that have been “domesticated” away from wild plant, coined wild 
relatives; see notably A.C. ZEVEN, "Landraces: A Review of Definitions and Classifications," Euphytica 104, 1998.. 
11
 CARLOS CORREA, "In Situ Conservation and Intellectual Property Rights," in Genes in the Field: On-Farm 
Conservation of Crop Diversity, ed. STEPHEN BRUSH, Boca Raton: IPGRI/International Development Research 
Corporation/Lewis Publishers 2000. 
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analysis of the actual users of the goods under study, i.e., plant genetic diversity. It should not 
only study the means through which such users have forged certain interpretations of applicable 
property regimes, but also underscore how they have thereafter built social innovation to overcome 
the shortcomings caused by the dominant interpretation in certain socio-technological innovation 
contexts. Indeed, amongst the diverse range of actors of plant improvement, an important 
proportion of agrobiodiversity user groups concede great importance to the public domain12 both 
within and outside informational enclosure mechanisms, understood in a pluralistic approach that 
includes the structural and functional domains created by applicable intellectual property rights 
(“IPR”) legislation. As a result, these social actors face adverse regulatory trends (B), as the 
legal structures that currently surround the formal seed market, notably the strong developmental-
oriented and arguably distorted property rights regimes, disregard and fail to recognise some of 
these stakeholders. Consequently, these actors turn to self-regulation, build pathways, practices 
and coping strategies (C) that strive to re-adjust the strong property paradigm13 and re-
appropriate a wider public domain, a multi-faceted concept that may as a result prove to be the 
most efficient means towards the salvation of these overlooked users of agrobiodiversity. Our 
analysis is in this sense based on a triangulation of applicable regulatory regimes, socio-
technological plant innovation contexts, and social actors who develop a wide array of tools to 
counter the adverse effects of regulation by using the flexibilities offered by the bendable 
boundaries of the property paradigm as applied to agricultural plant genetic resources. 
 
                                                                    
 
12
 We approach the “public domain” through a pluralist understanding, encompassing not only the knowledge, 
products and processes where no ownership claims have been drawn upon, either because of the lapse of legal 
protection in time, or by the effective choice of associated creators or inventors, but also embracing the public 
domains created by the law itself, delineating the object and scope of intellectual property protection, defined by 
James BOYLE as the “outside of the intellectual property system, the material that is free for all to use and build 
upon”, markedly inspired by the work of JAMES BOYLE, "The Opposite of Property?," Law & Contemporary Problems 
66, no. 1-2, 2003., DAVID LANGE, "Reimagining the Public Domain," ibid.463., PAMELA SAMUELSON, "Enriching 
Discourse on Public Domains," Duke Law Journal 55, no. 101, 2006., and SÉVERINE DUSOLLIER, "Le Domaine 
Public: Garant De L'interêt Public En Propriété Intellectuelle?," in L'interêt Général Et L'accès À L'information En 
Propriété Intellectuelle, ed. MIREILLE BUYDENS and SÉVERINE DUSSOLIER, Bruxelles: Bruylant, 2008. This 
understanding will be more thoroughly described in the first Chapter of this study. 
13
 We understand « paradigm » in the footsteps of Thomas KUHN’s seminal work (THOMAS S. KUHN, The Structure 
of Scientific Revolutions  Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1962., not only as the structure legitimising scientific 
methods, but also as a means to model future practice upon it, even though the word itself, and the notion of 
“paradigm shift” has been used and abused in various forms following Kuhn’s publications; see Ian HACKING’s 
introductory essay to the 50
th
 Anniversary edition of Thomas Kuhn’s aforementioned seminal book, T.S. KUHN and I. 
HACKING, The Structure of Scientific Revolutions: 50th Anniversary Edition: University of Chicago Press, 2012. 
Indeed, Kuhn’s paradigm is most often mistaken so as to mean something like “world-view”, whereas the notion of 
paradigm steps away from sets of assumptions or a perspective, and rather represents an actual example of scientific 
work which serves as a model”, SUSAN M. WOLF, "Shifting Paradigms in Bioethics and Health Law: The Rise of a 
New Pragmatism " American Journal of Law and Medicine 20, 1994. We therefore use the term to demonstrate the 
development-oriented approach to plant-related intellectual property rights that was established as a guiding principle 
reified through internationally agreed minimum standards and later corroborated by adequate stakeholders and 
legislative practice. We do so in the footsteps of numerous intellectual property scholars, such as ARTI K. RAI, 
"Regulating Scientific Research: Intellectual Property Rights and the Norms of Science," Northwestern University 
Law Review 94, no. 1, 1999., ROCHELLE C DREYFUSS, "Does Ip Need Ip? Accommodating Intellectual Production 
Outside the Intellectual Property Paradigm," NYU School of Law Public Law and Legal Theory Research Paper 
Series, Working paper no. 10-43, 2010., but also MICHAEL A CARRIER, "Cabining Intellectual Property through a 
Property Paradigm," Duke Law Journal, 2004. 
 5 
  Key biodiversity actors and stakeholders: benefits of agrobiodiversity protection and A.
use in diverse contexts 
The mere existence and conservation of biological diversity retains both anthropocentric and 
ecocentric values for humankind. It directly provides habitat, food, recreation, while also 
providing other ecosystem services, contributing for instance to air and soil quality or to carbon 
sequestration. Agricultural biodiversity in this sense produces numerous public goods
14
, such as 
environmental preservation, food security, knowledge dissemination and societal welfare. As a 
crucial requisite of agricultural input development, plant genetic resources
15
 irremediably 
influence food production, which needs to rise to the challenge of nourishing seven billion people 
today, and probably around nine billion in 2050
16
. These resources are a primordial input for both 
public and private research. Their diversity is thus of special importance for humankind’s 
necessary adaptation to new environmental challenges such as climate change and its 
accompanying effects on agricultural production
17
, as well as probable land, water and fossil fuel 
shortages. Furthermore, agrobiodiversity preserves traditional cultures and provides the 
livelihoods of local communities throughout the world. As a result, the importance of conserving 
and using agricultural plant genetic resources (“PGRFA”)18 sustainably cannot be stressed enough.  
Several actors conserve and use agrobiodiversity. They all rely on the ability to access wild, 
domesticated and improved PGRFA and associated information, either for cultivation, or solely for 
research and development. The eldest user-stakeholders, i.e. farmers, have been selecting and 
improving plant varieties for more than ten thousand years, relying on a wide array of traditional 
varieties for their own production, as well as on opportunities for saving and freely exchanging 
seeds at local or regional levels
19
. Even today a large proportion of the seed planted is either saved 
by farmers or exchanged on a farmer-to-farmer basis. In the mid-1980s farmer-saved seed 
accounted for an estimated thirty five per cent (or eighteen billion USD) of the total estimated 
                                                                    
 
14
 We refer to the traditional three-folded definition pertaining to the inherent characterisation of public goods as 
accessible and non-rival in consumption; INGE  KAUL, ISABELLE  GRUNBERG, and MARC A. STERN, "Defining Global 
Public Goods," in Global Public Goods: International Cooperation in the 21st Century, ed. INGE  KAUL, ISABELLE  
GRUNBERG, and MARC A. STERN, New York: Oxford University Press, 1999. In this context, institutional analysis 
focus upon the impact of normative endeavours over the accessibility of the goods in question, referring to the 
desirable production levels through political or legal perspectives in a governance mindset; see RENATE  MAYNTZ, 
"Common Goods and Governance," in Common Goods: Reinventing European and International Governance, ed. 
ADRIENNE  WINDHOFF-HERITIER, Boston: Rowman & Littlefield, 2002, 15-28. 
15
 Biological diversity is traditionally divided into three distinct categories through a hierarchical and structural 
approach: ecosystems, species and genetic resources. EDWARD O. WILSON, The Diversity of Life  New York: Norton, 
1992.  
16
 FOOD AND AGRICULTURAL ORGANISATION FAO, "How to Feed the World in 2050", FAO, Food and Agricultural 
Organisation of the United Nations, Rome, 2009.  
17
 Aside from the wide array of ecosystem services provided by agricultural biodiversity, such as pest regulation or 
erosion control, the sustainable use of plant genetic resources for food and agriculture bears great potential in both the 
adaptation and the mitigation of the effects of climate change, by responding to biotic and abiotic stress, or to extreme 
climate events. FOOD AND AGRICULTURAL ORGANISATION, "Climate Change and Biodiversity for Food and 
Agriculture: Technical Background Document for Expert Consultation", FAO, Rome, 2008.  
18
 Plant genetic resources destined to the agricultural sector shall be herein equally referred to as PGRFA, agricultural 
plant germplasm or agricultural plant genetic resources. The research shall only delve on agricultural plant genetic 
diversity management and the correlated rules of access and use, willingly setting animal and aquatic genetic 
resources (which also constitute an integral part of agricultural diversity), but also all industrial uses of such resources 
(such as energy) aside.  
19
 MIGUEL A. ALTIERI, K.M. ANDERSON, and L.C.  MERRICK, "Peasant Agriculture and the Conservation of Crop and 
Wild Plant Resources," Conservation Biology 1, no. 1, 1987. 
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value of fifty billion USD for all agricultural seed used worldwide, proprietary or not
20
. In 
developing countries, the importance of seed exchange networks and re-use is seemingly more 
enhanced, as an estimated eigthy per cent of the seed used in the early 1980s was farmer-saved 
seed
21
. With the advent of genetics and genomics science, the primary agricultural input that are 
seeds have started to also be developed off farm and delivered by plant breeders, and 
increasingly molecular biologists. Conventional plant breeders, by combining interesting genetic 
resources in lengthy and tedious research programmes, deliver new plant varieties with greater 
productivity rates, abiotic or biotic stress resistances, and even longer shelf life. They do so by 
relying on a constant input of both improved and traditional varieties to meet the latest challenges 
of food supply, even though they tend to predominantly rely on proven market successes and 
stable varieties
22
. But they also build upon material and knowledge that is publicly available and 
has been developed and maintained through informal channels and different communities. It has 
for instance been shown that Turkish wheat landraces have supplied genes used for stem 
nematode, bunt and hessian fly resistance but also for stripe rust resistance
23
. In a parallel fashion, 
a study conducted in 2000 showed that seventy one per cent of screened biotechnology patents had 
citations originating solely at publicly funded scientific institutions, universities, medical 
schools, or research institutes, corroborating the reliance on publicly available knowledge in even 
the most recent plant improvement models
24
. Just as traditional farming systems wholly rely on 
nature and its inherent variability in order to produce foodstuff, modern agricultural input 
production also depends upon the constant use and regeneration of PGRFA. All plant 
improvement actors extensively build upon the public domain, even the integrated genetic 
engineering giants with impressive intellectual property (“IP”) portfolios. 
 Adverse regulatory trends: disregard and failures of legal structures in certain socio-B.
technological innovation contexts 
The research and development investment-heavy industry that was gradually built upon the use 
of agrobiodiversity has rapidly expanded since the major biotechnology breakthroughs in the 
1980s. Markets relying upon biological diversity as raw material today amount to benefits that 
reach five hundred billion USD annually
25
. This share has expanded not only with new 
technological opportunities such as hybridisation, molecular precision breeding or genetic 
engineering, but also through the deliberate withdrawal of the public sector from so-called 
“applied research” endeavours. With the advent of modern genetics and genomics science, the 
development of plant varieties has become an increasingly knowledge-intensive activity. It 
exponentially depends not only on the use of tangible genetic material, but also on the access to 
                                                                    
 
20
 TON GROOSMAN, ANITA R. LINNEMANN, and HOLKE S.M. WIEREMA, Technology Development and Changing Seed 
Supply Systems: Seminar Proceedings, 22-23 June 1988: Development Research Institute (IVO), 1988. 
21
 CARL PRAY and BBARAT RAMASWAMI, A Framework for Seed Policy Analysis in Developing Countries  
Washington D.C.: International Food Policy Research Institute, 1991. 
22
 TIMOTHY SWANSON, Global Action for Biodiversity, an International Framework for Implementing the Convention 
on Biological Diversity London: Earthscan, 1997, pp.73-75. 
23
 JACK KLOPPENBURG, First the Seed: The Political Economy of Plant Biotechnology 1492-2000  Madison: 
University of Wisconsin Press, 2004, pp.167-168. 
24
 This study was conducted on 2334 biotechnology patents, which had 23,286 NPR on their front pages, see 
McMILLAN et al, 2000,  
25
 This estimate was drawn in 1999 for all sectors concerned with biodiversity, including agriculture but also the 
pharmaceutical and other industries; See KATE  TEN KATE and SARAH A. LAIRD, The Commercial Use of Biodiversity: 
Access to Genetic Resources and Benefit-Sharing  London: Earthscan, 1999, p.1. 
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 new breeding or genetic manipulation techniques, molecular research tools, and requires colossal 
financial investments. However, plant improvement remains void of inherent protection 
mechanisms and natural lead-time contraction. Furthermore, seeds are of self-reproducing nature
26
 
and are accompanied by inherent dilemmas attached to the production of informational public 
goods
27
.  
As a result, regulatory action ought to be taken in order to reward research results and avoid 
speedy copying. To cater such needs, intellectual property rights in the form of temporary 
exclusive prerogatives were awarded to the products and processes of plant breeding. The property 
layers that ensued resulted on the one hand from the “emulation” of need-specific protection 
regimes, i.e. plant variety or breeders’ rights, mainly designed to protect stable and uniform plant 
varieties, and from the “accretion” or expansion of traditional patent protection scopes to cater the 
needs of biotechnology on the other
28
. All traditional IPR operate an intricate balance between the 
grant of monopoly rights and the safeguarding of the public domain, between private reward and 
collective good. However, both the international reification29 and the implementation of strong IPR 
instruments have distorted this inherent balance for certain agrobiodiversity users, significantly yet 
separately raising the costs relevant to the creation and development of inventions
30
. With the 
adoption of the World Trade Organisation-linked Agreement on Trade Related Intellectual 
Property rights (TRIPS) in 1994, a strong intellectual property paradigm was legally reified 
through minimal protection standards responding mostly to the needs of molecular biology and 
gene technology. This paradigm, enshrined in the Agreement’s article 27§3b, has clearly helped 
develop knowledge on biodiversity and improved farming practices, albeit limited to a specific 
kind of knowledge, all the while raising new environmental and socio-economic issues. More 
significantly, its content and implementation have undermined and expunged existing practices of 
certain plant improvement actors. Great pressure has been put on conventional plant breeders 
relying on generous and wide-ranged biodiversity inputs (from the pool of existing domesticated 
seeds or from landraces), on the public research sector favouring greater public domain 
approaches, and at last on traditional farmers operating through informal seed exchanges. In 
particular, the strong property paradigm has raised new challenges to the breeders’ and 
researchers’ sacrosanct freedom to operate, notably because the essential research and breeding 
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exemptions have been increasingly obfuscated both in patents and plant variety right protection 
regimes. In parallel, farmers, smaller-scaled organic breeders and gardeners’ seed exchange 
networks have gradually been pushed towards forced illegality with their landraces, not only 
through ever-widening intellectual property protection scopes, but also by stringent seed marketing 
regulations.  
 Self-regulatory coping strategies and emerging practices: towards the re-adjustment of C.
the strong property paradigm and re-appropriation of the public domain 
In reaction to the enactment, legal reification and implementation of a strong intellectual property 
paradigm, certain agrobiodiversity users have strived to preserve their public domain-oriented 
practices. In particular, some key social actors have built coping strategies and self-regulatory 
proposals in concrete networks to overcome the hindrances created by the dominant property 
paradigm on their plant innovation model. In the field of molecular biology, a number of 
companies or public initiatives have for instance set up voluntary licensing schemes to the benefit 
of certain actors, whether private persons with lower income or companies established in least 
developed countries, like in the case of the Rockefeller led “African Agricultural technology 
foundation”, which shares patented technologies freely31. On another front, conventional plant 
breeders have reiterated numerous times their attachment to the breeders’ exception in plant-
related IPR. Plantum, the Dutch seed association has for instance very openly advocated an 
extensive approach to the exception in plant variety protection (just as to a lesser extent the 
European and French seed associations)
32
, while the necessity of acknowledging such an exception 
in patent protection has even been recognised in the International Seed Federation’s new 2012 
Rules on Intellectual Property
33
. With regards to farmers’ innovation, the United Kingdom based 
gardening and seed exchange network “Real Seeds” has for instance constituted itself as a private 
members’ club in order to continue its activities aimed primarily at the conservation of 
agrobiodiversity and revival of heirloom vegetables, all the while avoiding unfair competition or 
IPR infringement claims, positioning itself clearly outside the boundaries of the quality, uniformity 
and productivity-seeking formal seed market.  
However, these self-regulatory solutions will not suffice to rebalance the high protectionist regime. 
What may be needed is therefore a rebalance of exclusivity and access to agrobiodiversity related 
products and processes through formal legal change, broad public policies and governance 
initiatives. In light of increasingly constraining regulatory contexts, the social innovation practices 
of all agrobiodiversity users will need to be supported by adequate policy. Such support has 
arguably already been ignited, and its groundwork can be found in international environmental 
law. The different uses of agrobiodiversity, which all provide major benefits for humankind, have 
been regulated through global international environmental and agricultural law agreements that 
aim to support these practices, around the general principles of environmental equity and 
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 sustainability. These instruments, namely the Convention on Biological Diversity (CBD) and the 
FAO International Treaty on Plant Genetic Resources for Food and Agriculture (ITPGRFA) 
formally broadcasted the need to use genetic resources sustainably. They in parallel addressed 
these resources’ property regime, constructed around sovereignty, traditional knowledge, farmers’ 
rights and benefit sharing obligations. These idioms constitue both opportunities to draw a more 
equitable and sustainable agrobiodiversity public domain, and also significant threats to its viable 
constitution, if interpreted in a restrictively protective fashion. Indeed, policies have been applying 
an “eye for an eye” approach to protect national resources and local users, further commodifying 
and enclosing the informational goods used by all agrobiodiversity users, in order to counter the 
trends that have done so beforehand so as to support burgeoning seed industries.  
 Hypothesis and research design D.
The basis assumption of this thesis is that the incentives that are awarded to creativity and 
innovativeness should in principle enable the widest range of development and use of new genetic 
diversity, while ensuring equity and sustainability considerations have been duly complied with. 
As a legal approach focused on the adequacy of regulation vis-à-vis agrobiodiversity innovation 
chains, it shall operate a triangulating analysis of the exclusive rights granted over innovative or 
new products and processes that are part of the technological contexts of agrobiodiversity 
innovation, the corresponding socio-economic and technological contexts of such innovation, and 
at last the practices of social actors that use, conserve and improve genetic resources within the 
regulatory regime and in very different concrete innovation contexts. A first expected outcome of 
this methodology lies in the identification of situations of best and worst paradigmatic fit of the 
dominant interpretation of the property paradigm as applied in OECD countries vis-à-vis concrete 
innovation contexts and to analyse social innovations that have been developed to overcome some 
of the failures of the paradigm. The second indirect outcome of our approach would be to analyse 
potential concepts that would be a point of convergence for a broad set of social innovations, 
within the diversity of new emergent interpretations. This endeavour would avoid the present 
fragmentation between the different socio-technological contexts and their corresponding actors, 
for instance between mass selection and public biotechnology research, which are at first sight 
quite different from one another and currently not seen as building a common alternative, but 
which both suffer from the developmental paradigm. The pluralistic public domain appears to be 
such a converging concept, albeit in its different layers, whether through an extensive 
interpretation of the third-party user rights it concedes within exclusivity regimes, or through a 
broad negative construction of products and processes that do not comply with the strict conditions 
under which protection could be granted. In its effort to reclaim the balance between monopoly 
and the public domain within IPR regimes in accordance with the needs of all agrobiodiversity 
users, our research will be grounded on the normative practices of those actors who rely more 
greatly on the public domain and the availability of wild, domesticated and improved genetic 
material and associated knowledge. The method is embedded in the tradition of historical and 
sociological institutionalism, the ontology of which embraces an evolutionary stance on both 
formal and informal rules that govern social interaction
34
. Its efficiency stems from the 
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accompanying process of understanding actors’ preferences and offering the opportunity to 
reinforce agrobiodiversity use actors’ coping strategies and emerging practices legally and through 
public policy.  
The key objective of this thesis is to seek pathways to adjust the agrobiodiversity property 
paradigm starting from the coping strategies and normative practices of agrobiodiversity users who 
contribute to the conservation and sustainable use of agrobiodiversity while heavily relying on the 
public domain in their plant related technology or variety development process. Our key 
hypothesis is that in order to operate such an adjustment, a double constraint has to be satisfied, in 
that the negative consequences of the developmental paradigm need to be overcome for each 
category of actors of agrobiodiversity use, and that such adjustment needs to operate in a different 
way for farmers, conventional plant breeders, and public biotechnology or molecular biology 
researchers. This differentiation is attributed to the extremely diverse social, economic and 
technological features of plant innovation operated by these stakeholder-user groups. 
Consequently, drafting a unique solution to the shortcomings of the property paradigm will 
unescapably reduce its bearing to the support of certain politically active stakeholders. For this 
purpose, the preferences of all concrete actors of agrobiodiversity innovations will not be assumed 
exogenously, but shall be considered endogenously as well, determining what they “are trying to 
maximise and why they emphasise certain goals over others”35, assuming in parallel that these 
preferences may fluctuate “as they continuously adapt to the changing socio-economic 
environment and critically (re-) evaluate common practices and established institutions when 
exposed to new information or ideas”36 . 
We argue that the challenge rests in outlining an array of resolutions that corresponds to the 
technological features of innovation operated by agrobiodiversity users groups, and will foster 
their activities adequately, owing to regional, national, or local needs. To this end, agrobiodiversity 
conservation and use stakeholders will be defined in accordance with the different socio-
technological contexts of agrobiodiversity innovation they operate in, underscoring the common 
needs and informal social norms that bring them together. Some of these actors are, to different 
extents, disregarded by the strong property paradigm:  
 Public agricultural biotechnology or molecular biology researchers operating upstream basic 
or applied research (which is thenceforth infused into breeding programmes to enable time, 
accuracy and aptitude gains), within publicly funded institutions, who rely on enlarged access 
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 to genetic material and research tools, and who act upon informal norms of communalism and 
interdependence. 
 Conventional plant breeders operating methodical crosses to develop stable and improved 
plant varieties, within private or public structures, who rely on access to a wide range of 
(mostly pre-characterised) plant diversity in their research and development programmes, 
including the historical contributions to international public agricultural research, and who are 
consequently sturdily attached to the public domain hedged by the breeders’ exception present 
in intellectual property rights. 
 Farmers, gardeners and low-input plant breeders operating mass selection to develop 
heterogeneous landrace populations, within traditional or contemporary local or smaller-scaled 
communities, who rely on informal norms surrounding access and exchange to seeds with the 
major goal of cultivating and preserving agrobiodiversity rather than commercialising new 
plant varieties. 
To assess the impact of the IP regime on the agrobiodiversity use practices of these actors, we will 
first attempt to better define the boundaries of the public domain and property rights with regards 
to plant genetic resources and associated processes set out in traditional and currently applicable 
intellectual property rights instruments. Chiefly on account of the minimum standards set out by 
the TRIPS Agreement, the extensive approach to the allocation of rights over plant-related 
inventions has started in developed nations and spread to developing countries, which are 
growingly enacting standardised legislation. This geographical extension has however been 
already thoroughly studied in the literature, identifying the mismatch of the dominant property 
paradigm with local needs37. That is why our research will seek to identify the regulatory regime 
applicable in OECD countries, along with the contextual shortcomings created in such “advanced” 
plant improvement sectors where all agrobiodiversity innovation actors are actively present. By 
grounding our analysis in such manner, we wish to highlight that inadequacies may and do exist in 
different socio-technological plant innovation contexts, notwithstanding the level of economic 
development of a given country (a factor that will however highly influence the prioritisation of 
domestic regulatory objectives). Our positive law analysis will thus be mainly embedded within 
European Union (“EU”) law, along with some midly comparative examples from the United 
States. Our research shall nonetheless draw arbitrarily a number of examples from around the 
globe to highlight existing social innovations, as well as the interesting attempts of other domestic 
legislators’ to take international obligations, social, cultural, technological and economic 
considerations, including industry powerplays into account.  
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Our study shall therefore start by procuring the tenets of the strong intellectual property paradigm 
and its enclosure mechanisms propelled by international trade law, which predominantly govern 
agrobiodiversity innovation today, and its implementation in the European Union (PART I).  
Drawing on a historical and socio-technological account of plant improvement mechanisms and 
innovation contexts, we shall then identify the categories of actors who conserve, use and improve 
genetic resources, accessing proprietary and un-proprietary material or knowledge, and highlight 
the actors who heavily draw their inspiration, knowledge and tools from the public domain (PART 
II).  
The analysis will subsequently confront the strong intellectual property paradigm with those 
identified actors of plant improvement, illustrating the impact of enclosure mechanisms on defined 
agrobiodiversity conservation and use groups, and highlighting experienced paradigmatic failures 
or partial deficiencies (PART III).  
On the basis of such diagnosis and in order to analyse social innovation solutions to the prevailing 
failures of the strong property paradigm for each of the actor categories, we shall examine those 
regulatory tools carved by international environmental law that attempt to rebuild or merely 
reshape the public domain of agrobiodiversity (PART IV).  
This exercise will thereon help us ponder on and gauge social organisational innovation, coping 
strategies and emerging actor practices which make use of the inherent flexibilities of intellectual 
property rights, and which reclaim through this course an ostensibly more relaxed public domain 
built to achieve sustainable and equitable crop improvement (PART V).  
As the illustrations of these coping mechanisms and flexible endeabours inherently stand outside 
of any jurisdictional system, the adjustment solutions set out in this section will not be limited to 
the European Union legal order or to its existing specific agrobiodiversity user groups. The 
principal aim of this research is indeed to provide both agrobiodiversity user groups and domestic 
regulators with tools to mould regulatory tools that take the entire array of plant improvement 
actors and their accompanying socio-technological innovation contexts into account. Given the 
powers at play, especially the proven ability of certain stakeholders and agrobiodiversity users that 
positively benefit from the implementation of a strong and uniform property paradigm in the world 
seed trade, this exercise will hopefully offer roadmaps towards more balanced, contextualised and 
well-matched support of plant innovation and seed marketing regulation at national level.  
 13 
 PART I.  AGROBIODIVERSITY PUBLIC DOMAIN AND ENCLOSURE : THE 
STRONG INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY PARADIGM 
Plant improvement practices conserve, use and create agrobiodiversity, thereby triggering major 
benefits for humankind. They depend on the access to and use of the tangible and intangible 
features of genetic resources. Regulatory tools increasingly redefine dominion over the resources 
themselves, their components or related production processes, regulating the production of 
informational and biological public goods. Opportunities for the appropriation of the incorporeal 
features of agrobiodiversity have essentially surfaced with the development of novel market 
products and the growing importance of the informational components of genetic resources. 
Various intellectual property rights awarded to innovators have as a result restricted the public 
domain traditionally surrounding biodiversity
38
. IPR instruments, designed as temporary privileges 
awarding artificial lead-time to innovators, have expanded to the realm of living organisms. They 
protect and affect the plethora of actors involved in all plant improvement activities, which 
otherwise would face informational public goods dilemma in a context of easy reverse 
engineering. These temporary privileges are traditionally accompanied by inbuilt balances that 
compensate the grant of socially undesirable monopolies over useful innovations. Like all property 
endowment systems, they operate a delicate equilibrium between the benefits of enclosure and the 
social costs of exclusivity. This equilibrium has been notoriously reified at the international arena 
through the contentious enactment of Article 27§3b of the TRIPS Agreement, which solidified the 
inherent balance between exclusivity and open access, between monopoly rights and the public 
domain, arguably trumping the latter through a product development-oriented approach. 
Accordingly, a strong intellectual property paradigm emerged, characterised by the official advent 
of IPR on living organisms, layered exclusivity tools and strict market regulation linking a 
particular variety or technology to a specific actor, with extensive controls over the distribution of 
biological material in the marketplace.  
For the purpose of our analysis, the informational public domain will be defined in the footsteps of 
James BOYLE
39
, as the “outside of the intellectual property system, the material that is free for all 
to use and build upon”40. It will be approached in a broad and negative fashion, as the whole 
sphere of creativity and inventiveness that is not covered by individual, collective or sovereign 
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rights. This sphere will embody the domain purposefully left outside the reach of recognised 
exclusive rights, as a result of the limits put on the realm and protection scope awarded to right-
holders, or through the in-built diffusion mechanisms that may take for instance the form of 
liability rules
41
. As we envisage it, the informational public domain regroups the whole array of 
public domains created either structurally and negatively, the ontological public domain for which 
no exclusive rights have been awarded, just as it encompasses the regulatory public domain, 
purposefully set outside the boundaries of exclusive appropriation by laws and regulations such as 
subject-matter exclusions, the temporal public domain that is constituted at the end of protection 
terms, and last but not least, the assented public domain, where rightholders have purposefully 
renounced to exclusivity over  their creations or inventions42.  
In order to exhaustively portray the enclosures and disclosures that fence the agrobiodiversity 
public domain that finds its origins in intellectual property law, we shall first delve upon the 
inherent balance that is traditionally built by these property rights, between the urge to protect 
innovations on the one hand and the concern to diffuse them on the other (Chapter 1). After 
having converged on the international reification and extension of agrobiodiversity intellectual 
property rights into a virtually unilaterally imposed strong paradigm (Chapter 2), we shall finally 
appoint further considerations to the exact substance of prerogatives and obligations deriving from 
plant-related intellectual property rights, i.e. mainly patents and plant variety rights in the 
European Union (Chapter 3). 
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  CHAPTER 1:  BALANCING THE PUBLIC DOMAIN IN INTELLECTUAL 1.
PROPERTY RIGHTS ON LIVING ORGANISMS OR PROCESSES 
The stimulus of scientific knowledge and technological change is indispensable to mould technical 
solutions to the problems observed on farm, in shelves or all other stages of the food production or 
distribution mechanisms. However, the process of innovation itself does not solely rely on 
scientific progress. It also heavily depends on the institutions surrounding, endorsing or levelling 
technological improvements
43
. Relying on the premise that market based licensing negotiations do 
lead to social net benefit, by producing the optimum quantity and quality of products at optimum 
prices
44
, the main rights and obligations that have been shaped around innovation aim at granting 
artificial lead-time to innovators, especially those who develop easily reverse-engineered 
products. Improved seeds in this context embody inherent obstacles to the natural procurement of 
lead-time by those actors having invested colossal financial and human means to research and 
development activities, notably on account of the seeds’ self-reproducing nature45. They remain 
void of inherent protection mechanisms strong enough to reward research results and avoid speedy 
copying. Furthermore, the public good character of the information generated through the 
characterisation of genetic resources and all subsequent research and development activities 
carried out with and on these resources, generating further diversity within the global agricultural 
gene pool, also demands for regulatory action in order to maintain adequate production levels
46
. In 
light of these features, regulatory intervention to grant artificial monopoly rights is deemed 
inevitable to foster innovation and thus promote sustainable agricultural production, as well as 
economic and human development. Institutional frameworks drive social and economic 
development
47
. Intellectual property rights are in this sense viewed as the quanta of innovation, as 
highlighted by Adam HOLBROOK
48
. 
Prior to the end of the 20
th
 century, IPR instruments had nonetheless traditionally received 
relatively little consideration in the world of agricultural biodiversity, enabling public and private 
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breeders alike to freely use, improve and commercialise genetic material and new plant varieties, 
without fear of third party infringement suits
49
. In contrast, the national and international 
agricultural research centres having led the Green Revolution
50
 today face an "increasingly 
pervasive ownership of intellectual property rights", which require gleaming new caution in 
research operations
51
. These rights have been assigned through various international agreements 
and national laws, which have been constructed around private and exclusive rights regimes, 
where “individuals can exclude other from the benefit of their property”, rather than common 
property approaches, where the collective body’s members each have separate entitlements but 
“no one user has the right to abuse or dispose of the property”52. The limited supply of genetic 
resources and the growing importance allocated to their informational character, along with the 
desire to provide incentives for their commercial exploitation, have all influenced the choice of 
private property against common property regimes. Exclusive prerogatives are however a double-
edged sword; as they may enhance “dynamic efficiency” through the incentives awarded for 
innovation, while also may potentially undermine “static efficiency” by placing too much market 
power in the hands of the innovator
53
. In Mayo Collaborative Services v. Prometheus 
Laboratories, the United States Supreme Court brilliantly illustrated the delicate thread upon 
which the delineation of protection and exclusivity stand in all property regimes, be it copyright, 
patent or plant variety protection, as these regimes should be understood as  
“a two-edged sword”: while “the promise of exclusive rights provides monetary incentives 
lead to creation, invention, and discovery, […] that very exclusivity can impede the flow of 
information that might permit, indeed spur, invention”54.  
1.1. Why Balance Protection and Diffusion? Channelling the appraisal of public domains  
Private property rights are carved around protection rules, which grant exclusive monopoly 
rights
55
 to an individual as an incentive to create, innovate or market a product that is expensive to 
produce and easy to replicate. They are nonetheless also accompanied by diffusion rules, which 
compensate for the social cost of monopoly and preserve the public domain by minimising the 
restrictions surrounding the use of proprietary products by third parties, whether follow-on 
inventors or buyers. In all property endowment systems, an intricate balance needs to be struck 
between the individual and collective good. Between the economic and ecological benefits of 
crop improvement research on one hand and its social costs on the other. It needs to weigh in 
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 private reward on the one hand, granted through rules that protect innovations, and public interest 
on the other, guaranteed by rules enabling the diffusion of innovations
56
. The former protection 
rules delineate the rights awarded to the titleholder, whether as rights to exclude others from using 
the invention, or rights to authorise certain uses. The latter diffusion mechanisms allow third 
parties to have access to the protected intangibles in certain circumstances, whether these are 
statutorily determined (such as publication requirements or formal use exceptions) or need to be 
negotiated further in a bilateral fashion. The award of exclusive rights over creative works or 
innovative products should, within a wider perspective of global social welfare and equity, always 
stand conditional to a fair amount of opportunities to benefit from the creation or innovation itself, 
and from the natural resources used in the process. It should stand conditional to the creation and 
maintenance of a sound public domain, fenced by both the scope of protection delineating the 
object of protection and extent of monopoly rights, but also by the scope of diffusion mechanisms 
as well, since these are inherently designed as compensation for legal exclusivity. Both protection 
and diffusion should thus be seen as means to define the contours of the public domain in 
intellectual property rights, building both a “commons that set off against the fences that delimit 
the interests of individual rights holders” in James BOYLE’s understanding, and also a “sanctuary 
conferring affirmative protection against the forces of private appropriation that threaten 
[individual creative] expression” in David LANGE’s understanding57. The prerogative allocation 
game is in its essence anchored within the greater debate around  
“the scope of the public domain and the extent of exclusive private rights in information, 
[at the centre of the] battle over the shape of institutional ecology [confronting two 
competing] modes of information production”, the increasingly industrial model and the 
non-proprietary production scheme
58
. 
If imbalances exist between protection and diffusion rules, the incentives to create or innovate 
found in ownership regimes bear the risk of transforming into “teleologies of intellectual property 
maximalism"
59
. It flares the threat of under-producing public goods caused by 
“hyperownership”60, surrounding the access to a single genetic resource with numerous actors 
with diverging rights and obligations. In the state where agrobiodiversity stands today, both 
legislation and practice corroborate the cumulative recourse to various IPR tools, mostly in the 
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form of patents and plant variety rights
61
. Absolute certification requirements which link a single 
applicant to distribution rights pertaining to a particular plant variety
62
, without any time 
limitations, may also be viewed as an additional appropriation tool, as “quasi intellectual property 
rights” that in practice reinforce those exclusive titles that are awarded on stricter conditions and 
rationale
63
. The impact of such seed certification mechanisms is heightened by the fact that they 
are designed to cover all commercialised plant varieties, whether these are protected through IPR 
titles or not, questioning whether quasi-IPR have actually become even stronger than IPR. At any 
rate, maximalist enclosure approaches are only (or mainly) concerned with the low cost of (illicit) 
reproduction of the creation, pushing for stronger rights upstream. They sturdily disregard negative 
counter-effects vis-à-vis downstream production opportunities, which can mainly be caused by the 
restrictive limits and high costs surrounding the access to raw material, creating an under-
producing "anti-commons" landscape
64
. The ultimate challenge in this debate comes forth by the 
disparity between marginal private returns created through monopoly rewards and the social 
returns, which should, but in reality may not, coincide. The assessment of transaction costs and 
distributional effects of exclusive rights over informational resources accordingly constitute the 
greatest unsolved balancing puzzle in doctrinal debates both in economic, legal and political 
theory. Indeed, prudence and even hostility over the ability of strong patent protection to foster 
innovation dates back to the 1960’s, even before its reification in the international trade order65. 
Stemming from non-governmental organisations but also from academic circles, the main 
apprehensions vis-à-vis appropriation underline the fundamental importance of the diffusion of 
knowledge for progress, research and innovation, which finds itself battered against the red tape of 
intellectual property systems. Critics have not only spurred over the extensional tendencies of 
intangibles' appropriation regimes, but have also been expressed over their mere existence and 
their globalisation
66
. While proponents of enclosure ensure that "private property saves lives"
67
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 and also safeguards appropriate research and development investment, others assert that limited 
monopolies could "impede follow-on innovation and create barriers to entry"
68
. 
Provisional privileges granting extended control over different components of agricultural 
biodiversity have been steadily invading crop improvement chains. They have been viewed as an 
important driver of innovation and open information, mostly based on the theory of incomplete 
capture of the social value of information commons
69
. By maximising economic utility and 
creating a market for knowledge and information goods, intellectual property rights cater the need 
for social efficiency in the allocation of resources, ensuring that truly valuable information goods 
are created
70
. However, they may also be critically viewed as "a grab bag of rights, powers, 
privileges and immunities held together by nothing stronger than nominalism"
71
, or as a reification 
process “imposing duties, restricting freedom and inflicting burdens” on individuals72. 
Notwithstanding inherent notional disputes, all justifications of IP monopoly adopt various degrees 
of social justice and equity considerations. They all unequivocally support the essential need for 
balance in the recognition of exclusive rights. Whether rooted in the recognition itself of rights, or 
on their implementation by rightholders, numerous limits surround industrial property titles73. 
Temporary privileges exceptionally procure exclusive rights over physically un-appropriable 
intangibles, but as compensation, they also constrain monopoly rights in time, and provide 
additional conditions or exceptions ensuring the innovation or creation's use in specific 
circumstances. The greatest bargain over the control of living organisms is struck between the 
extent of enclosure and reach of disclosure in intellectual property rights and other forms of 
proprietary or semi-proprietary control. And the greatest difficulty in this bargain stems from the 
nature of the good itself, as a private good that produces tangible and informational public goods 
with intergenerational and interregional dimensions74. 
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1.2. Why protect? Private reward, innovation incentives and the tragedy of the commons 
Having started as censorship tools and privileges distributed by the realm in order to finance 
warfare or other pursuits, intellectual property rights are today justified either on utilitarian 
grounds as a means to foster innovation and thus economic growth, as a Lockean natural right 
linked to the right to liberty, or rather anchored around Rawlsian theories of justice
75
. Fiery 
doctrinal debates have surrounded the justification, enforcement and internationalisation of 
intellectual property rights. Ownership, defined as the “sum of duties, privileges and mutualities 
which bind the owners to the object and to each other”76, can be understood through different 
approaches. Within a traditional utilitarian approach, the legitimacy of intellectual protection 
stems from the necessity to maximise net social welfare. Here balance should be struck between 
the stimulation of creative endeavours through the recognition of exclusive rights on the one hand, 
and the widespread enjoyment of creative or innovative products by tools offsetting overly 
monopolistic tendencies on the other
77
. Another justification stems from Lockean labour theory, 
which asserts that the addition of labour into common resources validates the recognition of 
natural exclusive property rights as long as "enough and as good" resources are left "in common to 
others"
78
. Other rationale include the personality and human needs theory inspired by the likes of 
Hegel and Kant, whereby highly expressive intellectual activities ought to be formally recognised 
and valued. The "social planning" theory considers that loose intellectual property rights are 
needed and can be used to create a robust and pluralist society
79
. In economic theory, property 
rights are traditionally viewed as means to internalise the external costs and benefits conferred to a 
party through others’ actions, in order to fully capture the social value of one’s action and thereby 
grant optimal incentives to act
80
. In this context, intellectual property rights create an “artiﬁcial 
scarcity through temporary monopoly rights granted by the state as an incentive to fuel innovations 
that are in the interest of the public”81. Regardless of the wide array of justifications that surround 
intellectual property prerogatives
82
, two main elements of plant innovation lay in the heart of their 
challenging parallel enclosure and disclosure needs, i.e. their informational public good character 
and the ease of reverse engineering. 
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 1.2.1. Informational public goods 
Intellectual property rights do not appoint their affiliated bundle of rights and prerogatives on 
physical or tangible objects, but rather target “intellectual creations as such, [applying] to pieces of 
knowledge or information that belong to a special category of goods called ‘public goods’”83. 
Seeds embody an inherent duality, as they are not only commercial commodities in their own 
right, but they also constitute an instrument for technology transfer through their informational 
public good nature
84
, which farmers and breeders alike seek to improve daily. First and foremost, 
their cultivation produces numerous public goods, including but not limited to ecosystem 
resistance and resilience increases, or the maintenance of cultural preferences85. Seeds are not only 
the tangible inputs for agricultural production or tangible outputs of research and development, 
they also directly contain knowledge that represents the key inputs for further R&D for the 
titleholder, licensees or third parties, as potential sources of innovation. Science-based controlled 
plant breeding and the subsequent support it received from molecular biology have heightened the 
dual reality of plant genetic diversity
86
. Plant breeding has indeed become an increasingly 
knowledge-based activity. The informational component of agricultural biodiversity has become 
both the input and the output of its production process. The information generated through the 
characterisation of genetic resources and all subsequent research carried out on and with these 
resources, retains the nature of a public good, being purely non-rival and partially non-excludable 
once it is produced, thus requiring regulatory involvement in order to maintain adequate 
production levels
87
. Information flows indeed suffer from inherent uncertainty and 
indivisibility paradoxes, since information’s value cannot be determined without acquiring it, 
which can nonetheless be done without or with very little cost
88, and that the “very use of 
information in any productive way is bound to reveal it”89.  
These paradoxes create bottlenecks for the optimal allocation of resources, as information 
becomes a commodity that cannot be simply sold on the open market without prior negotiation. 
They drag an information use monopoly in the hands of the original possessor that is in reality 
socially inefficient, having contributed very little to the development of such information, or even 
perhaps not at all
90
. Vis-à-vis public goods, intellectual property rights have often been seen in 
economic theory as a means to escape what has been commonly referred to as the “tragedy of the 
commons”, ever since the publication of the ground-breaking article by the same name91. The 
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grant of ownership is to be viewed as an attempt to solve the so-called ‘free-rider’ problem, 
whereby no sufficient incentive to contribute to protection or creation efforts would exist if the 
enjoyment of these efforts’ benefits were not to be restricted, hampering at length with the 
production and supply of the public goods
92
. International regulation has exponentially spurred in 
fields related to the ‘global commons’, whose traditional res nullius status (and the consequent 
absence of private appropriation) seemed to have been slowly shelved away in favour of the 
concession of jurisdiction, sovereignty and property over such resources and their intangible 
content. This development has been compared to the 'enclosure movement', which established 
private land property through fencing and regulatory tools
93
. The constriction of the "public 
domain", whether defined as those materials not subject to material or intellectual appropriation 
(within a characterisation effort), or those owned by the public (within a more general property 
approach)
94
, was considered to be the only means for efficient management of land, but also 
informational resources, such as genetic resources. Exclusive prerogatives that surround 
agrobiodiversity therefore stem from the “classical” public goods problem that is inherent to the 
management of PGRFA
95
. 
1.2.2. Reverse engineering and the grant of artificial lead-time 
Owing to the technological developments infused into crop improvement by genetics and 
genomics science, seeds cannot today be merely viewed as inputs for agricultural production. 
Genetic resources also represent the key input of agricultural research and development activities, 
as a potential source of innovation. Both Schumpeterian creative destruction and biology-grounded 
“adaptative destruction” theories call in this context for innovative response mechanisms, because 
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 of the too-rapid obsolescence of commercial or ecological successes, which disallow market 
actors to "stand still"
96
. Continuous innovation is thus an imperative necessity for crop 
improvement and indirectly, food security
97
. The inherent feature of agricultural genetic resources 
that allows for the accelerated selection and improvement of varieties, i.e. the biological transfer of 
traits or desirable characteristics by sexual reproduction, may thus very well act against the 
creation and dissemination of this new genetic diversity's potential social and environmental 
benefits. Reverse engineering often proves too easy in the world of plant breeding, since 
competitors have an unfettered ability to appropriate the fruits of costly investment through merely 
trivial efforts
98
. Therefore, the developer of those innovations who continues to significantly 
contribute to social welfare, sustainable or more productive agricultural production, may actually 
be quickly driven out of the market through the sale of the same or excessively similar products at 
considerably lower prices. Their competitors indeed need not recoup substantial research costs but 
rather merely need to recover the trivial duplication expenditure before commercialising “copied” 
or “excessively inspired” plant varieties.  
Science-based and investment-heavy crop genetic improvement activities fall thus unfortunately 
short in terms of natural lead-time contraction. Reverse engineering of plant-related innovations 
indeed remains simpler than most other technologies and has become significantly easier through 
the development of biotechnological tools enabling scientists to understand and reach organisms at 
their barest levels
99
. Molecular biology has rendered the resort to plagiaristic breeding less costly 
and time-consuming, as varieties can be screened and “opened” much more easily than ever. 
Agrobiodiversity innovation thus remains void of inherent protection mechanisms strong enough 
to reward research results and avoid speedy copying, with the notable exception of hybrids, where 
saved seeds do not perform as well as the original seed released by the breeder. Especially in the 
case of self-pollinating crops where hybrids have generally been less developed, “a small sample 
of a new variety can be multiplied or bulked up in a short time at a low cost”100. The benefits 
generated by investments towards research and development activities in controlled plant breeding 
are are a result usually un-appropriable, or if they are, their collection remains very inexact, 
threatening to lead towards sub-optimal levels of investment without regulatory intervention
101
. 
Artificial lead-time thus needs to be awarded to initial product developers by regulatory tools in 
order to ensure the production of agrobiodiversity innovations that are socially important and 
generate public goods. Such lead-time has traditionally been conferred through the recognition of 
exclusive privileges defining one’s control over the innovation’s use and re-use conditions. The 
traditional economic defence of intellectual property rights builds upon such premise, 
acknowledging that in their absence, “inventions or creations with potentially great social benefit 
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might be delayed or might never come about at all, [… while also allowing the] maximisation of 
the social benefit that can be derived from the invention by creating value that survives the 
disclosure of the invention”102.   
Many factors may hinder the intensification of research and development, such as biological 
constraints in the controlled hybridisation process. This was for instance the case of former tomato 
breeding research, where the extremely labour-intensive necessities of deliberate sexual crossing 
led to sky-rocketing seed prices but to yield gains significantly less impressive than those 
experienced in corn for instance. Even so, weak intellectual property rights are considered 
frontrunners in the range of culprits for innovation obstruction. Their existence and efficient 
enforcement draws in a direct contribution as to the expectation of successful financial returns. 
They are viewed as a variable reducing the astounding costs attributed to sophisticated genomics 
research and development activities. These costs rise to around one hundred million USD for the 
introduction of a biotech-recombined trait into the market, from the trait's initial generation to its 
optimisation, its field trials, registration and initial marketing efforts
103
. These gargantuan 
investments are usually recouped by annual gross returns from sales, but the compensatory 
contribution of their intellectual property rights within sales figures cannot be overlooked. The 
incentive to innovate stands here at the level of the promise of a royalty check if the new variety is 
effectively used. This promise is realised through a strong set of properly enforced intellectual 
property rights.  
“Where cutting edge and easy to imitate technologies are at stake, such is the case of 
biotechnology, and where ‘tacit’ non-codified knowledge is an essential component of the 
technology package, [technology] transfer is more likely to take place if it is bundled with 
patents or other IPRs”104.  
The complex and time-consuming nature of IPR enforcement cases may nonetheless lead to sub-
optimal levels of investment in agrobiodiversity research from the private sector
105
. A recent court 
case in the Milano district in Italy, concerned with the illegal reproduction of the lettuce variety 
Ballerina RZ, ruled for two hundred thousand EUR damages from the illicit sales and unjustified 
profit stemming from the unauthorised reproduction of seeds and their sale under a different 
commercial name, six years after the facts of the case
106
. The existence of stronger enforcement 
mechanisms, such as centralised royalty collection systems, has in this context proven to 
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 considerably propel private sector involvement in research and development, by 
externalising the often times discouragingly high transactional, but also reputational costs of IPR 
enforcement post commercialisation, factors that have led companies out of certain research areas 
in the past, such as wheat
107
.  
In light of the uncapturable nature of genetic resources, the production dilemmas caused by such 
nature, the relative ease with which inventions that are costly to develop can be copied, and the 
strong incentive created by promised exclusivity over the fate of such inventions, robust 
intellectual property protection seems to be called for in the context of plant improvement.  
1.3. Why diffuse? Public interest, disclosure and third party uses  
Even the traditional strong “patent-induced invention” theory, which conditions innovative action 
to the grant of exclusive rights over the fate of its outcomes, recognises that such exclusivity 
comes at many costs. This is especially true seeing that the benefit of invention stimulus “is 
reduced by the fact that these grants do limit the full productive use of these inventions”108. 
Confronted to the strong impetus to protect the products of agrobiodiversity innovation, the need 
to set limits to commodification appears necessary and inherent to the construction of “scarcity of 
use” with regards to resources or ideas that are not in essence necessarily rivalrous, like 
knowledge
109. Boundaries ought in this sense to be built between the “property interest embodied 
in an intangible res” and the public domain, in order to avoid impediments to creativity or 
innovativeness by “encroachments” to the latter110. As opposed to classical private property, 
intellectual property remains inherently omnipresent once granted, as it “cannot be limited to a 
particular physical body incorporating the right, [it is rather] attached to all material or virtual 
occurrences of the protected work”111. This far-reaching potential is considerably enhanced in the 
field of biotechnology, since “there is a significant amount of ‘information character’ to a genomic 
invention”, opening an alarming and social cost-heavy door to a monopoly on an “infinite number 
of possible applications”112. Especially in cumulative (and therefore not stand-alone) innovation,  
“secondary inventions, including essential design improvements, refinements, and 
adaptations to various uses, often play as great a role in providing social benefits as the 
initial discovery. Patent law must ensure the diffusion of current innovations and the 
development of future innovation by enabling follow-on inventors to secure rights on 
improvements and build upon innovations in their entirety within a relatively short period of 
time”113.  
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To this end, IP regimes “moderate their exclusionary principles with limitations and exceptions 
[that are] in part designed to construct a public domain of resources and in part support uses that 
generate socially beneficial spillovers”114. These spillovers, traditionally ill-viewed externalities of 
enclosure, have conversely been considered to bear positive impacts, as “external benefits [that] 
are a ubiquitous boon to society”, in a context where “it is impossible to exclude competitors or 
other researchers entirely from the intellectual benefits of an innovation”115. This viewpoint bears 
strong arguments in favour of enclosure, but it advocates an enclosure that is inherently construed 
so as to maintain its externalities and inherent innovation diffusion mechanisms. Therefore, as a 
counterpart of exclusive monopoly rights, all institutions protecting intangibles contain carefully 
framed rules ensuring enough accommodation for social justice. Accordingly, all intellectual 
property regimes offer limited protection in time, while specific flexibilities are included within 
each category of rights.  
1.3.1. Social Compensation for Enclosure and Monopoly rights 
The enclosure stemming from intellectual property rights therefore establishes inherent limits to 
the reach of protection, most straightforwardly set out in the time boundaries and the revelation 
of the invention to the public, in order to ensure follow-on innovators to develop new socially 
beneficial products. IPR constructs, by encouraging the inventor who controls the fate of the 
invention to disclose the innovative knowledge, offer social compensation for the incorporeal 
enclosure they create. The grant of reward for innovation is indeed not only limited in time, but it 
is also always accompanied by the publication of the innovation, accessible through the claim 
documents for patents, or through the application dossier containing phenotypic observations and 
field trials results in the case of plant variety protection. The limitation of monopoly in time, as 
well as the access to primary information on the innovation indeed allows other innovators to build 
on or build around socially useful innovations, creating new socially useful products or methods. 
The construction of a solid public domain is vital for inspiration, which has always been an 
undeniably immense and unstoppable fuel for human creativity but also inventiveness, in its 
holiest understanding
116
. It is vital for all creative and innovative endeavours, whether it entails 
access to the products or processes themselves at the end of a protection period, or whether it 
connects users and improvers to technical information linked to their existence.  
Patents, probably the strongest of informational proprietary rights, not only avoid underinvestment 
in costly but socially beneficiary research and development activities, but also prevent the 
detrimental withholding of knowledge
117
. When the development and dissemination of 
innovations present high commercial interest, such as research tools, companies may be more 
likely to resort to trade secrecy than to dedicate their innovation to the public domain in the 
absence of patent or other statutory protection
118
. For instance, certain national practices as to 
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 patentability requirements, which consider the publication of research results in academic 
journals as "prior art", have often times been viewed as counter-innovative, pushing for greater 
resort to trade secrecy within companies' or universities' IP strategy in early stages of research and 
development
119
. This practice may as a result block information that would have typically been 
shared and could have potentially been utilised by other researchers and produce socially useful 
innovations. The argument built around the need to avoid trade secrets is nonetheless less 
prevalent in plant variety protection, since the element of disclosure is also present at the moment 
of marketing, especially in countries where seed certification is based on very similar criteria. 
Notwithstanding this temperament, the disclosure of the innovation or new plant variety does still 
generate spillovers that are beneficial to society, compensating for the creation of market 
exclusivity. Since “the technical aspects of patents are made known, others are free to incorporate 
the information into new inventions that do not violate the patent claim”120. Keith MASKUS adds 
that “the narrower the claim, the easier it is to invent around the patent”, raising the contentious 
issue of patent breadth to ensure that strong IPR titles do not run counter to their initial objectives. 
Even though the disclosure element of plant variety protection is less strict than patents, it stills 
provides at least “a description of the genealogy and breeding procedure, when known”121. The 
various disclosure elements found in IPR legislation are grounded on the premise that the 
relaxation of the artificial monopoly will “drastically change the incentives for an incumbent to 
license its technology to potential [market] entrants”, triggering greater technology transfer122.  
1.3.2. Use-specific considerations and extensions of the public domain 
Absolute permission rules delineate informational property titles. To this effect, the permission of 
the monopoly-owner ought to be sought for using the protected information. Exclusive rights to 
exclude third parties from using the innovation nonetheless bear the risk of raising the cost of 
knowledge through licensing fees, creating excessive monopolisation and patent thickets, thereby 
distorting the patterns of production. In order to balance the extensive rights awarded to 
innovators, In-built balances have often been crafted as liability rules
123
, and also reflected in the 
controversial yet imperative concept of “compulsory licensing”. Arguably, regulatory intervention 
carving all these third party uses aims at enhancing the free flow of ideas, and indirectly 
recognises that “intellectual activity is not creation ex nihilo”124, refusing the attribution of full 
market value to a single innovator and allowing society to benefit from the invention and its 
spillovers. The interpretations favoured with regards to the scope of protections granted through 
IPR regimes and the inherent limitations to the bundle of exclusive rights awarded to right holders 
                                                                    
 
119
 RM CUMMINGS, "Some Aspects of Trade Secrets and Their Protection: The Public Domain and the Unified 
Description Requirement," Ky. LJ 54, 1965. 
120
 KEITH MASKUS, Intellectual Property Rights in the Global Economy  Washington DC: Institute for International 
Economics, 2000, p.41. 
121
 7 U.S.C. 2422, Section 52, emphasis added, see JULIAN M ALSTON and RAYMOND J VENNER, "The Effects of the 
Us Plant Variety Protection Act on Wheat Genetic Improvement," Research Policy 31, no. 4, 2002. This requirement 
only calls for enough disclosure to enable a skilled artisan to "identify" the new variety and distinguish it from others, 
MARK D JANIS and JAY P KESAN, "Us Plant Variety Protection: Sound and Fury," Hous. L. Rev. 39, 2002. 
122
 ASHISH ARORA, ANDREA FOSFURI, and ALFONSO GAMBARDELLA, "Markets for Technology and Their Implications 
for Corporate Strategy," Industrial and corporate change 10, no. 2, 2001. 
123
 Understood in a hybrid approach between the traditional doctrine regarding them as protection mechanisms 
stemming from the law of torts that involve a collective decision as to the value of the entitlement (see footnote 26 
supra).  
124
 HETTINGER, "Justifying Intellectual Property," op.cit.,  p.38.  
PART I Conclusions: The AgrobiodiversityPublic Domain in Intellectual Property legislation 
 
 28 
will reveal the extent to which our societies foster creativity while ensuring pluralism, equality and 
welfare. Within copyrights law one finds the first sale doctrine, preventing control over subsequent 
movements of the protected material, and educational exemptions
125
. In this context, infringers 
should “not be punished for exercising their imagination [but] for failing to exercise their 
imagination, for failing to add any imaginative content to the copied material”126. Copyrights in 
parallel also retain the extremely versatile fair use doctrine, which not only serves as an alleviating 
force against market failures, or as a mediation tool between exclusivity and freedom of speech, 
but also operates as a bargaining facilitator between the right holder and the potential users
127
. 
Different sets of liability rules, in accordance to which the entitlement can be used without 
permission so long as adequate compensation in granted later, in parallel also embody the 
specificity of cumulative plant breeding innovation
128
. Two possibilities surround the use of the 
plant-related innovation by third parties, whether breeders, researchers or growers. While the first 
set of possibilities are rather inscribed within the legal regimes as such, as prospectively 
undeniable statutory uses of the invention, such as the research exception or fair use doctrine; the 
second set of possibility requires the signature of a licensing agreement with the developer, 
standing out as a negotiated use of the invention. Both derive from the regulatory IPR 
environment, even though the latter retains a strictly more private nature, since no statutory 
boundaries exist as to the content of licensing agreements except for those set out by contracts law.  
The marginal social return of rewarding innovators through IPR is to have innovation available 
earlier than it would have been under trade secrets; whereas exclusive rights seem to be granted on 
the entire value of the innovation, and not only such marginal return
129
. The rising costs of access 
to information have been considered as a blockage not only against non-mercantile research 
activities but also to economic development as a whole. Indeed, it prevents developing countries 
from using the free-riding strategies used by developed countries to reach high stages of welfare 
before the crowning of strong IPR, propelling charges of "information feudalism"
130
. Indeed, 
successful “catch-up experiences” have been recorded in countries where IPR regimes allowed (or 
did not restrict too strictly) the ability of their companies to replicate technologies that had been 
developed in more developed countries
131
. The distributional consequences of extensive monopoly 
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 rights
132
 have triggered a reminiscence of feudal times in plant improvement innovation. 
Notwithstanding the inherent criticisms on the control of nature, the rising commodification and 
restrictive appropriation trend has grown exponentially in agrobiodiversity management. As 
aforementioned, there indeed exists an essential need to grant artificial lead time to plant 
innovators (whether farmers, breeders or microbiologists) through the award of IPR, in order to 
foster the development of improved varieties that are easily reverse-engineered, yet costly to 
develop. While on the other hand, it has gotten extremely difficult to use and re-use the pool of 
improved and protected material for cultivation, research or breeding purposes. This trend may 
have extremely detrimental effects within the majority of agrobiodiversity innovation chains that 
remain primarily incremental. Indeed, all intellectual property policy  
“should aim towards privatising only that range of invention that would be used effectively 
through allocation to a single rightholder, [while] invention that would be used most 
effectively through open access should be left in the public domain”133.  
Notwithstanding the need to carefully enclose the informational public goods created by plant 
imporevement efforts, the need to ensure concrete and certain opportunities to use these goods 
cannot be set-aside in cumulative innovation chains. The latter concern, which calls for a solid and 
wide public domain, has even been stretched so as to shake down the rationale behind the need to 
protect certain products under strict exclusivity.   
CONCLUSION. The notional balance between exclusive rights and the public domain 
Intellectual property instruments protect and support creative and innovative activities that do not 
necessarily lead to the development of tangible objects, but rather settle in intangible forms. These 
characteristics rule out the possibility of physical control over the products of the creative or 
innovative mind, begging for active legislative action to foster private sector involvement under a 
liberal economy. Such legislative action has commonly taken the form of exclusive yet limited 
rights to innovators and creators, ever since the grant of privileges in medieval times. In line with 
the complete range of philosophical theories justifying the existence of intellectual property 
regimes, balance needs to be struck between the promotion of creative endeavours and the access 
and enjoyment of the wider public to both the resources used and the final informational “product” 
created by innovative individuals. From the inherent need for protection to the actual scope of 
enacted regulatory tools, an intricate balance thus operates between exclusive rules of 
appropriation and those of diffusion, which are designed to alleviate the social cost of monopoly. 
Private reward and artificial lead-time rely in this context on rules of protection, which grant 
prerogatives to creative or innovative individuals to control the products of their ingenuity for a 
limited period. The social cost of monopoly is conversely lessened by rules enabling the diffusion 
                                                                                                                                                                                                                              
 
aggressive protection of intellectual property by the company in the advanced country”. ROBERTO MAZZOLENI and 
RICHARD R. NELSON, "Public Research Institutions and Economic Catch-Up," Research Policy 36, no. 10, 2007. 
132
 See for instance AOKI, "Neocolonialism, Anticommons Property and Biopiracy in the (Not So Brave) New World 
Order of International Intellectual Property Protection," op.cit.; and JEROME H. REICHMAN, "Charting the Collapse of 
the Patent- Copyright Dichotomy: Premises for a Restructured International Intellectual Property System," Cardozo 
Arts and Entertainment Law Journal 13, 1995.; or from the same author, "From Free Traders to Fair Followers: 
Global Competition under the Trips Agreement," New York University Journal of International Law and Politics 29, 
1997. 
133
 RAI, "Regulating Scientific Research: Intellectual Property Rights and the Norms of Science," op.cit.,  p.135. 
PART I Conclusions: The AgrobiodiversityPublic Domain in Intellectual Property legislation 
 
 30 
of innovations, setting the boundaries and opportunities for the use of the innovation by third 
parties. Both protection and diffusion rules delineate the public domain available for creators and 
innovators to build upon. They are inscribed in the conditions surrounding the grant of IP titles, 
but also in the scope and limits of rights awarded to the titleholder, whether as rights to exclude 
others from using the invention, or rights to authorise certain uses.  
The determination of the most equitable boundaries for intellectual property protection for 
successful agrobiodiversity use should not be solely perceived as one related to the extent of 
protection as such, but rather also as one of dissemination, allowing for socially useful innovations 
to fulfil their purpose and be productively used by the largest possible range of scientists, breeders 
and farmers. All intellectual property rights retain a number of constraints and obligations directly 
targeted towards the right holders, as a means to counterbalance the bundle of exclusive rights 
obtained through the award of the protection title. Indeed, restrictive exclusive rights that are 
attributed to a single physical or moral person are limited in time, while even the strongest patent 
protection systems remain based upon the disclosure of the innovation. Certain inherent 
mechanisms will also allow third parties to have access to protected intangibles, whether in 
statutorily determined circumstances (such as publication requirements or formal use exceptions) 
or through bilateral negotiations. The inherent balances embodied in the ontology of intellectual 
property have nonetheless been put to the test of international reification, and have unfortunately 
led to a clear bias for developmental arguments embedded in protection and enclosure rules. 
Follow-on uses of plant material or plant breeding techniques by farmers, breeders and scientists 
alike, have become remarkably complex on account of the growing number of property titles and 
the extensive nature of prerogatives bestowed upon biological material or breeding techniques.
 
 CHAPTER 2:  DISPROVING THE PUBLIC DOMAIN THROUGH THE STRONG 2.
PROPERTY PARADIGM  
The seed market essentially deals with the trade of tangible goods that are produced by the actors 
of different innovation contexts. Trade regulations thus first and foremost address the seed packs 
that identify the species or the plant variety that are the object of commercial transactions. 
However, in light of the specificities of the products, i.e. their self-replicating nature, and of the 
investments required in research and development, regulation has concomitantly taken the path of 
granting artificial lead-time in the form of exclusive rights in order to foster innovation. The 
temporary privileges set out by IPR directly influence “competitiveness, the pace and focus of 
innovation, and affordable access to new technologies, knowledge or creative works”, both within 
and between national legal orders
134
. The relative simplicity of modern property rights, 
characterised by private property and contractual freedom, also make them easily tradable 
commodities in the global market, encouraging actors to look for competitive advantages
135
. The 
commodification of information and knowledge goods into forms of property actively “removes 
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 them from the sphere of social interactions, and places them in the realm of marketised 
interactions”136.  
Property rights over the intangible components of agrobiodiversity accordingly today complement 
almost all transactions that involve tangible agrobiodiversity goods, while having become a market 
in their own right as well. They form an additional and inescapable layer of formal seed markets. 
Trade-related regulatory instruments impact agrobiodiversity innovation contexts on two counts, 
through seed marketing laws and intellectual property rights legislation. Both apparatus have been 
dispensed in the international arena, respectively through the OECD Seed Schemes and the World 
Trade Organisation-backed Agreement on Trade-Related Intellectual Property Rights ("TRIPS"). 
Quite significantly, the latter has laid out the foundations of the strong intellectual property 
paradigm for plant innovation through its Article 27§3b. This paradigm is characterised by a 
combination of lenient patentability requirements on biological products and processes, coupled 
with strong plant variety rights stretching to harvested material and varieties essentially derived 
from protected phenotypes. The strong intellectual property paradigm is based on the need to grant 
artificial lead-time to developers and avoid the tragic fate of commons in the absence of 
proprietary delineation, while ensuring goods are traded in a cohesive and responsible market. But 
it also builds on the premise that exclusive rights ought to be “granted early on in the inventive 
process and should be very broad, so as to provide a hedge against competition and losses that 
would be incurred later if another company attempted to develop and commercialise the same 
invention”137. These prerogatives, which had started out as mere invention stimuli tools, have 
gradually become preventive commercial defence or strike mechanisms securing greater market 
control. While “intellectual property was tolerated in international trade as a private monopoly, it 
is now perceived by the companies controlling the major part of technology as the guarantor of 
this trade”138. The shift from mere tolerance into crucial vector manifests itself in the post 1980’s 
strong intellectual property paradigm, comprising of a complex web of bundled and essentially 
national rights and obligations, where protection scopes have been considerably expanded through 
the reification of minimal standards in the TRIPS Agreement.  
2.1. Tangible seed trade and certification schemes 
The most straightforward aspect of trade regulation that impacts agrobiodiversity innovation 
relates to the rules governing the marketplace where the tangible goods generated by the various 
innovation contexts are exchanged, either freely or for financial reward. In this context, 
“appropriate seed legislation at the national and regional levels is [considered] essential to create 
an enabling environment for the development of the seed sector”139. The law has as a result set the 
backdrop of conditions for the production and release of the agricultural inputs that are plant 
varieties, thereby dressing the contours of the national or global seed marketplace in order to 
resolve the inherently asymmetrical nature of information flows. Aside from regulation targeting 
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biosafety issues
140
 or seed production and packaging rules, the seed market is therefore essentially 
constructed around registration and certification requirements. Stringent seed certification 
schemes, which carve the formal seed market, impact the relationships between variety 
maintainers, producers, distributors and owners, and have also at times reduced the traditional 
fencing of the public domain with very stringent requirements and exclusivity over the fate of 
improved varieties. In plant improvement innovation chains, strong IPR have as a result been 
combined and enhanced through stringent seed market regulations. Propelled greatly at the 
international level by the “OECD Schemes for the Varietal Certification of Seed Moving in 
International Trade”, which aim to “promote the use of agriculture seed of consistently high 
quality”, seed certification marks the initial condition for entry into the market in most developed 
countries, and increasingly more various developing countries.  
2.1.1. Rationale of seed legislation: towards registration and certification 
While seed laws had already been enacted by the end of the 18
th
 century in Europe, the first 
certification attempts go back to the beginning of the 20
th
 century, as a means to control diseases 
in potato production, in order to stop the spread of breakdowns and important losses in the early 
1900’s141. The first certification rules were for instance enacted in 1888 in Sweden142, in 1934 in 
Germany
143
, where variety lists were kept as early as 1905, and in 1923 in the United Kingdom
144
. 
Certification was introduced in the USA in the 1960’s, as an answer to “the haphazard, inefficient 
and often inequitable basis” upon which new varieties developed by universities or public 
institutions were distributed
145
. Certification requirements are especially important for field crops, 
more particularly hybrid corn, where varieties have “traditionally been publicly released and their 
seed sold on the open market”, requiring greater control and maintenance of varietal identity146. 
The informal seed markets’ practice of “white bags”, untagged and unverified, was indeed not 
considered to reliably communicate the content of seed bags. Their quality was thus likely to be 
compromised, but according to certain commentators, “their proliferation [could have also] wiped 
out the formal sector supply because they were priced lower and did not include licensing and 
other technology fees”147. The choice of a regulated seed market would thus not only be directly 
towards transparency and quality control, but might also be an active political choice espousing a 
particular agrobiodiversity innovation context.  
                                                                    
 
140
 The World Trade Organization’s Agreements on Agriculture and on Technical Barriers to Trade or Sanitary or 
Phytosanitary Measures indeed impact seed trade. The WTO Agreement on Agriculture is as such not a seed or 
genetic resources-specific instrument, and rather essentially governs the trade of foodstuffs, whether harvested or 
processed. National phytosanitary requirements, especially for the screening of known diseases by plant protection 
agencies, as well as for treated seeds or genetically modified organisms that also need to comply with the terms of 
WTO SPS Agreement.  
141
 O. APPEL, "Vitality and Vitality Determination in Potatoes," Phytopathology 24, 1934. 
142
 R. TRIPP, Seed Provision and Agricultural Development: The Institutions of Rural Change  London: ODI, 2001. 
143
 H.W. RUTZ, "Seed Certification in the Federal Republic of Germany," Plant Varieties and Seed 3, no. 3, 1990. 
144
 A.F. KELLY and J.D.C. BOWRING, "The Development of Seed Certification in England and Wales," ibid. 
145
MILLER MCDONALD, "Seed Certification in the United States", available at 
http://seedbiology.osu.edu/HCS630_files/April%2010/Seed%20Certification%20USA,%20text.pdf  
146
 LARRY O. COPELAND and MILLER MCDONALD, "Seed Certification " Principles of Seed Science and Technology, 
no. pp.277-295., 1999. 
147
 SAKIKO FUKUDA-PARR, "Emergence and Global Spread of Gm Crops: Explaining the Role of Institutional 
Change," in The Gene Revolution: Gm Crops and Unequal Development, ed. SAKIKO  FUKUDA-PARR, London: 
Earthscan, p.203. 
CHAP. 2 Disproving Public Domain: The TRIPS-propelled Strong Property Paradigm 
33 
 Commonly based on the registration of varieties into a national or regional catalogue or registrar, 
seed marketing rules are a “quality assurance process, where seeds intended for domestic or 
international markets are controlled and inspected by official sources in order to guarantee 
consistent high quality for consumers”148. National seed lists put an ostensible focus on the 
identification of plant varieties and on performance pre-requisites for the global benefit of 
consumers and producers. They attempt to resolve the asymmetry of information flows between 
all actors involved (especially between the buyer and seller), which would create incentives for 
cheating and opportunistic behaviour if not addressed properly
149
. In order to take their place in the 
seed market, plant varieties and propagating material, whether imported or not, need as a result to 
comply with a number of criteria. These criteria depend on regional or national characteristics, but 
they all include examination or inspection procedures together with a maintenance clause, 
ensuring that the registered variety continues to be actively cultivated and maintained by at least 
one “maintainer”150. This approach ensures the variety remains available for all actors concerned, 
but also that it is adaptable to environmental changes
151
. In this context, certified seed should be 
produced using “pedigreed planting stock, careful quality control, field inspections during the 
growing season, and seed inspections following harvest”, and be viewed as “an officially 
recognised method for maintaining varietal identity of seed on the open market”152. The desire to 
regulate seed markets and ensure their swift functioning has also led to the establishment of 
standard quality criteria vis-à-vis products of agrobiodiversity innovation, and the construction of 
a clear chain of liability vis-à-vis actors involved in seed trade. Requirements are usually two-fold, 
first concerning the registration of varieties into national lists of cultivars, and second having 
regard to the certification of varieties as quality bearers. National seed laws determine the extent to 
which these two market regulations interact with each other and thereby influence the varieties 
offered to farmers and consumers. There are a number of regional attempts to harmonise formal 
seed systems regulation, such as the European Union’s Common Catalogue153 or the 
rationalisation efforts of Eastern and Central Africa
154
. These attempts all corroborate the 
increasingly important role of international standards in the establishment of an effective and 
                                                                    
 
148
 ORGANISATION FOR ECONOMIC COOPERATION AND DEVELOPMENT, "Oecd Seed Schemes: A Synthesis of 
International Regulatory Aspects That Affect Seed Trade", OECD, Paris, 2012.  
149
 Incentives to cheat are propelled by high information asymmetries and prevent the smooth functioning of markets, 
see FRIEDERIKE ALBERSMEIER et al., "The Reliability of Third-Party Certification in the Food Chain: From Checklists 
to Risk-Oriented Auditing," Food Control 20, no. 10, 2009: p.930., for an analysis of food certification schemes in 
general.  
150
 Such maintenance is for instance provided for in Article 11 of Brazilian Law Nº 10.711 on a National Seed and 
Seedling System dated as of August 5, 2003;  
151
 See for instance the argument made for the need to actively maintain one of the first high-yielding rice varieties 
that was released in 1966, IR8, coined “miracle rice”; SHAOBING PENG et al., "The Importance of Maintenance 
Breeding: A Case-Study of the First Miracle Rice Variety - Ir 8," Field Crops Research 119, 2010. 
152
 MCDONALD, op.cit., , and also MILLER MCDONALD and W.D. PARDEE, The Role of Seed Certification in the Seed 
Industry, ed. CROP SCIENCE SOCIETY OF AMERICA Madison1985. 
153
 See notably Council Directive 2002/53/EC of 13 June 2002 on the common catalogue of varieties of agricultural 
plant species, OJL 193, 20 July 2002, pp. 1-11. The European seed market is regulated by 12 different instruments: 
Council Directive 2002/55/EC of 13 June 2002 on the marketing of vegetable seeds, (OJL 193, 20 July 2002, pp. 33-
59), Directive 66/401/EEC regulates the marketing of fodder plant seed, Directive 66/402/EEC cereal seed, Directive 
2002/54/EC beet seed, Directive 2002/56/EC of seed potatoes, Directive 2002/57/EC seed of oil and fibre plants, 
Directive 2008/72/EC for material for the propagation of the vine, Directive 1998/56/EC for the marketing of 
propagating material of ornamental plants, Directive 92/33/EEC for vegetable material, other than seed, Directive 
2008/90/EC for fruit propagating material and fruit plants for fruit production, and finally Directive 1999/105/EC for 
the marketing of forest reproductive material.  
154
 MICHAEL WAITHAKA et al., "Impacts of an Improved Seed Policy Environment in Eastern and Central Africa", 
2011.  
PART I Conclusions: The AgrobiodiversityPublic Domain in Intellectual Property legislation 
 
 34 
transparent seed market, allowing their actors to easily trade their goods outside national or 
regional borders.  
Even though variety registration is unequivocally viewed as a prerequisite to certification, the 
latter may not be required for the entry of the variety into the market, although these two aspects 
do overlap in most developed countries. Seed distribution is indeed generally only allowed after 
certification procedures based on the distinctness, uniformity and stability of plant varieties (so-
called DUS testing), and the inclusion of either actors and/or varieties into official catalogues
155
. 
Seed certification, in its most traditional sense, encompasses notions of genetic improvement, and 
aims at facilitating “the provision of high quality seed from superior crop plants with similar 
genetic identity and purity”156. A number of seed marketing laws also include performance 
requirements, coined “value for cultivation and use of the variety”, based on yield, resistance to 
harmful organisms, response to the environment and quality characteristics, for instance regarding 
agricultural crops in the European Union’s Common Catalogue157. This approach to seed 
regulations stems from the standardisation of practices through international standards. Based 
upon the degree of variety purity, the production, conditioning and the overall quality of seed, 
centralised seed certification and quality control, should, in principle, be delegated to a legally 
sanctioned or chartered public or quasi-private institution
158
.  
2.1.2. Reification of stringent certification schemes through OECD efforts 
Seed registration, which marks the initial condition for entry into the market in most developed 
countries, and increasingly more various developing countries, has been greatly propelled by the 
“OECD Schemes for the Varietal Certification of Seed Moving in International Trade”, 
which aim to “promote the use of agriculture seed of consistently high quality”159. Negotiated in 
the 1960’s and gradually enacted for different species, the OECD Seed Schemes unwaveringly 
amended existing national legislation and triggered regulatory action in countries without effective 
frameworks that addressed seed quality. The first OECD scheme for the varietal certification of 
seed moving in international trade was adopted in 1958 and only concerned herbage seeds trade. It 
was adopted “amongst seventeen countries which wanted a minimum guaranteed level of varietal 
identity and purity in their international seed transactions”160. The minimum OECD standards for 
the control of forest reproductive material was for instance adopted in 1967, then quickly adapted 
in 1971, and were recommended by the FAO Panel of Experts on Forest Gene Resources as a 
model for countries adopting national seed certification schemes
161
. Adopted gradually for a wider 
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 range of species but also expanding their geographical reach, the compiled OECD schemes
162
 
now cover one hundred eighty five species and thirty three thousand varieties eligible for 
certification, throughout fifty-five participating countries. These instruments were also opened to 
non-OECD participants, and twenty-six of them have gradually joined in with the twenty nine 
OECD Members participating in the Schemes, even though all States do not participate for all 
species. For instance, only twenty-nine countries adhere and apply the Vegetables Schemes. 
Complaints for the non-execution of the Schemes may be lodged by a participating State to the 
Committee of Agriculture, which refers to issue to the OECD Council
163
. 
As for the content of these instruments, their focus clearly stays grounded on the identification of 
varieties and their quality. To this end, they set up official certification frameworks that extend 
to all stages of seed multiplication and set purity standards. They generally ensure that the OECD 
listed varieties have been registered in national official catalogues, thereby acknowledging this 
practice as a necessary first step towards certification, while assessing national grasp over 
procedures. Requiring the supply of official varietal description regarding essential morphological 
and physiological characters, the Schemes also entail an identity authentication process through 
field inspection, seed lots sampling and seed analysis. However, a number of regulatory 
differences persist between species, due to the specificities and relative successes of breeding 
efforts.  The OECD Grass and Legume Schemes for instance state that “tests mush establish that 
the variety is distinct and that its generations used for fodder production have sufficiently 
uniform and stable characters”164 (emphasis added).  
They should also establish that “the varieties have an acceptable value in at least one country”165. 
But not all agricultural goods are created equal and some have very seldom obtained complete 
genetic uniformity and predictability, making certification efforts not about purity but rather about 
identification. This is notably the case of trees, but also to a certain extent aromatic herbs. In 
parallel with those standards set out by the International Seed Testing Agency (“ISTA”)166, the 
schemes also set the criteria to be respected by authorities responsible for certification procedures. 
Most importantly, the Schemes establish an official guarantee of maintainer from breeder to 
farmer, which leads the Organisation to publish an extensive variety and maintainer database 
through its “Annual list of varieties eligible for OECD Certification”. The link between variety 
ownership and maintainer has become increasingly complex, especially since the OECD does not 
assume any responsibility in this regard
167
.  
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Addressing market imperfections and justified through social utility, seed market access 
regulations nevertheless establish excessive product testing and seed certification procedures in 
certain circumstances. This premise as a result may significantly increase the costs of 
commercialising the outputs of research and breeding efforts
168
. Furthermore, absolute 
certification requirements which link a single applicant to distribution rights pertaining to a 
particular variety
169
, without any time limitations, may be viewed as tools curtailing the PGRFA 
public domain. They may in practice reinforce the exclusive titles that are awarded on stricter 
conditions and rationale. The impact of such seed certification mechanisms is also heightened by 
the fact that they are designed to cover all commercialised plant varieties, whether these are 
protected through IPR titles or not, questioning whether these technical regulations have actually 
become even stronger than IPR. Indeed, there seems to be little or no consideration for farmers’ 
varieties in the general OECD Schemes. That is why the formerly applicable European seed 
legislation has been attacked because of its lack of legal recognition of seed exchange platforms, 
epitomised by the French case opposing Kokopelli to Graines Baumaux, which has been 
referenced by the Court of Nancy to the European Court of Justice in February 2011 (Case C-
59/11)
170
. The latter was asked to assess whether seed catalogues violated principles of the acquis 
communautaire related to the liberty of trade, free movement of goods, proportionality, equality 
and non-discrimination. Since the facts pertaining to this specific case that shall be thoroughly 
analysed in Chapter 9 of this study, the European Union has developed specific legislation on 
'conservation and amateur varieties', establishing derogations from the general principles of 
certification following the OECD approach to marketing requirements
171
.  
European seed legislation is undergoing an extensive review process and the 2013 draft for a 
Regulation on the “production and making available on the market of plant reproductive 
material”172 is at the time of writing still being discussed before the European Parliament after an 
initial rejection. Replacing twelve scattered Directives by one Regulation, the draft wishes to 
“adapt to the technical progress of plant breeding”, but also to “reduce the cost and administrative 
burdens and support innovation”, by overcoming the “uncertainties and discrepancies in the 
implementation” of existing complex and fragmented legislation, which create “an uneven playing 
field for professional operators on the single market”173. Even though the draft retains a number of 
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 derogatory provisions that we shall delve upon in the further course of this study, its main focus 
remains a strictly OECD approach oriented towards the productivity driven professional seed 
market and the facilitation of seed movement. 
The regulation of the tangible goods that are seeds to ensure their quality, purity and identity 
through both national and global seed registration and certification mechanisms have in effect 
launched and reinforced the formal seed sector. Seed quality assurance has become an important 
component of the vertically organised large-scale operation that is the formal seed system, along 
with variety development and release, seed production and seed marketing
174
.  
2.2. Minimal standards of strong intellectual property rights: the TRIPS Agreement 
As a legally defined intangible product of human activity, intellectual property provides “exclusive 
or erga omnes rights, i.e. a bundle of legally enforceable interests vested with their owner, who 
can oppose them against any third party”175. Traditionally, intellectual property rights “only 
protected human creativity in law” based on a clear distinction between the products of nature and 
human inventions
176
. This original standpoint rapidly evolved, and opened the doors to the 
appropriation of plant varieties, as well as biological material and processes. It should be noted 
that intellectual property rights do not exist outside of the legal structures that recognise and award 
them. They thus depend on the strength of their reification in national or international legal 
orders
177
, which formally and socially bring resources and related information into the market. 
They rest on important “political, economic and crucially ideological investments” to affect the 
process and content of international and national provisions fostering innovative endeavours
178
.  
It is in this context that “post-1980’s changes in intellectual property law [have not been driven by] 
primary arguments of traditional invention and disclosure, [but rather as a means] to ensure the 
efficient development and commercialisation of valuable property”179. Mostly in developed 
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countries, intellectual property legislation has navigated towards a commercial development and 
prospect-oriented enclosure model crowned by Edmund KITCH
180
.  
The most important step towards such direction was the 1980 so-called Bayh-Dole Act amending 
the United States Patent and Trademarks Law, with an objective “to promote the utilisation of 
inventions arising from federally supported research and development” (35 U.S.C. 200). It is 
rather the objective to encourage the distribution of innovative products that stands out here, rather 
than the more customary discourse focusing on the provision of incentives to innovate, thereby 
highlighting the active political will to increase the number of technologies licensed by the public 
to the private sector
181
. The current wrangling for patents witnessed in Universities worldwide as a 
result adamantly endorses the dominant discourse of the strong intellectual property paradigm, as 
exclusiveness tools favoured by both private and public entities alike in the brave new world trade 
order. Through this shift in the relationship between science and technology operated in parallel 
with an active regulatory push for lower government expenditure in applied research, national 
legislators have effectively built the groundwork for a strong property paradigm over knowledge 
goods. This foundation, and the associated novel approach to property, which was thereon directed 
towards the development and use of technology rather than a pure incentive to innovate
182
, were 
very quickly reified at the international level, infectiously reaching States that still approached 
research and property allocation, especially with regards to the life sciences, very differently. 
2.2.1. Linking intellectual property and trade 
The reification of intellectual property rights at the international level was realised through a 
lengthy and multi-faceted process characterised by an undefeatable linkage between international 
trade and the regulation of intellectual property, and by minimum protection standards determined 
through so-called “circles of consensus”183. These features made TRIPS “a coerced agreement that 
should be resisted rather than embraced”184, yet an inescapable reality for all agrobiodiversity 
innovation contexts. The Agreement on Trade Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights was 
incorporated as Annex 1C into the Marrakesh Agreement, which established the World Trade 
Organisation on 15 April 1994. The final text was adopted at the end of the so-called Uruguay 
Round working on the basis of the Global Agreements on Tariffs and Trade that were adopted in 
1947. In this context, the TRIPS Agreement is a full-ranged instrument taking integral part in 
arguably the strongest nest of international legal orders, encroaching farthest within the 
sovereignty of States, and it is best known as a package deal pushed by developed States. Prior to 
its adoption, a number of international instruments were already concerned with intellectual 
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 property
185
. They however regulated the domestic grant of temporary exclusive rights, setting 
legal standards or ensuring cooperation amongst States
186
. Indeed, under the provisos of the 1883 
Paris Convention on the Protection of Industrial Property for instance, Member States had “the 
freedom to subject the recognition of patents to the local exploitation of the invention, [in an 
understanding] that trade and patent protection were not necessarily related”187. The same 
principle also applied to the agrobiodiversity-specific intellectual property tool that are plant 
variety rights, constrained to the 1961 Convention of the Union for the Protection of New 
Varieties of Plants (UPOV), which did not provide for any links to international or transnational 
trade, but rather acted as a common denominator between national IP laws.  
The novelty of the TRIPS Agreement was to link intellectual property to international trade 
negotiations. Its main rationale was to establish the ground principles for a relatively 
unconstrained international exchange of goods and conditions for market access. This link was 
“imported” from national forums, especially that of the United States, which was already 
prescribing commercial sanctions if IPRs were not protected adequately
188
. By linking IP to trade, 
developed countries and their strong industry “underscored a strong relationship between high 
levels of IP protection and foreign investment”, which developing countries remain eager for, 
consequently becoming vulnerable to the agendas of the leveraged industry
189
. Even though 
developing countries initially fought against the overtrumping of the World Intellectual Property 
Organisation (WIPO), which would have been the most obvious choice for international IP 
standard setting, “the concept of the single undertaking of the Uruguay Round prevailed”190. The 
institutions deserted by this forum-shifting process were both the WIPO but also the United 
Nations Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD). The latter served as a forum for 
initiatives ensuring developing countries access to markets and technology transfer opportunities 
on the side-lines of IPR that were deemed unfavourable to developing countries
191
. This horizontal 
shift is attributed to strategic efforts of the United States to shift forums, i.e. “move a regulatory 
agenda from one organisation to another and other organisations”192. The choice of the trade order 
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was not made lightly. It allowed the TRIPS Agreement to “have teeth” by being linked to the 
WTO’s “hard-edged dispute settlement system in which treaty bargains are enforced through 
mandatory adjudication backed up by the threat of retaliatory sanctions”193. It also gave the future 
IP protection standards “fairly global coverage”, ensuring business units to “locate production 
anywhere in the world, safe in the knowledge that their IP would be protected”194. Supported by 
Europe, Canada and Japan, the United States successfully managed to put the issue of intellectual 
property as a negotiating point for the Uruguay round of trade talks ignited in 1986, creating in 
parallel the influential “Quad Group”, determining not only the forum of action but also the 
content of global IP standards.  
The involvement of the United States based Intellectual Property Committee and its counterparts 
from other members of the developing world in the negotiating process alone raised concerns
195
. 
The TRIPS Agreement has as a result been, and still is being virulently criticised as a post-
colonial imperialist instrument. Accordingly, the inclusion of intellectual property protection 
standards into the WTO legal order exemplifies the creativity through which “new mechanisms of 
accumulation by dispossession” have been steadily developed by dominating countries196. More 
recent commentators argue that the Agreement could rather be viewed as a neo-federalist regime, 
ensuring the resilience of the international intellectual property system by granting enough 
flexibility to WTO Members to take national priorities into account at the implementation stage
197
. 
Notwithstanding such range of action, the TRIPS Agreement marks a turning point in the 
conception of intellectual property both in the enterprise and society, as exclusive titles, which 
were formerly tolerated in international commerce as a private monopoly, are now perceived as a 
warrantor of such trade by companies developing competitive technology198.  
Whether post-colonial or neo-federalist, the success of forum shopping practices and of the WTO 
order’s retaliation power is illustrated by the appraisal of intellectual property rights in all 
other relevant international instruments, especially those targeting sustainability and equity 
concerns, which we shall tackle in Part IV of this study. It has become inescapable. Indeed, even 
the Convention on Biological Diversity (CBD) recognises the  
“need for adequate and effective protection of intellectual property rights”, even though 
these rights ought to remain “supportive of and not run counter” to the CBD system’s 
objectives (CBD, Article 16 §§2 and 5).  
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 In parallel, the Multilateral System established under the FAO International Treaty on Plant 
Genetic Resources for Food and Agriculture (ITPGRFA) states that  
“access to PGRFA protected by intellectual and other property rights shall be consistent 
with relevant international agreements, and with relevant national laws”, while technology 
transfer shall operate “on terms which recognise and are consistent with the adequate and 
effective protection of IPR” (ITPGRFA, respectively Article 12§3 (f), and 13§2(b)).  
Its success is also present in the change of the content of the strong intellectual property paradigm, 
enlarging the scope of protection in accordance with the interests of a powerful few. 
2.2.2. Developing a new paradigm in IPR on living organisms 
The contentious nature of the TRIPS Agreement does not only stem from its negotiation process 
and the choice of the retaliation accompanied trade fora. It also significantly draws upon the 
reified content in itself, as a top-down collection of minimal standards considerably extending 
protection scopes, established amongst a luckily powerful few. The Agreement furthermore 
operated a clear shift from the customary state of IP protection, ironing out the major differences 
that existed between national approaches, even though it still left enough room for accommodation 
at the stage of national implementation. In this context, “revisionist readings of TRIPS’ 
negotiating history now stress the power-based bargaining strategies that industrialised countries 
employed to coerce developing states into agreeing to treaty terms about which they had little 
understanding, let alone meaningful input”199. Much has indeed been written on the gradually 
informal groups or circles of consensus where legal provisions were actually drafted and 
negotiated, making the TRIPS Agreement a “hierarchical rather than democratic management of 
law-making”200.  
This new breed of international IPR regulation does not necessarily address “all of the issues 
raised by the grant of legal protection to intellectual property products”, and is therefore often 
referred to as "minimum standards" agreement, as a “basic floor of legal protection to which all 
Member States must adhere” 201. In this regard, the TRIPS Agreement states that its  
“Members shall give effect to the provisions of this Agreement. Members may, but shall not 
be obliged to, implement in their law more extensive protection than is required by this 
Agreement, provided that such protection does not contravene the provisions of this 
Agreement. Members shall be free to determine the appropriate method of implementing 
the provisions of this Agreement within their own legal system and practice” (TRIPS, 
Article 1§1).  
In light of the process of reification itself and its quasi-unilateral imposition on developing nations, 
the minimal protection standards set out by TRIPS have broken off with 19
th
 century tradition, 
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where the harmonisation of standards was traditionally a bottom-up approach bringing together 
common elements of “protection and discrimination”, to the benefit of enacting overarching 
minimal requirements
202. Commentators further argued that the TRIPS Agreement did “not reflect 
a harmonisation that had already occurred at the national level”203. In the post-colonial era, many 
new colonised countries enacted legislation that “still closely resembled earlier colonial laws, 
except for reactionary responses in the Americas and in Asia, where reformist efforts had “tailored 
IP laws to national priorities”204. International or regional IP standards-setting institutions and 
treaties date as far back as the 19
th
 century and were at the time merely assigned to industrial 
innovation or to creative works, precluding or only timidly allowing their extension to living 
organisms. The major shift in informational property rights to extend to biological material was 
witnessed in the mid-20
th
 century mostly in developed countries, on account of technological 
developments and their prevailing agricultural innovation structure
205
. The TRIPS Agreement 
generalised the extension of patent protection scope at least to non-biological processes and 
compounds, transforming it into a minimal international obligation for those States desiring to 
participate in the world trade order’s battlefield at the same level as others. It has “been one of the 
triggers for the introduction of life patents” in national orders where this option was not recognised 
to agrobiodiversity innovators
206
.  
The adoption of the TRIPS Agreement should therefore be acknowledged as a major turning 
point for plant improvement innovation, since its dispositions made the recourse to IPR in plant 
breeding not only a reality, but also an international legal obligation. Article 27§3b indeed states 
that  
“its "Members [should] provide for the protection of plant varieties either by patents or by 
an effective sui generis system or by any combination thereof", as well as acknowledging 
the patentable nature of essentially non-biological and microbiological processes. Indeed, 
Members may also exclude from patentability […] (b) plants and animals other than 
micro-organisms, and essentially biological processes for the production of plants or 
animals other than non-biological and microbiological processes” (TRIPS, Article 
27§3b). 
This provision sets out the contours of a strong intellectual property paradigm in agrobiodiversity 
innovation, restricted only in its terms by Article 27§§ 1 and 2, which sets out the general principle 
of patentability for novel, inventive and non-obvious inventions capable of industrial applications, 
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 while also setting up the conditions to be respected by Member States to exclude certain 
inventions from said principles
207
.  Indeed,  
“1.    Subject to the provisions of paragraphs 2 and 3, patents shall be available for any 
inventions, whether products or processes, in all fields of technology, provided that they 
are new, involve an inventive step and are capable of industrial application. (5) Subject to 
paragraph 4 of Article 65, paragraph 8 of Article 70 and paragraph 3 of this Article, 
patents shall be available and patent rights enjoyable without discrimination as to the 
place of invention, the field of technology and whether products are imported or locally 
produced. 
2. Members may exclude from patentability inventions, the prevention within their territory 
of the commercial exploitation of which is necessary to protect ordre public or morality, 
including to protect human, animal or plant life or health or to avoid serious prejudice to 
the environment, provided that such exclusion is not made merely because the exploitation 
is prohibited by their law” (TRIPS Agreement, Art. 27§§1-2). 
In this context, WTO Member States need to amend their national IP legislation if necessary, in 
order to provide artificial lead-time at least for plant varieties, micro-organisms, non-biological 
and microbiological processes. Plant varieties should also be protected through an “effective sui 
generis system”, which is not defined in the Agreement. The negotiating history does not provide 
clear guidance either as to such “effectiveness” gauge208. The legal system set out under the 
auspices of the Union for the Protection of New Varieties of Plants (UPOV), has nonetheless in 
this regard been advocated as the primary regime complying with such threshold. First enacted in 
1961, and amended in 1974, 1978 and 1991, the UPOV Convention in effect illustrates the relative 
flexibility but also the strengthening of plant variety protection. Indeed, countries had in the past 
the choice to apply and adhere to their preferred text, but now need to comply with the stricter 
terms of the 1991 text if they want to become part of the international organisation. Even though 
“there have been attempts to interpret the sui generis option as being limited to the UPOV model, 
[…] developing countries do have the possibility to devise an alternative model”209. Indeed, the 
establishment of a sui generis system for the protection of traditional knowledge and the rights of 
indigenous communities
210
 may very well fall into Article 27’s requirements, just as other 
alternatives experimenting with breeders’ rights outside the realm of the UPOV Conventions211.  
The Agreement also allows States to act discretionally in the interpretation of its provisions, 
carefully drafted to allow for such flexibility, even though a worrying trend has emerged in 
bilateral trade agreements that tend to include so-called “TRIPS-plus” provisions that stretch 
beyond the realm of the reified paradigm
212
. These features exemplify what has been called the 
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“limited discretion” of Member States: the flexible opportunities we view as the main prospect for 
fine-tuning agrobiodiversity related IPRs to the needs of all relevant innovation contexts. The 
same discretion that allows States to reach further than the minimal standards of the international 
agreement, along with the inherent manoeuvre margin left within the content of such standards, 
may indeed very well, if efficiently exploited, redress the sensed and experienced inequalities from 
the TRIPS invasion in domestic IPR legislation.  The Agreement does provide for a number of 
such diffusion-oriented flexibilities. In certain circumstances, the mere disclosure of protected 
innovations or the publication of creative works may not be sufficient to diffuse innovations and 
compensate for the excessive monopoly cost. This feature was recognised by the TRIPS 
Agreement in its Article 7, which allows its Members to  
“adopt measures necessary to protect public health and nutrition; and to promote the 
public interest in sectors of vital importance to their socio-economic and technological 
development, provided that such measures are consistent with the provisions of this 
Agreement” (TRIPS, Art.7).  
These measures may reveal restrictions directly targeting the rules of protection themselves, 
carving out exclusions to such protection (as it has been accepted for patents on biological matter), 
but they also may, and generally do, target the range of exclusive rights granted to innovators, in 
an attempt to set boundaries to their prerogatives. Indeed, intellectual property rights  
“should contribute to the promotion of technological innovation and to the transfer and 
dissemination of technology […] in a manner conducive to social and economic 
welfare”213. Article 8 goes on to state, “appropriate measures, provided that they are 
consistent with the provisions of this Agreement, may be needed to prevent the abuse of 
intellectual property rights by right holders or the resort to practices which unreasonably 
restrain trade or adversely affect the international transfer of technology” (TRIPS, Art. 8).  
According to the minimal protection standard set out by the TRIPS Agreement, additional 
diffusion tools should therefore be built in different intellectual property instruments. With 
specific regards to patents, the TRIPS Agreement acknowledges for instance in its Article 30 that 
exceptions may be carved around exclusive rights to  
“provide limited exceptions to the exclusive rights conferred by a patent, provided that 
such exceptions do not unreasonably conflict with a normal exploitation of the patent and 
do not unreasonably prejudice the legitimate interests of the patent owner, taking account 
of the legitimate interests of third parties” (TRIPS, Article 30).   
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 In-built balances of intellectual property rights have also been reflected in the controversial yet 
imperative concept of “compulsory licensing” enshrined in TRIPS Article 31. Indeed, “other uses 
without the authorisation of the right holder” are provided for notably in cases of national 
emergency or public non-commercial uses, but also when the “reasonable commercial terms and 
conditions” offered by the third party are refused by the right holder. Compulsory licensing 
opportunities arise around numerous conditions that ought to be respected as a counterpart to the 
“transgression” of the artificial lead-time granted to innovators: 
Where the law of a Member allows for other use (7) of the subject matter of a patent 
without the authorisation of the right holder, including use by the government or third 
parties authorised by the government, the following provisions shall be respected: 
(a) authorisation of such use shall be considered on its individual merits; 
(b) such use may only be permitted if, prior to such use, the proposed user has made efforts 
to obtain authorisation from the right holder on reasonable commercial terms and 
conditions and that such efforts have not been successful within a reasonable period of 
time. This requirement may be waived by a Member in the case of a national emergency or 
other circumstances of extreme urgency or in cases of public non-commercial use.[…] 
(c) the scope and duration of such use shall be limited to the purpose for which it was 
authorised, and in the case of semi-conductor technology shall only be for public non-
commercial use or to remedy a practice determined after judicial or administrative process 
to be anti-competitive; 
(d) such use shall be non-exclusive; 
(e) such use shall be non-assignable, except with that part of the enterprise or goodwill 
which enjoys such use; 
(f) any such use shall be authorized predominantly for the supply of the domestic market of 
the Member authorizing such use; […] 
(h) the right holder shall be paid adequate remuneration in the circumstances of each case, 
taking into account the economic value of the authorization;[…] 
(k) Members are not obliged to apply the conditions set forth in subparagraphs (b) and (f) 
where such use is permitted to remedy a practice determined after judicial or 
administrative process to be anti-competitive. The need to correct anti-competitive 
practices may be taken into account in determining the amount of remuneration in such 
cases. Competent authorities shall have the authority to refuse termination of authorization 
if and when the conditions which led to such authorization are likely to recur” (TRIPS, 
Article 31). 
Notwithstansing its provisions designed to ensure the balance between exclusivity and openness, 
the TRIPS Agreement comes about as an imposed bargain with levied extensive protection 
principles offering varying yet complex degrees of flexibility as a product of horizontal forum 
shifting strategies led by developed nations and powerful industry players. The Agreement 
effectively pushed for significant legislative and ethical changes in many legal orders, as most 
developing countries did not allow for the patenting of life forms and seeds before their entry into 
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the WTO order
214
. In this sense, it may have failed to promote cultural diversity by inadequately 
setting the balance between producers and user of knowledge goods, thereby failing to adequately 
represent the values and rationale of any IPR system
215. It is precisely these “distributive 
inequities” inherent to the TRIPS regime that have been vehemently disapproved, purposefully 
setting aside other forms of knowledge that may present a more community-oriented and free-
exchange-based outlook on innovation, especially with regards to agricultural or indigenous 
communities
216
.  
CONCLUSION. The Minimal Multi-layered Intellectual Property Protection Paradigm 
Most of the intervention targeting the inherent conundrums lagging private investment in plant 
improvement has been vested in intellectual property tools, for which minimal standards of 
protection have been reified at the international scale. Within a World Trade Organization and 
TRIPS governed international context, plant variety rights, patents and other informational 
proprietary mechanisms, such as trademarks or other public domain restricting tools like seed 
certification schemes may and do protect products and processes that stem from diverse contexts 
of agrobiodiversity innovation, or are used by their actors.  
These tools defined a stricter public domain for human inventiveness and creativity in plant 
innovation; a public domain that has taken another hit through stringent seed market regulations 
and certification mechanisms linking a variety’s future to a specific actor. Epitomised by the 
minimum standards set out in Article 27§3b of the TRIPS Agreement, the strong property 
paradigm is exemplified through different layers of protection on products and processes used in 
plant improvement. These layers consist inter alia of an effective sui generis plant variety rights 
protection scheme next to patents, awarded at minima to microorganisms, and to non-essentially 
biological processes. These informational monopolies have been complemented by seed 
certification requirements, which aim to overcome the informational imbalance between the 
consumer and producer, and have been tightened by the advent of compulsory certification 
fostering the development of improved and uniform plant varieties in a transparent and 
competitive marketplace. The striking feature of this paradigm has been the unequivocal linkage of 
regulatory solutions to the assymetrical information flows in seeds, and the lack of artificial lead-
time in the hands of innovators, with international trade. Such linkage, imposed by developed 
nations, whether in the immediate context of the OECD and the non self-evident yet valuable 
context of the WTO, has tremendously reinforced the reach of a product development and trade 
oriented approach to agrobiodiversity innovation.  
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  CHAPTER 3: PLANT-RELATED INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS: PATENTS 3.
AND SUI GENERIS PROTECTION 
Statutory or jurisprudential decisions pertaining to the extent and restrictions of patentability 
requirements predominantly remain a national endeavour, and therefore show important 
differences from one legal tradition to the other. Owing to the minimal protection standards reified 
in the TRIPS Agreement, a great number of similarities may nonetheless be found in the two main 
allocative tools that impact agrobiodiversity innovation, i.e. patents and plant variety or breeders’ 
rights. Jerome REICHMAN, in its prominent article focusing on "legal hybrids between the patent 
and copyright paradigms"
217
 argues that the current regulatory responses to "deviant fields of 
innovation" propelled by technological change, have either extended the scope and subject-matter 
of traditional intellectual property right paradigms such as copyrights or patents, or had recourse to 
"legal hybrids" and sui generis property rights systems built on slight modifications of these 
paradigms' inherent principles. The property layers that ensue result not only from the “emulation” 
of need-specific protection regimes, mainly designed for the products of conventional or molecular 
plant breeding, but also from the “accretion”218 or expansion of the traditional IP mechanisms' 
protection scopes to cater the needs of biotechnology.  
The products of plant improvement innovation, as well as the components and processes used 
throughout crop research and development, can today be appropriated through multiple 
instruments, used separately or collectively, according to the strategy and business model preferred 
by innovators
219
. A concrete example may best serve our purpose to illustrate the array of 
intellectual property tools that may surround a single product of agrobiodiversity innovation. Our 
illustration comes from the world of brown tomatoes, particularly appreciated in Mediterranean 
cuisine. In this particular segment, tomatoes produced in the districts of Campo de Níjar y Bajo 
Andarax in the province of Almería in Spain, in accordance with the “cahier des charges” set out 
in the application for the protected geographical indication “Tomate La Cañada”, would be 
protected under the terms of Council Regulation EC 510/2006
220
. The tomato varieties that fall 
under this geographical indication may be additionally protected through plant variety rights, as it 
is for instance the case of two brown tomato varieties, “SX 387” and “Olmeca”, granted to 
Syngenta by the European Community Plant Variety Office respectively through titles number 
21017 in 2007 and 16595 in 2007. The parent lines of these varieties are very likely to be 
protected as trade secrets, while the inbred tomato lines TZ367 and TZ368, which together form 
the hybrid SX387, are patented by Syngenta under US Patent 7,786,358 B2 on the basis of ATCC 
accessions (American type culture collection). The varieties may have in parallel been developed 
using any molecular marker that are protected through patents granted in the United States, the 
European Patent Convention or any other TRIPS Member State. The tomato products of both the 
Olmeca and Sx387 varieties are lastly marketed under the trademark Kumato, designating fresh 
tomatoes and first used in 30
th
 June 2009.  
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Providing for a de lege lata overview of appropriation tools present in the European legal order, 
and which influence the different contexts of agrobiodiversity innovation, we shall try to convey 
the evolution of the inherent balance of intellectual property rights in the entire array of enclosing 
instruments encountered by agrobiodiversity innovation.  As aforementioned, the geographical 
emphasis of such analysis will remain on the European legal order, to which supporting or 
contrasting illustrations may be additionally provided from other jurisdictions. Far from being a 
comparative law exercise, the sole aim of this analysis is to provide a concrete illustration of the 
TRIPS-propelled strong property paradigm, underlining the shrinking space left to the public 
domain by the concomitant recourse to plant variety and patent protection in their contemporary 
understanding and reach.  
3.1. Plant variety protection or plant breeders’ rights, the conventional breeders’ 
copyright 
Plant variety rights have been designed by those countries which recognised the need to endow 
some artificial lead-time to innovators in the development and commercialisation of products 
stemming from the new science of plant breeding, due to the built-in reverse engineering prospects 
carved within plant-related innovations. These countries were at the same time reluctant to bring 
the products of nature and life forms within the realm of patent protection. Arguably built on 
modified copyright principles
221
, sui generis plant variety rights were first crafted within a few 
European national legal orders from the 1940's onwards, and were effectively reified at the 
international level through the adoption of the International Convention for the Protection of New 
Varieties of Plants in 1961 (known as "UPOV", acronym of the French version of the Convention's 
title, symbolising past geopolitical influences and the role of the French government and seed 
association ASSINSEL in its crafting
222
). The Convention was amended numerous times, the latest 
being in 1991
223
. As an intergovernmental organisation that today counts seventy signatories in 
total. It also includes the United States, which enacted its Variety Protection Act in 1970 and 
amended it in 1994. The UPOV system strives to provide and promote "an effective system of 
plant variety protection, with the aim of encouraging the development of new varieties of plants, 
for the benefit of society"
224
. While protection is granted at the national level by national 
institutions applying national laws, the adherence to the UPOV system is designed as a substance-
oriented pledge mechanism allowing innovators to navigate international markets more freely. On 
account of UPOV adherence, plant breeders know how extensive a protection they will be granted 
in a signatory country, and also to which extent they will be allowed to actually use improved and 
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 protected material in their breeding programs. To this day, the only multi-State mechanism 
issuing certificates covering the territory of more than one State is the Community Plant Variety 
protection system, which extends throughout the territory of the European Union
225
. Even though 
none of the UPOV Conventions should be considered the “grail” of plant variety protection 
mandated by the TRIPS Agreement, their effectiveness has been acknowledged at the international 
level. This makes them an excellent starting point to study the state of plant variety rights 
worldwide, from protected subject matter to the rights granted to breeders, as well as third parties. 
The legal provisions that shall be studied as an illustration of the strong property paradigm pushed 
by a developmental reading of the TRIPS minimum standards therefore consist of the UPOV 
Conventions and the (consolidated) European Regulation 2100/94. 
3.1.1. Subject-matter and Breadth of Protection: A sui generis instrument for new plant 
varieties 
Notwithstanding their geographical or substantial reach, all plant breeders’ rights systems seek to 
protect plant varieties. They do not protect plant specimens in their tangible forms, but rather 
protect the phenotypic design of a plant variety, elevated to the rank of an intellectual object that is 
non-exclusive by nature. This qualification is not as straightforward as in the case of creations of 
the mind in the form of an idea that is expressed through words, for instance. Indeed, a plant 
variety is inherently translated into a physical object with direct industrial use, which will 
undoubtedly be re-used to develop another physical object with industrial use, i.e. foodstuff, feed, 
fuel or other uses. Yet these physical objects, i.e. specific plant specimens, constitute in essence 
the mere materialisation of characteristics that have been carefully selected and developed by a 
plant breeder.  
Plant varieties 
So-called “breeders’ rights” are effectively granted on very specific subject matter, i.e. on plant 
varieties, but not on all of them either. Under the 1961 Convention, protection is granted to  
“any cultivar, clone, line, stock or hybrid which is capable of cultivation [in all botanical 
genera and species], and which satisfies the provisions of Article 6”, while the 
opportunities for control also extend to “reproductive and vegetative propagating material, 
[including] whole plants, [as well as] to ornamental plants or parts thereof normally 
marketed for purposes other than propagation when they are used commercially as 
propagating material in the production of ornamental plants or cut flowers” (UPOV 1961 
Convention, respectively Art.2§2, and 5§1). 
The 1991 Convention adopts a somewhat stricter and much more detailed definition of a plant 
variety, considering it  
“a plant grouping within a single botanical taxon of the lowest known rank, […] defined by 
the expression of the characteristics resulting from a given genotype or combination of 
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genotypes, distinguished from any other plant grouping by the expression of at least one of 
the said characteristics and considered as a unit with regard to its suitability for being 
propagated unchanged” (UPOV 1991 Convention, Art.1 (vi)) 
In this approach, plant populations in the likes of landraces may arguably be considered as plant 
varieties, while wild relatives may not, since they will probably not fall under the scope of this 
definition of a “cultivar”. The exact wording of the 1991 UPOV Convention is in this sense 
reprised in Article 5 of EC Regulation 2100/94, which goes on to state that  
“a plant grouping consists of entire plants or parts of plants as far as such parts are 
capable of producing entire plants, both referring to hereinafter as “variety consistuents”, 
while “the expression of the characteristics referred to [above] may be either invariable or 
variable between variety constituents of the same kind, provided that also the level of 
variation results from the genotype or the combination of genotypes” (Art.5 §§3-4, EC 
Regulation 2100/94).  
These precisions allow for more variability within the notion of a plant variety, flexibilities that are 
still compliant with UPOV 1991 terms. They extend the notion of plant grouping in order to also 
cover certain parts of plants, if they retain reproductive capacity vis-à-vis an entire plant. The 
grouping can also show some variation in its characteristics. However, all aforementioned texts 
seem to exclude specific traits, substances, or plant breeding processes from protection under “an 
effective” plant variety protection regime, limiting it to the global phenotype which characterises a 
plant variety and can be reproduced in the field.  
New, distinct, uniform and stable plant varieties 
It is generally accepted that PVP protection operates with regards to new, distinct, uniform and 
stable varieties in the dominant strong property paradigm. Protection could nonetheless for 
instance be awarded to so-called “extant varieties”, as has notably been the case in the 2001 Indian 
Plant Variety Protection and Farmers’ Rights Act, which targets varieties that had been developed 
by the public sector in the past
226
. While the TRIPS Agreement solely conditions the design of a 
plant variety protection system to an effectiveness threshold, thereby arguably allowing a looser 
approach to novelty, the development oriented dominant strong paradigm, epitomised by the 1991 
UPOV Convention, does not adopt such an ample understanding towards the eligibility criteria 
that open the door to exclusivity for breeders. The four aforementioned conditions have indeed 
been designed to limit the scope of PVP legislation to the needs of conventional plant breeding in 
most OECD countries, including the EU. 
Within the four cumulative conditions, novelty is usually sought after first. According to Article 6 
of the 1961 UPOV Convention,  
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 “the new variety must not have been offered for sale or marketed in the territory of that 
State, or for longer than four years in the territory of any other State”, at the time of the 
application for protection in a member State of the Union. (UPOV 1961 Convention, Art.6) 
This wording is not completely maintained in the 1978 text of the UPOV Convention, which keeps 
the absence of single year marketing requirement in the territory of the State, but adds a four 
years’ timeslot for action if the plant varieties are sold or marketed in any other State in its Article 
6. Such slot is extended to six years for vines, ornamentals, forest and fruit trees, which are 
technically easier to “copy”. This novelty criterion is maintained as such, except for minor 
adjustments, in article 6(1) of the 1991 Convention.  
Indeed, “The variety shall be deemed to be new if, at the date of filing of the application for a 
breeder's right, propagating or harvested material of the variety has not been sold or 
otherwise disposed of to others, by or with the consent of the breeder, for purposes of 
exploitation of the variety: (i) in the territory of the Contracting Party in which the 
application has been filed earlier than one year before that date and (ii) in a territory other 
than that of the Contracting Party in which the application has been filed earlier than four 
years or, in the case of trees or of vines, earlier than six years before the said date” (UPOV 
1991 Convention Art. 6.1).  
The Convention allows for a little flexibility with regards to plant species that were not previously 
protected under its terms, but does not address other issues, such as contractual transfers or 
cultivation related to field trials, which would seemingly not affect novelty. Additional precisions 
have nonetheless been given in the European legal order, where, just as the UPOV 1991 text, 
varieties are considered novel when  
“at the date of application determined pursuant to Article 51, variety constituents or 
harvested material of the variety have not been sold or otherwise disposed of to others, by 
or with the consent of the breeder within the meaning of Article 11, for purposes of 
exploitation of the variety: (a) earlier than one year before the abovementioned date, 
within the territory of the Community; (b) earlier than four years or, in the case of trees or 
of vines, earlier than six years before the said date, outside the territory of the 
Community” (EC Regulation 2100/94, Art. 10§1).  
However, the Regulation steps further in its interpretation of what is meant by the “disposal of 
material and variety constituents”, by stating that the breeder retains an “exclusive right of 
disposal”, in a framework where the “exploitation of the variety” is interpreted in a restrictive 
fashion. For instance, novelty is not breached when such material is transferred to official bodies, 
or to third parties solely for production, reproduction and multiplication, or when the material is 
used for non-commercial or commercial research purposes and not for further reproduction or 
multiplication (EC Regulation 2100/94, Art. 10§2-3). In terms of implementation, an interesting 
question was raised with regards to novelty in mixtures, where it was successfully argued that a 
variety that had been previously marketed both outside and within the EU as part of a mixture 
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could not be protected in its own for lack of novelty227. Since traditional or farmers’ varieties are 
generally commonly known and have been sold or disposed of for a long time, the novelty criteria 
does seemingly only address varieties that have been improved through controlled plant breeding. 
However, “the continued selecting and breeding efforts of rural communities” may very well 
generate important changes and qualify landraces as new in certain circumstances
228
.  
Furthermore, not only does the plant variety have to be “novel” but, according to Article 6 of the 
1961 UPOV text, it shall be protected if it is also  
“clearly distinguishable by one or more important [morphological or physiological] 
characteristics [capable of precise description and recognition], from any other variety 
whose existence is a matter of common knowledge at the time when protection is applied 
for” (UPOV 1961 Convention, Art.6§1a). In this context, “common knowledge may be 
established by reference to various factors such as: cultivation or marketing already in 
progress, entry in an official register of varieties already made or in the course of being 
made, inclusion in a reference collection or precise description in a publication” (UPOV 
1961 Convention, Art.6§1a).  
The 1991 amendments have shrunk the disposition’s text and thereby enlarged the margin of 
appreciation left to implementing States, by positing that the variety ought to be “clearly 
distinguishable from any other variety whose existence is a matter of common knowledge 
at the time of the filing of the application” (UPOV 1991 Convention, Art.7).  The text adds 
that “in particular, the filing of an application for the granting of a breeder's right or for 
the entering of another variety in an official register of varieties, in any country, shall be 
deemed to render that other variety a matter of common knowledge from the date of the 
application, provided that the application leads to the granting of a breeder's right or to 
the entering of the said other variety in the official register of varieties, as the case may 
be” (UPOV 1991 Convention, Art.7)  
In this latest version of the UPOV approach, the criterion of distinctness is therefore linked to the 
appreciation of “varieties of common knowledge”. It does not refer to the elements that may help 
appreciate such distinct nature, although it seems to indicate, albeit non-exhaustively, that prior 
knowledge stems from the existence of procedural steps to protect said variety. EU legislation 
seems to provide a little more guidance, in that the distinctness is defined “by reference to the 
expression of the characteristics that results from a particular genotype or combination of 
genotypes” (EC Regulation 2100/94, Art. 7§1). This means that a phenotypical observation is 
required at this stage to assess whether not necessarily all, but at least certain characteristics differ 
from varieties of common knowledge, which have been “the object of a plant variety right or 
entered in an official register of plant varieties, or of an application for the granting of a plant 
variety right” (EC Regulation 2100/94, Art. 7§2). The determination of distinctness and 
qualification of an existing plant variety as of “common knowledge” has been subject to numerous 
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 interpretations by the CPVO Board of Appeals229. In an infamous case that was brought all the 
way up to the European Court of Justice, a breeder was for instance denied protection by the 
CPVO for protection under EC Regulation 2100/94, on the grounds that the proposed variety was 
in fact not dictinct enough from a wild variety originating in South Africa, and which had been 
marketed for years in Germany230. In another case, the Board of Appeals has annulled a decision to 
grant protection to an apple variety that was granted on an assessment of distinctness where the 
characteristic taken into account was the width of stripes in fruit, which was objected against due 
to its scientific unacceptability, even though such decision was later annulled by the Europen 
Court of First Instance (General Court) on different grounds231. National implementation also 
provides more explanations as to the threshold of “common knowledge”, as “the existence [of a 
reference variety] was considered a matter of common knowledge because of its presence in the 
botanical garden and because the reference variety originated from the German horticultural 
company Nothhelfer who had commercialised propagating material of the reference variety 
between 1994 and 2000’ in the Netherlands232.  
The wording of the United States PVP Act is somewhat different with regards to novelty and 
distinctness, as it states that a novel variety should be considered distinct when it "clearly differs 
by one or more identifiable morphological, physiological, or other characteristics ... from all prior 
varieties of public knowledge”. Notwithstanding their differences, in all of these contexts, the 
contribution or value of traits or characteristics is not taken into account to assess novelty or 
distinctness, making the inclusion of “cosmetic traits” that do not contribute to the productivity of 
the crop, a sufficient condition to create a new and distinct plant variety.  
In addition to their new and distinct nature, plant varieties also “must be sufficiently homogeneous, 
having regard to the particular features of their sexual reproduction or vegetative 
propagation” in the words of both the 1961 and 1978 UPOV texts (UPOV 1961 and 1978 
Conventions, Art.6§1c) .  
This benchmark was later coined uniformity and enshrined in Article 8 of the 1991 
Convention, whereby “the variety shall be deemed to be uniform if, subject to the variation 
that may be expected from the particular features of its propagation, it is sufficiently 
uniform in its relevant characteristics”, (UPOV 1991 Convention, Art.8) 
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The exact same wording has been maintained in EU law, as “a variety shall be deemed to be 
uniform if, subject to the variation that may be expected from the particular features of its 
propagation, it is sufficiently uniform in the expression of those characteristics which are 
included in the examination for distinctness, as well as any others used for the variety 
description” (EC Regulation 2100/94, Art.8). 
The additional precision of the European legislation, stating that uniformity should lie in the 
“expression” of characteristics once again emphasises the focus on phenotypically observable 
traits and qualities of the varieties. Even though the UPOV interpretations and technical guidelines 
do offer some tolerance with regards to the maximum acceptable number of off-types, it does “not 
allow for the protection of plant groupings with a high degree of diversity as is typical of many 
landraces”233. This stance has been viewed as a deprivation of potential benefits to breeders and 
society, and directly linked to the controversial notion of genetic erosion and uniformisation of 
agricultural production, as we shall study in the further course of this monograph. It should 
however be noted that should heterogeneous plant groupings be accepted under PVP laws, this 
change would significantly broaden the reach of intellectual asset protection, in turn risking to 
severely restrict agricultural development
234
.   
The last criterion that plant varieties need to meet in order to fall under plant breeders’ rights relate 
to their stability. Plant varieties indeed ought to be stable in their essential characteristics; in so far 
as they “must remain true to their description after repeated reproduction or propagation or, 
where the breeder has defined a particular cycle of reproduction or multiplication, at the end of 
each cycle” (UPOV 1961 and 1978 Conventions, Art.6§1d) 
The 1991 Convention mentions “relevant” rather than essential characteristics, which shall 
“remain unchanged after repeated propagation” in its Article 9. This stability requirement stems 
from a desire to ensure those actors who will be marketing or cultivating the protected variety that 
the characteristics describing the novelty will continue to be observed throughout the protection 
period. It does not figure in all PVP laws as a criterion for protection, as the 1982 Japanese statutes 
for instance rather opted for the nullity of the protection title if the characteristics of the protected 
variety cease to manifest themselves compared to the time of registration
235
.  
The European Union approach follows suit to the 1991 UPOV Convention, as: “a variety shall be 
deemed to be stable if the expression of the characteristics which are included in the 
examination for distinctness as well as any others used for the variety description, remain 
unchanged after repeated propagation or, in the case of a particular cycle of propagation 
at the end of each cycle” (EC Regulation 2100/94, Art.9), 
Stability should therefore be assessed once the variety has been propagated, and cannot on its own 
serve to establish distinctness, as it is « alongside distinctness and uniformity, an 
independent, necessary characteristic that makes a plant grouping a variety. Stability is 
also not a distinguishing characteristic within the meaning of Art. 7(1), because it is not 
                                                                    
 
233
 LESKIEN and FLITNER, "Intellectual Property Rights and Plant Genetic Resources: Options for a Sui Generis 
System," p.51. 
234
 "Intellectual Property Rights and Plant Genetic Resources: Options for a Sui Generis System," p.53. 
235
  Ibid., p.52 
CHAP. 3 Plant-related IPR 
55 
 expressed. This is because a genotype characteristic of a plant is expressed only if it 
manifests itself in a different way compared with another plant. No statement can be made 
about stability until after propagation, once several generations have been compared with 
each other »236. 
The four main conditions that trigger plant variety protection under UPOV 1991 rules and also 
their quasi-textual implementation in EC Regulation 2100/94 are cumulative and inherently 
require the conduct of what has been coined “Distinctness, Uniformity and Stability” (DUS) field 
examinations that are highly technical in nature. Interestingly, yet quite predictably, considering 
the technical nature of the DUS criteria for protection and the inevitability of field trials, PVP 
certificates are not granted by traditional IP offices but rather by specialised entities of the 
Ministry of Agriculture. These entities are generally those testing departments responsible for 
certification procedures when they exist. This element emphasises the sui generis nature of plant 
breeders’ rights, which necessarily rely on field examinations as the single means to objectively 
ensure that the variety is true to word and form, based on phenotypic observations over time. This 
necessary phase does however considerably lengthen the procedure for obtaining protection, as it 
remains excessively contingent of natural farming cycles and environments.   
3.1.2. Bundle of Rights Awarded through Plant Variety Protection 
All IPR restrict methods of acquiring ideas; patents in this context restrict the use of ideas, while 
copyrights restrict their expression
237
. Plant variety rights stand equidistant to such premise, 
granting a mixture of exclusive rights to definitively exclude others from copying plant varieties, 
accompanied by minor rights to exclude others from using new varieties. The rights to exclude 
from third party uses are significantly restricted by two major counter-conditions, drafted in the 
shape of liability rules. The breeders' exemption grants other plant developers the possibility to use 
the protected information without prior consent of the titleholder, while the farmers' exemption 
allows growers to save and conditionally sell the protected seeds. Even though the patent-like 
restrictions on use are significantly alleviated by these third party prerogatives, they still remain 
present. Indeed, plant breeders cannot in any case use protected plant varieties to develop their 
own product by solely acknowledging the origin of their inspiration, as would be allowed under 
copyright protection. The link between the phenotype of a plant variety and the actual physical 
object of a seed is irremediably closer to industrial inventions than creative works. That is notably 
why Jerome REICHMAN has identified them as “legal hybrids”238. According to HEITZ239, plant 
variety protection was not crafted as an artificial monopoly, since such premise would not coincide 
with the reality of plant breeding, where research and commercial associations are a necessity, and 
where competition with both breeders and farmers is inevitable, however innovative the product 
may be. The development of agrobiodiversity-innovation specific regime of plant breeders’ rights 
was in this sense “based on the premise that innovations by breeders could only be sustained if the 
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primary and protected material remained freely available for further research”240. Another premise 
reinforcing the resemblance of PVP to copyright protection lies in the in-built link with food 
security and cultivation of protected varieties, inevitably recognising the prospects of farmers to 
save, re-plant and sell seeds.  
Considered by many as a regulatory model for inventions with partial appropriability and 
excludability, the effect of plant variety protection on production results such as yield 
improvement have however generally failed to generate mind-blowing figures, urging 
commentators to view the appropriability and excludability PVP entails as marketing tools rather 
than propellers of genetic enhancement
241
. On the other side of the spectrum, the introduction of 
PBR protection has also been associated with increased breeding activity, an increased number of 
new varieties and enhanced access to foreign germplasm through the breeders’ exemption242. The 
reality might very well lie in between these two opposite assumptions, while the presence and 
growing recourse of PVP protection tools remains of inescapable actuality for all actors involved 
in the use of agricultural biodiversity.  
Prerogatives awarded to right holders 
When the aforementioned protection criteria are met, an array of prerogatives is granted to the 
breeder for a limited time. The protection period started out as minimum fifteen years in both the 
1961 and 1978 text (Article 8), extended to eighteen for ornamentals, trees and vines. According to 
article 19 of the 1991 UPOV Convention, such period shall now  
“not be shorter than twenty years from the date of the grant of the breeder's right. For 
trees and vines, the said period shall not be shorter than twenty five years from the said 
date” (UPOV 1991 Convention, Art.19)   
Throughout this period, plant breeders’ rights give various prerogatives to right holders. The 
initial 1961 text indeed states in its Article 5 that the prior authorisation of the breeder should be 
sought  
“for production, for purposes of commercial marketing, of the reproductive or vegetative 
propagating material, as such, of the new variety, and for the offering for sale or 
marketing of such material”. It went on to assert “the breeder's right shall extend to 
ornamental plants or parts thereof normally marketed for purposes other than propagation 
when they are used commercially as propagating material in the production of ornamental 
plants or cut flowers” (UPOV 1961 Convention, Art.5)   
The special regard for the different conditions of ornamental breeding, where the plant itself or its 
parts may be used to recreate the variety or just sell cut flowers, is also present in the 1978 
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 Convention. With slightly clearer wording, Article 5§1 of the 1978 text had rendered the 
breeders’ prior authorisation mandatory in cases of  
“production for purposes of commercial marketing, offering for sale, and marketing of the 
reproductive or vegetative propagating material, as such, of the variety” (UPOV 1978 
Convention, Art.5)  .  
The real extension of the list of actions requiring the breeder’s authorisation came with the 1991 
Convention’s Article 14, enumerating with great detail the enlarged scope of action awarded to 
right holders. The list now entails the  
“production, reproduction (multiplication), conditioning for the purpose of propagation, 
offering for sale, selling or other marketing, exporting, importing or stocking of the plant 
variety and its harvested material obtained through the unauthorized use of propagating 
material” (UPOV 1991 Convention, Art.14)   
This enlarged scope of prerogatives, and their conditional application is reprised in the relevant 
EU legislation, as:  
“2. The following acts in respect of variety constituents, or harvested material of the 
protected variety, both referred to hereinafter as ‘material’, shall require the authorization 
of the holder: (a) production or reproduction (multiplication); (b) conditioning for the 
purpose of propagation; (c) offering for sale; (d) selling or other marketing; (e) exporting 
from the Community; (f) importing to the Community; (g) stocking for any of the purposes 
mentioned in (a) to (f).  
The holder may make his authorization subject to conditions and limitations” (EC 
Regulation 2100/94, Art.13). 
The potential limits and conditions that can be imposed upon the users by the breeder holding the 
rights to a variety have been interpreted quite extensively. Indeed, the judiciary has approached the 
manoeuvre margins left to producers restrictively, especially when these have been bound by 
exclusive licensing agreements. It has for instance established that the purchase of material from 
an agent of the breeder and not directly from him, even though the seeds bought were the same, 
amounted to a contractual breach; thereby affirming the supremacy of conditions that can be 
imposed by the right holder on the sale and use of its variety243.  
Essentially derived varieties 
These principles do not only apply to propagating material such as seeds, but have also been 
extended to harvested material and essentially derived varieties, respectively answering the 
preoccupation of the ornamentals sector and the challenges caused by molecular breeding. In an 
attempt to enlarge the breadth of protection covered by PVP and safeguard the rights of plant 
breeders who have to compete with varieties that constitute only slight modifications of their 
original or initial varieties, the novel concept of essential derivation was infused in Article 14 of 
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the 1991 UPOV Convention. As such, essentially derived varieties do not directly fall into 
eligibility criteria for plant variety protection, but as a concept extending breeders’ prerogatives to 
different plant varieties, it in effect highly influences the subject matter of protection. Indeed, 
under the strong property paradigm, plant breeders’ rights not only protect new, distinct, uniform, 
and stable plant varieties but also those that have been essentially derived from them. In light of 
the technological progresses beheld in genomics and genetics sciences, which have enlarged the 
possibilities of speedy and inexpensive copying of new biological material, the 1961 and 1978 
Conventions were deemed insufficient to meet the globalised industry’s needs244. As a result, the 
concept of “essentially derived varieties (EDV)” was considered necessary "to prevent converted 
lines from infringing and pirating breeder's genetic material"
245, since the “cosmetic 
modifications” obtained through simple backcrossing of parental lines would qualify as a new 
protectable plant variety. 
Owing to the introduction of the EDV concept, royalties would need to be paid when a variety is 
"predominantly derived from the initial [improved] variety, retaining the expression of the 
essential characteristics that result from the genotype or the combination of genotypes of 
the initial variety", except for the small differences that still make it distinguishable from 
the initial variety” (UPOV 1991 Convention, Art.14§5)   
Through this provision, licensing agreements should not only be negotiated when the protected 
variety's use in a breeding programme leads to the commercialisation of a new variety that is not 
clearly distinguishable from the initial protected variety, but also when it leads to one that is 
"essentially derived". This extension was also echoed in Article 13(1) and (2) of Council 
Regulation EC/2100/94, which reads a little differently, while retaining the same overarching goal 
of extending the bundle of rights stemming from plant variety protection:  
“6. a variety shall be deemed to be essentially derived from another variety, referred to 
hereinafter as‘the initial variety’ when:  
(a) it is predominantly derived from the initial variety, or from a variety that is itself 
predominantly derived from the initial variety;  
(b) it is distinct in accordance with the provisions of Article 7 from the initial variety; and  
(c) except for the differences which result from the act of derivation, it conforms essentially 
to the initial variety in the expression of the characteristics that results from the genotype 
or combination of genotypes of the initial variety.”(European Regulation EC/2100/94, Art. 
13§§1-2, emphasis added) 
Even though the Council Regulation reprises the UPOV definition in its main lines, the legislator 
has provided some minor adjustments for clarification purposes 246. Just as the UPOV wording, it 
refers to predominant derivation, which implies that the alleged EDV does not have to be directly 
derived from the initial protected variety, and also states that an EDV could be obtained by using 
another variety that had already been predominantly derived from the initial variety. Both texts 
reprise the principle of distinctness between plant varieties, but they diverge on their approach to 
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 conformity in the expression of the characteristics. It is the latter characteristics that ought to be 
essential and retained according to UPOV, but the EC rather establishes that the EDV itself need 
to be “essentially conform” to the initial variety. Furthermore, the differences ought to stem fro 
mthe act of derivation, but both texts are worryingly silent on whether these different ought to be 
quantitative or qualitative. As we shall see in the further course of this study, determining whether 
a plant variety is essentially derived from another is more than an arduous task, as epitomised by 
the conflicting reports submitted by conflicting firms in one of the rare cases to have been settled 
before the judiciary247. 
Harvested material and exhaustion of rights 
Furthermore, just as the 1991 UPOV text, the scope of prerogatives has been extended in the EU 
to cover a wider range of material: 
3. The provisions of paragraph 2 shall apply in respect of harvested material only if this 
was obtained through the unauthorized use of variety constituents of the protected variety, 
and unless the holder has had reasonable opportunity to exercise his right in relation to 
the said variety constituents” (EC Regulation 2100/94, Art.13). 
The prerogatives of the breeder are quite naturally expressly extended to those “essentially derived 
varieties”, but also to those plant varieties that are not distinct in the sense of the legislation, or 
those that require its repeated use for their production (Art.13. para.5). Establishing the limit 
between propagating material and finished products has been arduous, especially since the width 
of protection does not only depend on the definition of a plant variety and the conditions that open 
up protection, but also on the eventuality of exhaustion vis-à-vis certain plants or products. This 
principle intends to build limits to the prerogatives awarded to right-holders under certain 
conditions, which render exclusivity unnecessary.  
With regards to the exhaustion of plant variety rights, article 16 of the 1991 UPOV Convention 
thus explicitly refuses to extend protection  
“to acts concerning any material of the protected variety, or of [an essentially derived 
variety], which has been sold or otherwise marketed by the breeder or with his consent 
[…], unless such acts involve further propagation of the variety in question or an export of 
material allowing the propagation of the variety” (UPOV 1991 Convention, respectively 
Art.16§1). 
The principle of exhaustion clearly proves the emphasis of plant variety protection on a sole 
extension to propagating material, a protection that would only exceptionally extend to portions of 
said material as it is the case of cut flowers (since they can themselves may be propagating 
material). In no case however do plant breeders’ rights extend to marketed products under the 
UPOV Conventions, an extension that was for instance envisaged in the proposed “Convention of 
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Farmers and Breeders” (“CoFab”) covenant248. Once again, applicable European law provides 
more specific guidance as to the instances where exhaustion may not hold up in Court.  
“The Community plant variety right shall not extend to acts concerning any material of the 
protected variety, or of a variety covered by the provisions of Article 13 (5), which has 
been disposed of to others by the holder or with his consent, in any part of the Community, 
or any material derived from the said material, unless such acts: (a) involve further 
propagation of the variety in question, except where such propagation was intended when 
the material was disposed of; or (b) involve an export of variety constituents into a third 
country which does not protect varieties of the plant genus or species to which the variety 
belongs, except where the exported materials is for final consumption purposes” (EC 
Regulation 2100/94, Art.16).. 
However, the articulation of these two principles, i.e. the expansion of protection to harvested 
material and the exhaustion of rights to materials disposed or derived from protected varieties has 
been quite arduous in practice. The judiciary has been for instance left to consider whether the sale 
of cut flowers the seeds of which had been obtained from a third party who was not authorised to 
sell the protected variety, whether the breeders’ right stopped at the use of the variety as 
propagating material, or to its use as a commercial end product as well249. In the event of a prior 
unauthorised sale, and only in such event, does the strong property paradigm allow for extensive 
protection to prevail. A strict approach to PVP exhaustion would indeed further preclude the 
extension of prerogatives for instance on end products destined to industrial uses or as animal feed 
for cereal, which could be considered harvested material when used for cultivation without the 
consent of the right holder, opening up royalty payments.  
Judicial remedy 
Notwithstanding the limits put upon the prerogatives awarded to breeders who successfully protect 
their plant varieties, they are unconditionally accompanied by judicial remedy opportunities. As 
an international convention that does not have a specific adjudicative body, all UPOV texts leave 
such issue to be determined under national or supranational jurisdiction. In this sense, European 
Union law provides that the Court of Justice shall be competent to hear disputes on damages 
linked to non-contractual liability (EC Regulation 2100/94, Art.93) on the basis of the following 
principles: 
“Whosoever: (a) effects one of the acts set out in Article 13 (2) without being entitled to do 
so, in respect of a variety for which a Community plant variety right has been granted; or 
(b) omits the correct usage of a variety denomination as referred to in Article 17 (1) or 
omits the relevant information as referred to in Article 17 (2); or (c) contrary to Article 18 
(3) uses the variety denomination of a variety for which a Community plant variety right 
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 has been granted or a designation that may be confused with it; may be sued by the holder 
to enjoin such infringement or to pay reasonable compensation or both. 
Whosoever acts intentionally or negligently shall moreover be liable to compensate the 
holder for any further damage resulting from the act in question. In cases of slight 
negligence, such claims may be reduced according to the degree of such slight negligence, 
but not however to the extent that they are less than the advantage derived therefrom by the 
person who committed the infringement” (EC Regulation 2100/94, Art.94). 
The Regulation therefore specifies the infractions, including intentional and non-intentional 
violations of the breeders’ prerogatives, but also infringements attributed to mere negligence that 
would open the door to the payment of “reasonable compensation”. Such compensation can also 
be required “from any person who has, in the time between publication of the application for a 
Community plant variety right and grant thereof, effected an act that he would be prohibited from 
performing subsequent thereto” (Art.95). The interpretation of such idiom has led national Courts 
to refer to the Court of Justice, faced with the uncertainty surrounding the means through which 
the compensation should be calculated, and whether it should mirror the specific “equitable 
remuneration” reserved to farmers, that we shall touch upon in the next section. The recent 
reference to the European Court of Justice for a preliminary ruling in Geistbeck v Saatgut250 has 
shed some light on the interpretation of the Community Regulation in this aspect, as the 
Bundesgerichtshof’s questions were directed to the core need to calculate the amount of 
“reasonable compensation” owed by a farmer who unlawfully uses protected propagated material. 
The German Court went on to ask whether such amount should “be calculated on the basis of the 
average amount of the fee charged for the licensed production of a corresponding quantity of 
propagating material of protected varieties of the plant species concerned in the same area, or must 
the (lower) remuneration which would be payable in the event of authorised planting under the 
fourth indent of Article 14(3) of the CPVR Regulation and Article 5 of the Community Planting 
Regulation be taken as a basis for the calculation instead?”251. The answer of Luxembourg 
provided an interpretation favouring the breeders’ interests, since the acts perpetrated by the 
farmers were considered to be “unauthorised”, triggering considerable compensation: 
“39. As a result of the infringement of the plant variety rights, STV is entitled to require 
payment of reasonable compensation under Article 94(1) of the basic regulation. 
Moreover, the referring court points out that the Geistbecks’ failure to fulfil their 
obligation to provide information is intentional or negligent, so that STV can also claim 
compensation for any further damage resulting from the infringement under Article 94(2) 
of that regulation. 
40. I must point out straight away that, for the purposes of examining Article 94 of the 
basic regulation, one should start from the assumption that the underlying objective of 
that article is full compensation based on the principle of restitutio in integrum.  In other 
words, the compensation which is payable when plant variety rights have been infringed 
is intended to return the holder of those rights to the situation that existed prior to the 
                                                                    
 
250
 European Court of Justice, C-509/10 Josef Geistbeck and Thomas Geistbeck v Saatgut-Treuhandverwaltungs 
GmbH, reference for a preliminary ruling from the German Bundesgerichtshof, 5
th
 July 2012. 
251
 European Court of Justice, C-509/10 Josef Geistbeck and Thomas Geistbeck v Saatgut-Treuhandverwaltungs 
GmbH, reference for a preliminary ruling from the German Bundesgerichtshof, 5
th
 July 2012. 
PART I Conclusions: The AgrobiodiversityPublic Domain in Intellectual Property legislation 
 
 62 
infringement. However, it is not so easy to apply that principle in this case because that 
situation can be restored either by reference to authorised planting or by taking into 
account the amount charged for the licensed production of the propagating material”252. 
The judicial remedies offered by the Community Regulation is therefore quite large, based on the 
principle of reasonable compensation, which should enable the return to the situation which 
existed prior to the infringement, calculated on the basis of the “fee charged for the licensed 
production of a corresponding quantity of propagating material of protected varieties”, which 
includes monitoring and supervision costs and can be supplemented by pre-litigation or litigation 
costs if deemed necessary.  
Rights awarded to third party users 
To offset the social cost stemming from the prerogatives awarded to breeders through PVP 
protection, a number of theoretically irrefutable statutory use options have been conceded in plant 
variety protection in all UPOV regimes. Targeting directly or indirectly researchers, breeders or 
farmers, PVP legislation allows for the use of protected varieties by third parties without the 
explicit authorisation of the breeder through the so-called breeders’ exemption, the farmers’ 
privilege and compulsory restrictions to protected rights. While these temperaments’ largely 
unconditional nature was initially designed to balance the exceptional reward of exclusivity 
granted to the innovator, they also share the same tragic faith of being increasingly surrounded by 
stringent regulatory constrictions.  
Breeders’ exception 
Science-based plant breeding relies on a constant and unconditional access to improved 
germplasm found in the market in order to generate socially, economically or environmentally 
interesting new agrobiodiversity on the basis of existing genetic variability. The breeders’ 
exception allows variety developers to use protected varieties in their crop genetic improvement 
activities, acknowledging the practices of “market prospection” for genetic material. This 
exemption from authorisation, which can also be viewed as an exception to the bundle of property 
rights, formally ends at the stage of commercialisation of new varieties developed using the 
protected germplasm, at which point royalty negotiations can be undertaken in accordance with the 
product developed by the second breeder, and its closeness to the initial variety.  
Under UPOV 1961 and 1978, this prerogative really transpires like a true exemption. The initial 
1961 text states that the prior authorisation requirement stemming from plant variety protection 
shall  
“not be required either for the utilisation of the new variety as an initial source of variation 
for the purpose of creating other new varieties or for the marketing of such varieties”, 
except “when the repeated use of the new variety is necessary for the commercial 
production of another variety” (UPOV 1961 Convention, Article 5§3), a wording that 
remained unchanged in the 1978 Convention.  
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 Under these terms, licensing negotiations emerge as a mandatory step in cases where the 
protected variety's use in a breeding program leads to the commercialisation of a new variety that 
is not clearly distinguishable, or whose production requires the repeated use of the protected 
variety, i.e. if the new variety is merely an identical copy of the protected plant variety, or if the 
latter has been directly used as a parent of a new variety.  
However, the terms of UPOV 1991 have altered such trigger. This mechanism rather emerges as a 
“compulsory exception”, through which certain actions exceptionally do not fall under the breadth 
of PVP protection. According to Article 15§1, these actions range from 
 “acts done privately or for non-commercial purposes, acts done for experimental 
purposes, [to] acts done for the purpose of breeding other varieties” (UPOV 1991 
Convention, Art.15§1)    
In this last scenario, the bundle of authorisation prerogatives would not be relevant, “except where 
the provisions of Article 14(5) apply”. The breeders’ authorisation will thus be waived provided 
that the breeding programme does not produce an essentially derived variety. Licensing 
negotiations would thus need to be undertaken when the resulting variety can be considered to be 
essentially derived from the protected initial variety. In this sense, the restrictive turn taken by the 
breeders' exemption has been effectively astounding, since the trigger point for authorisation 
shifted from distinctiveness to essential characterisation. In contrast to such restrictive stance, 
there are examples of other sui generis legislation that take an even lenient attitude on the 
breeders’ exemption than the 1961 or 1978 UPOV texts, as we shall further explore in this study. 
The 2001 Namibian proposal for instance precludes breeders to exercise their rights also “in 
obtaining varieties from gene banks or plant genetic resources centres”253. In the European Union, 
applicable legislation gives a particularly large margin of appreciation to Member States, all the 
while maintaining its UPOV 1991 compatible approach, viewing the research and breeders’ 
exceptions as “limitations of the effects of plant variety rights”:  
“Limitation of the effects of Community plant variety rights (a) acts done privately and for 
non-commercial purposes; (b) acts done for experimental purposes; (c) acts done for the 
purpose of breeding, or discovering and developing other varieties” (EC Regulation 
2100/94, Art. 15).  
Since none of the essential terms have been actually defined in the Regulation, this provision 
leaves the door open to either stricter or wider appreciations of the so-called “freedom to operate” 
on protected varieties, which could for instance determine whether a royalty payment should 
operate at the end of the breeding cycle, even if the resulting product is not a plant variety essential 
derived from the initial one. However, as it purposefully limits the right holders’ prerogatives on 
the inclusion of varieties into breeding programmes, it still stands at the core of the plant variety 
protection regime’s sui generis nature, as a mechanism that was inherently designed to allow 
breeders to continue building on the pool of available improved varieties. As most of the conflicts 
seem to be resolved either through commercial arrangements or by means of arbitration, there is 
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effectively no European case-law dealing with the reach of the breeders’ exception in plant variety 
protection.  
Farmers’ exception 
An additional liability rule, similar to the breeders’ exception, concerns the use of the protected 
informational matter by farmers faced with varieties protected by a plant variety protection 
certificate. This privilege is recognised in light of ancestral traditions of seed saving and exchange. 
It also stems from socio-economic considerations linked to subsistence, as well as the primordial 
role of seeds in the further in situ use and conservation of agrobiodiversity. The farmers' 
privilege, allowing farmers to sow seeds for saving, using or exchanging, was essentially implied 
by the 1961 and 1978 UPOV Acts. Indeed, the extent of exclusive rights awarded to breeders did 
not reach acts perpetrated without any commercial purpose by third parties, including 
unmethodical selectors and farmers
254
.   
The formerly implicit farmers’ exemption is now found in article 15§2 of the 1991 UPOV 
Convention, which states that  
“each Contracting Party may, within reasonable limits and subject to the safeguarding of 
the legitimate interests of the breeder, restrict the breeder's right in relation to any variety 
in order to permit farmers to use for propagating purposes, on their own holdings, the 
product of the harvest which they have obtained by planting, on their own holdings, the 
protected variety or [an essentially derived variety]” (UPOV 1991 Convention, Art.15§2).    
The wording clearly shows the shift taken by the approach to the farmers’ privilege, which 
evolved into a clear and even more importantly into an “optional exception” to the exclusive 
rights of breeders, rather than an array of acts considered outside the scope of the IP title in itself. 
The restriction of the farmers’ exception, or the corresponding extension of PVP protection to 
cover farm-saved seed or those crops grown from saved seed, have been advocated with a clear 
“policy objective of reducing public investment in breeding”, since the private sector would not 
otherwise enter into costly yet less lucrative research and development segments, such as wheat 
breeding
255
.This sharp contrast between the old and new UPOV systems has ignited virulent 
criticism from civil society, as well as the international community, denouncing the downgrading 
of the farmers’ privilege256.  
However, most, if not all plant variety rights legislation generally pertain provisions enabling 
small farmers, the scale of whom is defined on account of national developmental specificities and 
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 the particular needs of the crop, to save and exchange protected improved varieties. This is also 
the case of the European legislation, which this time does not view this particular liability rule as a 
“limitation of the plant variety protection” as it did apprehend the breeders’ exception, but sees the 
farmers’ exception as a “derogation from community plant variety rights”. A slight variance that 
clearly demonstrates the lawmaker’s difference in attitude towards the two rules, as one is a clear 
boundary that cannot be crossed, and the other a mere derogation that could be adjusted or even 
retracted in time. Indeed, the principle surrounding the derogation is that:  
 “1. Notwithstanding Article 13 (2), and for the purposes of safeguarding agricultural 
production, farmers are authorised to use for propagating purposes in the field, on their 
own holding the product of the harvest which they have obtained by planting, on their own 
holding, propagating material of a variety other than a hybrid or synthetic variety, which 
is covered by a Community plant variety right” (EC Regulation 2100/94, Art. 14.1). 
This principle is nonetheless accompanied by quite substantial conditions, as it is only allowed for 
certain fodder plants, cereals, potatoes and oil or fibre plants, thereby excluding all species not 
listed in the Regulation, especially vegetables in their entirety, but also maize (Art. 14.2.). 
Furthermore, specific concerns are addressed in order to “safeguard the legitimate interests of 
breeders”:  
“Conditions to give effect to the derogation provided for in paragraph 1 and to safeguard the 
legitimate interests of the breeder and of the farmer, shall be established, before the entry into 
force of this Regulation, in implementing rules pursuant to Article 114, on the basis of the 
following criteria: 
— there shall be no quantitative restriction of the level of the farmer's holding to the extent 
necessary for the requirements of the holding, 
— the product of the harvest may be processed for planting, either by the farmer himself or 
through services supplied to him, without prejudice to certain restrictions which Member 
States may establish regarding the organisation of the processing of the said product of the 
harvest, in particular in order to ensure identity of the product entered for processing with 
that resulting from processing, 
— small farmers shall not be required to pay any remuneration to the holder; small farmers 
shall be considered to be […] 
— other farmers shall be required to pay an equitable remuneration to the holder, which shall 
be sensibly lower than the amount charged for the licensed production of propagating 
material of the same variety in the same area; the actual level of this equitable 
remuneration may be subject to variation over time, taking into account the extent to which 
use will be made of the derogation provided for in paragraph 1 in respect of the variety 
concerned,  
— monitoring compliance with the provisions of this Article or the provisions adopted 
pursuant to this Article shall be a matter of exclusive responsibility of holders; in 
organizing that monitoring, they may not provide for assistance from official bodies, 
— relevant information shall be provided to the holders on their request, by farmers and by 
suppliers of processing services; relevant information may equally be provided by official 
bodies involved in the monitoring of agricultural production, if such information has been 
obtained through ordinary performance of their tasks, without additional burden or costs. 
These provisions are without prejudice, in respect of personal data, to Community and 
national legislation on the protection of individuals with regard to the processing and free 
movement of personal data” (EC Regulation 2100/94, Art, 14.3). 
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The European Regulation therefore completely exempts small farmers from the payment of 
royalties for the use of harvested product obtained by planting on their own holding for all species 
listed in Article 14, and also for the use of propagating material other than hybrids and synthetic 
varieties. They can as a result consume and replant open-pollinated varieties, which are more 
likely to produce interesting results due to their inherent reproductive characteristics. All other 
farmers who cultivate the aforementioned limited list of species ought to compensate the breeder, 
albeit to a lesser extent than standard royalty rates, and provide adequate information. Both the 
definition of small farmers and the exact content of information to be provided by farmers who 
desire to benefit from the so-called “agricultural exemption” have been carefully drafted in the 
Implementing Rules257, while the derogatory nature of the farmers’ privilege has been re-affirmed 
by the European Court of Justice:  
“32 Under Article 13(2)(a) of the basic regulation, the holder’s authorisation is, in 
principle, required for the propagation of the harvested material of a protected variety 
33. However, Article 14(1) of the basic regulation provides for a derogation from that 
principle. That derogation aims to safeguard agricultural production. Under that article, 
farmers are authorised to use the product of the harvest obtained by planting propagating 
material of protected varieties for propagation in the field on their own holding, provided 
that the criteria referred to in Article 14(3) are complied with. 
34. The farmers’ privilege does not therefore apply if the farmer does not fulfil the 
obligations laid down in Article 14(3) of the basic regulation, which are specified in detail 
in the implementing regulation”258. 
A number of additional interpretative cases have been brought before national Courts and to the 
European Court of Justice more specifically with regards to the “right to information” that 
breeders could be entitled to within the framework of such derogation, and the resulting reach of 
the “obligation to inform” incumbent upon farmers. Article 9 of the Implementing Rules already 
provides some guidance as to some information that may be considered relevant, albeit non-
exhaustively, prompting the European Court of Justice to rule whether the Regulation creates a 
“general right to information” to the benefit of the breeder whose material is been saved by 
farmers. More specifically, the Court has had to consider whether relevant information could be 
requested from either farmers or from processors without any indication that the cultivator was 
using the farmers’ privilege. With regards to the former, i.e. farmers, confirmed ECJ jurisprudence 
considers that, just as the derogation concerning the farmer’s privilege should be interpreted 
restrictively, so should the accompanying obligations. Therefore, if “there is no indication that the 
farmer has used or will use, for propagating purposes in the field, on his own holding, the product 
of the harvest obtained by planting, on his own holding, propagating material of a variety other 
than a hybrid or synthetic variety which is covered by that right and belongs to one of the 
agricultural plant species listed in Article 14(2) of Regulation No 2100/94”, the prerogative of 
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 Article 14.3 may not be used by rightholders259. The same reasoning applies to processors as well, 
as information could only be requested from suppliers that have processed protected material, and 
thus affected by the derogation, or in those cases where the rightholder “has some indication” that 
such processing is about to operate260.  
Notwithstanding the inherent limitations that surround the agricultural exemption, the notion of the 
“equitable remuneration” that is due to the breeder when the privilege is used also had to be 
further detailed. The legislators’ guidance stems from the Implementing Rules, distinguishing 
cases of contractual and non-contractual farming, and providing a number of criterial threshold to 
infuse equity in both sides of the equation:  
« 1. The level of the equitable remuneration to be paid to the holder pursuant to Article 
14(3), fourth indent of the basic regulation may form the object of a contract between the 
holder and the farmer concerned. 
2. Where such contract has not been concluded or does not apply, the level of 
remuneration shall be sensibly lower than the amount charged for the licensed 
production of propagating material of the lowest category qualified for official 
certification, of the same variety in the same area. If no licensed production of 
propagating material of the variety concerned has taken place in the area in which the 
holding of the farmer is located, and if there is no uniform level of the aforesaid amount 
throughout the Community, the level of remuneration shall be sensibly lower than the 
amount which is normally included, for the above purpose, in the price at which 
propagating material of the lowest category qualified for official certification, of that 
variety is sold in that area, provided that it is not higher than the aforesaid amount 
charged in the area in which that propagating material has been produced. 
3. The level of remuneration shall be considered to be sensibly lower within the meaning of 
Article 14(3), fourth indent of the basic regulation as specified in paragraph 2 above, if it 
does not exceed the one necessary to establish or to stabilise, as an economic factor 
determining the extent to which use is made of the derogation, a reasonably balanced ratio 
between the use of licensed propagating material and the planting of the product of the 
harvest of the respective varieties covered by a Community plant variety right. Such ratio 
shall be considered to be reasonably balanced, if it ensures that the holder obtains, as a 
whole, a legitimate compensation for the total use of his variety […] 
5. Where in the case of paragraph 2 [there is no agreement between organisations of right 
holders and farmers], the remuneration to be paid shall be 50% of the amounts charged 
for the licensed production of propagating material as specified in paragraph 2. 
However, if a Member State has notified the Commission before 1 January 1999 of the 
imminent conclusion of an agreement as referred to in paragraph 4 between the relevant 
organisations established at national or regional level, the remuneration to be paid in the 
area and for the species concerned shall be 40% instead of 50% as specified above, but 
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only in respect of the use of the agricultural exemption made prior to the implementation of 
such agreement and not later than 1 April 1999. 
6. Where in the case of paragraph 5 the farmer has made use, in the relevant period, of the 
agricultural exemption at a ratio of more than 55% of the total material of the relevant 
variety used for his production, the level of the remuneration to be paid in the area and for 
the species concerned shall be the one which would apply in respect of such a variety if it 
was protected in the relevant Member State under its national system of plant variety 
rights, if a national system exists which has established such level, and provided that that 
level is more than 50% of the amounts charged for the licensed production of propagating 
material as specified in paragraph 2. In the absence of such level under the national 
scheme, the provisions of paragraph 5 shall apply irrespective of the ratio of use » 
(Commission Regulation 1768/95, Art.5).  
The European Commission would therefore consider, in absence of contractual arrangements to 
the contrary, that an equitable remuneration should be “sensibly lower” than the royalty rate 
applied to same variety in the area, viewed as a “reasonably balanced ratio” between the breeders’ 
interests and his need to recoup his investment, and the need to cultivate such variety for 
sustenance and smaller-scaled production. The text also seems to fix a rate of fifty per cent of the 
certified seed fee, supplemented by a transitionally fixed rate of forty per cent in order to 
encourage the conclusion of agreements between rightholders and farmers. However, these 
precisions have not unlifted the nebulous veil as to what may essentially constitute an equitable 
remuneration, especially in cases where contractual agreements between two moral persons or 
between national or regional associations have fixed substantially higher rates. This issue has been 
duly tackled by the European Court of Justice, which has ruled that a flat rate of eighty per cent of 
regular royalties could not befall under such category in the specifics of the case, even though the 
rate of fifty per cent would only apply in absence of an agreement between organisations of 
holders and farmers261. The Court has thereon also affirmed that the rate of fifty per cent of 
certified seed fee is a “fixed amount which constitutes neither an upper limit nor a lower limit”, as 
“inferred from the very wording of that provision that the value stated is mandatory”262.  
Compulsory licensing 
Aside these liability rules that are triggered by the quality of the actors who use protected varieties 
and harvested material, all plant breeders’ rights statutes also provide for opportunities of 
compulsory licensing in order to safeguard public interests. The UPOV Conventions in this 
regard « restrict the exercise of the rights protected », only « for reasons of public interest […] in 
order to ensure the widespread distribution of new varieties », providing for an « equitable 
remuneration » of the breeder (UPOV 1961 Convention, Art.9)  .  
Based on the similar prose of the 1978 UPOV Convention, the Model Law on Plant Variety 
Protection adopted by the Union in 1980 foresaw three choices to national law-makers for the 
interpretation of the public interest safeguard clause. The first does not reflect on the public 
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 interest dimension at all, since it merely consist of patents-reminiscent « voluntary or contractual 
licenses » , and « license of rights » that need to be agreed upon parties for the exploitation of a 
protected variety
263
. The actual « compulsory licensing » provision of the 1980 Model Law 
provided that the Plant Breeders’ rights office would grant a license without the consent of the 
right holder for “the rapid and wide distribution of new varieties and their availability to the public 
at adequate and reasonable prices”264. The compulsory license would only be granted if the 
applicant was in a position to actually exploit the PVP, contractual licensing was unsuccessfully 
tried to be obtained, the terms offered by the right holder were unreasonable, and the PVP title had 
at least been given three years before
265
. The compulsory license would not be given for not less 
than two and more than four years. The 1991 revision of the UPOV Convention saw the return of a 
broader account of this peculiar licensing mechanisms, as the grounds for safeguarding the public 
interest were not explicitly detailed, neither in Article 17 of the Convention, nor in the Model Law 
adopted in 1996. The latter still operated a distinction between voluntary and compulsory 
licensing, which leads one to believe that an initial negotiation with the right holder would be a 
necessary step before applying for a compulsory license.  
No such distinction seems to be established by Article 29 of the EC Regulation 2100/94, which 
limits the grant of such licenses to “reasons of public interest” after consultation of the 
Administrative Council of the CPVO, all the while interestingly considering the case where such a 
license would be requested by the holder of an essentially derived variety, but also the more 
complex issue of a patent holder desiring to use the protected phenotype, a characteristic that we 
shall tackle in the further course of this study. 
Plant breeders’ rights, a relatively lesser-known intellectual property right system outside of those 
having recourse to its instruments regularly, are conferred either under laws enacted in view of the 
different UPOV Conventions, or as stand-alone national legislation. They confer a bundle of rights 
to a novel particular combination of genes manifested as a distinct, uniform and stable variety. 
Requiring neither proof of an inventive step or a specific utility for the concerned plant variety, 
protection is granted on the basis of the existence of phenotypic differences vis-à-vis known 
varieties, without regard for the contributed value, except for their genetic quality in terms of 
uniformity and stability. They are closely and expressly linked to considerations of sequential 
innovators relying on access to improved germplasm on the one hand, and of farming communities 
cultivating propagating material for their own consumption, to make ends meet, or as a viable 
commercial enterprise on the other hand. It is on account of this indissoluble bond that the 
prerogatives granted to breeders under PVP protection for new, distinct, uniform and stable plant 
varieties are accompanied by exceptions for both breeders and farmers, even though the reach of 
both these exemptions has steadily been retracted.  
3.2. Patent protection, an old instrument revived for the DNA age  
Plant-related patents are relatively newly expanded forms of IPR in the agrobiodiversity 
innovation chain, with the notable exception of the United States, where the first ever Plant Patent 
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Act was designed in 1930 for asexually reproduced plants266. Derived from the Latin “litterae 
patentes” (open letters), patents were first introduced in the city of Venice in 1474 to attract 
merchants that would be given a ten years long exclusive use right to the novel technique they 
developed
267
. These strong instruments today grant vast exclusivity not only on inventions that 
would be described as classically technical or mechanical, but they also cover living organisms 
used for food and agriculture. The development of biotechnological characterisation, selection, 
insertion and recombination tools in the science of plant breeding has indeed granted patents 
incredible momentum. Designed as a means to procure artificial lead-time in an increasingly 
competitive market with extensively lofty product duplication capabilities, patent protection came 
across as a convenient tool for securing new market places for innovators in the biotechnology-led 
global seed industry. But this tool also had to be stretched to the verge of infection in order to 
bring in products and processes that remained incremental, cumulative and self-replicating, 
making them easy to reproduce yet difficult to improve singlehandedly.  
Even though a number of international conventions have allowed greater cooperation or set out 
minimum standards
268
, patents remain national legal titles, awarded to eligible inventions, and 
conferring a bundle of exclusive rights to title holders. Most studies nonetheless focus on the 
approaches favoured by the industrialised countries that have developed important biotechnology 
capacity. In this respect, the infamous title 35 of the United States Code concerned with both plant 
and utility patents269 is generally put up against the European approach to patents in the life 
sciences. The latter has been harmonised outside the realm of the European Union through the 
1973 European Patent Convention (“EPC”), which arguably swept away numerous national 
specificities. It is also carved in specific instruments that are integral part of the acquis 
communautaire
270
, such as the 1975 Convention for the European Patent for the common 
market
271
, the Directive 98/44/EC on the patentability of biotechnological inventions (“EU Biotech 
Directice”), for the (failed) implementation of which eight EU Member States were referred before 
the European Court of Justice
272
, and also more recently the 2012 so-called “patent package” 
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 towards a unified patent court
273
. Starting off from the minimal thresholds set out by the TRIPS 
Agreeement, our analysis will mainly draw from the implementation of these standards in the 
European Union, touching nonetheless at times on regulatory differences in the two sides of the 
Atlantic. As aforementioned, such implementation and their clear focus infuse different societal 
concerns, guiding the assessment of the impacts of such policy choices on plant improvement 
actors, as well as the search for alternatives in socio-technological innovation contexts which may 
suffer from its stringent contours.  
3.2.1. Patentable Subject Matter and Patent Breadth: Breeding Processes and Products 
Patents are perhaps the oldest form of intellectual property, awarded to new and useful products, 
processes, structures of matter and designs in countries with no specific industrial design 
protection. By providing a major incentive to undertake research and bring new products to the 
market, patents “are a primary solution to the problem of ensuring that inventors may appropriate 
the returns to R&D in the area of industrial invention and innovation”274.  
“Until 1930, one could not patent a plant. Plants were excluded from patent law for two 
reasons. First, plants are products of nature. Second, plants were not thought to be 
amenable to the written description requirement of patent law. As a result of lobbying 
efforts by the seed industry, the United States first recognized plants as patentable in the 
Plant Patent Act of 1930. Patents were limited, however, to plants which were reproduced 
asexually. The rationale for restricting protection to asexually reproduced plants was the 
belief that new plant varieties could not be reproduced reliably by seed”275. 
The question of patent eligibility has roiled the legal systems of both developed and developing 
nations for the last decade, not only with regards to software, but also biotechnological inventions, 
whether designed for agricultural inputs or pharmaceutical products.  
Novel, useful and non-obvious inventions (Protectable Subject-Matter and Eligibility)  
The main conditions for patentability have been reified through the minimum standards of TRIPS, 
even if legal orders naturally contain innate differences. Patents are nonetheless accepted to grant 
absolute yet temporary rights of exclusion over an invention, once the strict substantive and 
cumulative pre-requisites of novelty, utility and non-obviousness (or inventiveness) are complied 
with. Indeed, article 27§1 of the TRIPS Agreement states that  
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“any inventions, whether products or processes, in all fields of technology, provided that 
they are new, involve an inventive step and are capable of industrial application” can fall 
under patent protection. (TRIPS Agreement, Art.27§1).  
Notwithstanding the respect of these conditions, an initial observation relates to the existence of 
two different “types” of claims in all legal orders, first those to a physical entity (as a product or a 
compound), and second to a physical activity (as a method or a process). The walls surrounding 
their fall into exclusivity are however quite different from one legal order to the other. 
In the United States two different patents may be awarded over plant-related inventions. Indeed, 
the 1930 Plant Patent Act, which was modified in 1954 and 1998, reads:  
“Whoever invents or discovers and asexually reproduces any distinct and new variety of 
plant, including cultivated sports, mutants, hybrids, and newly found seedlings, other than 
a tuber propagated plant or a plant found in an uncultivated state, may obtain a patent 
therefor, subject to the conditions and requirements of this title” (35 U.S.C. §161) 
Alongside plant patents granted on asexually reproduced plants, the appraisal of utility patents in 
biological matter is attributed to the infamous Diamond v. Chakrabarty ruling that deemed 
“everything under the sun that is made by man” patentable in 1980276, and to the analogous 
extension of patentable subject matter in civil law traditions. Today, plant improvers can in the 
United States use either the plant or utility patent protection in their innovation chain, depending 
on the invention at stake, and whether the object concerns asexually reproductive plants or not. 
The eldest protection is thus awarded through plant patents in accordance with the terms of 
sections 161 to 164 of 35 U.S.C., which grant exclusive rights to asexually reproductive plant 
varieties, with the exception of tubers. Subject matter eligibility and conditions for the more 
general-scoped utility patent protection are defined in section 101 of 35 U.S.C, covering  
“any new and useful process, machine, manufacture, or composition of matter, or any new 
and useful improvement thereof” (section 101 of 35 U.S.C).  
It is this particular type of protection that has been extended to cover living organisms through the 
aforementioned Chakrabarty ruling. Although such extension seemingly started in the United 
States, numerous developed countries, including the European Union, have followed suit rapidly, 
either through targeted legislation or judicial interpretations. In the European Union, plant-related 
inventions may only be protected through a utility-type patent, under stricter conditions, notably 
concerning excluded subject-matter, since this type of artificial monopoly may not be granted over 
plant varieties or essentially biological products or processes, as we shall see below.The 1973 text 
of the European Patent Convention states in general terms that 
“(1) European patents shall be granted for any inventions which are susceptible of 
industrial application, which are new and which involve an inventive step. 
(2) The following in particular shall not be regarded as inventions within the meaning of 
paragraph 1: (a) discoveries, scientific theories and mathematical methods; (b) aesthetic 
creations; (c) schemes, rules and methods for performing mental acts, playing games or 
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 doing business, and programs for computers; (d) presentations of information. 
(3) The provisions of paragraph 2 shall exclude patentability of the subject-matter or 
activities referred to in that provision only to the extent to which a European patent 
application or European patent relates to such subject-matter or activities as such” 
(European Patent Convention 1973, Art. 52. 1-2). 
The provision has been amended in 2000 in order to clarify that no fields of technology should be 
left outside of the scope of patentability, maintaining its non-exhaustive list of acts, products and 
processes that would not qualify as inventions: 
“(1) European patents shall be granted for any inventions, in all fields of technology, 
provided that they are new, involve an inventive step and are susceptible of industrial 
application” (European Patent Convention, Art. 52.1)  
In this context, Article 3§1 of the European Directive 98/44/EC on the legal protection of 
biotechnological inventions provides more detailed conditions, mentioning that the principle 
enshrined in the EPC text shall be applicable to biological material and associated processes: 
“inventions which are new, which involve an inventive step and which are susceptible of 
industrial application shall be patentable even if they concern a product consisting of or 
containing biological material or a process by means of which biological material is 
produced, processed or used” (European Directive 98/44/EC, Art.3§1).  
Notwithstanding the formal exclusions from patentability that may be enshrined in applicable 
texts, three main elements thus need to be paid attention to when considering the issue of 
patentability in the development oriented strong property paradigm and its European 
implementation, i.e. whether the claim at hand concerns an invention, whether it is novel, and 
whether it is non-obvious and capable of industrial application.  
An invention 
As we have seen, first and foremost, traditional patent protection is always granted to inventions, 
rather than discoveries. The recourse to the criteria of “invention” has been advocated as 
performing a double function, not only restricting protected subject-matter, but also restricting the 
protection conferred to an individual subject-matter, thereon contributing to the public benefits 
objectives of the patent system
277
. With specific regards to plant-related inventions, the first 
interesting criteria stems from Article 52 (2) of the European Patent Convention, which states that 
“discoveries, scientific theories […or] presentations of information” may not be regarded as 
inventions, opting for list of excludable subject matter rather than providing an exhaustive 
definition of an invention, which would prove trickier
278
. Indeed, biotechnological advances, or 
any advance relying on the investigation and use of living organisms, retain essential 
characteristics and elements “that might easily be located in the public realm of scientific 
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discoveries”279. This feature would have, at least historically, not allowed for their patentability, as 
“much of biotechnology involves the discovery of the genetic basis of various biological 
functions”280. However, the existence of certain technological strides “essentially or only industrial 
in application”, coupled with the deployment of “powerful corporate interests” have shifted the 
patentability line towards a pole dangerously closer to the fruits of basic research and 
discoveries
281
. In essence, an invention would need human involvement in nature to gain such 
qualification, notwithstanding the inanimate or living nature of material or process used, whereas a 
discovery would not benefit as much from human ingenuity
282
. This approach is a close 
descendant to the Chakrabarty doctrine, which ascertains the threshold of patentable invention at 
the level of human involvement in nature, rather than favouring a distinction between inanimate 
and living material. It in effect caters to the needs of the burgeoning industries of the developed 
countries. Following the advances in molecular biology, both the US Patent and Trademarks 
Office and the European Patent Office have stretched the line between discoveries and inventions, 
for instance generally considering isolated and purified nucleotide sequences as man-made 
chemicals. The particular issue of gene sequences has proven tricky since they « represent a hybrid 
case between discrete inventions and more general pieces of information that are useful for many, 
potentially very different, purposes »
283
. In the much talked about recent Myriad Genetics ruling of 
the United States Supreme Court
284
, claims to DNA sequences in isolation were nonetheless held 
to be insufficiently distinct from naturally occurring genes in the body, and the patent attorneys 
were not able to circumvent such shortcoming by proving how new and useful the knowledge and 
process were developed. This ruling followed another much-echoing decision of the US Supreme 
Court, which, in Mayo vs. Prometheus, had held that the patent eligibility threshold had to be 
fulfilled in all claims in order to be considered valid. The decision highlighted that a mere 
recitation of a law of nature could not be subject to patent protection, “unless there were additional 
steps that ensured the claim was sufficiently tailored to not preempt further use of the natural 
law”285.  
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 The EPC has attempted to place the tricky line between discoveries and inventions by having 
recourse to “a positive requirement for technical character”, making all subject matter including 
some technical character an invention
286
. In the section of its Guidelines focusing on discoveries, 
the European Patent Office (“EPO”) considers that finding “a previously unrecognised substance 
occurring in nature” constitutes a mere discovery, while “if a substance found in nature can be 
shown to produce a technical effect, it may be patentable”287. The stretch of the notion of invention 
for the needs of biotechnology patents, so far as to consider isolated and purified naturally 
occurring genes as no longer existing in nature, has been compared to allowing intellectual 
appropriation to rocks picked up in the park after being washed and polished
288
. The comparison 
might shudder some, as the realm of biotechnology and plant breeding remains guided by practical 
application and workmanship, but it definitely illustrates the evident distension first operated in 
industrialised countries, and then corroborated by international reification, in order to allow patent 
protection for living organisms. The tresholds of “human intervention” and “technical step” are 
prominently found in the European Patent Office’s jurisprudence tackling the reach of the 
exclusion of essentially biological processes from the realm of patentability, as we shall study 
below. We can nonetheless already note that the relevant case-law has indirectly qualified 
processes that would fall under the criteria of an invention, when they “contain at least one 
essential technical step, which could not be carried out without human intervention and which had 
a decisive impact on the final result”289.  
The “technical step” criteria was also held up in the EU Biotech Directive, where, as a principle,  
“biological material which is isolated from its natural environment or produced by means of 
a technical process may be the subject of an invention even if it previously occurred in 
nature” (European Directive 98/44/EC, Art.3).  
In a prominent case of the EPO Board of Appeals relating to “claims to transgenic plants 
comprising in their genomes specific foreign genes, the expression of which results in the 
production of antipathogenically active substances, and to methods of preparing such plants”290, 
i.e. to genetically modified plants that exterminate plant pathogens, the Board confirmed that 
nothing prevented inventions to be general in their essence, and thus claims to be broad: 
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“An inventor who has invented fastening means characterised in that they consist of a 
specific material has invented neither a nail, nor a screw, nor a bolt. Rather his invention is 
directed to fastening means generally. This is not a question of form but of substance: the 
applicant may claim his invention in the broadest possible form, ie the most general form for 
which all patentability requirements are fulfilled. If he has made an invention of general 
applicability, a generic claim is not the consequence of the verbal skill of the attorney, as the 
referring decision seems to suggest, but of the breadth of application of the invention”291.  
A novel invention 
Once the existence of an invention, requiring a technical step, has been set, patent eligibility also 
asks for it to be new, “preventing the disutility of re-inventing the wheel, ensuring that matter 
which is already in the public domain is not brought under private monopoly control, and to 
protect parties who have been using products or processes publicly from being stopped from doing 
so”292. The gauge of novelty indirectly pushes patent offices, legislators and adjudicators to 
construct the public domain, mostly on the basis of the so-called “state of the art”, checking 
whether the patent could have been “anticipated” through documents or even practices, “enabling” 
the notional skilled person to produce the invention or versions of the invention based on the 
disclosed information. Anticipation can in this regard either occur by use or by disclosure, if in 
both cases, the information made available to the public allows individuals to work the 
invention
293
.  
The legal thresholds for novelty are set as follows in the European legal order:  
“(1) An invention shall be considered to be new if it does not form part of the state of the 
art.  
(2) The state of the art shall be held to comprise everything made available to the public by 
means of a written or oral description, by use, or in any other way, before the date of filing 
of the European patent application.  
(3) Additionally, the content of European patent applications as filed, the dates of filing of 
which are prior to the date referred to in paragraph 2 and which were published on or after 
that date, shall be considered as comprised in the state of the art. 
(4) Paragraph 3 shall be applied only in so far as a Contracting State designated in respect 
of the later application, was also designated in respect of the earlier application as 
published. 
(5) The provisions of paragraphs 1 to 4 shall not exclude the patentability of any substance 
or composition, comprised in the state of the art, for use in a method referred to in Article 
52, paragraph 4, provided that its use for any method referred to in that paragraph is not 
comprised in the state of the art” (EPC, 1973, Art. 54). 
The Convention’s revision in 2000 maintained the general principles related to the criteria of 
novelty, retaining its link to the state of the art, and the latter’s definition. The amendments have 
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 nonetheless retracted the limitation that was present in former indent four, retracting the 
conditional designation of a Contracting State and thereby making the state of the art a 
supranational notion extending beyond national boundaries
294
. Novelty has proven to be a knuckle 
for biotechnological inventions, and especially in the context of medical research as epitomised by 
the abundant EPO case-law. The Board of Appeals even had to conceive into making a limited 
exception to the general rules for novelty in cases of second and subsequent therapeutic uses, all 
the while expressly indicating that such a special approach to “derivation” in novelty assessments 
could only be applied to claims to the use of substances or compositions intended for use in a 
method referred to in Article 52(4) EPC295. The Board has confirmed the restrictive nature of such 
exceptional approach numerous times, and developed it further when asked whether “a claim to 
the use of a compound for a particular non-medical purpose novel for the purpose of Article 54 
EPC, having regard to a prior publication which discloses the use of that compound for a different 
non-medical purpose, so that the only novel feature in the claim is the purpose for which the 
compound is used”296.  
“If on its proper construction the claim contains no technical feature which reflects such new 
use, and the wording of the claim which refers to such new use is merely mental in nature 
and does not define a technical feature, then the claim contains no novel technical feature 
and is invalid under Article 54(1) and (2) EPC (because the only technical features in the 
claim are known)”297.  
Notwithstanding such derogative stance, it has been difficult to draw the contours of the state of 
the art in patent applications. For instance, it is as a principle not only assessed vis-à-vis the initial 
content of claims, as persistent EPO case-law has also allowed disclaimers to restore novelty by 
delimiting claims against the state of the art or accidental anticipation298. In parallel, both the 
Technical and Appeals’ Board have shed light on the epinous question of what constitutes the 
“state of the art” and how an invention may be considered to be a part of such realm that 
considerably delineates the boundaries of patentability. An approach has been to define the 
invention’s “availability to the public”, as prescribed by the second indent of Article 54 of the 
EPC, by analysing the kind of information that should be available, and whether one should seek 
for the rationale guiding the invention: 
“An essential purpose of any technical teaching is to enable the person skilled in the art to 
manufacture or use a given product by applying such teaching. Where such teaching results 
from a product put on the market, the person skilled in the art will have to rely on his general 
technical knowledge to gather all information enabling him to prepare the said product. 
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Where it is possible for the skilled person to discover the composition or the internal 
structure of the product and to reproduce it without undue burden, then both the product and 
its composition or internal structure become state of the art. […]  
There is no support in the EPC for the additional requirement […] that the public should 
have particular reasons for analysing a product put on the market, in order to identify its 
composition or internal structure. According to Article 54(2) EPC the state of the art shall be 
held to comprise everything made available to the public. It is the fact that direct and 
unambiguous access to some particular information is possible, which makes the latter 
available, whether or not there is any reason for looking for it”299.  
With regards to the availability of biological material, the Board has had to assess whether the 
customary exchange of material within the scientific community could be an obstacle to the 
novelty threshold. Even when institutional policies encouraging free exchange of biological 
material can be substantiated, the existence of such policies have not been considered as making 
the material “publicly available” for the purposes of patentability, whether contractual restrictions 
applied to the material or not300. Notwithstanding this objective evaluation of the state of the art, its 
time constraints have been thoroughly discussed in relevant case law, leading the Board to state 
that the publication of a document during the priority interval would constitute prior art for the 
application claiming such priority301. For the purposes of establishing prior art, the EPC text itself 
gives some indication with regards to scientific publications or other disclosures of the innovative 
product or process. Indeed, Article 55 states that “a disclosure of the invention shall not be taken 
into consideration if it occurred no earlier than six months preceding the filing of the European 
patent application and if it was due to, or in consequence of: an evident abuse in relation to the 
applicant or its legal predecessor, […] an international exhibition”. The date to be taken into 
account for the calculation of the six months period has been confirmed to be the date of the actual 
filing of the patent application (and not the priority date)302. 
However, the determination of the “state of the art” has not been solely set to be balanced against 
written disclosure in specific documents, whether scientific publications or patent applications. 
The concept for novelty in patent application, as acknowleged by Art. 54.2 of the EPC, also allows 
the test to be run “in any other way”. In this regard, the EPO case law has highlighted that 
“common general knowledge” whether found in writing, or simply as a part of the “unwritten 
mental furniture of the notional person skilled in the art” could also be used to overturn the 
patentability of an invention, as long as proof of its existence could be brought by documentary or 
oral evidence, and its content be obtained without a comprehensive search303. At least two high 
profile cases have raised the issue of whether naturally occurring biological material already used 
by man and known to foreign communities would satisfy the novelty inquiry, in the infamous 
cases involving the so-called Neem tree patent in 2000 and corn plants with improved oil 
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 composition in 2004
304
. In a parallel fashion, the reach of prior art in plant innovation has also 
been considerably tense in the example of Oryza longistaminata, a wild rice variety from Mali, 
which will be studied further in Chapters 7 and 14
305
. 
A non-obvious invention capable of industrial application 
Novel inventions ought also to be non-obvious or involve an inventive step, while being 
capable of industrial application in order to qualify for patent protection. These criteria, taken 
collectively, may serve as watchdogs to ensure that patents are not granted on abstractions with 
very little technical appeal, but that they rather foster the development of useful products and 
processes. Taken individually, they entail different checklists. The gauge of inventive step 
requires a jump from the state of the art or the public domain sufficient enough to justify the grant 
of temporary monopoly. Referred to as non-obviousness in the United States and focusing on the 
particularities of the result
306
, the criteria stems in Europe from Article 56 of the EPC, according to 
which the invention needs to be “not obvious to a person skilled in the art”. The tresholds of 
obviousness is thus measured with regards to an individual’s mastering of the state of the art. This 
slight difference may in practice make a great difference in an inventor’s chance at patentability, 
as the gauge is compared once again to the state of the art, but also to those skilled individuals who 
might have developed the same invention, rather than just the products’ contribution to said state 
of art. Once again, applying the inventive step criteria to biotechnological inventions has proven 
quite tricky, especially in the “old continent”. In a leading case regarding the Genentech patent307, 
granted on a human tissue protein that helps the dissolution of blood cloths, the EPO most 
imperatively defined “notional skilled persons” restrictively, and considered they were gifted with 
high levels of ingenuity in the knowledge intensive sector of biotechnology
308
. It deemed that 
having at least five other research teams working on the same material towards the same goals, 
using the same technology, would preclude the existence of such an inventive step. On the 
contrary, the United States’ system rather focuses on the non-obvious results of research and 
development to the eyes of an expert. Claiming “a specific recombinant DNA sequence if all of 
the techniques necessary to produce it are known” would be obvious and therefore could not fall 
under patent protection
309
.  
As a result of persistent case-law, the EPO’s Guidelines have set out a quite complete picture of 
the “notional skilled person”, as someone “presumed to be a skilled practitioner in the relevant 
field of technology, who is possessed of average knowledge and ability and is aware of what was 
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common general knowledge in the art at the relevant date […], presumed to have had access to 
everything in the "state of the art", in particular the documents cited in the search report, and to 
have had at his disposal the means and capacity for routine work and experimentation which are 
normal for the field of technology in question, […] involved in constant development in his 
technical field […], expected to look for suggestions in neighbouring and general technical fields 
[while it sometimes may be] more appropriate to think in terms of a group of persons, e.g. a 
research or production team, rather than a single person”310. This notion was recalibrated to the 
needs of biotechnology, since the Board took the view that the skilled person could not be 
expected to be a Nobel prize winner, but rather a scientist or a team of scientists carrying out of 
experimental work by routine means within the framework of the normal practice of filling gaps in 
knowledge by the application of existing knowledge:  
“The relevant question in relation to inventive step is whether, starting from the prior art 
information referred to in point 4 above, and based on other relevant prior art knowledge, the 
skilled person would have arrived in an obvious manner at the said recombinant DNA 
molecule, and would have reasonably expected so to arrive. […] Given the rather confused 
technical circumstances, in the board's judgement, the skilled person would have had no 
reasonable expectation of successfully finding of the gp50 gene identified in the document 
within the known segment of the PRV genome, nor of successfully cloning and expressing 
it”311. 
The notion of inventive step, balanced against the ability of a notional skilled person’s ability, also 
involves the assessment of the technical feature of the invention, which has been elevated to the 
rank of an explicit requirement by the 2000 revisions to the EPC, as aforementioned in the 
definition of an “invention”. The main issue regarding the evaluation of the inventive step (rather 
than the differentiation of an invention from a discovery) relates to the treatment of inventions 
consisting of a mix of both technical and non-technical features, where the dominance of non-
technical aspects would not preclude patent protection. Indeed,  
“An invention consisting of a mixture of technical and non-technical features and having 
technical character as a whole is to be assessed with respect to the requirement of inventive 
step by taking account of all those features which contribute to said technical character 
whereas features making no such contribution cannot support the presence of inventive 
step”312. 
The requirement regarding industrial applicability in Europe, or utility in the United States, 
maintains in essence the technical nature of inventions, and has in general not proven problematic 
in most fields of innovation. This has, once again, not been the case of biotechnological 
inventions, both sides of the Atlantic. Authors and patent offices have put forward the fact that 
inventions relying on living organisms or biological processes should “perform a function”. 
Determining a “function” has thus been seen as a condition for the protection of new gene 
sequences or fragments. This particular bottleneck mostly emerged in the 1990’s, during the 
debate over the patentability of “expressed sequence tags” (EST), which represent partial gene 
fragments with no known or identified uses. “Central to the question of industrial application for 
                                                                    
 
310
 Guidelines for Examination, European Patent Convention, Part G, Chapter 7.3, “Person skilled in the art”.  
311
 Technical Board of Appeals, European Patent Office, Pseudorabies/UPJOHN, T-0791/96, 15.11.1999 
312
 Technical Board of Appeals, European Patent Office, Two Identities/Comvik, T-0641/00, 26
th
 September 2002.  
CHAP. 3 Plant-related IPR 
81 
 claims to gene sequences or proteins is adequate description of their function, [as] merely 
describing existence and structure is not enough”313.  This emphasis on the description of a 
function has been taken on through another legal conundrum, having regards to wheter protection 
should be extended to products that contain the protected innovation, whether a product or a 
process. Indeed, “to the extent that the patent system allows that DNA sequences are claimed per 
se, even referring to the function of the sequence […], all uses of the protected sequence would 
constitute an infringement if the consent of the right holder was absent”314, without distinguishing 
whether it performs its function or not.  
Outside of Specific Subject-Matter Exclusions (Excluded Subject-matter) 
Patent eligibility criteria need to fall outside of nationally defined subject-matter exclusions, based 
on ethical grounds and greater considerations of merit and justice as to the appropriateness of the 
patent award
315
. These exceptions relate first to morality or the "ordre public", and also additional 
subject-matter exclusions specific to living organisms. Situated above and afore the grant of any 
exclusive title over an innovative product or process, ethical considerations regarding the 
patentability of life per se have been carved in the flexibilities recognised in Article 27 §2 and §3 
of the TRIPS Agreement, as well as articles 53 of the EPC, and 35 U.S.C §101
316
. These 
provisions allow States to exclude altogether certain inventions from the realm of patent 
protection, and are frequently observed in national systems “where questions are asked first and 
patents granted later”317.  
According to Article 27§3b of TRIPS, “plants and animals other than micro-organisms, and 
essentially biological processes for the production of plants or animals other than non-
biological and microbiological processes” may also be excluded from patent protection.  
These exclusions are once again a national regulatory choice. The breadth of claims allowed 
through patents thus significantly varies from one national order to the other, especially with 
regards to biological or plant-related inventions that molecular plant breeding science is concerned 
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with. Some commentators have nonetheless argued “these exceptions were unlikely to allow states 
to derogate from the spirit of the treaty, which gives full IPR protection over living organisms”318. 
Patentability requirements relating to the "biomatter itself", whether non-living material such as 
amino acids, enzymes or DNA molecules, or living, such as cells and microorganisms, remain in 
this context extremely intricate to assess and apply
319. In the 1960’s, the Indian government, as a 
response to the high drug prices in its national market, “designed its patent law in a way which 
would help lower drug prices”320. It granted patents for processes used in the production of 
pharmaceuticals, but “not for chemical compounds themselves”, an option that is arguably not 
available to States bound by the terms of the TRIPS Agreement any longer. Indeed, the flexibility 
offered by its minimal standards is stiffer, as biological material should as a principle fall under 
the scope of patent eligible products. TRIPS-compliant exclusion options have nonetheless been 
used in the European legal order.  
Plant varieties 
The first potentially excludable subject-matter relates to plant varieties, in a move to avoid double 
protection in legal order where plant breeders’ rights are awarded on plant varieties. Such is the 
case of the 1973 European Patent Convention, which precludes patent protection for plant 
varieties, in order to avoid double protection under both patent and PVP legislation. As a result,  
“European patents shall not be granted in respect of:  […] (b) plant or animal varieties or 
essentially biological processes for the production of plants or animals; this provision shall 
not apply to microbiological processes or the products thereof” (EPC 1973 and 2000, Art. 
53).   
The first issue has been the definition of a plant variety and the reach of such concept in patent 
law. The EPO has found, through a comparative analysis with the relevant provisions of the 
UPOV Conventions (especially article 2.2 of the 1961 text), that the idiom described a 
"multiplicity of plants which are largely the same in their characteristics and remain the same 
within specific tolerances after every propagation or every propagation cycle"
321
. With the advent 
of biotechnology, a new issue arose as to whether product claims that extended farther than plant 
varieties and were not limited to a sole plant variety, and could therefore apply to all plants, could 
be included in this exception or be considered within the realm of patentability. In the 
aforementioned Novartis decision, the Technical Board of Appeal had refused to grant patent 
protection as  
“[It] could not accept the appellant's argument that a claim comprising more than a single 
variety was permissible. It did not appear to the Board to comply with the normal rules of 
logic. If the argument were accepted, the prohibition of Article 53(b) EPC could be avoided 
by drafting a claim to a plant with some characteristics of any actual embodiment left 
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 unspecified. The concept that specific embodiments of an invention, namely the actual plant 
varieties, should not be patentable, but that it should be possible to have a broad claim to 
plants, the scope of which would include all such varieties, was a notion quite alien to patent 
law in general. It would leave a fundamental anomaly at the heart of patent law as it related 
to plants”322.  
In this contextual prospect of double protection that “the Community Plant Variety Office (CPVO) 
preferred the approach according to which a claim covering, or potentially covering, a plant 
variety should be rejected whether or not the variety was the product of a microbiological 
process. The exclusion of plant varieties from patentability would be seriously undermined if 
it could be circumvented simply by formulating claims sufficiently widely to avoid express 
reference to an individual plant variety. On the other hand, the CPVO stated that they had no 
difficulty with the acceptance of claims in relation to plant material not in the fixed form of a 
plant variety which would admit the possibility of protecting a plant variety containing a 
patented invention”323. 
It is in this context that the Enlarged Board of Appeals declared that “a claim wherein specific 
plant varieties are not individually claimed is not excluded from patentability under Article 
53(b), of the European Patent Convention (EPC) even though such claim may embrace plant 
varieties. The exception to patentability in Article 53(b), 1st half-sentence, EPC applies to 
plant varieties irrespective of the way in which they were produced. Therefore, plant 
varieties containing genes introduced into an ancestral plant by recombinant gene technology 
are excluded from patentability”324.  
This restrictive interpretation to potential claims, and arguably extensive yet “logical” approach to 
the exclusion of plant varieties from patentability was nonetheless seemingly cracked open by 
article 4§1 of the EU Biotech Directive, which states that “plants and animals” shall not be 
patentable, yet patents ought to be granted to inventions concerning plant and animals “if the 
technical feasibility of the invention is not confined to a particular plant or animal variety”. 
(European Directive 98/44/EC, Art.4§1). This confinement criterion is defined as a “technical” 
one in the Preamble of the regulatory instrument, hinting at a considerably enlarged benchmark 
with the possibilities of genetic engineering and molecular biology. Furthermore, the Preamble 
specifies,  
“a plant grouping which is characterised by a particular gene (and not its whole genome) is 
not covered by the protection of new varieties and is therefore not excluded from 
patentability even if it comprises new varieties of plants” (European Directive 98/44/EC, 
Preamble, §31).   
This approach potentially not only increases the scenarios of co-existence of patents and plant 
variety protection certificates on a specific plant grouping, but also increases the prospective 
overlaps between the two, as the former may be granted over specific genotypic information, and 
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the second on the entire phenotype that arises from the expression of the whole genotype. 
Essentially biological processes 
Notwithstanding the tricky relationship between plant varieties and patents, the issue of patentable 
subject-matter is rendered even more complex since these inventions relates to living organisms 
and related processes, which are directly targeted by yet another formal exclusion from 
patentability. Non-biological and microbiological processes steadily constitute the “cornerstone of 
the biotechnology industry” and their referral in the formulation of the strong property paradigm 
provides “very broad scope for patent rights over biotechnological products and processes325. In 
this sense, it has also been argued that most if not all products developed through genetic 
engineering and microbiological processes are patentable
326
, even though the reach of such 
statement has been re-assessed before the judiciary. 
According to the EPO Guidelines, “biological material which is isolated from its natural 
environment or produced by means of a technical process even if it previously occurred in nature” 
can fall under patent protection, just as “plants or animals if the technical feasibility of the 
invention is not confined to a particular plant or animal variety”, and also “a microbiological or 
other technical process, or a product obtained by means of such a process other than a plant or 
animal variety”327. Recent decisions of the Enlarged Board of Appeal have nonetheless proven the 
complexity of practical realities
328
. The issue especially arose with regards to molecular-assisted 
selection efforts that include complex and technical steps, which might be considered as non-
microbiological and thus patentable processes
329
.  The standard definition of the term "essentially 
biological process “within the meaning of Article 53(b) EPC 1973 was developed as a concept  
“to be judged on the basis of the essence of the invention taking into account the totality of 
human intervention and its impact on the result achieved”. It is the opinion of the Board 
that the necessity for human intervention alone is not yet a sufficient criterion for its not 
being "essentially biological". Human interference may only mean that the process is not a 
"purely biological" process, without contributing anything beyond a trivial level. It is 
further not a matter simply of whether such intervention is of a quantitative or qualitative 
character. […] In the present case, which presents a multistep process, each single step as 
such may be characterised as biological in a scientific sense but, as the Board stated, the 
facts clearly indicate that the claimed process for the preparation of hybrid plants represent 
an essential modification of known biological and classical breeders processes, and the 
efficiency and high yield associated with the product give evidence of technological 
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 character
330
. The qualification of a process as ‘essentially biological” would then be “on 
the basis of the essence of the invention, taking into account the totality of human 
intervention and its impact on the results achieved”. 
The so-called “Lubrizol principles” were confirmed and further refined by the Technical Board in 
the 1995 Plant Genetic Systems case
331, which favoured an intermediate approach where “a 
process involving at least one essential technical step which could not be carried out without 
human intervention and which had decisive impact on the final result would be patentable”. As a 
result, a process claim was patentable because even though only the first steps used in the 
production of the plant were to be considered ‘non-biological’ (e.g. recombinant DNA). These 
nevertheless had to have a decisive impact on the final result, notwithstanding the subsequent 
‘biological’ steps of regenerating and replicating the plants and seeds332. Two infamous and 
eagerly awaited cases since 2007 have shed a little more light on the issue. Cases G1/08
333
 and 
G2/07
334
, respectively opposing the State of Israel against Unilever with regards to a process 
involving crossing and selection of tomatoes, and opposing Syngenta, Limagrain against Plant 
BioSciences regarding a similar invention, were merged by the Enlarged Board of Appeals, which 
gave its verdict in 2010. The patents both concerned breeding methods, respectively breeding 
broccoli with anti-cancerogenic effects, and tomatoes with a trait that allowed the drying of fruits 
on the vine, allowing for substantial savings, and ignited twenty four amicus curiae submissons to 
the EPO. The conclusions of the Enlarged Board of Appeals went on to assert that: 
« 1. A non-microbiological process for the production of plants which contains or consists 
of the steps of sexually crossing the whole genomes of plants and of subsequently selecting 
plants is in principle excluded from patentability as being "essentially biological" within 
the meaning of Article 53(b) EPC.  
2. Such a process does not escape the exclusion of Article 53(b) EPC merely because it 
contains, as a further step or as part of any of the steps of crossing and selection, a step of a 
technical nature which serves to enable or assist the performance of the steps of sexually 
crossing the whole genomes of plants or of subsequently selecting plants. 
3. If, however, such a process contains within the steps of sexually crossing and selecting 
an additional step of a technical nature, which step by itself introduces a trait into the 
genome or modifies a trait in the genome of the plant produced, so that the introduction or 
modification of that trait is not the result of the mixing of the genes of the plants chosen for 
sexual crossing, then the process is not excluded from patentability under Art 53(b) EPC335. 
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The decisions adopted a surprisingly extensive interpretation of statutory exceptions, extending de 
facto their scope to all methods “which contain the steps of sexual crossing”, and seem to limit the 
technical step measurement to those steps that do not enable or assist sexual crossing. This means 
that all molecular-marker assisted breeding processes will fail to escape the EPC 53(b) exclusion. 
However, the rulings also clearly state that the claims on the plants obtained through these 
methods remained valid, if, as aforementioned, the claim is not confined to as specific plant 
variety. 
In the same lines, Article 4§1 of the Directive also formally excludes “essentially biological 
processes for the production of plants or animals” from patent eligibility, defined as 
processes consisting “entirely of natural phenomena such as crossing or selection” 
(European Directive 98/44/EC, Art. 1§2).  
Such exclusion nonetheless operates “without prejudice to the patentability of inventions, which 
concern a microbiological, or other technical process or a product obtained by means of 
such a process” (European Directive 98/44/EC, Article 4§3).  
According to the Preamble of the European Directive, the patentable nature of a technical process 
may not necessarily extend to the product, since “if an invention consists only in genetically 
modifying a particular plant variety, and if a new plant variety is bred, it will still be excluded 
from patentability even if the genetic modification is the result not of an essentially biological 
process but of a biotechnological process” (European Directive 98/44/EC, Preamble, §32).  
Even in the presence of detailed regulation, the definition of the exact contours of patentability 
exclusions has become an increasingly complex task. In molecular plant breeding, the patentability 
of a process isolating a substance already existing in nature seems to be generally accepted, even 
though recent case law before the European Patent Office has proven the complexity of practical 
realities
336
. For instance, innovative breeding processes or tools may retain a biological character 
yet constitute important technological leaps forward. This is especially true with regards to 
molecular selection efforts pertaining complex and technical steps, which might at first sight be 
considered as non-microbiological and thus patentable processes
337
.  
3.2.2. Patent Width and the Bundle of Exclusive Rights  
“Mainstream Anglo-American legal philosophy” understands property as a “bundle of rights”, 
combining Wesley Hohfeld’s approach, where “any right in rem should be regarded as a myriad of 
personal rights between individuals”, and A.M. Honoré’s “description of the incidents of 
ownership”338. This conception adds supplementary layers to the classical approach to property 
rights as a defined individual’s exclusive rights to exclude others from enjoying the tangible good 
falling under a deed or title. When beheld in the realm of intangibles, such bundle of rights theory 
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 ascribes one to consider the range of prerogatives that are granted to titleholders, especially those 
that may allow one to refuse access to protected knowledge, or allow one to condition its use to 
overbearing compensation from follow-on users. 
Prerogatives awarded to right holders 
Patents, once having passed the initial requirements set out by the aforementioned criteria, convey 
a number of prerogatives to the applicant. First and foremost, before delving into the extent of 
such prerogatives, one must assess the extent of protection granted on a given patent. There are 
diverging principles surrounding the determination of such extent of protection, as no real 
consensus exists on the interpretation of patent claims, even within the EPC legal order. Indeed, 
the TRIPS Agreement remains completely silent on the means through which literal infringements 
should be determined. While the United Kingdom has been known to interpret claims quite 
literaly, Germany tends to interpret them broadly, especially when determining the existence of 
literal infringement, even though a version of the US doctrine of equivalents has been seemingly 
adopted in the framework of the EPC. In light of such doctrine, the scope of a given claim can 
extend beyond literal wording, identifying the existence of infringement in cases where merely 
elements of the patented product or process are contained within a device or process. In any case, 
the EPC’s more recent amendments have tried to set the record straight:  
“The extent of the protection conferred by a European patent or a European patent 
application shall be determined by the claims. Nevertheless, the description and drawings 
shall be used to interpret the claims” (EPC, Article 69§1).   
Most importantly, a parallel approach to the doctrine of equivalents was enshrined through the 
“Protocol on the Interpretation of Article 69 EPC”, adopted in 2001 and which forms an integral 
part of the Convention states:  
“Article 1: General principles 
Article 69 should not be interpreted as meaning that the extent of the protection conferred 
by a European patent is to be understood as that defined by the strict, literal meaning of 
the wording used in the claims, the description and drawings being employed only for the 
purpose of resolving an ambiguity found in the claims. Nor should it be taken to mean that 
the claims serve only as a guideline and that the actual protection conferred may extend to 
what, from a consideration of the description and drawings by a person skilled in the art, 
the patent proprietor has contemplated. On the contrary, it is to be interpreted as defining 
a position between these extremes which combines a fair protection for the patent 
proprietor with a reasonable degree of legal certainty for third parties. 
Article 2: Equivalents 
For the purpose of determining the extent of protection conferred by a European patent, 
due account shall be taken of any element which is equivalent to an element specified in the 
claims” (Protocol on the Interpretation of Article 69 EPC).  
Not only the interpretative and binding provisions clarify that the reality of claim interpretation 
lies between a literal reading and an unnecessarily broad one, it also hails that certain specific 
elements contained in the claim, but not forming its entirety, can be taken into account when 
determining potential infringements. Such non-literal and arguably broad approach aims to protect 
the patentee and its prerogatives, first against linguistic imperfections, and secondly against 
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unforeseen technological advances as the full potential scope and impact of the invention may not 
be known at the time of filing339. By allowing for infringements to be noted only in presence of 
certain elements contained in the claim, it intends to reward an inventor who has made a 
significant contribution to the state of the art, and enlarges the scope of protection awarded by the 
exclusive titles. 
Patent law has been generally described as not granting titleholders any rights to exploit the 
invention, but have rather been formulated as a negative right to exclude others from engaging in 
certain activities without their consent. This formulation might be misleading, in so far as the 
patent rights in effect “creates a zone of non-interference in which the patent holder may exercise 
the right by undertaking activities of commercial exploitation”340. In this sense, the right to exploit 
the invention is inherently encompassed in patent protection, which could rather be described as a 
bundle of rights awarded to right holders, describing their hold over the uses made of the invention 
by third parties.  
In this sense, article 28 of TRIPS provides that product patents confer their owners the exclusive 
rights “to prevent third parties not having the owner's consent from the acts of: making, 
using, offering for sale, selling, or importing for these purposes that product”, while 
process patents encompass the rights “to prevent third parties not having the owner's 
consent from the act of using the process, and from the acts of: using, offering for sale, 
selling, or importing for these purposes at least the product obtained directly by that 
process”.  
Furthermore, §2 provides that “patent owners shall also have the right to assign, or transfer by 
succession, the patent and to conclude licensing contracts” (TRIPS Agreement, Art.28). 
The European Patent Convention understands the rights awarded by patents quite broadly, and 
leaves the effective contours to be designed by national laws. Indeed, the rights conferred by a 
European patent are as follows: 
“1) A European patent shall, subject to the provisions of paragraph 2, confer on its 
proprietor from the date on which the mention of its grant is published in the European 
Patent Bulletin, in each Contracting State in respect of which it is granted, the same rights 
as would be conferred by a national patent granted in that State.  
(2) If the subject-matter of the European patent is a process, the protection conferred by 
the patent shall extend to the products directly obtained by such process.  
(3) Any infringement of a European patent shall be dealt with by national law” (EPC 1973 
and 2000, Art. 64). 
The second indent of the article is the most interesting, as it embraces the extension of protection 
of process patents to products obtained through such process, quite impressively enlarging the 
rules of appropriation embedded in the law. The range of infringing acts does not widely differ 
from one legal order to the other, yet the trigger for infringement proceedings to be ignited may. 
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 Indeed, in the United Kingdom for instance, the infringement of process patents depends on the 
knowledge of the alleged infringer, while such prerequisite is not sought after when facing product 
patents, where an “absolute liability” threshold has been favoured341. The reach of protection 
granted to products has as a result proven a tricky issue in the case of biotechnological inventions, 
especially product patents covering gene sequences.  
“It is generally accepted as a principle underlying the EPC that a patent which claims a 
physical entity per se, confers absolute protection upon such physical entity; that is, 
wherever it exists and whatever its context (and therefore for all uses of such physical entity, 
whether known or unknown). It follows that if it can be shown that such physical entity(e.g. 
a compound) is already in the state of the art (for example in the context of a particular 
activity), then a claim to the physical entity per se lacks novelty. It also follows that a claim 
to a particular use of a compound is in effect a claim to the physical entity (the compound) 
only when it is being used in the course of the particular physical activity (the use), this 
being an additional technical feature of the claim. Such a claim therefore confers less 
protection than a claim to the physical entity per se”342.  
Under traditional patent law principles, product claims extend to all instances where such product 
manifests itself, and would cover both recognised and potential uses of the product. This stance 
has however been alleviated in the field of biotechnology, where patent protection has been 
granted to “alternative uses of a particular compound”, thereby restricting the wide-scoped reach 
of the aforementioned principle, all the while avoiding investment in further research into the 
patented compound with the goal of merely enhancing the value of the original or “first use” 
claim
343
. It should be noted here that in Europe, products-by-process claims are not accepted, i.e. 
the novelty of the process cannot normally be used to demonstrate the novelty of a product, even 
though the protection awarded to the process may extend to products obtained using such process, 
as shall be studied below. Faced with unclear case law, the European Patent Office, ruling on the 
so-called Soybeans case introduced by Monsanto
344, recently took a “clear standpoint in favour of 
purpose-bound product protection” to limit an extensive reach of prerogatives345. 
Rights awarded to third-party users 
Intellectual property rights systems are designed as coherent and efficient semi-commons; and 
they therefore need to provide for limits in the scope of awarded monopolies, as a necessary part to 
the overall design
346
. In this sense, the copyright system provides for instance for the “fair use” 
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defence against infringement claims, which “should not be considered a bizarre, occasionally 
tolerated departure from the grand conception of the copyright monopoly” but rather a critical 
element to its utilitarian efficiency and coherence
347
. All patent systems similarly provide for in-
built boundaries to the exclusive rights granted to innovators, which are critical to the patent semi-
commons’ legitimacy and efficiency.  
Quite straightforwardly, the first frontier stems from the limitation of these prerogatives in time. 
Indeed, although the term of protection tends to vary from one legal order to the next, all patent 
systems provide for such a limited term. The TRIPS Agreement states, in its Article 33, that the 
minimum term of patent protection “shall not end before the expiration of a period of twenty 
years counted from the filing date”. When stringent regulatory approval mechanisms exist for 
products to be granted access to markets, so-called “Supplementary Protection Certificates” have 
been envisaged so as to ensure the full exploitation of patent terms. This option was for instance 
beheld in the case of medicinal and also plant protection products in the European Union
348
. 
Notwithstanding the inherent difficulties that have arisen when assessing the extent to which the 
protected invention and the product to be authorised are the same
349
, such longer protection term 
has been advocated for by integrated biotechnology giants for genetically-engineered crops 
alongside plant protection products.  
Inventions related to plant improvement that mostly rely on the use of living material have also 
raised an additional issue, which does not directly relate to the question of patentability itself, but 
rather concerns the efficiency of disclosure with regards to such material, and therefore to the 
need to ensure the sufficient balance of private reward and public interest. Indeed, one of the 
essential counterparts of granting such an important artificial monopoly to inventors is that the 
invention would be disclosed and not held as a trade secret. However, such disclosure had to be 
adapted in the case of living material so as to ensure that it operates “in a manner sufficiently clear 
and complete for it to be carried out by a person skilled in the art”, in accordance with Article 83 
of the EPC.  As a result,  
 (1) If an invention involves the use of or concerns biological material which is not 
available to the public and which cannot be described in the European patent application 
in such a manner as to enable the invention to be carried out by a person skilled in the art, 
the invention shall only be regarded as being disclosed as prescribed in Article 83 if: 
(a) a sample of the biological material has been deposited with a recognised depositary 
institution on the same terms as those laid down in the Budapest Treaty on the 
International Recognition of the Deposit of Microorganisms for the Purposes of Patent 
Procedure of 28 April 1977 not later than the date of filing of the application;  
(b) the application as filed gives such relevant information as is available to the applicant 
on the characteristics of the biological material;  
(c) the depositary institution and the accession number of the deposited biological material 
are stated in the application, and  
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 (d) where the biological material has been deposited by a person other than the applicant, 
the name and address of the depositor are stated in the application and a document is 
submitted to the European Patent Office providing evidence that the depositor has 
authorised the applicant to refer to the deposited biological material in the application and 
has given his unreserved and irrevocable consent to the deposited material being made 
available to the public in accordance with Rule 33” (Implementing Regulations to the 
EPC, Rule 31, Deposit of biological material). 
This specific requirement has however been interpreted quite narrowly so as to ensure that the 
incentive to apply for patents in living material remained intact. Indeed, no obligation to deposit 
material is triggered if the invention can be repeated on the basis of the written description, even if 
this should be a much more cumbersome way than by merely growing the deposited micro-
organism350, unless such “undue burden” is characterised by uncertainty of outcome and not just 
lengthiness351. The essential question is thus is this context to determine whether a notional skilled 
person is reliably able to replicate the same organism based on the information provided in the 
application, and to impose the material’s deposit if such additional step is proven necessary.  
However, ensuring the temporal limitation of the monopoly and the disclosure of its subject are 
not the only mechanisms used by the patent paradigm to balance the uncompetitively exclusive 
rights it grants. “The core unifying feature of the various limits which are imposed on the exercise 
of patent rights is our old friend, the public interest”, urging action when the invention is not 
exploited or the technical details are kept out of the public domain
352
. As a result of such premise, 
Article 31 of TRIPS allows  
“uses without the authorisation of the right holder”, where, according to national law, 
“the subject matter of a patent [can be allowed to be used] without the authorisation of the 
right holder, including use by the government or third parties authorised by the 
government”, if a number of provisions are respected. (TRIPS Agreement, Art. 31) 
The basic proviso is that such authorisation “shall be considered on its individual merits”, making 
compulsory licensing negotiations mandatory and granted by the State on a case-by case basis, 
following unsuccessful efforts of the parties to reach a licensing agreements with “reasonable 
commercial terms and conditions”. A waiver to such preliminary negotiation obligation is 
admitted in cases of “national emergency or public non-commercial uses”. Furthermore, these 
“non-exclusive” and “non-assignable” licenses’ “scope and duration shall be limited to the 
purpose of which it was authorised”, while the rightholder “shall be paid adequate remuneration 
in the circumstances of each case, taking into account the economic value of the authorisation”.  
Additional limits to the bundle of patent rights relate to the exploitation of the title in certain 
circumstances. Much like most IPR, patents are exploited through licenses and sub-licenses, under 
the belief that negotiations in the marketplace will result in the most efficient allocation of 
resources. However, a number of specific actors or specific uses of the invention may be left 
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outside of the bundle of exclusive rights, or the license negotiation may be merely postponed, in 
the name of public interest. These mechanisms operate like liability rules, and are in effect 
statutorily defined opportunities that are awarded to those actors to use the invention without a 
license, as long as they remain within the limits set out by statutes or the judiciary. Article 30 of 
TRIPS allows Members to  
“provide limited exceptions to the exclusive rights conferred by a patent, provided that 
such exceptions do not unreasonably conflict with a normal exploitation of the patent and 
do not unreasonably prejudice the legitimate interests of the patent owner, taking account 
of the legitimate interests of third parties” (TRIPS Agreement, Art. 30). 
In this context, exemptions for the use of proprietary material for research purposes are almost 
universally granted under all plant-related traditional intellectual property regimes, whether 
patents or plant breeders rights. Each national intellectual property system has its own voice on 
this particular subject, and positions remain patchy. In the United States, the research exemption is 
not even part of patent statutes, but has been rather restrictively carved by the judiciary. In the 
European legal order, the reach of the research exception seems to follow the precepts enacted in 
article 27 of the Community Patent Convention, even though the instrument has not been 
ratified
353
. Both the European Patent Convention and the EC Directive 98/44 on biotechnological 
inventions remain particularly silent on the subject, leaving the issue to be dealt with by the 
national legislator and judiciary. The experimental use defence is therefore “an area where there is 
considerable diversity of approach around the world, including within Europe”, where for instance 
the German Supreme Court has exempted “all experimental acts as long as they serve to gain 
information and thus to carry out scientific research into the subject-matter of the invention, [even 
extending] to possible new uses hitherto unknown”, while the English Patents Court rather 
considers “whether the immediate purpose of the transaction was to generate revenue or not”354. 
Belgium has then again opted for a much wider understanding of such exception, as the 2005 
amendment of article 28§1(b) of the patents law has strayed away from “experimental use” 
vocabulary, stating rather that the bundle of patent rights does not extend to “acts accomplished for 
scientific purposes on and/or with the object of the patented invention”355.  
Last but not least, much alike plant variety protection, patent protection is also considered to be 
exhausted in certain legislative orders that apply the so-called “first sale doctrine”, in accordance 
to which the monopoly rights cannot extend farther than the sale of products with the consent of 
the right holder. This doctrine is not tackled by the TRIPS Agreement, which leaves the issue to be 
determined at national level in its Article 6, just as the European Patent Convention, which is 
surprisingly silent on the issue. The possibility to de facto restrict the prerogatives of patent 
holders in the case of market release has in this regard been viewed as one of the flexibilities 
offered by the dominant patent paradigm. A flexibility that is commonly used in the United States, 
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 but also in the United Kingdtom, Denmark, Germany, Ireland, Italy and the Netherlands, and is 
applied without much stir with regards to sales involving a single jurisdiction356. Belgium and 
France on the other hand, have recourse to the concept of a very limited “right of destination” in 
accordance to which supply of products can be surrounded by conditions on specific markets or 
users, without giving the ability to be used as an opposition to resale. The issue of parallel imports 
has caused much more headache, especially in view of the different types of approaches set out by 
national patent laws.  
3.3. Other Intellectual Property Tools used in Plant Improvement 
Alongside the more traditionally used instruments of intellectual property for the protection of 
plant-related innovations, namely plant variety rights and patents, a number of other 
informational protection tools have also growingly appeared in plant breeding research and 
development, such as trademarks, copyrights, and trade secrets, accordingly influencing the chains 
and costs of agrobiodiversity innovation. Within a sector that is largely knowledge and technology 
intensive such as the seed industry, there is still growing recourse to trademarks, even though 
these instruments merely protect names and other symbols solely denoting products or 
technologies, and not the technologies themselves. Much of the widespread innovations are 
actually trademarked in practice, such as Keygene's AFLP markers or "Breeding by Design" 
model
357
, a trademarked approach to plant breeding that encompasses ever-evolving prospects of 
selection and breeding methods. Trademark registrations primarily operate as a means to 
distinguish products from their competitors, but also as powerful communications tools, 
warranting product quality on account of a stronger brand image
358
. Within this growingly 
marketing oriented approach, a number of plant varieties have also been trademarked, such as 
Syngenta's brown tomatoes, where two specific varieties already protected under PVP have 
additionally been regrouped under the Kumato brand, visible to the very end consumer in its 
supermarket packaging. This increasingly prevalent practice exemplifies the novel marketing 
strategies favoured by companies wishing to push their products forward through brands, 
consequently enlarging their intellectual property portfolios.  
Copyrights on the other hand, are another form of grants and reservations attributed to physical or 
moral persons over the literary, scientific or artistic creations of their mind without much formal 
administrative process, entailing a prohibition against copying rather than monopoly rights as 
such. While remaining a rarity, they are yet becoming important in the field of plant breeding on 
account of the growing recourse to databases holding genetic and phenotypic information. Even 
though these types of protection do not directly affect the trade of products that have been 
developed using the protected information, they still appear as an additional formal requirement to 
be taken into account in crop genetic improvement research costs.  
Trade secrets protect "formulas, practices, processes, designs, instruments, patterns, or other 
compilations of information that can be used as competitive advantages in order to obtain artificial 
lead-time" through the secrecy and confidentiality surrounding them. Regulated at the national 
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level, trade secret laws retain wide-ranging characteristics, and have often been used for the 
protection of inbred lines used in controlled hybridisation processes within the plant breeding 
industry, through the non-release of the hybrids' parents, even when these have been planted 
especially for field trials, as the secret does not commonly have to be absolute but be publicly 
unavailable
359
. This practice has propelled litigation alleging trade secret misappropriations with 
regards to parental hybrid lines, most notably the case having opposed Pioneer Hi-Bred and 
Holden Foundation Seeds, which did not assess whether genetic information could qualify as a 
trade secret, but rather showed that when such reality is undisputed for the parties concerned, this 
peculiar tool could effectively be used to protect breeding lines, side by side with patents and 
PVP
360
. Relying heavily on the physical security that may cover the companies' facilities, trade 
secrets may also cover new research programs or technologies under development, but also those 
aspects of plant biotechnology that cannot be detected in the final plant product, such as markers 
and regeneration methods, thereby avoiding the disclosure requirements entailed in PVP or patent 
protection
361
. The withholding of technical information undisclosed through the recourse to trade 
secrets may thus in truth not serve the public interest, even though society may still benefit from 
the commercialisation of the innovation itself, thereby reinforcing the case for strong disclosure-
based intellectual property tools such as patents or PVP
362
.  Trade secrets are particularly 
important for the newest agrobiodiversity innovators, since the regulatory data that is attached to 
plant protection products and genetically engineered crops is protected through this tool.  Article 
39§2 TRIPS provides that  
“natural and legal persons shall have the possibility of preventing information lawfully 
within their control from being disclosed to, acquired by, or used by others without their 
consent in a manner contrary to honest commercial practices so long as such information 
(a) is secret, (b) has commercial value because it is secret; and (c) has been subject to 
reasonable steps under the circumstances, by the person lawfully in control of the 
information, to keep it secret” (TRIPS Agreement, Art. 39§2). 
Article 39§3 specifically addresses the submission of undisclosed test or other data for the market 
approval of pharmaceutical or agricultural chemical products, requiring from Member States  
“to protect such data against unfair commercial use, [especially] against disclosure, except 
when necessary to protect the public” (TRIPS Agreement, Art. 39§3). 
So-called “regulatory data” holders are granted “exclusivity” for ten years both in the United 
States and the European Union, even though the former provides for fifteen years of data 
compensation, and the latter gives fives additional years of protection for new data. A quite recent 
but worryingly crucial feature of the molecular plant breeding property paradigm relates to the fate 
of the extremely complex and costly regulatory cultivation or import approval dossiers and the 
information contained therein, with regards to those transgenic traits and varieties that will fall 
within the public domain in the following years on account of their patents' expiry, for instance in 
2014 for Roundup Ready formulations. The debates inherent to the development of so-called 
"generics" (or "biosimilars" in the pharmaceuticals industry) will heathen up especially with 
regards to the confidentiality and maintenance of national and foreign approval dossiers, as well as 
                                                                    
 
359
 R.  KJELGAARD and D. MARSH, "Intellectual Property Rights for Plants," Plant Cell 6, no. 11, 1994: pp.1524-1528. 
360
 BLAKENEY, Intellectual Property Rights and Food Security, op.cit. 
361
 XU, Molecular Plant Breeding, op.cit., p.525. 
362
 GRAHAM DUTFIELD, Intellectual Property Rights, Trade and Biodiversity  London: Earthscan, 2000, p.25. 
CHAP. 3 Plant-related IPR 
95 
 the exact definition of "generic seeds" (especially with regards to the extent to which germplasm 
combinations could be altered). 
Geographical indications may also be present within agrobiodiversity innovation chains. These 
peculiar instruments, which stand at the frail frontier between intellectual property rights and food 
quality policies, preserve a strong link with labelling requirements.  Defined by WIPO as “signs 
used on goods that have a specific geographical origin and possess qualities, reputation or 
characteristics that are essentially attributable to that origin”363, geographical indications (GI) take 
diverse forms. Even though there is a great disparity between legal frameworks protecting GIs, 
these instruments unanimously target products that have qualities linked to a specific territory. The 
link between quality and geography “varies according to the natural and cultural history of the 
resources and their transformation processes, as well as to the legal framework in which the GI 
develops”364. Appellations of origin are nonetheless aggregated at the international level in the 
context of the 1958 Lisbon Agreement, which defines this particular form of GI, as  
"the geographical denomination of a country, region, or locality, which serves to designate a 
product originating therein, the quality or characteristics of which are due exclusively or 
essentially to the geographical environment, including natural and human factors” (1958 
Lisbon Agreement, Art.2)
365
 
The TRIPS Agreement has also reified GI’s to a certain extent, urging Member States in Article 
22, to “provide the legal means for interested parties to prevent: the use of any means in the 
designation or presentation of a good that indicates or suggests that the good in question 
originates in a geographical area other than the true place of origin in a manner which 
misleads the public as to the geographical origin of the good; [and also to prevent] any use 
which constitutes an act of unfair competition” (TRIPS Agreement, Art. 22). 
Without the need for a registration process, the minimal standard for geographical indication 
protection acts therefore as a tool against the misappropriation or misuse of geographical 
information to identify the origin, quality or reputation of product. Addressing more specifically 
the potential conflicts between trademarks and geographical indications, the TRIPS Agreement, 
mostly responding the pleas stemming from the European continent, also allows for greater room 
and protection scopes for GIs in international negotiations. Indeed, GI’s are very much put forward 
within the European agricultural product quality policy, awarded on the basis of registration, in the 
form of “protected geographical indication” and “protected designation of origin”, or even through 
“traditional specialities guaranteed”366. Aside from their product quality and consumer protection 
angles, geographical indications have also been put forward as means to protect, or at least 
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recognise, both in situ conservation efforts undertaken by farmers, and also traditional 
knowledge
367
.  
CONCLUSION. The tangible balance of the strong property paradigm propelled by the 
world trade order 
The contours of the TRIPS-propelled strong property paradigm have been carved around 
expansive and layered protection realities, which nonetheless carry the same overarching goals and 
outcomes, that of greater commercial exploitation of genetic resources. Indeed, plant breeders’ 
rights and patents “are based on similar premises insofar as they both seek to give the private 
sector an incentive to enter a particular industry, as a stimulus for research and development of 
new varieties of plants”368. There is a greater prospect to see specific genetic compounds protected 
through separate yet closely interlinked angles, in terms of genetic material as a whole, and also at 
the level of the isolated and purified “useful” compound. The product-development oriented 
property paradigm has proclaimed the reign of plant variety rights awarded in accordance with the 
terms of the 1991 UPOV Conventions, as the prime specimen of an effective sui generis regime, 
which protects new, distinct, uniform and stable plant varieties’ phenotypes, and extends its reach 
to both harvested material and varieties that are essentially derived from a protected initial variety. 
In parallel, patents, which had been drawn up for inanimate products, less sequential or 
incremental processes, and non-self-replicating technologies, have been growingly applied to 
biodiversity related innovation, challenging the definitions of invention, non-obviousness (or 
inventive step) and novelty. Stretching traditional understandings of patentable subjet-matter 
directly in the definition of scientific discoveries, the state of the art or of notional skilled persons, 
the products and processes involved in plant innovation have also been accompanied by extremely 
complex patentability exclusions, which have made the navigation of the patent system a 
byzantine challenge. 
Aside from such layered and intensified protection, a relatively steady trend saw the triumph of 
negotiated third party uses against those statutorily determined exceptions. Opportunities for third 
parties to use innovations without the consent of the right holder have considerably shrunk in time, 
while the bundle of prerogatives awarded to the latter has extended, both in plant variety and 
patent protection.The parallel expansion of the realms of product protection has furthermore 
restrained the conditions designated for the lawful use of the plant-related innovation. It has 
effectively pushed for the development of iron-clawed licensing skills to be able to use improved 
agricultural biodiversity. Such premise, however justified, ought to be considered in light of the 
inherent balance of intellectual property rights, questioning whether the paradigmatic evolution 
has irrepressibly curbed the social compensation commanded by the grant of artificial lead-time to 
innovators. The double stretch in the strong property paradigm has resulted in a wince of the 
public domain, which remains crucial for follow-on innovation and arguably for food security in 
the case of agrobiodiversity innovation. 
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 PART I CONCLUSIONS. Shrinking public domain against pronounced exclusivity in a 
formal seed market 
The non-exhaustive nature of the products of crop genetic improvement, the emphasis put upon 
knowledge in this peculiarly complex research sphere, and finally the ease of reverse engineering 
possibilities have all set in motion the recognition of bundled intellectual property rights over the 
fruits of plant breeding research and to material attached thereto. These rights aim to regulate an 
innovator's hegemony over the access to the information linked to an innovative product or 
process. They also determine the conditions surrounding the product’s subsequent uses. They try 
to address untraditional forms of innovation and attempt to allocate rights over the rather new yet 
ubiquitous information goods that are used and produced by various actors along the way. 
However, this allocation game faces important challenges, coming from the conceptual tradition of 
traditional knowledge, the divergent legal traditions involved, the changing structure of all 
involved actors, the accelerating pace of resource degradation and the new sustainability model of 
resource exploitation
369
. Any property undertaking needs to carefully settle adequate protection to 
fuel innovation on one hand, and diffusion sufficient enough to counter the social costs of 
monopoly. The equilibrium act that takes centre stage in agrobiodiversity innovation confronts in 
this context the inherent lack of innovative reward in seed development on the one hand, and its 
incremental nature and the close links it entertains with vital socio-economic rights on the other. It 
needs to have due regard to past contributors of knowledge and agro-biodiversity, as well as the 
future developers of incremental knowledge and new agro-biodiversity in the entire range of 
instruments affecting these peculiar innovation chains, but also to those who improve and grow the 
seeds that embody these invisible prerogatives.  
Regulatory shifts in trade law have targeted both the tangible goods that are seeds, ensuring the 
quality, identity and purity of traded products, and their incorporeal features, ensuring that 
artificial lead-time would be awarded to innovators. However, the inherent balancing act of 
intellectual property protection, taking traditionally into account social welfare and the public 
interest next to private benefits, has been considerably shaken down by efficient forum-shopping 
and exclusivity-endowing practices. This movement came through the international reification, 
and the subsequent implementation and interpretation of the layered protection mechanisms 
entailed in the new intellectual property paradigm set by the TRIPS Agreement. Owing to the 
contentiously negotiated and imposed general characteristis of a strong intellectual property 
paradigm, those involved in plant innovation now need to navigate in a relatively unchained, or 
rather tortuously chained ocean of patents and plant variety rights. This new command also 
happens to occur in the background of a heavily controlled product market ensuring the delivery of 
quality seeds.  
The TRIPS-impelled paradigm as a result holds multiple layers of proprietary instruments over the 
main inputs of food production, seeds. It aims to protect the new innovative products of 
biotechnology, and is thus centred on strong intellectual property rights protection carved around 
enhanced plant breeders’ rights, lenient patentability requirements and wide bundles of patentee 
prerogatives. In OECD countries, plant breeders’ rights, are granted under laws enacted in view 
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of the different UPOV Conventions, mostly the 1991 text, in stand-alone national legislation. They 
confer a bundle of rights to a novel particular combination of genes manifested as a distinct, 
uniform and stable variety. They are closely and expressly linked to considerations of sequential 
innovators relying on access to improved germplasm on one hand, and of farming communities 
cultivating propagating material for their own consumption, to make ends meet, or as a viable 
commercial enterprise. The European Community Regulation 2100/94/EC reflects in this sense the 
general trend of the dominant paradigm, having notably extended the reach of breeders’ 
prerogatives to harvested material and essentially derived varieties, while considerably narrowing 
the derogative privileges awarded to farmers who wish to save protected seeds. Patents on the 
other hand tentatively offer protection for big leaps in technological achievements
370
, enabling the 
recovery of important research and development investment costs, while not completely 
obliterating technology transfer prospects. Provided the minimum protection standards of novelty, 
inventive step and industrial applicability are complied with, national statutory and jurisprudential 
decisions carve the patentability requirements and the range of prerogatives allowing right holders 
to exclude third parties to use protected inventions. De lege rata analysis shows that there are 
important differences from one legal tradition to the other, all the while demonstrating that 
patentability standards had to steadily be lowered or at least relaxed in order to accept most claims 
stemming from the world of green biotechnology within the realms of the patent paradigm
371
. The 
assessment of whether a product or process used in plant innovation constitutes a novel and non-
obvious invention capable of industrial application has not been the only contentious challenge 
posed with regards to patentability in the European legal order defined by the European Patent 
Convention and the so-called Biotech Directive 98/44/EC. Specific questions as to the reach of 
expressly excluded subject-matter (i.e. plant varieties and essentially biological processes) have 
heightened the difficulties that accompany the determination of the public domain. The nebulosity 
surrounding the reach of third-party use rights allowed under the TRIPS standards so as to uphold 
the public interest has further tainted the dominant paradigm, which is for instance assorted by a 
legally uncertain research exception. Alongside these two more traditionally used instruments for 
plant-related innovations, additional informational protection tools also growingly carve 
research and development; such as trademarks, copyrights, and trade secrets, accordingly 
influencing the chains and costs of agrobiodiversity innovation. This web of intellectual property 
rights will mainly affect subsequent plant improvement efforts by apportioning rights and 
obligations around parent germplasm in its complete phenotypic sense through individual plant 
varieties, but also around germplasm constructs, i.e. input or output gene sequences, as well as 
enabling technologies and molecular research tools that allow improvers to gather information, or 
multiply and transform plants or plant cells. 
Reified traditional intellectual property rights have slowly dismantled their inherent balance, 
favouring the development-centred generalised and pervasive contraction of artificial lead-time
372
. 
Indeed, “the effective life of the patent may be determined by the breadth of the right, rather than 
its statutory length”373, a breadth that has been reified and magnified by TRIPS, but also been 
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 expanded through practice. This trend has strained the regulatory system to its breaking point, 
and weakenened the competitive ethos it remains based upon
374
. It therefore calls for an effective 
fine-tuning of the rules of appropriation and diffusion in order to maintain successfully innovative 
and equitable agricultural biodiversity use in competitive markets. The paradigm’s shortcomings 
have been fiercely pushing for an equitable reassessment of the entire intangible protection system 
in light of the various actors involved in the diverse socio-technological context of 
agrobiodiversity innovation. The limits around biodiversity use, appropriation, production and re-
use need in this context to be clearly re-defined in accordance with the effects of these artificial 
boundaries on the practices of the entire range of plant improvers. 
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PART II  ACTOR ANALYSIS: INNOVATION CONTEXTS, AGROBIODIVERSITY 
CONSERVATION AND USE GROUPS  
In the backdrop of distinct property rights requisites, the law strives to build pioneering, efficient 
and equitable agrobiodiversity management opportunities. The dominant development oriented 
intellectual property paradigm seems nonetheless to have disrupted the inherent balance of 
between the grant of exclusive rights and the social compensation of exclusivity. It may have 
undermined the reach of the public domain that remains vital for the continuity of diverse plant 
improvement endeavours, and also for the sustainability of agricultural genetic diversity in the 
long run. We believe this is partially due to the fact that legislative action takes place out of the 
contexts it will be used in, and thereby does not sufficiently have regard to its impacts on relevant 
users of agrobiodiversity. In our case, the studied stakeholders embrace those actors engaged in 
plant improvement activities and agricultural cultivation, research and development efforts
375
. 
They may influence the collective management of agricultural biodiversity explicitly, setting up or 
acting as communities having the direct aim of conserving, using and improving PGRFA, but they 
may also do so implicitly, for instance by promoting their propagation and exchange376. They exist 
within socio-economic and technological contexts where genetic resources will effectively be 
conserved and used, within innovation systems that complement each other
377
.  
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 In this context, the innovation system metaphor  
“may be defined as the network of agents whose interactions determine the innovative 
impact of knowledge interventions including those associated with scientific research. The 
concept is now used as a kind of shorthand for the network of inter-organisational linkages 
that apparently successful countries have built up as a support system for economic 
production across the board. In this sense, it has been explicitly recognised that economic 
creativity is actually about the quality of ‘technology linkages’ and ‘knowledge flows’ 
amongst and between economic agents. Where the interactions are dynamic and 
progressive great innovative strides are often made. Conversely where systemic 
components are compartmentalised and isolated from each other, the result is often that 
relevant research bodies are not at all productive. In extreme cases, they have ceased to 
provide any innovative output at all. Put another way, the key property of a system of 
innovation is therefore not so much its component parts, or nodes, but rather how it 
performs as a dynamic whole”378. 
Accordingly, the science behind the development and production of seeds has shaped divergent 
economic models that constitute the reality of the primary sector today. They can be understood 
through a perspective inscribed in historical institutionalism, embracing and analysing both 
formal and informal rules surrounding institutional change
379
. The incorporation of the historical 
and sociological dimensions of technical change
380
 provides in this sense a toolkit to foster the 
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regulatory shift that has been quite vocally advocated for in doctrinal thought
381
 and by a plethora 
of civil movements
382
. 
Agriculture has witnessed numerous technological revolutions, from mechanisation, irrigation, 
greenhouses, to food storage and transportation possibilities. One might even say that every single 
human invention from fire to petrol has influenced our capacity to control and cultivate nature in 
order to spawn foodstuff. Our ability to understand, cultivate and improve plant diversity has 
yet played an unrivalled role in improving agricultural production patterns. The scrupulous 
command of genetic resources has affected agricultural production in terms of quantity and 
quality, altering the capacity, productivity, adaptability and sustainability of its patterns. Research 
directly involving agricultural genetic resources targets the introduction of new inputs within 
production schemes, seeds. An absolutely essential component along with soil, water and direct 
human nurturing, seeds can be considered the ultimate starting point of any agricultural 
ecosystem
383
. They have been exchanged, used, analysed and tested, first by farmers, then by 
scientists, and finally by private breeders. They have been used not only to provide foodstuff, but 
also to determine the best suitable varieties for cultivation in terms of environmental conditions or 
market demands. Throughout time, this particular research field has evolved from a brutal and 
wide search for important leads within a wide array of collected material, towards directed and 
focused activities, relying on scientific models pointing out the material showing greater promise 
before the undertaking of applied research per se.  
All activities nonetheless possess a common ground, in that they also rely on the selection 
operated between and within plant species, which can mould crop varieties to satisfy human needs 
or adjust to environmental conditions. Differing degrees of genetic change occur in diverse 
fashion, on account of all the selections that are operated on fields (or in laboratories), with or 
without human intervention, incessantly creating and de-creating gene pools. Selection may in this 
context take place naturally, through mere survival, but also unconsciously, through the 
preservation of most valued crops based on the observation of production results on farm, through 
mass selection. It can also be carried out methodically, through a systematic modification of 
breeds according to predetermined standards
384
. The better understanding of genetic heredity 
allowed in this sense plant breeders to intentionally cross plant varieties to attain specific results 
in terms of size, colour or taste, and obtain high productivity rates at harvest
385
. Newfound uses of 
plant genetic resources have contributed to a striking escalation in yields and productivity. For 
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 instance, English wheat yields, which had only increased from zero point five to two metric tons 
per hectare in one thousand years, saw their results triple from 1960 onwards, reaching six metric 
tons on account of new plant varieties and the accompanying industrial agricultural model
386
. This 
escalation only took forty years, within a ground-breaking cycle twenty-five times shorter than the 
one characterised by un-methodical variety selection. The second agricultural quantum leap was 
achieved merely decades later, owing to the developments in molecular biology and genomics 
science of the late 1990's, adding incredible precision and foresight to the research process, 
shortening the cycle of product development, and generating the newest type of modern varieties, 
fruits of genetic modification
387
. Propelling and deriving almost exclusively from such new uses of 
genetic resources, the rates of return of research and development have cruised at considerably 
high levels in all agricultural commodities, especially with regards to field crops where mean rates 
reached as high as one hundred thirty five per cent, well privileged above the average of seventy 
five per cent for all agriculture
388
.  
Drawing from the recent theories on technological change having concentrated on the study of the 
parallel evolution of technology, public policy and institutions
389
, we shall trace back the 
technology- induced shift in ownership and management of agricultural plant germplasm. This 
enterprise will first illustrate the initial uses of agricultural biodiversity for cultivation 
purposes, which have improved genetic variability through the selection of best-performing 
individuals (Chapter 4). The focus will thereon shift onto more recent science-based and 
methodical plant improvement opportunities, describing first the rise of conventional plant 
breeding (Chapter 5) and then the shift "from the Green to the Gene revolution" stemming from 
our knowledge of and experimentations with living organisms (Chapter 6). Accordingly, our 
analysis shall identify the institutions and actors that constitute the “Plant Genetic Resources 
System”390, from indigenous communities of the genetically-rich “South”, to farmers, to public or 
private variety collectors and/or developers of the capital-rich “North”. This historical perspective 
shall lead to the identification of the different socio-technological contexts of agrobiodiversity 
innovation and the actors that navigate them; an identification that will guide our subsequent re-
assessment of legal appropriation tools.  
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 CHAPTER 4: MASS SELECTION OF BEST PERFORMING INDIVUALS BUILDING 4.
ON INFORMAL SEED EXCHANGES  
Up from the initial transformation of humankind from hunter-gatherers into farmers through the 
domestication of crops, agriculture has always tried to improve production results in fields. Within 
the more general Darwinian framework of survival of the fittest in the wild, agricultural practices 
have always exerted "an evolutionary pressure on plants"
391
. Individuals have always played a 
pivotal role in crop enhancement and have constantly sought to better cultivate, adapt and produce 
foodstuff. This role is traced back to ten thousand to twelve thousand years, when “wild 
progenitors gave rise to the first primitive varieties [that were] genetically quite narrow” and were 
gradually domesticated, starting the flow between the so-called crop wild relatives and cultivated 
species, generating landraces
392
. From the sixteenth to the eighteenth century, the individual 
landowner has grown beyond the depreciated “medieval husbandman closely following traditional 
practices” and working for his family on his land, towards a “dynamic and experimental farmer-
entrepreneur”, using cost-benefit analysis to choose between offered alternatives393.  
Farmers, whether described as small-scale, subsistence-oriented, dynamic, or even professional, 
have continuously selected their most efficient plants for sowing the following year, in order to 
obtain better results in terms of yields. Even today a large proportion of the seed planted is either 
saved by farmers or exchanged on a farmer-to-farmer basis. In the mid-1980s farmer-saved seed 
accounted for an estimated thirty five per cent, or eighteen billion USD of the total estimated value 
of fifty billion USD for all agricultural seed used worldwide
394
. In developing countries, an 
estimated eighty per cent of the seed used in the early 1980s was farmer-saved seed
395
. 
Furthermore, the use of modern improved cultivars has not annihilated the recourse to farmers’ 
varieties in developed countries, as the many unregistered garden forms of dry bean that are still 
grown in The Netherlands show
396
. In this context, farm-based mass selection ought to be viewed 
as a stand-alone plant innovation chain, developing landraces or population varieties, based on 
informal and socio-cultural norms of exchange. This distinct system is still very much a present 
and indispensable reality of agrobiodiversity innovation. It is precisely these dynamic farmers’ 
selection endeavours that have been reinforced through precise scientific knowledge, obtaining 
more defined results through the crossing of different strains
397
. 
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 4.1. A traditionally holistic approach to crop improvement  
Mass selection could be defined as a traditionally holistic approach to crop improvement 
based on little-constrained seed exchanges, resulting in the development of local and non-uniform 
landraces. The key process of traditional farming systems relies on the repeated local reproduction 
of seed, where farmers influence such reproduction by choosing varieties and selecting interesting 
individuals
398
. In a context of great diversity and exchange, farmers repetitively select interesting 
or efficient plants for sowing the next year. This selection is based upon the observation of each 
variety’s and each individual’s performances on the field. The intensity and exact reach of the 
selection efforts operated on farm is impossible to determine with clarity at a global level, since 
there are merely a handful of case-studies recorded in comparison to the actual selections made on 
farms around the globe every day. Furthermore, this practice is used just as much in marginal 
systems within a low-input context relying on indigenous knowledge of farmers, as in developed 
countries such as Finland or the United Kingdom
399
. Major differences thus exist in the cultivation 
and improvement of landraces, as they might very well be cultivated through high-input and 
modern agronomic and agricultural techniques. However, a number of general principles of 
operation have been highlighted in the literature. Some commentators argue that farmers only 
carry out mild recurrent mass (or negative) selection between populations, while others tend to 
recognise the existence of conscious selection of traits in individual plants
400
. Others highlight the 
potential of retaining desirable characteristics in populations, despite the difficulty to qualify it as a 
breeding method per se
401
. Different phenomena and practices have been observed by 
commentators, such as seed replacement routines based upon the need to “revive tired cultivars” 
and thereby renew landrace seed stocks
402
. It is in this regard safe to say that the intensity and 
reach of variety selection will depend on a number of factors, including the experimental nature 
and interests or abilities of the farmer himself, but also the farm’s geographical, agronomical and 
cultural surroundings. 
Focused on the minimisation of risk, farmers traditionally plant a wide range of both species and 
varieties. Through a practice coined ‘multiple cropping’, they use a mixture of species 
considered desirable in terms of food or fibre production needs, or other socio-cultural or 
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religious community demands
403
. The variety of cultivated and selected varieties thus depends on 
the multi-criteria approach privileged by farmers in both production and selection, which may not 
merely focus on yield or other productivity-related aspects. Farmers seldom concentrate their 
efforts and production capacity on a single species. The decision to cultivate a traditional or an 
improved variety will be determined by the farmer’s perception of the cultivar’s or the landrace’s 
ability to fulfil the household’s requirements relative to alternative options. This decision will take 
into account the existence of markets and transaction costs, as well as the physical, economic, and 
cultural contexts of local agriculture
404
. Decisions to add or delete a specific variety or population 
are made in accordance with changes in the local biophysical or sociocultural environment and the 
consequent changes in the search for varietal traits, as certain characteristics might be less or more 
sought after due to internal or even external events, which may stretch as far as evangelisation
405
. 
Furthermore, these changing landscapes are heavily influenced by the availability of modern 
varieties that are similar to farmers’ varieties or the availability of farmers varieties themselves, for 
instance through the presence of a local market with easy access to local seed stocks
406
. Selection 
methods based on plant characteristics have for instance been often described in the literature with 
regards to sorghum and pearl millet in Africa
407
. However, farmers do not only operate their 
selection on phenotypic characteristics. In the Mexican community of Cuzalapa for instance, seed 
selection does not operate on plants during cropping season or at harvest, but rather on piles of 
harvested maize ears
408. These ears also constitute the farming household’s grain stocks for 
personal consumption. Ear selection operates on the basis of multiple criteria, in the search for 
well-developed and well-filled ears without fungi or insect damage. Consequently, the objectives 
set out by mass selectors are not solely concerned with yield, but rather comprise of an array of 
desirable characteristics. Amongst these criteria lies the search for yield stability associated with 
diversity within and between cultivars. Farmers use observed yield as only one of several criteria 
to predict varietal performance in more stressed local environments
409
. Within the wide array of 
selection objectives pursued by farmers also lies the adaptation of species or varieties to local 
water and soil conditions or the availability of labour. These criteria are accompanied by general 
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 consumption objectives, whether having direct regard to taste, size or the use of varieties in 
traditional dishes, or through indirect uses, like the potential utilisation of products for animal feed 
or for roofing (in the case of sorghum for instance)
410
.  
The peculiar crop improvement mechanism that mass selection forms an integral part of a more 
complex agricultural ecosystem, which stretches beyond the cultivated field where farmers grow 
their crops, including adjacent land plots used for food supplements with social culinary value, or 
for organic fertilisers, within an intricately integrated system
411
. Even though it resonates more 
deeply with small-scale subsistence agriculture in contemporary times, mass selection nonetheless 
is not limited to what the “West” might assign to the agriculture of the developing world. It is still 
very much present in developed countries, as the aforementioned example of dry bean production 
in The Netherlands show
412
. It has also been taken on by a rather new trend in plant production, 
that of low-input and especially organic or bio-dynamic agriculture. Indeed, “organic or low-
external-input systems in developed countries resemble farming systems in marginal environments 
of developing countries because environmental stress is heterogeneous, there are few varieties that 
meet the diverse needs of farmers in such systems and there is very little interest from the 
commercial seed sector"
413
. Indeed, the traits sought after by farmers in low-input environments, 
whether in organic agriculture or in small-scale subsistence agriculture, are considered to be too 
diverse to be adequately addressed by formal plant breeding programs
414
. Furthermore, the holistic 
approach to plant improvement also resonates more deeply with the value system that surrounds 
organic and low-input agriculture, favouring as a result techniques that work at the level of whole 
plant performance without breaking reproductive barriers between species, relying on the so-called 
breeder's eye
415
.  
The products of mass selection efforts operated under the aforementioned objectives and 
principles are coined local, farmers’ varieties or landraces. These varieties are considered to 
provide high yield stability in marginal and relatively variable cultivation environments from years 
on end
416
. They have narrow geographical adaptation capabilities from one environment to the 
other. Contrary to those stable varieties that would be developed by plant breeders by the 
beginning of the 20
th
 century, it is extremely difficult to define landraces as such. Indeed, they 
form plant groups or populations, rather than easily definable static varieties. Definitions have 
therefore attempted to highlight their inherent characteristics and the rationale behind their 
cultivation and development. Amongst other definitions, “an autochthonous landrace [has been 
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viewed as] a variety with a high capacity to tolerate biotic and abiotic stress, resulting in a high 
yield stability and an intermediate yield level under a low input agricultural system”417; or as “a 
dynamic population(s) of a cultivated plant that has historical origin, distinct identity and lacks 
formal crop improvement, as well as often being genetically diverse, locally adapted and 
associated with traditional farming systems”418. In Sierra Leone, a study focusing on farmers’ rice 
varieties has found that “there was consistency in the naming by farmers of traditional varieties, 
but inconsistency in the naming of newly acquired varieties and cultivars”419, especially when one 
travelled outside the initial region. These findings nonetheless corroborated the difficulty of 
assessing landrace use and development with exactitude, in a context where variety names may be 
trumped by the farmers’ seed exchange mechanisms, even though some populations had retained 
their “traditional credentials”. Understanding and predicting the fate of farmers’ varieties is indeed 
quite a complex task, both in terms of their creation and demise.  
4.2. Mass selectors, reliance on seed exchange networks and socio-cultural norms  
Today at least one and a half billion individuals still depend on small-scale farming for their 
livelihoods, living mostly from subsistence agriculture on less than two hectares of land
420
. In this 
context, traditional farming systems rely integrally on the farmers’ interaction with the 
environment in its most general understanding, encompassing both domesticated and wild 
ecosystems. Their operations are generally carried out without or with very little access to external 
inputs, or capital, or precise scientific knowledge, but rather through the recourse to inventive self-
reliance, experiential knowledge and locally available resources
421
. In this context, the web of 
unsanctioned and colloquial exchanges built around farmer mass selection have led to the 
unequivocal recognition, especially in social sciences, ethno-botany or geography, of a farmer-
based seed system, coined “informal”.  
Whether treated as economic marginality or a social reality, the eldest yet vivacious 
agrobiodiversity innovation chain that is mass selection reveals the need to take into account a 
wide range of external institutions. Even though the development of local cultivars remains 
primordial for food security issues, the informal market’s practice of “white untagged bags” 
cannot reliably communicate information on the seeds they contain on their own. These practices 
have thus unequivocally been accompanied by socio-cultural ties ensuring the flow of knowledge. 
In an effort to minimise risk and maintain high levels of security stocks, farmers do replace, 
modify or complete the stocks they keep for the same varieties through exchanges operating with 
other farmers. Farmers acquire seeds and information upon such seeds through a vast range of 
channels. They may do so through local, regional, national and even international farmers’ 
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 organisations, weekly foodstuff markets and other personal or social networks. These exchanges 
can take place either inside or outside of their community, a practice that is for instance still 
pursued today in the Cuzalapa community located on the Pacific coast of Mexico
422
. Formal seed 
markets function on the basis of regulation pertaining to approval and promotion, with quality 
insurance and guarantee as to the identity of purchased seeds. In contrast, the informal material 
exchanges that mass selection activities rely upon are rather governed by cultural norms and ad 
hoc rules determined solely by the participants to the exchange, without regulatory 
intervention
423
. Indeed, the pool of genetic variation maintained by farmers does not solely depend 
on biophysical and agronomical factors, but is also determined by the existence and strength of 
social networks providing access to seeds, and the individual’s status within these networks and 
the community in general
424
.  Several case studies have highlighted that the decision to take part in 
the exchange or to accept an individual to the “free-handover of seed” is heavily influenced by the 
presence of relatives and socio-cultural ties between farmers
425
. Big farmers may indeed willingly 
exclude smaller ones from the network, as documented in Peru for potato seed ware
426
. New 
material may only be offered in “handfuls” to close friends or important neighbours outside of the 
local markets, as witnessed in Rwanda for beans
427
.   
While local farmers’ markets carried out, and even intensified their exchange practices within 
small-scaled production units both in developing and developed countries, mass selection and its 
related seed exchange networks grew into new areas. In response to the forceful regulatory push 
towards a highly regulated and competitive formal seed market, networks solely concerned with 
seed saving and exchange were concomitantly constituted especially in developed countries in the 
1990’s. In parallel, organic farming and breeding was being developed as an alternative to 
industrial production, cultivating foodstuff in accordance with strict “cahier des charges” 
prescribing lesser recourse to farm inputs and a greater diversity in cultivated plant varieties
428
. 
Whether motivated by the “naturalness” of the produced food or by other values, organic farming 
and other non-certified types of low-input agriculture has become an undeniable reality of 
contemporary farming
429
. These models are all based on breeding methods close to mass selection 
efforts and revolve around strong-knit seed exchange and saving networks, and particularly suffer 
from the poor adaptation of modern cultivars to the conditions inherent to their unique agricultural 
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ecosystems
430
. These contemporary networks tend to have more institutionalised structures, 
bearing national, regional, or even international ambitions and reach. In developed countries, 
seed exchange networks show the same characteristics as informal farmers’ innovation, being also 
governed by cultural and ad hoc norms and articulated around “seed swaps”. They nonetheless 
tend to be more institutionalised than those exchanges carried out by so-called “subsistence” or 
smaller farmers of developing but also developed nations. Indeed, most of these seed exchanges 
are organised around regulated networks, which either take the form of non-governmental 
organisations or of private clubs. They have been set up mainly in reaction to the State-sponsored, 
industry and productivity oriented formal seed markets. These coalitions usually set up 
“heirloom”, “heritage” seeds catalogue and provide them to members for cultivation and saving, 
provided sometimes a portion of the saved seed is returned to them. Amongst many lies Arche 
Noah, an Austria based Central European Seed Savers Association set up in 1990 and which 
manages the largest private seed collection in Europe with six thousand plant varieties; the United 
States based Seed Savers Exchange, set up in 1975, and currently manages several different 
catalogues. All organisations do not however distribute seeds, some rather act as intermediaries 
between several smaller or more regional and local exchange networks, carrying out conservation 
projects, trainings and swap events at a larger scale, such as the French Reseau Semences 
Paysannes for instance, whose specific old heirloom vegetables projects brings together several 
local groups, which are active in mass selection activities (Le Biau Germe, Germinance, Payzons 
ferme, Les Semailles, Le Potager d'un curieux, Graines del Païs, Jardin'envie). 
Farmers’ innovation is based upon observations on farm and the selection of the best-performing 
individuals, not only in terms of yield but also on account of ecosystemic, social and economic 
considerations. Even though it is still uncertain whether or not farmers recognise a direct private 
value from genetic diversity as such, the private value of local crop populations is unequivocally 
accepted, as direct benefits derive from the production and consumption of landraces. This 
assumption is corroborated by the continuity of landrace farming practices even though alternative 
systems are proposed to farmers
431
. Heavily relying on social networks surrounding seed saving 
and exchanges, mass selectors, in both their traditional and more modern forms, develop and 
conserve landraces: non-uniform plant varieties that are particularly well adapted to local 
conditions. Notwithstanding their inherently heterogeneous and local focus, all seed exchange 
networks are based on the premise of an open innovation system. They do not seek to 
commercialise their seeds in the formal market, nor do they take steps to appropriate either the 
genetic resources they cultivate or the knowledge attached hereunto. This approach does not 
however fit well into the currently applicable legal tenets that surround seed systems. They have 
indeed been compelled to resituate themselves within the technological and regulatory 
environments that surround their activities, sustaining their production without infringing other 
actors' rights, and ensuring the survival of their biodiversity conservation and innovation model 
based on open access. Economic theory has predominantly hung on to the premise that informal 
seed systems should be treated as marginal or vestigial with regards to the economic development 
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 process
432. By the end of the 1990’s, approximately three hundred million hectares of land were 
still considered to bear the hat of “subsistence agriculture” feeding two hundred and thirty million 
households or more than one billion people. These “marginal lands” are ignored by modern crop 
developers, and considered to be unproductive in their essence, heavily vulnerable to crop 
failure
433
. This latter approach needs however to bear the test of challenging contemporary times 
of food, financial and unemployment crisis, where returns to farming activities are generally 
witnessed, just as changes in consumption patterns, which have been pushing agricultural 
production towards invigorated lower-input systems
434
. While it is widely acknowledged that the 
social returns from research activities exceed the private returns of the particular developer
435
, 
leading to the recognition of the public goods dimension of agricultural research, technological 
changes witnessed in past centuries may have very well transformed agricultural research into an 
impure public good, starting with the advent of science-based plant breeding. 
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 CHAPTER 5: SCIENCE BASED PLANT BREEDING BUILDING ON 5.
INTERNATIONAL GERMPLASM FLOWS AND HEREDITY 
Inherently local, at most regional genetic resources have attracted the interests of other actors than 
farmers. The appeal of exotic genetic resources for botanists and scientists was the first trigger that 
substantially altered the fate of biodiversity conservation and plant improvement. After having 
spent ten thousand years in the hands of farmers, the crown of seed control has steadily been 
altered on account of different technological revolutions. The Darwinian "evolutionary 
pressure"
436
 on plants initially characterised by the selection of the most efficient plants by farmers 
in order to sow them the following year, highly intensified with the dawn of plant breeding. Its 
genesis metamorphosed crop improvement into a knowledge-intensive, extremely productive and 
fast-evolving research-and-development focused industry. The technological breakthroughs 
witnessed through the last decades of the 20
th
 century have altered agricultural research and 
development activities with formidable speed, on account of our deepening knowledge of natural 
cycles, and more specifically of genetic heredity.  
The development of science-based plant breeding has as a result propelled the development of 
farming inputs off-farm. It has ignited the distribution of improved and stable plant varieties by 
public research institutes or extension services, and progressively by private seed companies. 
Defeating fears related to the exponentially rising number of mouths to feed, while also driving 
commodity prices onto the lower side despite growing food demand, agricultural productivity 
gains attributed to our better understanding and use of genetic resources have been crucial to 
human and economic development. Since the domestication of plants epitomising the dawn of 
agriculture, it has taken ten to twelve thousand years for grain production to reach the impressive 
one billion tonnes mark in 1960, while the second billion tonnes mark was hit in merely forty 
years’ time in 2000437. Such impressive development is not associated with industrialisation, but 
rather with crop genetic improvement and the development of professional plant breeding about 
two hundred years ago
438
. Plant breeding still undisputedly stands as an arena where returns on 
research investment remain "well above the returns attainable from alternative uses of funds"
439
, 
whether from an international, public, or private perspective
440
, even though the cycle of breeding 
remained a lengthy and tedious process whose success is never guaranteed. 
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 5.1. From crop selection to active plant breeding 
The development of hybridisation techniques was achieved in timid steps, mostly on account of 
the re-discovery of principles governing genetic heredity. Reinforcing in reality farmers’ selection 
endeavours through the infusion of precise scientific knowledge, breeders were able to obtain 
more defined results through the crossing of different strains
441
. Within this mind-set, it is the shift 
from unconscious selection to methodically conscious rational attempts that marks the 
development of science-based plant breeding. It is also precisely the strengthening of conscious, 
methodical and active variety selection activities that has historically impacted the perception and 
status of agricultural genetic diversity the most. The methodical scientific selection of genetic 
resources has indeed allowed plant breeders to intentionally cross varieties in order to attain 
specific results, such as size, colour or taste, and mostly obtain high productivity rates at 
harvest
442
. The evolutionary agricultural challenge of changing agronomic, environmental and 
human needs could effectively be resolved through the controlled enhancement of cultivated 
species, which provided the means to fit agricultural inputs to purpose. Throughout colonisation, 
sufficient working material to rise to such challenge had been accumulated and modestly studied 
within collection and characterisation efforts.  
The introduction of new exotic crops, along with the growing complexity of rotation techniques 
and the divisions of land, resulted in the first Agricultural Revolution of the 18
th
 and 19
th
 
centuries
443
. This revolution marked the first attempts at "conscious active breeding". These 
undertakings first bore similarities to traditional farmer-like mass or individual selection operated 
mainly on species with asexual or vegetative reproduction, and evolved into timid attempts at 
methodical selection and variety crossing for a wider range of domesticated plants, including those 
with sexual reproduction, towards the beginning of the 20
th
 century
444
. Crosses were still very 
tentative in nature, until the rediscovery of the infamous Moravian Gregor Mendel's 1865 
Experiments in Plant Hybridisation, thirty-five years after its publication, after having only been 
cited three times until 1890. The rediscovery is indeed now considered an ultimate turning point 
for the future of plant breeding, exemplifying the "zeitgeist at work"
445
. Through his trials on peas, 
Mendel elaborated so-called “laws of inheritance”, comprised of “segregation” and “independent 
assortment”. Mendel's methodical phenotypic446 observation was explicitly concerned with the 
expression of the plant's dominant alleles in the environment
447
. Practically, he identified the 
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notion of "gene" as a unit, and carefully followed each generation of plants, coining the filial 
through the initial "F", the follow-up to a deliberate crossing "F1", the following generation "F2" 
and so forth. He determined and segregated the progeny's characteristics through a terminology 
that is still used by the industry today to identify generations of hybrid seeds. This enabled 
breeders to truly comprehend heredity, while also underlining the value of parental lines and their 
purity in the creation of new plant varieties, and especially in the rare but golden “hybrids”.  
Drawing from enduring collection efforts of the past centuries, the so-called "Green revolution" of 
the 1960's quickly acquainted the world with new high-yielding modern varieties, which at times 
happened to be “hybrids”, i.e. hyper-performers that only showed such heterosis-bound 
performance only during the first sowing year. Indeed, in certain cases and for certain varieties, the 
products of plant breeding outperformed the parental lines used in their development, through the 
lesser-understood principle coined heterosis or hybrid vigour. Hybrids transformed plant breeding 
into a “lucrative science”448, where the goals of research endeavours shifted from an effort of adapt 
exotic varieties into an effort to find specific traits ensuring disease resistance or higher yields
449
. 
As we shall see in the further course of this study, hybrids also present an additional advantage, in 
that their beneficial performance only presents itself during the first sowing year, yearning for a 
renewal of seed stocks by cultivators and therefore creating a study influx of income to seed 
developers. They have nonetheless not been developed for all crops and species, as they are 
usually present in maize and vegetables but not as easily operated in open-pollinated varieties, 
such as wheat, where hybridisation has proven more difficult than the development of “open” and 
thus re-sowable new varieties
450
. 
Whether faced with open-pollinated species or with hybrids, sexual crossing allows breeders to 
predict the crosses that are needed to stabilise a desired character, which responds to contemporary 
ecological, geographic, climatic and disease-related challenges faced by farmers. Relying on 
empirical "trial and error" techniques, breeders detect useful mutations and 'fixate' desired 
characteristics
451
. Breeders can, as a result, predict the occurrence of useful traits such as drought 
resistance or fungal tolerance as a result of deliberate crossing. The lucrative promise of plant 
breeding laid hence not only in greater yields but also in the possibilities to respond to farmer and 
consumer demands. The new uses bestowed upon these components of agricultural biodiversity 
have nonetheless mostly contributed to striking escalations in terms of yield, mostly due to the 
new varieties’ uniformity and stable physiological characteristics. Resulting yield gains are best 
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 illustrated by the example of English wheat, for which yields had only increased from zero point 
five to two metric tons per hectare in one thousand years. Results triple from 1960 onwards, 
reaching six metric tons in just forty years’ time, within a ground-breaking cycle twenty-five times 
shorter than the growth achieved by un-methodical variety selection
452
. The public International 
Rice Research Institute's IR8 rice variety, first introduced in the Philippines, produced for instance 
yields of nine point five to ten point five tons per hectare when average global rice yields were 
around two tons per hectare
453
. Yield increases up to a hundred per cent were witnessed on 
account of new plant breeding techniques and correlated genetic improvements
454
. These new 
varieties also fuelled a relentless cycle of necessary genetic improvement. The so-called "miracle 
IR 8 rice" is in this sense a truly comprehensive example, since it also illustrates the inherent need 
for constant research on the maintenance, further improvement and adaptation of these newly 
developed genetics. This variety indeed stands out through its inbuilt vulnerabilities against 
environmental conditions or the risks of genetic change
455
.  
While mass selection launched the pace of holistic agricultural development, deliberate crossing 
and hybridisation efforts relying on inheritance-focused methodical selection procured the flag of 
intensified agricultural industrialisation. The recourse to these improved varieties indeed not 
only significantly impacted agrobiodiversity management in itself, but also came about with a 
major reallocation of cultivation and food production schemes. Indeed, the Green Revolution 
presupposed not only the use of improved seeds, but also the recourse to external inputs such as 
fertilisers, nutrients, pesticides, irrigation techniques and modern farm equipment
456
. Past plant 
varieties put a lot of “energy into straw and foliage”, having to rely on manure and water supply 
limits. Early high-yielding varieties of wheat and rice, fruits of the burgeoning plant breeding 
science, channelled in contrast “more energy into grain, benefited from fertilisers and flourished 
under irrigation”457. Breeding efforts were indeed accompanied by immense efforts in the 
conveyance of water to farms, and also presupposed the development and recourse to fertilisers, 
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such as synthetic nitrogen for instance
458
. It thenceforth stirred the interest of a plethora of actors, 
from public sector researchers to the construction of a seed industry.   
5.2. The renaissance of an actor: plant breeding as a commercial enterprise and the reign 
of seed companies 
Even though biological material collection efforts matured in the hands of public botanical gardens 
or early research centres, plant improvement as such, and the development of new crop cultivation 
techniques, had interestingly remained the concern of much localised private ventures
459
. 
Agricultural innovation has emerged as an exclusively private institution, first in the hands of 
farmers, and then through the risks taken by venturesome, innovating and passionate individuals. 
The rediscovery and development of Mendelian genetics signalled the expansion of activities 
carried out by public institutes to include the development of new improved varieties. The first 
hybrids would indeed stem from the public sector, before the wheel turned again in the direction of 
the private sector, lured into plant improvement through its new productive and fecund promises.  
5.2.1. From Public Hybrids… 
Until the 19
th
 century, plant improvement endeavours depended upon the interest, potency and 
innovativeness of individual landowners. Exotic material was collected throughout colonial 
expeditions, but these remained the property of individual scientists until the creation of a wider 
net of public collecting and disseminating agents
460
. Indeed, early-bird public experiment or 
satellite stations cultivated foodstuff to meet national needs but did not specifically target crop 
improvement or the development of best practices as such
461
. By the end of the 19
th
 century, the 
public sector would however gradually take over and coordinate what had previously been almost 
exclusively private ventures, whether at the level of the landowner, farmer, collector or individual 
scientist
462
. It did so through the support of diverse institutions, such as clubs and societies 
dedicated to agricultural improvement. It also had recourse to calls for research made to the 
research community as a whole, with suitable incentives such as prizes or substantive financing. 
Food production and related crop improvement became part of a wider understanding, as a 
national political tool of primordial economic importance in terms of foreign dependence. In this 
context, the United States Department of Agriculture was founded in 1862, while state-run 
agricultural experiment units were established as early as the 1850’s in France and Germany463. 
Operating wide-ranging collection and screening programmes during the 1960's, State-funded 
agricultural and medicinal research institutes focused on concrete discoveries in the advancement 
of science and societal welfare in general. What is striking in this context is the fact that these new 
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 actors also created networks of collecting agents, in similar fashion to the Banksian 
understanding of collection activities
464
. Modern prospecting activities were however granted a 
more institutional background as they were carried out on a contractual basis, as the State 
mandated botanical gardens to work with local associations in order to legitimise the 
collections
465
.  
Gargantuan public agricultural research programmes were gradually established, relocating in 
parallel crop development as an internationally strategic political and economic pursuit. Following 
what had already began in past decades, the end of the 19
th
 and beginning of the 20
th
 century saw 
an increase in State interest for undertaking biological collection expeditions and correlated 
research
466
. This trend notably intensified as the United States joined the race for exotic 
germplasm. Conscious of the limited range of endemic resources available within their borders, 
the well-endowed continents publicly funded colossal research programs to acquire specimens, 
mainly to be used for classification and analysis, but also for variety development. Much like their 
“imperial botaniser” predecessors, public research programmes “dispatched special agents 
overseas to search for new crop germplasm”467. Mark Carlton, a special agent of the United States 
Department of Agriculture, returned from instance from Russia in 1898 with several varieties of 
durum and hard red wheat, which proved to be extremely useful in fighting the Midwestern 
droughts and significantly increased production results
468
. On the other side of the Atlantic, 
Nikolai Ivanovich Vavilov and his colleagues adapted the “New World crops” they had collected 
to the agronomical conditions of the Soviet Union
469
. Bioprospecting efforts extended around the 
globe and throughout the 20
th
 century. They were for instance conducted by Jack Harlan in Turkey 
during the 1940’s and onwards on behalf of the USDA’s “Division of Plant Exploration and 
Introduction”, unearthing wheat gene micro-centres470. These public institutions did not only carry 
out biological material collection endeavours; they also made use of _ arguably exponentially 
triggered _ technological developments in genetics, by developing and distributing improved and 
stable varieties
471
. The main goal of these State-funded programmes was to contribute to the 
“advancement of science and the public good”472. They indeed undertook public domain 
oriented characterisation and basic research. Especially in the United States, they also distributed 
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their new plant varieties for free and actively engaged in extension services designed to facilitate 
the uptake of agricultural improvements by farmers
473
.    
The global food crisis of the 1950's and 1960's saw a need to institutionalise the informal flows 
and free exchanges of biological material at the global level, in order to respond to the urgency of 
the Malthusian concerns related to shortages in food supply
474
. Within this mind-set, the national 
networks that dominated agricultural research and improvement during the early-twentieth century 
embraced a wider and more global societal conscientiousness. As a result, internationally 
integrated sui generis institutions were set up to accomplish the virtually unachievable goal of 
feeding the world, cementing the cornerstones of international agricultural research
475
. The main 
preventive response to apprehend potential food crises was to embed an international character to 
existing national nurseries and research networks. This move would enable them to efficiency 
gains and provide locally adapted plant varieties by having access to other nurseries’ material and 
experiences. The first research centre to present an international structure focused on the 
development of wheat varieties resistant to stem rust disease. Indeed, in response to a stem rust 
epidemic that spread worryingly quickly, the USDA requested concerned nations to join forces in 
1954. Wheat lines were tested by the “First International Stem Rust Trial”476 based on efforts 
carried out in the “International Spring Wheat Rust Nursery”, which formalised germplasm 
screening and related resource exchanges. This endeavour successfully brought the stem rust under 
control, and it did so in a context where all genetic resources and related information were “freely 
shared and made available to the co-operators and others who were interested”477. The project had 
an interesting active participant, the Office for Special Studies, an association between the 
Rockefeller foundation and the Mexican government. This office carried out transboundary 
experiments through off-site nurseries and engaged in international collaboration with national 
research centres. Under the leadership of the Nobel-prize winner plant breeder Norman Borlaug 
and with the financial support of the Ford and Rockefeller Foundations, the Latin American trials 
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 and those developed in West Asia and North Africa were effectively merged into the 
“International Spring Wheat Yield Nursery”478. This new nursery and breeding programme saw 
formal inter-State collaboration in professional training, and provided breeding lines upon request. 
This evolution is considered to be the beginning of “the opening of the commons, a free 
germplasm exchange system and worldwide collaboration”479. The nursery later became the 
International Maize and Wheat Improvement Centre ("CIMMYT") in 1966. The 
internationalisation of biological collections and plant nurseries was effectively switched on. The 
second example of such phenomenon is the International Rice Research Institute ("IRRI") in the 
Philippines, founded in 1960 in the footsteps of the wheat-breeding programme, but with a 
stronger organisational structure. The success of these institutes created higher demand for their 
replication in other species and for other geographical conditions, underpinning the creation of a 
network of International Agricultural Research Centres (“IARC”), each focusing on the resolution 
of one or more specific problematic in food supply and cultivation, from livestock or forestry to 
tropical or semi-arid areas
480
. Further formalisation of PGRFA exchange and research continued at 
the international level throughout the middle of the 20
th
 century and mostly during the 1970's. All 
IARC’s were confederated under the single umbrella of the Consultative Group for 
International Agricultural Research (“CGIAR”) in 1971. The Group maintained close links to 
both the World Bank and the United Nations, through the involvement of the Food and 
Agricultural Organisation ("FAO") and the United Nations Development Programme ("UNDP"). 
Even though this 'centralisation' movement was backed up by the aforementioned international 
organisations, the CGIAR kept an autonomous nature, being built around the principle of 
voluntary cooperation of the research centres involved. Established as an informal association, the 
aims of the Consultative Group were mainly to "examine the needs of developing countries for 
special effort in agricultural research at the international and regional levels in critical subject 
sectors unlikely otherwise to be adequately covered by existing research facilities and to consider 
how these needs could be met"
481
. 
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Successors of the past centuries' botanical gardens, public agricultural research institutes were 
dramatically more result-oriented than their forefathers. They used biological collections to satisfy 
their global mission of plant improvement and food production. With a better-established structure 
and financial assistance, public research started developing ‘end products’, i.e. seeds. Due to the 
uncertain nature of early breeding research results and thus imperfect profitable opportunities, crop 
improvement and seed distribution networks were traditionally instigated by the public sector, 
where research was understood as a public good
482
. Public structures gladly took over the 
challenge of becoming agricultural improvement hubs. By the 1950's, breeding centres had been 
established throughout industrialised countries and started to spread around the world through 
extension services
483
. Institutionalised agricultural research has nonethelles not been the sole 
feature of developed countries, even though the establishment of wide research programmes has 
occurred in these countries earlier in time vis-à-vis developing ones. While the former started to 
institutionalise agricultural research in the beginning of the 20th century, the latter delivered with a 
few decades' delay, by the middle of the same century, mostly through the regulatory and 
institutional push of development programmes established after the World War II
484
.
.
 The potential 
of methodical selection was quickly utilised by both the IARC’s and national research institutes. 
Generating more than just pure material exchange, the work of these public entities was indeed 
mainly directed towards the development of high yielding new varieties. Combinations towards 
resistance to local stresses or threatening diseases were sought after, primarily through the 
recourse to semi-dwarf varieties, which showed increased yield results, up to forty per cent
485
. The 
scientists working under the CGIAR umbrella were in this context considered the catalysts of the 
Green Revolution, i.e., the introduction of these improved varieties in productivity-oriented 
agricultural production schemes. Together with the inherently cost-effective and interest-igniting 
characteristics of science-based plant breeding, the exemplary successes of publicly bred lines and 
the provision of characterised and open breeding material also thrust private sector re-involvement 
and expansion in plant improvement.   
5.2.2. …To Private Crop Improvement 
Public institutions, whether national or international, dominated the global institutional landscape 
of breeding research for most of the 20
th
 century. However, the potential of scientific discoveries 
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 on selection methods and hybridisation techniques for the burgeoning 'industry' also gradually 
materialised. It really enfolded from the 1970's onwards, on account of a newly developed viable 
and profitable business model. This model significantly soared away from the traditional public 
good agricultural improvement paradigm, navigating towards a private research agenda. While the 
public sector harnessed and steered the way for future research and development, private entities 
showed flexibility in the adoption and advancement of technological change. State institutions 
were indeed never the sole actors furthering the opportunities of methodical plant breeding. Small-
scale private corporations, either within the one-man-brand scheme or through the more classical 
commercial family enterprise, were also always present in the plant improvement landscape
486
. In 
terms of plant breeding, public supremacy in agricultural research was indeed mostly true within 
the "new continent", namely the United States, as private small-scale breeders were quite quick to 
grasp the impact of technological change and dominated hybridisation research throughout the 
European continent until the early 20
th
 century
487
.  However, in the early days of plant breeding, 
most private seed companies pursued commercial activity on the cleaning, treatment, storage, 
packaging, sale and distribution of improved seeds found in the public domain. They relied on 
genetic material developed by public institutions, with the relatively small exception of firms 
specialised in niche hybrids.  
The private sector started to shyly be involved in the development of field crops, such as in maize 
or corn, where the first attempts at F1 hybridisation had been extremely efficient and lucrative, 
since farmers had to purchase the seed yearly to obtain the promised performances and had in fact 
done so
488
. From the 1970's onwards, the private seed sector sought to redefine itself in light of the 
new possibilities offered in terms of variety improvement. Consequently, it gradually expanded 
from the niche markets where it had been confined, such as the aforementioned hybrid maize 
sector, and slowly increased its global market share, becoming a proper industry
489
. The green 
lights glimmering over guaranteed productivity gains promised by the development of need-
specific characteristic, the difficulties of product replication by competitors and the need for 
farmers to come back for purchase every year all contributed to the expansion of private research 
and development. Marketing a product with precise added value, responding to actual pleas 
coming from the field or shelves, became an increasingly viable basis for a financially lucrative 
business model. Furthermore, neither farmers nor other researchers could obtain direct knowledge 
of the parental inbred lines that were used to create hybrid varieties, or gain immediate access to 
those lines without several years of 'reverse selection'. These features highly enticed commercial 
interest, since it made hybrids inherently proprietary products
490
. Moreover, "hybridisation 
methods produced a one-generation 'heterosis' effect that [could not] be replicated in farmer-saved 
seed"
491
. Not only would the yields obtained during the subsequent years of hybrids' use be 
substantially lower, the characteristic segregated through crossing might also not be fully 
displayed by the following F2 generation due to the crossed and 'impure' nature of its parental F1 
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lines. Those desiring the exact same results derived from the hybrid seed had thus to purchase new 
F1 lots the following sewing year. All biological barriers for private investment in germplasm 
research and product development had fallen
492
.  
The reasons behind the re-allocation of actors in agricultural research thus primarily relate to the 
technological opportunities created by the better understanding of plant science and the consequent 
development of "active breeding". This re-allocation was nonetheless also backed by the 
enactment of favourable liberal regulation worldwide. Indeed, the socio-economic landscape and 
political climate of the end of the 20
th
 century, characterised by a stronger push for deregulation 
and private innovation, actively reinforced this institutional shift flared by technology. The 
enticement fed at the time by these technologically profitable opportunities was accompanied by a 
decline in economic growth, which led to significant decreases in government expenditure, along 
with a change of political ideology redefining the boundaries of State intervention. Public 
investment in agricultural research was to gradually lose its importance. Even though figures tend 
to vary, it has been said that public research only showed an annual increase between 0.2% and 
1% during the 1990's, while this rate was 2.2% during the previous decade
493
. In the meantime, 
investment in private agricultural research showed annual increases up to 5.1%
494
. Within an 
asserted desire to balance the State budget and increase efficiency, plant research was slowly 
privatised, often through the use of the new concept of "near-market research" by policy-makers, 
coining the necessity to involve the private sector for innovation aimed at generating a specific 
product for the commercial market
495
. The official consecration of a new division of labour in 
agricultural research entailed the confinement of government-funded or owned institutions to 
concentrate on "pure or basic research" in genetics
496
. The degree of private involvement would be 
analysed on a case-by-case basis, but public institutions working on projects with potential 
commercial value were widely opened to "wholesale privatisation".
497
  
Hand in hand with this accommodating re-definition of the role of the State in agricultural 
research, the private sector also benefited from regulatory changes in relation to the protection of 
the fruits of their research, in the form of more specific trade regulation and intellectual property 
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 protection opportunities, whether through the aforementioned Bayh-Dole Act or the international 
reification of the strong property paradigm by the TRIPS Agreement. Within the 1980's context of 
extensive science-related privatisations, only fundamental research would be provided by public 
institutions, which also remained the main source of the raw and characterised biological material. 
The material's combination and the development or commercialisation of end products, i.e. 
varieties and seeds, would rather chiefly be carried out by private entities, acting as 
complementary institutions rather than competitive entities to public actors
498
.  
5.3. A new form of genetic diversity management prone to criticism  
Significant changes operated both in terms of the possibilities offered by plant improvement 
science, and the actors involved in these endeavours. These shifts unsurprisingly also reshaped the 
values attached to genetic resources by altering their management, while igniting reticence over 
the creation of diverse private breeding pools in contrast to the uniform varieties found on fields, 
indifferent to socio-economic production contexts.  The growing use of the Mendelian principles 
of heredity and segregation in agriculture dramatically changed collection and research activities 
related to biological material. It converted simple germplasm characterisation into an in-depth 
understanding and observation of selected phenotypic information, which would then be 
segregated and used in new varieties. Henceforth, with merely two key elements in their hands, i.e. 
a good degree of genetic variation between individuals and the means to identify and select the 
most suitable variants, breeders could produce a new population composed entirely of a selected 
and desired variety
499
. The opportunities offered by plant breeding thus set a re-adjustment of the 
values attached to PGRFA in motion, creating unfamiliar hierarchical distinctions between 
improved and wild genetic material. The weight granted to plant varieties and their inherent 
features substantively changed through the breeders’ ability to methodically improve them. It also 
meant that genetic resources would be conserved and developed in breeding pools with sealed 
access. This new hierarchical agrobiodiversity management that took place “behind closed doors” 
did not receive unanimous praise. Albeit the Green Revolution’s potential to create and conserve 
biodiversity, the characteristics of its products and the disruption of farmers’ functions in 
agrobiodiversity management have tainted the delightful hopes of food security and sovereignty.  
5.3.1. All New, All Improved, All Private Breeding Pools? 
The new methodical approach to variety selection and improvement had significant impacts on the 
collection of biological material. Accordingly, not only was the 'renaissance' of the private sector 
going to influence the supply of end-products and the means through which agriculture was to be 
perceived, it was also going to influence the geographical and institutional distribution and flows 
of genetic resources. The newfound priorities of variety development and the prospects of 
commercialisation, coupled with races for market share and profits, created the outlook for the 
return of confidential private collections. Viewed this time as foundations for breeding pools 
within the realm of which new improvements could be developed, significant germplasm 
collections were established within private companies. Private breeders indeed screened and 
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collected market successes, as well as benefiting from those genetic resources conserved within 
the auspices of international and national gene banks. They constitute heterogeneous pools and 
create new variations through their attempts at hybridisation and their success. Commercial 
research and development programmes established around new methodical and science-based 
breeding practices have, through their emphasis on plant improvement, furthermore altered the 
valuation of PGRFA in itself, through the internal composition of the breeding pools used in such 
programmes.  
By using perfected techniques of crop hybridisation and the deliberate production of mutations, 
breeders fully exploit existing genetic variation to create new variation, within and between 
species
500
. The possibility to exploit genetic variation with pronounced preciseness has in this 
sense altered the conception of plant varieties and dramatically transformed the priorities and 
machinery of agrobiodiversity management. The selection of material found in biological 
collections has for instance changed drastically from a search for best results in individual samples 
to a quest for specific traits and best combinations. Breeding research is indeed primarily 
carried out on standardised and stable plant varieties, which are already known to breeders. Within 
the new agro-biodiversity management scheme of methodical plant breeding, the first two years of 
research programmes are used for the deliberate production of mutations and variety crosses. The 
subsequent 'lengthy and tedious' selection stage entails six to eight years devoted to examining the 
best recombination and stabilisation designs for the new variation
501
. Seeking to provide cultivars 
showing increased adaptation capability to differing agricultural environments, plant breeders thus 
not only made fresh use of existing collections, but they also altered genetic resource management 
in its general sense
502
. Certain species with absolutely no intrinsic value in the past due to poor 
overall results on farm became extremely interesting. These varieties bore direct yet concealed 
commercial value, as they possessed one or more desired characteristic that could be transmitted to 
new varieties, but could not have been identified without methodical breeding efforts
503
.  
The benefits of modern varieties rely on the constant input of new seeds, whether exotic or already 
improved genetic resources
504
. It is in this context widely acknowledged that commercialisation-
oriented breeding programmes accordingly begin through an analysis of existing improved 
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 varieties, in an attempt to further develop proven market successes
505
. Then, exotic characters 
are incorporated in these foundations, in order to append the additional trait that would lead to an 
increase of productivity or efficiency in farming. Within this mind-set, it has been shown that wild 
genetic resources and landraces represented merely seven point nine per cent (7.9%) of the total 
germplasm used in breeding programmes
506
, knowing that only two point four per cent (2.4%) of 
these had been conserved in situ by farmers all around the world. This impressively low figure has 
been mainly attributed to these resources' lesser quality and stability. Moreover, they require a 
greater amount of research to be efficiently used in variety improvement programmes, especially 
compared to those resources whose characteristics have already been established methodically. 
The low-level use of exotic genetic resources also finds rationale in the financial health of market-
oriented breeding programmes. For instance, varietal development programmes for maize are 
considered to extend from six to eight years, with costs rocketing as high as seven million US 
dollars. However, the lifetime of developed varieties merely stretches from three to six years in 
terms of production and consumer demands
507
. This premise clarifies not only the search for 
specific favourable characteristics in collections, i.e. the look for commercially interesting traits, 
but also explains the main sources of raw material provision, i.e. the focus on stabilised and 
already tested market successes
508
. There is therefore a clear preference by private breeders to 
mostly manipulate elite germplasm, where perceived net values remain significantly higher 
compared to exotic resources. This preference accounts for the altered composition of these 
extended private gene pools, compared to those collections maintained by the public sector, 
whether at the national or international levels.  
However, exotic resources and landraces still constitute a smaller yet often times vital part of 
these pools, as they are esteemed highly by variety developers in terms of long-term security
509
. 
Alongside the social, cultural and economic importance they carry for small farmers’ livelihoods, 
landraces may indeed also be valued for their resistance to currently unknown or temporarily 
eradicated diseases. Indeed, however important the stress put upon the predictability of breeding 
programmes based on former market successes remains, it has also been demonstrated that 
researchers continued to rely, and in fact depended upon wild germplasm in order to ensure the 
long-term sustainability of their studies
510
. Figures indeed show that the agricultural industry could 
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and did indeed not rely on a static range of genetic material, which would not in itself provide the 
necessary variability to ensure the resistance of the new varieties. Breeders totally renewed their 
stocks every ten to fourtheen years, renewal for which natural diversity pools need to remain at 
their widest range. It should however be noted that the recourse and utility, and thus the presence 
of these resources within private breeding gene pools tend to vary from one crop to the other, in 
accordance with the specific needs of the cultivar
511
.  
5.3.2. New Genetic Diversity Put to its Own Test 
Modern plant breeding activities present aspects of biodiversity conservation and creation that 
resonate deeply in the roles traditionally attributed to farmers in terms of on-farm agrobiodiversity 
maintenance. Breeders draw on past market successes and release new variants either through the 
use of known varieties and traits, or having recourse to wild germplasm (whether exotic material, 
wild relatives, or traditional landraces). They then create new genetic variation. Throughout the 
process, they actively contribute to the conservation of plant diversity. However, this newfound 
brilliance also ignited detrimental effects as a productivity-oriented agrobiodiversity management 
scheme, having propelled genetic uniformity and high-input agriculture to farmers unanimously, 
without having regard to their assimilation capacity. An all-encompassing paradigm change, the 
Green Revolution remains a double-edged sword, being attributed either extremely positive or 
extremely detrimental social effects, depending on the writers' perspective
512
.  
While the links between scientific genetic research and plant breeding became stronger day-by-
day, the relationship between farmers and breeders weakened considerably. Farmers have 
been excluded from the "institutionalisation and professionalisation of breeding" activities, 
whether undergone within the public or burgeoning private sectors
513
. This rupture is nonetheless 
not as obvious as it would appear to us today, as most experiment stations and college 
administrators assumed at the time that farmers could and would produce their own hybrid seeds 
during the timid beginnings of plant breeding science
514
. This assumption became a reality for a 
short time-period. However, the power granted to technological breakthroughs instigated a 
different institutional organisation, weakening the ability of farmers to generate improved 
varieties. Not being able to keep up with the rapidly evolving know-how of hybridisation, farmers 
thus progressively lost an aspect of PGRFA management which had always been traditionally 
awarded to them, that of genetic enhancement. Any direct competition between landraces and 
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 hybrids bears in essence an unsustainable aspect, especially having regards to the extension of 
food distribution networks, the internationalisation and growth of food production demands, and 
concurrent demanding consumer requests. Modern varieties indeed bear much more universality 
and preciseness than farmers’ varieties. The traditions of multiple cropping, the holistic 
approaches to crop cultivation and improvement, as well as the growing financial weight of 
modern agricultural tools and external inputs effectively pushed farmers outside of the active 
breeding realm. Farmers started to be considered as mere 'conservers' and ‘cultivators’, rather than 
active variety developers and genetic mass selectors. Due to the subsequent lack of distribution of 
inbred lines, 'breeders' emerged as stand-alone actors of genetic resource management, both in 
terms of their use and conservation, while commanding the driving seat of plant improvement 
from this moment forward.    
Even though one cannot undertake an in-depth analysis of the social and economic consequences 
of the introduction of modern varieties within the scope of this study, it is still safe to say that the 
Green Revolution has been mostly welcomed in a negative fashion in the developing world where 
it introduced high-yielding varieties not adapted to the socio-economic cultivation conditions. 
The dissemination of high-yielding end-products of public research through the exploitation of 
'heterosis' or hybrid vigour found within the crosses carried out at breeding institutes worldwide, 
was first condemned vis-à-vis its motivational impulses and its results on farmers of the 
developing world, a stance that has deepened further with the increased involvement of private 
companies in the development of modern varieties. In accordance with the national security focus 
of the international political scene of the 1950's, the spreading of F1 hybrids in the developing 
world by powerful nations such as the United States fuelled cynical foreign policy analysts to 
assert that the motivations lying therein was the elevation of developing countries to potential 
trading partners of the 'West', having fed their population and achieved economic growth
515
. It has 
been viewed as a change having fuelled inequality, caused evictions, reliance on inputs and 
mechanisation, while considering rural areas merely as spaces for food production destined to the 
industrialising urban populations. Indeed, this phenomenon has drawn in accurate critics over the 
social dislocations caused by the introduction of this new agricultural production scheme, but also 
over the increase of the costs of cultivation for farmers and the trade-offs witnessed between the 
promised yields and crop reliability. This highly pessimistic approach however needs to be 
alleviated. Indeed, it is generally accepted that these high-yielding varieties have successfully 
lowered the food prices for the regional consumer, and might have actually also had a positive 
effect on neighbouring rural economies through a "knock-on" effect
516
. High-yielding varieties 
have also had positive contributions in terms of productivity improvements and the modernisation 
of social structures around the world
517
. 
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However, controlled plant improvement and its accompanying structural changes did not only 
impact farming communities and the economy in its overarching sense. The growingly privatised 
and input-oriented world of plant breeding also had effects on the natural environment and the 
conservation of biological diversity. Agricultural production has already in itself various 
detrimental effects on agro-biodiversity, amongst others the alteration or conversion of natural 
habitats. The intensification of agricultural practices is also considered to detrimentally affect 
biodiversity services, climaxing in species loss or changes in ecosystem stability and resilience
518
. 
The specialisation and homogenisation of agricultural production are also cited as causes of the 
genetic erosion witnessed with regards to agricultural plant diversity. This trend is shown through 
the well-known figures relating to the number of species actually used for human food 
consumption. Indeed, seven thousand out of two hundred and seventy thousand plant species 
known to science have never been used for food and merely nine species provide for seventy five 
per cent (75%) of human food worldwide
519
, while only three crops provide sixty per cent (60%) 
of the calories we obtain from plants
520
. The introduction of modern varieties, fruit of plant 
breeding efforts, is often assumed to have led to the decrease of genetic diversity on farm, 
operating to the demise of locally adapted and inherently more gene-diverse farmers’ varieties and 
populations. Such statement is indeed corroborated by numerous studies that have demonstrated 
that the infusion of new uniform varieties had a direct negative impact on the recourse to farmers’ 
varieties
521
. Indeed, the area allocated to the cultivation of landraces did tend to decrease with the 
adoption of new modern varieties generally performing better in terms of yield and productivity
522
. 
Furthermore, modern plants developed new pest and disease resistances with devastating effects, 
such as the well-documented crisis and famines caused amongst others by the potato blight 
epidemic in Ireland in the 19
th
 century or the corn leaf disease in the USA in the 1970s. Concerns 
have thereon been raised as to the role of plant breeding science in the reduction and 
uniformisation of crop genetic diversity
523
. In this regard, continuous selection efforts and crosses 
between genetically related cultivars may have very well led to a narrowing of the genetic base of 
cultivated crops
524
. Notwithstanding such erosion claims, the over-reliance on fertilisers and lack 
of regard for soil structure in the spread of the Green Revolution is also considered to have led to a 
general degradation of the environment. Studies from the Indian Punjab regions have in this regard 
attributed soil erosion, nutrient depletion, falling water tables and salinisation to the introduction 
of modern varieties’ production scheme525. These findings do nonetheless need to be attenuated. 
Even though modern agriculture, especially monoculture and over-mechanisation, has been 
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 mentioned as a major cause of extinction with regards to agricultural genetic diversity, the same 
modernisation, by reducing pressure on soil, has also been considered to have helped the 
protection of biodiversity outside agricultural fields
526
. Modern varieties can indeed contribute 
to such sustainability by propelling land-savings and reducing pesticide use by improving the 
resistance of varieties to biotic stresses
527
. Furthermore, certain studies have also shown that the 
fruits of plant breeding have actually maintained or even increased genetic diversity on farm, for 
instance in maize farms with field plots having diverse needs
528
 or for the cultivation of wheat in 
general
529
. Research benefitting from molecular data has also shown that the decrease of diversity 
was undeniable during the period when landraces were replaced by modern cultivars, especially in 
the 1960’s, but that genetic erosion has since then stopped, as new diversity had been created530. 
The issue might then very well lie not within the scope of genetic erosion per se, but on genetic 
replacement, and whether a complete substitution between farmers and modern varieties should be 
strived for. Crop-specific studies applied in defined socio-agronomical environments converge 
towards a globally moderate reduction of genetic diversity accompanied by a significant alteration 
of resource management with the introduction of science-based plant breeding
531
.  
CONCLUSIONS: Improving varieties, outsourcing informational inputs and reallocating 
actors  
Mostly attributable to the growing use of quantitative genetics in modern agriculture, plant 
breeding was born again on the basis of the science-based phenotypic observation of plant 
varieties, including those genetic and environmental components, as well as their interactions. The 
selection and breeding of plant varieties was from then on overtaken by professionals, trained and 
educated towards this specific career, while farmers, whose unconscious selection had played an 
important role in the past, would only be seen as sowers of the seeds distributed through public or 
private networks. Furthermore, the necessities of Mendelian genetics and sexual hybridisation 
altered the design and provision of raw genetic material. Science-based breeding programmes did 
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not solely consist of exotic resources, but rather chiefly relied on existing improved germplasm 
and correlated parent inbred lines.  
Backed by an encouraging political and regulatory climate, these developments led to the almost 
full conferral of commercial agricultural research and plant breeding activities into the hands of 
the private sector by the end of the 20
th
 century. This new approach to PGRFA management 
focusing on specific traits and variety crossing possibilities was indeed bestowed upon small or 
medium-sized private companies, which would be crowned the new conservers and creators of 
genetic diversity. Plant breeders worked hard to create, expand and best exploit their private 
breeding pools mainly comprised of modern and stable cultivars with tested market value, but also 
by a small yet at times vital portion of landraces or wild relatives. An extremely lucrative industry 
based upon the use of agricultural genetic resources swiftly arose to reach soaring figures. Today's 
global seed market’s value is estimated to reach fort two billion USD532, a figure within which 
twelve billion USD is allotted to the United States' industry, while the European continent stands 
for seven billion EUR
533
. In this new socio-technological context, new stable and uniform plant 
varieties may be developed in eight to ten years (until their commercialisation), and cost around 
two to four million EUR. 
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  CHAPTER 6: MOLECULAR BIOLOGY AND BIOTECHNOLOGY BUILDING ON 6.
GENOMICS INTROSPECTION 
The aforementioned major reversal in the landscape of participants to PGRFA management is 
attributed to the development of plant breeding. Yet plant improvement was to go through another 
transformation, fuelled by yet another scientific breakthrough in our understanding of plant 
biology. The extension of controlled plant improvement based on sexual hybridisation techniques 
into the world of molecular biology revolutionised genetic resource management once again. It at 
times reinforced the criticism voiced against the Green Revolution with even greater vehemence, 
and unquestionably pushed both farmers and conventional plant breeders to re-assess their place in 
agrobiodiversity innovation.  Subsequently, with the development of genomics science, crop 
improvement has grown into a molecular and biotechnology-heavy industry, dramatically altering 
germplasm exchange opportunities. It has ignited a race for genetic trait royalties, and further 
broke links with farmers, who now face oligopolistic mega-structures
534
.  
By the end of the 20
th
 century, with staggering speed, the “export of a gene sequence had become 
the equivalent to the export of the underlying organism”535, converting the typical flows of 
germplasm and actual biological material into flows of genomic information. As our knowledge of 
a plant's anatomy and its inherent genetic sequences deepened, it was suggested that 
biotechnological advances would “be to the Green Revolution, what the Green Revolution was to 
traditional plant varieties and practices”536. Just as its predecessor, this latest change in research 
and development opportunities altered the organisational structure of plant improvement once 
again. Propelling and deriving almost exclusively from the new uses of genetic resources, the rates 
of return of research and development have cruised at considerably high levels in all agricultural 
commodities, especially with regards to field crops where Herculean mean rates reached as high as 
one hundred and thirty five per cent, well privileged above the average of seventy five per cent 
generally maintained in agriculture
537. While the seed industry’s global value has doubled in less 
than thirty years’ time, its distribution within the sector has taken an even more remarkable turn. 
Indeed, while the highest company turnover was of seven hundred and thirty five million USD in 
the year 1985, the uppermost earnings reached as high as four thousand and twenty eight million 
USD in 2006, a figure that equalled the combination of the turnovers of the six biggest companies 
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in 1996
538
. These figures are only one symptom of the altered seed industry structure and the new 
rules of the agrobiodiversity improvement game. 
6.1. Molecular biology and biotechnology in agriculture 
The science of genetics would witness incredible leaps forward through the middle of the 20
th
 
century. Brilliant minds such as Alfred Hershey, Martha Chase, James Watson and Francis 
Crick
539
 notably unravelled the role and structure of deoxyribonucleic acid, more commonly 
known as DNA, a molecule discovered as early as 1869. The analysis of this molecule, which 
codifies all instructions related to living organisms from their growth to their reproduction and 
maintenance, opened the door to the excavation of genetic resources at a deeper level. On account 
of consecutive scientific breakthroughs, the term "biotechnology" became a recurrent term in exact 
and social science research alike, even though the general public, familiar with the term, has 
ordinarily no precise idea of its meaning
540
. A far-reaching idiom, "biotechnology" 
comprehensively refers to "the application of scientific and engineering principles to the 
processing of materials by biological agents to provide goods and services", in the prevalent 
wording of the Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development ("OECD")
541
. 
Biotechnological innovations, which cover all kinds of innovations, including that of industrial 
fermentation and modern genetic engineering, have widened the spectrum of plant breeding. They 
have done so by developing very efficient novel screening tools and variety development 
techniques, new conservation and use possibilities. Accordingly, genomics science revolutionised 
the food industry in general
542
 and breeding activities in particular, as scientists were now able to 
map and thus locate the genes responsible for specific features or diseases carried by plants. 
Distinctions were established within the organisms and between different traits on a cellular level, 
between simply inherited traits and complex polygenic ones, allowing greater control over the 
characteristics borned by plant varieties in the field or shelves
543
. Agricultural plant biotechnology 
is considered to have propelled revolution-like advances in three key areas, namely the isolation 
and replication of desirable traits through cell culture, the selection of genotypes and associated 
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 phenotypes, and the creation of new transgenic organisms
544
. The changes brought about by 
genomics science to the field of plant breeding may thus be classified as those supplementing 
conventional selection and hybridisation methods on the one hand; and those offering new 
horizons to breeding by genetic modification and DNA recombination on the other. 
6.1.1. Biotechnology in "Conventional" Plant Breeding  
Exclusive of the possibilities offered by genetic manipulation per se, the general contributions of 
biotechnological innovation with regards to crop productivity and stability relate to tissue culture 
technologies on one hand, and to selection, screening or diagnostic tools and methods on the other. 
Both methods have brought in greater precision and considerable time gains in plant breeding 
endeavours. In terms of tissue culture technologies, biotechnological micro-propagation 
techniques have enabled the cloning of cells and their mass propagation. Botanists had attempted 
to cultivate plant cells starting from Gottlieb Haberlandt's successful experiments in the very early 
years of the 20
th
 century
545
. Yet it was only on account of the subsequent advances in our 
understanding and processing of microorganisms that scientists and breeders were able to replicate 
plants on sterile media in a much more secure and efficient fashion. As a result, the conventional 
take on plant breeding that consisted of sexually reproducing the varieties that retained desired 
characteristics has evolved so as to include material generated through tissue and embryo culture. 
These possibilities allow not only a better control of the environment, but also enlarge the 
spectrum of crosses that can be accomplished. Using tissue culture, breeders are not only able to 
predict research results more accurately, but can thereon also cross species which would not 
naturally cross in nature. Unichromosomal "haploid" plants may now be consciously produced, 
putting aside the issue of unpredictable dominance, in favour of absolute certainty over the 
characteristic fuelled by the gene
546
. As a faster alternative to backcrossing efforts needed to 
obtain pure lines, haploids can be crossed to produce homogenous diploid plants where absolutely 
all undesirable traits have been eliminated
547
. While conventional breeding techniques require 
multiple generations of selection to stabilise desired traits; doubled haploids are genetically pure 
and produced in just one generation. Furthermore, the development of homogenous haploid cells 
has also opened the door to so-called “somatic” interspecies hybridisation548, breaking a frontier 
that conventional plant breeders could not initially breach. Tissue culture techniques have 
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therefore allowed the development of new varieties through the combination of species outside 
each other's immediate gene pool and that would otherwise not interbreed
549
. Breeders can thus not 
only operate with greater adequacy, but can also make wide, perhaps even unlimited, variety 
crosses by using so-called “somaclones”550.  
Another extremely timesaving and accuracy-adding revolution brought to plant breeding by 
genomics science involves the development of new screening and selection technologies. 
Analysing plant varieties at the DNA level, tools such as molecular markers and immuno-
diagnostics using molecular assays today assist the characterisation and management of plant 
genetic resources
551
. Through these analytical tools, breeders are currently able to process 
thousands of plants in great molecular detail during the course of a single day, while merely a few 
dozen samples could have been analysed in the past during the same time frame
552
. Molecular 
markers are short and identifiable DNA strips that indicate the presence of a desired trait within a 
plant's genome,. They contribute to the generation of genomics knowledge not only through 
'fingerprinting', i.e. the characterisation of germplasm itself, but also through the dissection of 
desired traits and the identification of genetic regions or "quantitative trait loci's"
553
. These 
markers are incresingly included within crop improvement programmes through a new scheme 
coined "marker-assisted selection"
554
. This technique allows for selection to be operated 
concurrently on more than one trait for one plant
555
 and allows for the efficient screening of 
characteristics that are difficult or time-consuming to predict through simple phenotypic analysis. 
Breeders can for instance screen disease resistance traits without need for pathogen exposal, or 
traits only found in mature plants without any need for maturing. Moreover, the segments of DNA 
identified through markers allow for the efficient follow-up of inheritance. They open the door for 
the transfer of desired traits to progeny or for the suppression of undesired ones, all the while 
having recourse to 'conventional' sexual hybridisation. Breeders today use a wide range of 
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 molecular markers, which each present different advantages and constraints
556
. These markers 
first need to be identified, not only through sequencing efforts that may produce too much 
information and miss the important markers, but also by alternate detection techniques
557
. Diverse 
diagnostic tools exist, such as molecular assays and the more costly polymerase chain reaction 
('PCR')-based DNA diagnostics, which may also identify viruses, disease-causing agents or 
suspected pathogens
558
. Besides their invaluable contribution to information and selection 
techniques, biotechnological breakthroughs may thus also play a major part in disease prevention 
and control.  
Notwithstanding the institutional barriers surrounding the recourse to molecular biology tools, by 
the end of the 1990's, some of the shortcomings and flaws of the quantitative genetics' revolution 
had been levelled out. The new science of molecular plant breeding, with its enhanced knowledge 
of the desired traits’ genetic architecture, literally allowed breeders to tailor-make specific new 
plant types to be highly productive in specific and more difficult growth environments, on account 
of DNA analysis and recombination
559
. Following in the footsteps of plant breeding, the second 
quantum leap of plant improvement was thus achieved, adding incredible precision and foresight 
to the research process, shortening the cycle of product development, while also generating the 
newest type of modern varieties, fruits of genetic modification
560
. IRRI's work on IR 8 has for 
instance incorporated this leap in order to obtain "Green Super Rice", in an effort to improve the 
grain quality initially obtained with sexual crosses operated on over two hundred and fifty 
varieties. This improvement is sought essentially after through the asexual incorporation of genes 
for targeted disease and insect resistance
561
. Molecular plant breeding, backed for instance by 
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marker-based selection or haploid technologies, has become an extremely precise breeding 
technique that nonetheless relies on the access to a combination of complex technologies. 
Diagnostic tools and molecular markers allow for substantive time gains if used efficiently, 
shortening the time frame for variety development by two to three years. However, they come at a 
price. With the exception of certain methods such as the simple sequence or microsatellite markers 
(“SSR markers”) that are relatively cheap, the initial investment to build a stand-alone laboratory 
or a molecular unit within existing breeding programs is considerably high
562
. The tricky question 
that ought to be answered in terms of cost-effectiveness is therefore the trade-off between time 
gains and additional investment, which means that if “operating capital is constrained, the best 
breeding method will maximise the internal rate of return, i.e. conventional selection”563. This 
trade-off clearly shows the barriers that exist to enter the world of molecular biology.  
6.1.2. Genetic Engineering and DNA recombination  
Constantly deepening our knowledge of specific regions and markers responsible for certain traits 
within a plant's genome, genomics science soon extended to genetic recombination. Ever since 
Stanley Cohen and Herbert Boyer decided to join forces and proceed to DNA cloning experiments, 
providing results on the recombination of organisms in 1973, their ground-breaking discoveries 
have fuelled significant interest. The practical implications of their experiments heralded a new 
research and development field that was coined 'genetic engineering'. Even though tissue culture 
techniques and molecular markers have speeded up the process of breeding and reduced unwanted 
gene transfers, conventional breeders were not able to neither control the exact degree of genetic 
change found in the new plant variety, nor totally eliminate all undesirable traits through mere 
sexual reproduction
564
.  
The language of molecular biology, solely considering cellular information, has thus been 
compared to a "biological Esperanto common",
565
 whereby genetic instructions and functions 
showed no distinction between living organisms, as a universal language, which, when deciphered, 
unveiled a knowledge Eldorado in terms of plant variety improvement possibilities. Genetically 
engineered new varieties, presenting traits uncharacteristic to the very species they belong to, have 
thus demolished the walls of inherent genetic incompatibilities
566
. Building upon the developments 
in the field of molecular biology and genomics science, genetic engineering took the possibilities 
offered by genetic resources a step further, breaking the limits of reproduction past “mere” 
somaclonal hybrids. Through genetic engineering, it became possible to accomplish what 
evolution had not (yet) granted to certain plants, as it has been done in the development of C
4
 
photosynthesis rice. In this case, scientists granted the natural opportunity of photosynthesis to rice 
varieties that did not have this prospect, thereby significantly improving yields, water and nitrogen 
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 use performances
567
. It is on account of recombination methods that modern agricultural 
genomics science has resolved the shortcoming of undesired genetic variation inherent to sexual 
mating. Indeed, through the recourse to transgenesis, namely the insertion of exogenous gene into 
plants, the recombination of DNA added to breeding in exactitude and time. Isolating one or two 
specific genes with pre-identified characteristics such as disease resistance within a donor 
organism, genetic engineers introduce these isolated genes within an external plant variety, 
creating a unique genetic modification and thus recombining the genome sequence of the recipient 
organism. The most common two techniques for transgene insertion are biolistics, using gold 
particles, and Agrobacterium-mediated gene insertion, whereby the organism is “infected” with 
DNA
568
. Molecular biology enables "changes in gene frequencies with a wholly unprecedented 
specificity, such recombinations [being] no longer limited to sexually compatible organisms"
569
. 
Genomics science, when applied to plant breeding, meant that the main barriers to new, stronger, 
more productive, resistant or adapted varieties had become the breeders' imagination, wiping out 
the frontiers of sexual reproduction, families or varieties in plants, bacteria or any other living 
organism. The availability of plant transformation techniques, either through the recourse to 
Agrobacterium or the development of biolistics, has tremendously extended the reach of plant 
breeding, by stretching it beyond the limitations imposed by sexual reproduction and cross-
compatibility requirements, thereby making absolutely all organisms a potential material for plant 
transformation and new genetic diversity
570
. The limits rather now lied in the patience of the 
breeders and the financial means injected in their project, as the development of a single trait may 
cost more than one hundred million USD in a time span of twelve to thirteen years
571
. 
The “mere” infusion of biotechnological innovations to conventional breeding has mostly focused 
on the improvement of variety performance and breeding efficiency. On account of its open-ended 
barriers, the priorities of genetic modification have shown a wider range. In this context, 
distinction is generally made between genetic enhancement directed towards the inputs of the 
variety or towards its output traits, a difference highlighting whether the improved 
characteristics are uncovered respectively in the seed itself or on the harvested material
572
. In the 
former input-oriented research, transgenesis has accordingly attempted to directly improve biotic 
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or abiotic stress resistances, just as conventional breeding efforts did, focusing on stresses related 
to viruses, bacteria and fungi, or to drought and other thermal stresses. Another major input trait 
developed by agricultural biotechnology relates to herbicide tolerance, one of the earliest 
transgenic traits to be developed commercially, and which is not found in conventional breeding 
methods
573
. With regards to those output traits improved through transgenesis, research has 
generated promising results in the enhancement of the harvested product's vitamins content, as 
well as in biofortification efforts against soil deficiency in essential minerals, or in the nutritional 
enhancement of oil crops. Both the development and spreading of these new genetically improved 
varieties have in this context been extremely impressive. The first billion of accumulated hectarage 
has taken ten years to be reached, starting from 1995, while the second billion was reached in 
merely three years, in 2008
574
. Not short of regulatory setbacks, the biotechnology revolution has 
been spreading much faster than conventional sexual hybridisation techniques in the world, in 
parallel to the head-turning speed through which technological advances continue to see the light 
of day. The latest of such advances is notably the generation of products combining 'stacked' 
transgenic traits, rooting for more performance in genetically modified crops projecting multiple 
benefits
575
.  
6.2. New actors of agrobiodiversity management: specialisations, acquisitions, and the 
dawn of an oligopolistic industry  
Just as plant-breeding activities became conspicuously more reliant on laboratory work, "a 
wholesale corporate takeover" was coincidently taking place, whose rationale appeared to be this 
new dependence on genomics science
576
. Indeed, “the large and overwhelmingly public 
agricultural research effort of developing countries has, with a few notable exceptions, made 
relatively little progress in developing and commercialising agricultural biotechnology 
innovations”577. The clear shift from publicly-funded agricultural research into a private-sponsored 
one had been consecrated during the 1980's, the decades of plant breeders' reign
578
. With the 
development of molecular biology however, new actors got directly involved in PGRFA 
management. This pushed for a reallocation of the crown of seed control. Not only would cutting-
edge laboratories take the lead while companies stemming from a chemical background entered 
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 this lucrative market, the seed industry would also undergo impressive waves of mergers and 
acquisitions, resulting in an oligopoly of sizeable multinationals.  
6.2.1. Cutting-edge Research Prospects Grabbed by New Corporate Actors  
As one of the most knowledge-intensive industries in the world, agricultural or “green 
biotechnology” has proven to be a very efficient technological platform for high-end, mostly 
public, research entities specialising in cutting-edge research. Most of the initial efforts, 
especially those directly regarding the development of molecular research tools, were indeed 
carried out by the public sector, seen as “a key repository of up-to-date expertise in most of the 
cutting edge areas of new technologies, such as genomics, bioinformatics or molecular 
markers”579. Technological advances in plant genomics triggered the establishment of specialised 
early-stage public research laboratories or companies, less concerned with marketing issues per se, 
but developing products that would be infused into the marketplace later on by other actors. It has 
for instance been shown that in 1996, the “sales of products developed from inventions produced 
by academic research and licensed to industry amounted to twenty point six billion USD, 
[considering that] nearly two-thirds of these licenses were to small firms”580. Public and university 
initiatives were however not always designed to stay that way, and soon gained a private nature, 
even though the ties with their parent public institutions or universities would not be severed to the 
point of no return.  The supremacy of the cutting-edge biotechnology start-up had began. One of 
the most striking aspects of this move has been its speed in reacting to the potential of the 
application of genomics science in agricultural plant biology. Indeed, the first company to exploit 
the DNA recombination technology was founded merely three years after its initial discovery
581
. 
Numerous technology licensing offices start-ups have been established in the field of 
biotechnology, financed mostly by venture capitalists
582
. Researchers of Cornell University set up 
their own start-up company, Biolistics, which developed the “Biolistic Particle Delivery System” 
gene gun technology. At the dawn of the 21
st
 century, the knowledge-based biotechnology 
industry, defined in its largest sense, was thus predominantly composed of smaller-scale 
companies with strong ties to university scientists, whether official start-ups or entrepreneurial 
personal initiatives
583
. As a perhaps unforeseen result, the “intellectual centre of gravity” in 
biotechnological inventions was starting to move towards the private sector, especially through 
start-up firms in the likes of Mycogen or Calgene
584
. This has also for instance been the case of the 
infamous Genentech in the field of biomedicine, having started with the development of synthetic 
human insulin and has now grown in tremendous proportions. 
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In parallel to this specialisation and “entrepreneurial science” surge, the promises of “green 
biotechnology” and genetic engineering generated a great deal of equity investment stemming 
from major multinational firms active in remote fields
585
. Molecular science created a new 
biotechnology business model predominantly relying on molecular interactions and cellular 
manipulation. But this model’s economic survival relied upon significant financial reserves and 
suitable high-end infrastructures to benefit from the genomic revolution. This dynamic and 
promising context, and the increasing cost-effectiveness attributed to breeding activities, swiftly 
tickled the interest of companies that had previously dominated the agricultural chemical sector. 
Indeed, at the dawn of the influential environmental movement, these agrochemicals 'giants' were 
under regulatory pressure to further regulate and reduce the use of pesticides, which had started to 
prove their detrimental effects on nature
586
. They thus had to find innovative ways for their 
activities' proliferation and could easily finance the expensive research and development tools 
required in the increasingly knowledge-intensive and laboratory-oriented world of plant 
biotechnology. Pharmaceutical companies accompanied this new extension, whether as parent 
entities (Pharmacia Upjohn for Monsanto for instance), or as inside divisions (G.D. Searle 
Company’s green biotechnology division acquired by Monsanto in the 1980’s)587. On the other 
hand, private conventional breeding and seed companies could not join the Gene Revolution with 
the same ease and speed. Indeed, "the type of scientific capacity required to mount a successful 
biotechnology research programme [was] fundamentally different from that needed for developing 
adapted crop varieties"
588
. The often times small or medium-scale seed enterprises maintained a 
sharp focus on phenotypic experimentation, field trials, the natural talent and intuition of 
individuals, while relying on the rapid uptake of the products of their research and uninterrupted 
cash flow
589
. The investment and know-how related to molecular biology had in this sense 
effectively triggered a shift away from seed companies specialised in delivering new plant 
varieties. A portion of agricultural input development and provision was as a result sliding away 
from the hands of those who could not take the leap of biotechnology. 
6.2.2. “Acquiring” in the Name of Breeding Background and Market Control 
Even though specialised entities were developing crucial molecular research tools and large 
chemicals originating multinationals were entering the plant innovation landscape, the initial basis 
of agricultural production and variety selection stayed very well in place. Conventional plant 
breeders were seemingly there to stay, even though there were fears of them becoming “a dying 
breed”590. This obituary was premature since genetic engineering could not survive without any 
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 breeding background. Yet again, the collision of specialised laboratories, chemicals giants, and 
seed companies was inevitable, and it was a violently exterminating one, and on all sides. This 
collision’s annihilating effects, unforeseen by certain actors, are best epitomised by the story of 
Calgene, one of the early-bird green biotechnology start-ups. Calgene was “a force of 
revolutionary change within the most traditional and backward of industries”, agriculture, and 
arguably regrouped the most productive and innovative scientists working on green 
biotechnology
591
. These scientists dropped the so-called “antisense gene” (a gene constructed 
backwards that prevented the first sequence of DNA from achieving its purpose) into tomatoes, 
extending their shelf life considerably. The gene got the name of “Flavr Savr” and it became a new 
marketable product that would be very publicly pushed by the company in the name of its 
revolutionary nature, while other actors would continue their R&D more discretely. However, the 
company remained focused on molecular biology, and was not successful in understanding the 
needs of plant breeding, “thinking they could simply find a variety, splice in the gene and plant 
it”592. The molecular innovation model needed a complementary friend to survive the market and 
rise to the challenges of agricultural production. This need counts as one of the prime motivations 
lying behind the important re-structuring that would be witnessed in the molecular seed industry. 
Calgene ended up being gradually bought by Monsanto. 
The collision tickled by the genomics revolution would indeed translate into a radical movement 
of mergers and acquisitions, also coupled with moderate restructuring trends such as strategic or 
research alliances and joint ventures. The motives behind this movement have been numerous and 
studied in depth throughout all academic disciplines
593
. They can nonetheless be essentially 
attributed to the need to supplement product pipelines, enhance research and development 
capability, and ultimately achieve wider market control. The evolution has in this context been 
two-fold in the seed sector, respectively through horizontal integration, by means of mergers 
operated within the same level of the production chain, and through the vertical integration of local 
small-scale seed companies providing for market-ready and geographically adapted varieties, ajar 
for biotechnological trait enhancement
594
. At the horizontal level, the main actors of the new seed 
industry started to rapidly acquire their competitors, in order to consolidate costs, extend their 
sphere of influence or even use this commercial strategy as a pre-emptive tool to defend their own 
valuable assets
595
. Studies have shown that the specificities of the agricultural biotechnology 
sector have opened the doors to this intensive take-overs race in their own right. Indeed, the high 
sunk costs, i.e those expenditures impossible to recoup, rendered market entry and exit extremely 
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costly for new players
596
. In parallel to such horizontal growth, a wave of vertical absorptions of 
small-scale seed companies concomitantly took place to the advantage of the newly formed 
giants. Vertical integration ensured that both the biotechnological capacity and the knowledge of 
the seed industry and process of breeding were combined in the same hands. As the demise of 
Calgene illustrated, the success of plant genetic engineering continued to depend upon an 
extremely solid base of conventional plant breeding. Breeders had to develop the stable and 
commercially successful varieties upon which the new technology was to be applied. Additional 
rationale has also been pinpointed to justify this phenomenon of vertical integration, namely the 
complementarity and substitutability of seeds and chemicals, making it more profitable for 
companies to enclose both production capacities
597
. The move was also corroborated to a certain 
extent by the regulatory changes regarding intellectual property protection, in order to constitute 
complete portfolios and avoid unsecure licensing deals
598
. Through this vertical integration 
movement, "trait developers have gained access to germplasm by acquiring seed companies with 
breeding programmes", while "historically, most germplasm developers had been independent 
from trait developers", to directly quote an industry giant, Dupont / Pioneer Hi-Bred 
International
599
. The core difference between the results of conventional plant breeding activities 
and so-called genetic engineering continued to lie within the premise that the former does not and 
cannot manipulate or alter the genetic integrity of organisms as the latter proposes to. However, 
the distinction between these two sectors was to become blurrier, as the commercial success of 
genetic engineering generally presupposed the existence of a successful cultivar obtained through 
conventional plant breeding, within which the biotechnology-derived trait enhancements would be 
incorporated
600
.  
Whichever the strategy or specific action path viewed fit to achieve higher market share, the final 
result of this changing industry structure has been the creation of an enormous 'life-sciences' 
complex, realising not only economies of scale but also that of scope, enclosing several product 
pipelines within its walls
601. Even though the “life science” model is seemingly showing cracks 
today, as pharmaceutical giants have gradually divested themselves of their green biotechnology 
legs, both the highly specialised and oligopolistic nature of the biotechnology market are 
undeniably established. Whether reinforcing the oligopolistic structure resulting from the 
integration waves, or rather expanding them into the public realm, new external linkages are now 
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 emphasised by the biotechnology industry, favouring agreements with competitors, research 
agreements with universities, and investments in the capital stock of other biotechnology firms
602
. 
The industry consolidation of the industry has as a result without a doubt dramatically altered 
germplasm exchange opportunities. It consequently yielded a hefty impact on the deepening gulf 
between existing differences in stages of economic and human development, all the while 
contributing to the demise of the Gene Revolution’s reach. 
6.3. Opportunities for genetic diversity management veiled by concentration and 
distribution concerns 
The biotechnology revolution holds much wider-reaching goals than plant improvement and 
productivity vis-à-vis agriculture. It comes across as a "broader technological transformation that 
is galvanising changes in the social organisation of all production processes in which organic 
substances or life forms play a significant role"
603
. Rightful or not, it has triggered messianic 
discourses as the sole solution to eradicate hunger and effectively feed our growing population 
under growingly more stressful cultivation conditions. Although the potential benefits of 
biotechnology science in terms of amplifying and conserving gene pools are almost unanimously 
flaunted, the actual reach of this development has been undermined by a variety of factors. These 
factors stem from ethical grounds, scientific knowledge itself, and also from the institutional 
organisation having surrounded the development of Gene Revolution and the distribution of its 
products
604
.  
6.3.1. A Revolution of Unprecedented Environmental and Socio-economic Reach 
The product development possibilities offered by both molecular biology tools and genetic 
engineering demonstrate a major strength of the 'gene revolution': its potential contribution to 
biodiversity conservation, as well as its geographical and socio-economic reach. Classical 
quantitative phenotypic analysis continued to constitute the backbone of breeding programmes, as 
a framework upon which tools stemming from genotypic analysis have been appended
605
. 
However, biotechnology stretched characterisation efforts achieved by early collectors of 
biological material of the 19
th
 century further away. It surpassed phenotypic observation 
experiments symbolising the 20
th
 century and left almost no secret so as to the composition of 
germplasm. The advances witnessed in the field of plant molecular biology possess in this regard 
tremendous potential as to the conservation of plant genetic resources, through new storage 
methods and a greater understanding of biodiversity. By digging deeper into the organism, 
genomics science and the biotechnology revolution further informationalised genetic resources. 
Molecular biology has created a new kind of germplasm collector, focusing chiefly on the 
molecular level of genes, alleles, traits and their possible enhancement. The gene revolution has 
accordingly fully transformed genetic resources into sources of decipherate information, with 
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simultaneously corporeal and informational compounds, striving away from a mere form of 
matter. Indeed, "what begins as a thick, messy whole organism (something unquestionably 
corporeal in form), [becomes…] progressively decorporealised, existing as a body of 
information"
606
. It is precisely the use of DNA sequencing or genetic marking technologies that 
have progressively led to such de-corporealisation, granting them both material and informational 
features
607
, while also opening the door to new appropriation mechanisms. As a result of this new 
reign of information, resources shifted from traditionally observable phenotypes into abstract 
genotypes. Collection interests also extended deep to the level of microorganisms, especially 
crucial to the development of specialty enzymes. Genetic resource collections attributed to 
conventional sexual hybridisation techniques were mainly concerned with a variety in itself, 
seeing it as a whole organism, thus paying prime attention to those locally adapted, primitive and 
traditional landraces. Molecular biology re-shaped these collection endeavours so as to target 
individual genes, re-enlarging the focus of bioprospecting
608
. Bearing in mind the fact that a 
breeder's major objectives usually remain embedded within a single gene, allele or quantitative 
trait loci, conferring the plant with the sought-after tolerance or resistance to specific external or 
internal stresses, the emphasis of genetic material collections shifted towards those wild relatives, 
which could hold genes now able to show all their worth. Molecular researchers can indeed better 
take advantage of wild relatives’ potential, especially when tackling issues like disease resistance 
and stress tolerance, just like rye’s traditional tolerance to frost and cold, which researchers 
attempt to ultimately move to wheat varieties, who sensibly suffer in colder climates
609
. It is in this 
context that the biotechnology revolution has enabled researchers and breeders to understand and 
exploit genetic resources to the best of their abilities and potential, enlarging the opportunity for 
biodiversity creation and conservation, but also its extensive exploitation.   
Besides its undeniable contribution to biodiversity conservation and the enhanced use of genetic 
variability, the Gene Revolution’s product range also holds great environmental, social and 
economic promises. Biotechnology related innovations bear the promise of reducing the 
environmental pressure of agriculture through the products offered to farmers and consumers. 
Growing GMO’s developed and commercialised today can for instance reduce the use of 
chemicals; even though there is tremendous unutilised potential to fight environmental risks such 
as desertification, soil erosion or salinisation
610
. The Gene Revolution may also actively be an 
essential component of food security and malnutrition related strategic actions, as epitomised by 
the research of the West African Rice Development Association ("WARDA") on a cross- breed 
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 easier to harvest by hand, set in motion through embryo rescue technology
611
. Furthermore, 
biotechnology does not necessarily rely on existing agricultural production schemes. It does not 
necessitate the same kind of knowledge vis-à-vis irrigation techniques or specific farm 
management training as for the cultivation of hybrids, but rather has the potential to adapt itself 
directly to challenging cultivation scenarios, such as extremely dry regions, potentially spreading 
even to the most remote areas of least-developing countries. Alongside the complex balancing 
discourse needs mainly attached to genetic engineering, biotechnology has also brought about 
uncontested positive progresses.  Indeed, by shortening the life-cycle of breeding programs, 
molecular research tools also contribute actively to bringing socially, economically or 
environmentally interesting plant varieties into the market. The efficient recourse to haploid 
technology for instance shortens research time-span approximately by three to even four years, if 
used together with greenhouse and contra-season production
612
. Most of the pro-poor rhetoric used 
in favour of a positive correlation between the recourse to genetically engineered crops and 
poverty reduction do nonetheless favour a reductionist Malthusian argument that focuses on the 
need for more productive technologies to rise to the challenge. Even if this stance needs to be 
alleviated by recognising that hunger and poverty are much more complex notions that also are 
“an outcome of unequal entitlements to food”, productivity growth still remains critical to achieve 
these goals
613
. The bottleneck lies here in assessing whether or not the products of the Gene 
Revolution are the sole responses for productivity, without falling into simplistic syllogisms. 
6.3.2. Tainted by Scientific and Institutional Shortcomings 
The grand promises of green biotechnology need to be alleviated, and “the messianic fervour of 
[…] proselytes of transgenesis should strike a note of caution”614. The active choices in the 
development of genetically modified crops, with a clear emphasis on herbicide tolerance products, 
have received acute criticism. Notwithstanding the populist and ethical controversies over the 
final products of transgenesis, accusing “Frankenfoods” of “genetic pollution”, and playing on 
inherent public reticence vis-à-vis obscure scientific experiments done behind the closed doors of 
underground laboratories
615
, green biotechnology has in practice not lived to its real potential. 
Indeed, the range of possibilities offered by transgenesis do not reflect the reality of the research 
that is currently been undertaken and commercialised, since most of product development 
endeavours still tend to focus on herbicide tolerance
616
, as well as pest and disease resistance
617
. 
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The reasons behind such narrow focus are manifold. First and foremost, they revolve around 
scientific and technical shortcomings. Indeed, it is inherently difficult to determine the 
sequences that should be moved in terms of utility and interest, and to operate the move swiftly 
within another organism, at the exact desired spot, even though all genes may theoretically be 
isolated and transferred into all organisms
618
. In oil crops for instance, the grand aspirations 
advocating the engineering of ‘designer crops’ capable of “producing any type of carbon-based 
product [ranging from pharmaceuticals, biodegradable plastics to vitamin-rich edible oils)…] have 
taken far longer than any of the [scientists] had imagined”619. The difficulty to transform the 
biotech potential into a concrete product responding to an actual plea for the fields or shelves 
considerably lowered the revolutionary reach of the Gene Revolution. Transgenesis’ utility thus 
remains limited to those breeders that are not on a tight budget; work with well characterised 
material and on relatively simple traits regulated by a small number of genes, such as pest 
resistance
620
. Moreover, when commercialised, these products have had extremely virulent 
detrimental social and economic consequences on farmers, sowing the dramatical “seeds of 
suicide” on account of the sharp increase of seed prices, along with the undetachable 
agrochemicals to be sprayed to obtain the promised results
621
. These realities have triggered 
important national, regional and even global mobilisation against the products of transgenesis, 
shifting towards a wider debate on the politics, values and future of the agrarian society towards 
perhaps greater food sovereignty, in a context of farmer “indebtedness and increasing reliance on 
credit and loans from traders and seed companies”622. In this context, the development of Round-
Up Ready soybeans in the United States is considered to have “nothing to do with improving the 
nutritional properties or commercial value of the bean […but] rather signals the increasingly 
monopolistic impetus of corporate efforts to enrol the seed into other product lines”623. This 
strategy of forced combination of both seeds and herbicide has been coined “accumulation by 
dispossession”624, ringing alarm bells over the missed opportunity for biodiversity conservation or 
food security gains theoretically offered by the technology.  
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 The newly oligopolistic character of the agricultural input market greatly contributed to the 
criticism waves plundering the Gene Revolution. Merely looking at the end of the 1990's to the 
beginning of the 21
st
 century, the rate of integration and consolidation has been vertiginously 
swift, generating disturbing figures with regards to market control, fifty five per cent of which was 
in the hands of merely ten companies in 2008
625
. These figures have not only propelled hostile 
civil society movements and the instauration of 'watchdogs'
626
; they have also cost the industry's 
major players to be on many States' anti-trust red lists
627
. The potential censure of competition law 
against these structures is also heightened by anti-trust cases that have been filed by competitors, 
especially in the district of Saint Louis
628
. In parallel to the oligopolistic tendencies of the seed and 
agricultural biotechnology market, an even more radical concentration has indeed taken place in 
terms of 'trait ownership'. This idiom would have been impossibly hard to fashion by Gregor 
Mendel. However surprising this trend may be, it was a natural and most often hidden 
consequence of the restructuring of the seed industry on the flow of germplasm, and the resulting 
artificial organic unity created between germplasm and trait developers. The concentration levels 
in the ownership of genes that contain enhancement traits are believed to actually be higher than 
those pertaining to the merger movement in terms of company and equity control. However, these 
levels remain extremely difficult to objectively quantify due to the commercial and private nature 
of the transactions. Information has nonetheless been made available by companies themselves, 
such as the undisputable leader in trait ownership, Monsanto, which confirmed its ninety eight per 
cent monopoly on herbicide tolerant soybean biotechnology seed traits in 2009, as well as its sky 
high shares in corn and other stacked traits
629
. It has also been shown that the market for 
biotechnology traits developed for cotton seeds was more concentrated that the cotton market 
itself, as merely three companies provided for traits, with extremely uneven distributional share 
between these top competitors, their leader maintaining more than ninety per cent of traits
630
.  
Most of the official data stems from patent ownership evaluation, which is easier to establish with 
exact certitude. Accordingly, the USDA has announced that the aforementioned mergers of the 
1990’s did in fact generate a heavy concentration of patent ownership in the agricultural 
biotechnology sector
631
. The 2003 study showed that the top ten patent assignees controlled over 
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half of the patents that were issued before the year 2000. Tracking actual germplasm movements, 
as well as determining the actual extent of structural, organic and collaboration-based linkages 
between the different actors of the private industry became an incredibly difficult task. Figures do 
tend to corroborate the oligopolistic nature of the seed market and the near-monopolistic structure 
of the biotechnology traits market
632
. These figures have indeed impelled competition authorities 
to carry out more stringent analysis of gene ownership in merger applications, which has led to the 
conditional acceptance of certain acquisitions, whereby the availability of germplasm or genomics 
processes to competitors had to be ensured for specific periods of time
633
. Besides the civil society 
reaction impelled by these dominant positions, they have also created tensions within the private 
sector itself, between those conventional breeding- rooted companies and those derived from 
biotechnology enhancement trait development, but also within the latter companies themselves, 
anxious to the sight that one company is established "as the gatekeeper to future innovation in 
biotechnology and germplasm improvement, and as the sole arbiter of the new products that 
become available to farmers"
634
.  
Even though the concept of the 'life-sciences' company has started to show signs of slowing down 
and compartmentalisation vis-à-vis the agricultural production pipeline, the impacts of the high 
levels of both vertical and horizontal integration have been extremely detrimental. The 
institutional features of the Gene Revolution threaten the health of the sector in terms of 
competitivity, deteriorating the prospects of equity within the private sector itself, but also abate 
those prospects of equity with regards to farmers of both the developed and the developing world. 
The relationship between farmers and breeders, which had already been shaken up by Mendelian 
genetics, has received yet another wound through the increased recourse to plant genomics and the 
rise of impenetrable multinationals.  
CONCLUSIONS: Recombining DNA, trading genetic traits and forming oligopolies 
The infusion of molecular biology into plant improvement has ignited a new age of “gene 
hunting”, next to the age-old specimen selection on farm on the one hand, and variety 
development through controlled crosses and field trials on the other. Even though all of these 
methods remain valid and efficient for crop innovation, they have been re-shaped by the advent of 
molecular research tools, offering preciseness and saving precious time, culminating in the even 
more complex reality of genetic engineering. Shortening the timeframe for the development of 
new varieties and adding much-acclaimed precision into the breeding process, biotechnological 
innovations have effectively revolutionised crop improvement. They have generated new genetic 
variation that could not be foreseen in the past, thanks to genetic engineering or somaclonal 
hybridisation methods. Molecular biology techniques have also indirectly expanded the universe 
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 of plant breeding on account of tissue culture opportunities, screening and diagnostic tools, or the 
support of molecular markers in conventional controlled plant improvement. Biotechnology has in 
this regard given breeders the possibility to develop new varieties faster, controlling the outcome 
of crosses with more acute precision through a deepened analysis of germplasm. The possibilities 
offered by molecular biology applied within conventional plant breeding efforts led to a race 
towards the development of molecular research tools, and not “solely” plant varieties or breeding 
techniques. While more “passive” molecular biology tools have been extremely useful in reducing 
the effects of unwanted genes, genetic engineering has increased the expression of desired traits in 
organisms that would not carry them.  
These influxes have been accompanied by an important re-organisation of agricultural research 
and development, as well as crop production cycles, with grand promises and equally grand 
setbacks, whether at the level of the farm or within the seed industry itself. The expansion of our 
knowledge of organisms at the cellular level and the new horizons created through their 
manipulation has created a new institutional landscape. The symptoms of this new innovation 
context lie in the reign of specialised cutting-edge biotechnological research entities expanding 
from their initial public habitat into the world of agro-chemicals, and a consequent intensification 
of horizontal and vertical integration within the new private actors of the seed industry. 
Germplasm exchange opportunities between competitors were dramatically altered
635
 in the face 
of oligopolistic mega-structures relying heavily on the new market for trait development rather 
than variety development
636
. The socio-economic and institutional features of green biotechnology 
thus bear fundamentally differences with conventional breeding activities. Indeed, there are today 
merely a few entities capable of investing billions into research programmes with uncertain 
outcomes, developing a viable and interesting product, getting its market approvals and then 
commercialising it. On the other hand, plant breeders who do wish to, and financially can take 
advantage of the “simpler” yet extremely effective tools offered by molecular biology are 
numerous and diversified around the world. The option of molecular breeding still presupposes the 
access to technology developed outside the traditional realm of plant breeding, obeying to other 
scientific norms and presupposing different skills, notably in terms of legal and commercial 
negotiation. 
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PART II CONCLUSIONS. The Five Categories of Actors of Agrobiodiversity Conservation, 
Use and Improvement 
Undoubtedly creating new horizons for the selection and cultivation of foodstuff, scientific 
progresses have significantly altered farm management, cultivation and plant improvement 
practices. They have transformed the cycle of variety development, the priorities of 
agrobiodiversity management, and the actors involved in the provision of primary agricultural 
inputs. Farmers were the first users, conservers and creators of agricultural genetic resources, 
selecting best performing individuals in their fields for their own consumption or foodstuff trade. 
As colonial expeditions ignited tangled and international flows of biological material, genetic 
resources moved outside the realms of the traditional and informal seed exchange networks set up 
by farmer-selectors. The plant repertoire that had been domesticated for ten thousand years was 
thereafter taken on by public botanical gardens and their satellite stations, cultivating and studying 
exotic germplasm. Mastering heredity on account of scientific developments, these stations 
morphed into agricultural research centres, quickly engaging into the brave new world of plant 
breeding. Active breeding endeavours embedded in conscious sexual crossings efforts and 
phenotypic observations allowed the development of specific characteristics adapted to the desires 
of farmers or consumers. The stable and uniform plant varieties of the Green Revolution enabled 
farmers to reach astonishingly higher yield and productivity results, calming Malthusian concerns 
over growing population figures. However, the novel sharp race for industrial efficiency lit up 
criticism over the uniformisation of production and the socio-economic inadequacy of this 
Revolution to certain local conditions. Even so, the proficiency of science-based plant variety 
selection took another exponentially curve with the advent of molecular biology and the invisible 
world of genetics. Molecular research tools such as embryo rescue technology, molecular markers, 
and other screening or diagnostic tools were infused into plant breeding programmes. This 
progress caused a remarkable jump in terms of precision and control, and shortened the variety 
development cycle. In the meantime, the frontiers of sexual crossing and asexual reproduction 
were pushed further especially on account of genetic engineering. The Gene Revolution, by 
carving deeper into the genome, abolished (at least in theory) the species frontiers for crop 
improvement. Plant breeders and molecular research tool developers have been able to build 
resistances to biotic or abiotic stresses into varieties, all the while dramatically increasing 
productivity. Throughout these spectactular changes, mass selectors continued to cultivate and 
select locally adapted landraces, joined by the new generations of institutionalised seed exchange 
networks and selectors targeting low-input agriculture in the developed world. Methodically 
controlled crop improvement, and “molecular drilling" have however revised the list of actors 
involved within PGRFA management, whether at the level of agro-biodiversity use, conservation 
or dissemination. They redefined responsibilities within the pipelines of variety development, 
altering relationships within the PGRFA system, in a shaky balance between dependence, 
inspiration, trust and wariness. They have announced the age of the new agrobiodiversity users 
directly involved in agrobiodiversity-based innovation. 
In this context, mass selectors, both in the form of low-input farmers and gardeners, observe 
best-performing specimens on farm and select these individuals for next harvest, and who maintain 
and develop landraces, i.e. farmers’ variety populations that are extremely well adapted to specific 
local conditions and for low-input agriculture such as organic farming. They do not solely follow a 
market-oriented approach, being influenced by social, anthropological or economic considerations, 
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 and rely on informal rules of seed exchange. Farmers traditionally reproduced their own means of 
production, but the revolution of science-based plant breeding propelled the development of 
farming inputs off-farm, making seeds external commodities. The age-old and locally adapted 
innovation model of mass selection was excluded from the institutionalisation and 
professionalisation of breeding activities in the name of productivity, uniformity and stability with 
a wider reach. The oldest seed controllers, after ten thousand years of variety selection on farm, 
have gradually become mere variety users and customers to both public and private breeders, and 
then to the green biotechnology industry, using a technology outside of their reach and control.  
However, the reallocations of the crown of seed control did not only affect cultivators. Other 
actors also had to adapt to the new rules of the game. Publicly funded conventional breeding or 
molecular research programmes, which lied at the forefront of the two major technological 
strides, continued to develop new varieties and upstream molecular biology research tools mainly 
through non-market approaches of scientific progress and economic development. Propelled by an 
understanding of more open or at least less restrictive access opportunities, public research entities 
active in either plant breeding or molecular biology develop and aim to produce public goods by 
generating scientific knowledge. They therefore disseminate developed varieties and their research 
tools openly or with less restrictive appropriative stances, conforming to the informal norms of 
science. Furthermore, the lines between public good production oriented public research and 
commercially oriented product development attempts have been blurred by the Gene Revolution 
and the concomitant dawn of molecular biology start-ups. These often initially public entities 
build nonetheless their business model on the licensing of their often patented technology and 
research tools such as tissue culture, somatic hybridisation techniques, screening, sequencing and 
diagnostic tools. They have as a result broken from the traditions of public research concerned 
with more basic, uncertain and less lucrative knowledge and innovation.   
The new molecular approach to crop improvement concomitantly created and altered the seed 
industry itself. In the brave new world of profit-maximisation driven crop improvement, private 
conventional or molecular plant breeding entities methodically observe specimens, consciously 
select them and deliberately reproduce desirable traits through sexual or asexual variety crosses, 
within small to medium seed companies. They traditionally rely on phenotypic observation and 
develop stable, uniform and improved varieties in an eight to ten years’ time frame for an 
approximate cost of two to three million EUR. Private breeders develop stable and uniform 
varieties, and take integral part in the marketplace within a business plan of seeds and plant 
varieties’ sale, complemented by eventual royalties on breeding material. If they have the capacity 
to find, license and integrate molecular technology within their own institutional organisation or 
their research agenda, they may at times rely on molecular research tools for the characterisation 
and use of genomic information, which are generally developed by highly specialised public 
entities or private start-ups. In the brave new world of molecular biology, breeders can now 
develop the same varieties in six to seven years with greater precision but with an increased initial 
cost of research, even though these expenses may become more cost-effective in the long run.  
Entities can take advantage of this last technological stride only if their operating capital is high, or 
if they can integrate licensed technology. This is where a tear has operated between those entities 
able to genetically engineer new varieties and those merely licensing molecular research tools 
inherently designed to be applied within a conventional plant breeding programme, such as 
screening or diagnostic tools. Genetically engineered products, developed through the insertion of 
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exogenous genes into plants, have to this day only been successfully developed within integrated 
structures encompassing both the dimensions of conventional breeding and molecular biology 
capacities, able to meet the extremely high sunk costs of market entry and able to invest more than 
one hundred million USD for the development of a single trait in a time span of twelve to thirteen 
years. Integrated genetic engineering and molecular breeding companies have been formed to 
acquire such capacity without having to license molecular technology from third parties. Relying 
on a market model based on the sale of seeds, but also of correlated products and technology, i.e. 
traits and techniques, these biotechnology giants collect royalties on both breeding material and 
molecular research tools. 
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 Notwithstanding their positive contributions to the management of environmental stresses or food 
production and the institutional changes propelled by technological strides, both the revolutionary 
hybrids of the Green Revolution and the subsequent “pro-poor” biotechnology narratives have 
been equally tainted by inherent shortcomings. The growingly private and increasingly uniform 
and integrated structure of plant breeding encloses obstacles to the successful use of 
agrobiodiversity. Defined within the relatively more short-term goals of satisfying end markets or 
solving technical problems experienced by growers, the growing private nature of agricultural 
research and development generates numerous concerns. These relate to the fact that private actors 
have spread beyond the conduct of "near-market" applied research to reach long-term variety 
improvement, questioning the sustainability of the dominant industrial production model, and 
leaving crop development destined for population clusters with no market power to the sidelines. 
Indeed, "the private firm may only value the "monopoly rents that may be acquired from a 
technological innovation, while [discounting] any future stream of such rents with regard to the 
expectation of future technological or biological innovation"
637
.  
Even though the new structure of biodiversity management strikes through its capacity to generate 
new genetic variability and efficiently use existing diversity, it comes with a blatant lack of regard 
for in situ genetic resource conservation, as important breeding material is either found in the 
market embodying commercial success, or in gene banks, duly characterised for further research. 
Even though breeders using conventional or molecular tools do create new and performing genetic 
diversity, concerns have been voiced over the complete replacement of farmers’ varieties by these 
new improved models bred in private gene pools. Plant improvement relies on a constant input of 
agricultural biodiversity, whether it consists of farmers’ varieties exchanged in local markets, 
landraces accessed through gene banks, wild relatives actively prospected for hidden traits, or 
those improved varieties commercialised in the global marketplace. Not only these genetic 
resources need to remain diverse, but the various crop improvement opportunities need also to 
remain flexible and most importantly, viable, so as to provide this imperative diversity. New 
genetic diversity management models have also propelled fears of undermining farmers' 
sustainable livelihoods, while also kindling a growing anxiety over the technological land-locking 
of a science that had been open to researchers and breeders alike, even within the seed industry 
itself.  
In essence, the (frequently vehement) critiques voiced over modern crop improvement chains 
clearly reveal that no unique technological responses may feed all existing socio-economic 
realities and the entire range of needs in national, regional or international agricultural production. 
Their role and place need to be adjusted according to local specificities, including agronomic 
considerations but also the level of education and training of farmers and breeders, the economic 
power of all actors involved, and aspects related to social organisation, regarding for instance 
feudal practices and land ownership figures. The detrimental impacts of technological 
breakthroughs in plant improvement, such as new high-yielding varieties or molecular biology 
tools have been commonly analysed through a political motivational lens, wounded by a much too 
recent colonial past, as well as the revolution’s technological shortcomings per se, and its impact 
over traditional community constructs. Studies focusing on human development today stress the 
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need to share existing technological knowledge with those countries lagging far behind the 
development wagon, while taking due account of the strengths and frailty of non-industrialised 
farmers. Attributing enough regulatory space for the dissemination of knowledge according to the 
specific needs of the different actors of agrobiodiversity innovation within the currently applicable 
strong property paradigm could perform this advocated shift more effectively. 
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 PART III  ACTOR DIAGNOSIS: IMPACTS OF ENCLOSURE ON 
AGROBIODIVERSITY CONSERVATION AND USE GROUPS 
Agrobiodiversity innovation springs from different agrobiodiversity users, who navigate different 
socio-technological contexts and have diverging endogenous preferences. From a bird's eye 
viewpoint, all different agro-biodiversity innovation contexts remain an integral part of any 
successful use of agricultural biodiversity, and ought thus to be fostered through adequate policies 
and regulation. These frameworks cannot be uniform, yet rather need to acknowledge the 
specificities of each innovation context and its particular actors. All plant innovators manage 
agricultural biodiversity, all the while creating new genetic variability and conserving existing 
diversity. They do so efficiently in certain respects, and adversely in others. Such assessment 
would in essence look at the social and economical consequences of the adoption of a specific 
innovative product or more general agricultural production model. Yet any account of 
technological change also needs to take due account of the regulatory landscapes and legal 
environments within which these changes befall
638
. Private plant breeding activities may have 
kicked off with the dawn of the "hybrid", but they have predominantly intensified and 
strengthened with the grant of intellectual property rights over plant varieties and biological 
compounds.  
In this context, anxiety has grown stronger over both the technological and the regulatory land-
locking of a science that had been open to researchers and breeders alike. Studies on the impact of 
property regimes on research and development were gradually set off, highlighting certain 
detrimental effects of both science and law-based tools ensuring stronger levels of property and 
control over seeds
639
. Intellectual property protection has expanded from the market and product 
development oriented worlds of plant breeding and biotechnology into biodiversity conservation 
and traditional plant development endeavours
640
. The complex web of the strong property 
paradigm stands at two levels, first through prerogatives protecting innovators against the 
misappropriation of innovative products or processes, in the form of intellectual property rights, 
and secondly to a lesser extent through legislation determining the plant varieties’ access to the 
market, in the form of seed certification schemes. Both mechanisms aim in economic terms to 
balance static and dynamic efficiency in the production and use of knowledge and correlated 
natural resources. In their legal transcription, they assign decision rights to an individual or a 
community, while also allowing for broader opportunities for other actors to use the resource
641
. 
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However, these mechanisms are flawed, especially when applied to certain actors of cumulative 
innovation chains such as agrobiodiversity improvement. Formal standards may fail to achieve 
what they were initially tailored for, i.e. the wide diffusion of technology in the public interest, as 
their considerable lack of flexibility cannot make room for all existing know-how and products
642
. 
In a similar fashion, private property rights over intangibles may not persistently make up for static 
inefficiency and “invite rent-seeking”643. If protection is too weak, it may result in “forgone 
innovation, and if it is too strong, it may sacrifice available benefits from consumer access, in “a 
poorly struck bargain [that] could slow economic growth to the extent that access to protected 
technologies is required to induce incremental innovations […], which is how the bulk of 
innovation occurs”644.  
Different actors, who tend to draw to different extents on the public domain, are affected by the 
enclosure of plant genetic diversity in different magnitudes. The “predominance of traditional 
intellectual property notions in discussions concerning biodiversity-related innovations has 
ensured that current regimes neither foster the sustainable management of these resources, nor 
offer adequate answers to the need to reward the multiple actors involved in their management”645. 
The design of alternative governance frameworks to promote the successful use of biodiversity in 
terms of efficiency, distribution and fairness, will therefore in our analysis stem from a central 
interrogation:  
Does the prevailing property paradigm, characterised by lenient patentability 
requirements and enhanced plant variety rights protection, adequately cater for the 
needs of all categories of actors engaged in innovative and sustainable uses of 
agrobiodiversity?  
National choices in the implementation of the minimum standards set out by the TRIPS 
Agreement will not and have not been felt in a uniform fashion by all agrobiodiversity users. Both 
public research initiatives and farmers’ innovation have been clearly put to the side-lines by the 
legal frameworks assigning control rights over genetic resources. Furthermore, the strong property 
paradigm has clearly favoured the private sector model able to develop or integrate molecular 
research tools, either in the form of private start-ups or biotechnology giants, pushing those primal 
seed companies that rather focus on the development of new and improved plant varieties into 
difficult corners. That is why our analysis will strive to identify with exactitude the adequacy, but 
also shortcomings and failures of the strong property paradigm on those agrobiodiversity users 
identified in the previous section as those actors relying on a broadly fenced public domain and the 
availability of biodiversity to improve upon. Acknowledging that the failures at the level of 
upstream research permeate to downstream innovation levels, we will as a result first tackle the 
paradigm’s impacts on public research institutes focusing either on plant breeding or on upstream 
molecular biology research tools (Chapter 7). The analysis will thereon focus on private 
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 conventional or molecular breeding companies licensing improved plant varieties (Chapter 8), 
and then on the eldest yet primordial users and improvers of agrobiodiversity, mass selectors, 
(Chapter 9). Strong intellectual property rights, allowing for less statutory innovation use 
exception by third parties who wish to cultivate or improve the protected biological information, 
may indeed very well only respond to the needs of the most recent actors of agrobiodiversity 
innovation, i.e., integrated and transgenesis oriented large-scaled companies relying on seed and 
agro-chemical packages as well as technology royalty for their income, and specialised start-ups 
relying on the exploitation of a strong patent portfolio.  
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 CHAPTER 7: PUBLIC RESEARCHERS IN PLANT BREEDING, MOLECULAR 7.
BIOLOGY OR BIOTECHNOLOGY 
The implementation of the strong agrobiodiversity property paradigm greatly impacts publicly 
funded individuals and institutions engaged in plant-related research in all its range. It bears 
significant effects to those researchers active in national or international agricultural research 
institutes, focusing not only conventional but also molecular plant breeding, as well as those 
researchers active in universities or other institutes, focusing on the development of molecular 
research tools. Today, the numerous publicly funded institutions involved in plant improvement 
are growingly pushed to protect their research, just as they face the growing risks of infringing 
third party intellectual property rights. Corroborated by ad hoc legal regimes and an impetus to 
find alternative funding sources, public researchers are both confronted to strong property rights 
that might render the use of certain tools more difficult and costly, while also having recourse to 
these rights. The rather infamous case of the Agrobacterium tumefaciens- mediated or biolistic 
mediated gene transfer method resonates deeply in that regard. An absolutely crucial enabling 
transformation method of gene transfer to plant cells, it was developed by the public sector and “in 
hindsight had the IP rights been reserved for public-sector applications, […but was rather] 
committed on exclusive terms to commercial licenses”646. Public research has indeed also been 
impulsed to restrict the further uses of their own inventions. The strong property paradigm 
arguably spread to the public research sector first through the 1980 Bayh-Dole Act in the United 
States, which allowed public research institutions and universities to seek patent or other 
protection for innovations carried out under government grants. This trend gained remarkable 
momentum with the advent of molecular biology, as conventional plant breeding was being 
“dumped along the wayside as the unfashionable old cousin of genetic engineering”647. The direct 
funds for breeding oriented public agricultural research were drying up and universities replaced 
“retiring plant breeders with molecular geneticists more likely to produce high-profile journal 
article”648, all the while securing royalty income for their institutions. As a result, public 
researchers encountered a dual stretch, not only having to face and license third party intellectual 
property rights, but also having to claim and license their own. “If the patent system works as we 
might presume it had been intended to work in some ideal moment of regulatory history, then 
techniques and technologies that otherwise might never have been developed will be stimulated 
and accelerated”649. There is unfortunately growling evidence that such premise does not hold true 
for all, even though certain aspects of the patent paradigm seem to correspond to the needs of 
public researchers, albeit partially.  
The double evolution of being increasingly pushed to apply for patents while having to navigate 
existing rights does not echo well with the nature of molecular biology and plant breeding 
innovation, but also with the nature of publicly funded research and the informal norms and 
underlying objectives surrounding it. In this brave new world, severe shortcomings are 
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 experienced by all public breeders, whether those focusing on molecular biology, biotechnology 
or conventional plant breeding. They indeed all in essence first and foremost aim to produce public 
goods, and not to generate financial gain. Furthermore, they arguably do not entirely rely on past 
market successes. Nor do they strive to become sectoral leaders by responding to market dictated 
needs. That is why publicly funded basic and applied researchers have felt the impact of the 
development oriented patent paradigm on their activities more significantly. The strong product 
development oriented property paradigm first of all disregards the norms of science that guide 
public researchers, and which are built on communalism and the widespread and unpecuniary 
diffusion of innovation. It is also unsuited to address complex and incremental technologies like 
molecular or conventional plant breeding, as it becomes prone to the creation of patent anti-
commons and encloses what should and could in essence not be enclosed too exclusively. In a 
similar fashion, it also fails to address the cumulative nature of agricultural plant improvement, 
which means that public researchers and downstream users are more likely to recycle public, 
common or traditional knowledge.  
7.1. Disregard for Science Norms: Communalism and Non Market Valuation 
Even though the development of molecular research tools might be seen as an innovation context 
fitted to strong intellectual property rights, just as much as integrated transgenesis, research 
endeavours surrounding these tools also bear elements of open innovation systems650. Indeed, these 
tools are still predominantly produced through publicly funded efforts, whether in universities or 
public agricultural research institutes. In parallel, the development of improved plant varieties or 
the mere conservation and characterisation efforts carried out by the latter institutes also remains 
attached to non-market values that do not fit well within a paradigm favouring concomitant or 
isolated quests for plant breeders’ rights and patents. Both molecular biology and plant breeding 
efforts adopt an acute public goods production perspective, and are grounded on the communal 
norms of science, with a goal to distribute both knowledge and products as widely as possible.  
7.1.1. Addressing communalism, cooperation and the public goods dimension of public 
agricultural research 
Scientific inquisition is governed by several tenets. Norms of science have been identified by 
building on the major paradigm of the sociology of science and its ethos set up by Robert K. 
MERTON as an “affectively toned complex of values and norms which is held to be binding on 
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the man of science”651, as well as Michael POLANYI’s view of a social system where “scientists, 
freely making their own choice of problems and pursuing them in light of their own personal 
judgment, are in fact cooperating as members of a closely knit organisation”652. Science tenets 
have in this context been notoriously codified as those of “cooperation, universalism, 
disinterestedness, openness and scepticism” by John ZIMAN653. These principles are found not 
only in publicly funded molecular research, but are also endorsed by scientists affiliated with 
international and national agricultural research institutes. They nonetheless have been considerably 
drawn aback by the strong property paradigm, and especially its component of patent protection. 
The actions of public researchers are today fenced by limitations imposed by IPR titles belonging 
to third parties, as well as the often gruellingly incentivised possibility to claim exclusive rights on 
their own inventions.  
The main precept of publicly funded international and national agricultural research institutes, as 
well as universities or other public research organisations, remains the emphasis put on the 
production of global public goods. The national and international agricultural research centres 
having led the Green Revolution evolved in a world without informational property rights, using 
and distributing improved agricultural biodiversity in an unrestrained fashion. Both exotic and 
improved crop genetic resources were deemed to be shared by humankind in its most generous 
definition, and available for all to use for centuries of mass selection, as well as during most of the 
first steps of controlled hybridisation
654
. The Green Revolution’s improved plant varieties 
produced by public research channels were distributed without proprietary claims, even under the 
growingly proprietary regulatory framework of first plant patent acts and the increasing number of 
plant variety protection systems
655
. This open practice also found evidence within the applicable 
regulatory system, as the wording of the 1983 International Undertaking on Plant Genetic 
Resources coined agricultural genetic resources the "common heritage of mankind", propelling a 
peculiar kind of legal appropriation rules
656
. Up until 1999, the fulfilment of food needs was not 
perceived as a primarily profit-making enterprise, especially by international agricultural research 
centres
657
. Due to the uncertain nature of early breeding research results and thus of unclear 
profitable opportunities, global crop improvement and seed distribution networks were still being 
instigated by the public sector, where research was understood as a public good. In order to 
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 improve agricultural productivity, they adapted exotic varieties to different geographies and local 
conditions, within the far-reaching goals of poverty alleviation and food security procurement
658
. 
Public programmes were at times also accompanied by free seed distribution schemes. The USDA 
has for instance distributed up to one point one billion seeds a year from the end of 19
th
 century 
until the 1920’s, free of charge659. In accordance with the public good orientation of national and 
international breeding activities, the distribution of these new varieties was mostly carried out 
without any proprietary claims until the 1980's. This approach enabled other researchers to work 
on these new products while allowing farmers to exchange or save interesting varieties
660
. Public 
agricultural research institutes acted as directors of both the discovery of pure knowledge and its 
application on the field. In the absence of coordinated state policy on the fate of publicly funded 
inventions, the ownership of scientific findings and the potential commercial products that may 
seldom arise from such discoveries indeed traditionally falls under public purview
661
.  
The technological stride of molecular biology nonetheless increased the commercial potential of 
basic research efforts. As a result, it warranted regulatory action for the private appropriation 
of research results; the prospect of which also spread to the world of publicly funded research and 
unsettled the traditional understanding of public good production. The impact of strong exclusive 
rights over the products or the conduct of public research sprung at the outset from an issue of 
finance. First the criticism of public expenditure in public agricultural research or even “science”, 
and then its ominous decrease, significantly shaped the path of public researchers. It rapidly 
infused monopoly seeking into its primeval equation. Provocative stances in the economics of 
scientific research asserted that government support to scientific endeavours did not lead to 
economic growth by crowding out private sector research springing from marketplace 
opportunities
662
. Public funding for biomedical research and applied agricultural research was 
thereon reconsidered towards lower figures in order to balance the State budget and increase 
efficiency. As a result, the industry growingly got involved in the design of specific products for 
the commercial market
663
, and increasingly funded research and development projects in 
universities
664
. The 1980 Bayh-Dole Act considerably contributed to such broadcast first in the 
United States, and then spread its influence across OECD countries. Designed to promote the 
widespread use of publicly funded research, the Act allowed universities to patent their inventions 
and commercialise them, using exclusive licenses if needed
665
. Seventeen years into the 
implementation of the statute, the total number of patents granted to universities in the United 
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States had been multiplied by ten, even though its share remained small compared to the private 
sector patenting activity
666
. “In 1997, Stanford University received over forty-three million USD 
from licensing the now-expired Boyer-Cohen patent claiming basic recombinant DNA technology, 
which represented over half of its total licensing income”667. European countries and universities 
unevenly followed suit through various policies and statutes. These disparate reactions nonetheless 
spurred a wide variety of extremely critical and poignant essays expressing concerns over the 
direction of pure scientific research and the increasing “lack of touch with its pure, public-spirited 
roots”668. 
Granting property rights over research discoveries has indeed been viewed as anti-thetical to the 
norms of science, “undermining a previously shared professional canon of promoting the 
dissemination of knowledge for the public welfare [on account of] the openness, the free exchange 
of ideas and information, the free exchange of strains of protein, [and] techniques”669. The clearly 
discernible disinclination to secure patents has a normative component, in that it is thought 
contrary to scientific norms, since making new observations available to the scientific community 
for evaluation and extension in further research is believed to facilitate the progress of science
670
. 
The publicly available nature of research tools has generally been seen as an important driver for 
innovation in upstream molecular-biology research. Indeed, both the unpatented sequencing 
technologies developed by Frederick SANGER and Walter GILBERT, and the early public 
molecular markers, such as RFLPs (restriction fragment length polymorphisms) have been central 
to "automated genomic research"
671
. Not only the potential uses of molecular biology instruments 
will most probably be unknown to the inventors, they also are often numerous, and will be 
developed outside the traditional actor boundaries of the patent system. For instance, RNA-
mediated gene suppression mechanisms were successfully developed by multiple actors, and 
clearly drifted away from the clear and well-defined invention boundaries dictated by a strong 
patent system
672
. “Traditional scientific norms promote a public domain of freely available 
scientific information […based on] the view that scientific knowledge is ultimately a shared 
resource”; they rely on communalism673.  
Within a truly cumulative innovation chain such as plant breeding, the communalised nature of 
research and development innately surfaces even more virulently, as all agrobiodiversity 
improvement projects “benefit from the countless small-scale contributions to the prior art by 
individuals who draw from the public domain to make improvements, […] generating new 
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 information that others may exploit to their own advantage”674. The communalised nature of 
research also surfaces in the case of molecular breeding opportunities, which heavily rely on basic 
or pure research to elaborate new techniques allowing time, efficiency and precision gains in 
controlled hybridisation. Like the pressures and research needs which propelled the creation of the 
SNP Consortium in the sequencing of the Human Genome
675
, crop improvement research has also 
relied on partially open institutions for the development of determinant molecular research 
tools
676
. Molecular biology research tools and isolated biological compounds perhaps best 
illustrate the challenges of appointing individual exclusive rights to “complex technologies” 
developed in a communalist perspective. Most, if not all technological breakthroughs in molecular 
biology have heavily relied upon "highly synergistic environments", drawing extensively from the 
public domain and from the contribution of numerous actors, knowledge and technologies. Further 
challenges also stem from the fact that public research organisations’ engagement to obtain and 
exploit exclusive IPR is found to run against or at least weaken the correlated norms of trust and 
cooperation amongst researchers
677. “Conflicts of interests amongst researchers and changes in 
the university research environment” were witnessed as early as the late 1990’s, as the “patent and 
trade secret protection desired by industrial sponsors [was] in sharp conflict with the university’s 
desire to maintain an open, academic, public-servant environment”678. Yet the new strong 
intellectual property paradigm has shifted the norms of cooperation in public research, leading to 
new difficulties in the negotiations and completion of joint projects on account of growingly un-
communalised technology transfer offices and policies. While existing IPR titles have been shown 
useful in the negotiations of new research partnerships by “codifying the discrete quanta of 
technology that the partners license into the venture, making it easier to keep track of which 
partner contributed the technology”679, negotiations have been getting seemingly more complex 
when public research institutions have been involved in the actual development of new 
technology. A multi-year and multi-faceted project focusing on the practice of United States- 
based companies showed that tensions arose more frequently in the negotiation of research joint 
ventures between commercial firms and universities, due to several issues, including “outrageous 
demands, the fact that IPR are viewed as significant source of income, that technology transfer 
offices are inexperienced”680. With striking consistency, all respondents to the survey found that 
universities had become “more aggressive and greedy” over the distribution of exclusive titles. In 
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parallel, similar conflicts over property rights have blocked projects between public research 
institutes themselves, whether in developed countries or in a North-South dynamic. A notable 
example of such collapse concerns the Andean strawberry research project led by the University of 
Davis in California
681
. These phenomena illustrate quite well the discordancy between the norms 
of science and the strong intellectual property paradigm, which, when upheld by public research 
organisations, negatively affects the social system of science, while also hampering the conduct 
and diffusion of research, especially far from the innovation frontier.  
7.1.2. Warranting non market research and the dilemma of orphan crops 
The traditional disinclination of publicly funded institutes to secure exclusive rights over their 
innovative plant varieties, products and processes, concurrently stems from another dimension of 
science norms, having this time regard to the goals of public research innovations and their 
diffusion. The public goods production perspective embraced by public researchers 
unquestionably bears a universal perspective. This aversion is not well catered for under the strong 
property paradigm, which remains dictated around market needs and the subsequent allocations of 
value. Actors whose research endeavours are fostered by the promise of strong exclusive property 
rights will solely cater innovation that bears social value in the market itself. As they deliberately 
and unavoidably rely on market mechanisms, they  “exhibit a predictable bias for intellectual 
goods that generate the most appropriable value in consumer markets”, and lead to the 
underproduction of various socially desirable intellectual goods such as basic research or products 
destined to smaller markets
682
.  
These roadblocks raise fundamental concerns, as technology transfers and innovation diffusion 
remains crucial for the global public goods that are food security and successful agrobiodiversity 
use. The availability of new improved varieties deriving from the modern biotechnological 
revolutions could for instance, according to the World Health Organisation, "not only have an 
important role in reducing hunger and increasing food security, but also have the potential to 
address some of the health problems of the world"
683
. The international agricultural community, 
joining the bandwagon, has recurrently rejoiced at the possible redress of Malthusian concerns 
through technology and classical or molecular biology-based plant breeding
684
, pointing out that 
biotechnology remains a powerful tool in the fight against poverty if efficiently made available to 
poor farmers and consumers
685
. Notwithstanding the need to consider alternative production 
systems based for instance on agro-ecology
686
, the significant economic development-related 
potential of biotechnology is at serious risk of realisation today. Such risk is mainly attributed to 
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 the property endowment systems that have been purposely built for the harshly competitive 
globalised seed market and the need to recoup seriously gigantic investments quickly, as well as to 
the nature itself of informational monopolies as they exist today. Notwithstanding the traditional 
institutional issues raised by geographic perspectives on the dissemination of technology in the 
developing world (having for instance regard to the crucial role of diffusion agencies), strong 
intellectual property rights do not indeed very well accommodate the international 
developmental dimension of public research. Such dimension concerns the conditions that 
enable the transfer of technology to those found in the margins of the lucrative seed markets, and a 
specific attention to the type of innovations that are produced.  
Those “follower countries”, poorest in terms of innovation capacity and neediest in terms of 
economic development, naturally disadvantaged vis-à-vis competition, are faced with reinforced 
external obstacles to growth in light of the “proliferation of legal monopolies and related entry 
barriers”, which consign them within their disadvantages687. The strong intellectual property 
paradigm does not indeed trigger the technology transfer opportunities it should create in 
compensation of the artificial monopolies it creates. First, the mere publication of patents or plant 
variety rights certificates, viewed as a contribution of IPR to the social cost of monopoly rights, 
may in reality not encourage the diffusion of technical information, considering that this 
information ought first to be properly understood. Indeed, the stimulation of economic growth 
based on innovation is not only stimulated by the interaction effect through knowledge spillovers, 
but also through “learning by doing”. Most IP systems broadly rely on tacit knowledge, and thus 
require that actors engage in more than literature or patent landscape reviews and rather possess 
“absorptive capacity”688. Without this active involvement and strategic prerequisite, the 
counterbalance of monopolisation will not really contribute and lead to technological progress by 
third parties. Codified information in IP certificates or even in variety catalogues will indeed not 
be translated into an exploitable technical advance by “unskilled workers with low absorptive 
capacity”689  . The lack of diffusion of innovations far from the innovation frontier may also be a 
simple question of cost. An example of such phenomenon stems from the patent protection 
awarded to the biochemical reagent "Taq", an enzyme with heat-resisting properties upon which 
polymerase chain reaction ('PCR') relies. The fact that the patented Taq polymerase is now 
'generic' has now substantially reduced the cost of PCR applications for both the developed and 
developing worlds, allowing for successful DNA diagnostics, and also identifying the presence of 
pathogens for further disease prevention or treatment. 
690
.  
Next to the inherent needs to ensure the diffusion of produced innovations, the strong property 
paradigm also comes hand in hand with intrinsic shortcomings regarding the production of 
innovations itself. Indeed, in the current situation where artificial lead-time contraction has been 
extended to plant varieties and biological material or processes, “commercial viability, fuelled by 
financial reward or incentive, and market forces are the factors that determine which agricultural 
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crops should be supported by research, and which others are not worthy of research and 
development effort”691. The blatant policy choice to let the private sector penetrate and reign over 
the once sacred realm of publicly controlled research leads to under-investment in certain types of 
crops or innovations, driven solely by market needs. “Since the 1930’s, immense effort has been 
put into getting better hybrids, yet virtually no one has tried to improve open-pollinated 
varieties”692. Indeed, plant breeders’ rights “generally do not encourage breeding related to minor 
crops in small markets”693 or those crops with less substantive profit promises. Scholars have 
questioned whether it would be “reasonable to expect the research agenda to be geared towards the 
needs of individuals below the poverty line, as long as most of the research is carried out with a 
view to develop commercially valuable products”694. Under a strictly market-oriented paradigm, 
the contributions of research shall tend to be directed towards the needs of those close to the 
frontier of innovation. The goods responding to the needs of the unlucky many who keep (or are 
kept) far from the innovation frontier, quite dramatically coined "orphan crops", will indeed not 
be produced by the vertically integrated molecular plant breeding innovation chain, lacking proper 
markets to develop its activities
695
. Strong intellectual property rights may in this context be 
considered to “favour centralised crops breeding and the creation of uniform environmental 
conditions, [discouraging] agro-ecological research or local breeding tailored to local 
conditions”696. Innovation without patent pay-offs encloses a serious risk of drying up and 
undermining the conduct of research in those fields where the commercial or social value of 
innovation may not be as straightforward as others, such as tropical agriculture or poor regions 
where farmers lack the financial power to invest in expensive improved seeds. "The pursuit of 
patent-based monopolies only internalises one facet of reserve value, [that of the private valuation 
of biodiversity reserves by firms in intermediate good markets]", thereby underestimating by large 
margins the total social value of biodiversity reserves
697
. Indeed, within a "technological trajectory 
shaped by the imperatives of private property institutions", the results of research neglect a 
considerable portion of its objective, as new varieties are not developed to solve the social or 
environmental problems of those geographically remote and economically frail, like hunger or 
deforestation, but rather "mostly to increase shareholder values of companies that have invested 
heavily in R&D efforts in the biotechnology sector"
698
. An increasingly stringent and multilateral 
IPR system will thus not benefit all countries in an equal fashion, since it is rather the economic 
and technological levels of development in each country, and the size of its market, that will 
largely influence who gets to reap the benefits of innovation. This has for instance been the case of 
the biologically and legally difficult yet commercially attractive enough Asian rice market, which 
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 has been targeted by numerous innovative actors
699
. When the market imperative also takes 
public research hostage in view of income needs and prestige, those institutes, which would have 
traditionally invested time and money in the development of orphan crops, also “abandon” them. 
Monopoly-granting intellectual property rights on plant-related innovations have therefore been 
considered to lead to the misallocation of research expenditures, benefiting the developed world at 
the expense of those countries continuing their development process
700
.  
It is absolutely undeniable that the strong property paradigm has effectively permeated the daily 
life of public researchers in both molecular biology and plant breeding. Exclusive rights 
nonetheless enter into stark contrast with the communal social organisation of public 
research, oriented towards innovation diffusion and public good production. Current research and 
development strategies appear more inclined to serve public research institutions' crave of pre-
eminence and finance, yearning to win the internal strife to become the best proprietary innovator, 
while also replacing shrinking public funding through license revenues
701
. Publicly-funded 
research institutes, which traditionally work towards finding solutions for the agricultural 
problems of resource-poor farmers in developing countries, have joined the patent race not to be 
left out from the world research pace
702
. They have been vehemently criticised in this process as 
"vassals of knowledge corporations, […] serfs of science", receiving meagre rewards for creativity 
from entities who come to own their ideas, as the new rewards for knowledge creation now 
convert from "keeping it secret and putting a price on it"
703
.  
7.2. Startling enclosure of incremental and cumulative inventions 
Socially beneficial plant technologies have become increasingly lucrative but also expensive to 
develop due to scientific developments. They are yet self-replicating in nature and as a result call 
for regulatory action in order for their ‘architect’ to better control their fate and recoup the 
substantial financial investment in their development. This need was answered through intellectual 
property protection, which has been more or less extensively granted in different regions of the 
world under the tenets of a strong paradigm. In parallel to the first enclosure movement, identified 
by eminent commentators as the fencing off of common land, the possibilities offered by IPR to 
exclude others from using intangible information have been coined the “second enclosure 
movement”704. As aforementioned, this second enclosure transpired in plant improvement as a 
result of the emulation of need-specific plant variety protection regimes and the accretion of patent 
protection to cater the needs of biotechnology
705
. This double reality is nonetheless tainted by the 
inherent flaws of the development oriented patent paradigm to address incremental innovation. 
Inherently cumulative and incremental innovation such as plant improvement does not indeed 
produce major leaps forwards extremely often, and relies on a wide array of contributions, from 
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biological material to processes or other products. Plant variety protection had in this regard been 
crafted as a “legal hybrid” taking such incrementality of agrobiodiversity improvement into 
account, even if precariously, while the traditional patent system has remained inherently flawed. 
The strong property paradigm therefore partially fails to address the allocation of control over sub-
patentable innovations, stretching the gauge of ‘inventive step’ to its peripheral bounds. It also 
fails to address the inherent menace of recycling publicly available knowledge, in both of its 
dominant facets, i.e. patents and plant variety protection. 
7.2.1. Protecting incremental and derivative contributions  
New plant varieties, whether improved or traditional, as well as product or process innovations 
stemming from the application of molecular biology to plant breeding science, are remarkable 
examples of "deviant fields" in need of fresh paradigmatic legal hybrids
706
. Copyright-like 
protection fails to apply due to the fact that the protected object comprises of numerous elements 
that are all related to a specific function or application
707
, especially for the various 
biotechnological tools used within the R&D cycle in the vein of processes or isolated traits. 
Proprietary rights in the form of patents have thus been seen as an answer to market failures in 
light of those innovations exposed to reverse engineering, begging for strong exclusivity over the 
product’s fate, stronger than those offered by the traditional copyright paradigm. However, in 
parallel with other industries based on complex technology, innovation chains that depend on 
'incremental’ contributions rather than 'major leaps forward' do not find neither sufficient 
protection, nor provide for adequate access vis-à-vis their research results in today's approach to 
intellectual property protection. They face inherent shortcomings linked to the overarching 
characteristics of agrobiodiversity innovation. Indeed, the development of new plant varieties is 
carried out in a common context of sub-patentable incremental innovation, produced in a 
cumulative fashion, relying on the work and knowledge of other actors, as well as on numerous 
research tools. 
First and foremost, agricultural biotechnology builds on natural products. Leaps achieved in any 
steps of plant improvement therefore need to be stretched to effectively qualify as "an inventive 
step" beyond existing "prior art", and correlatively open the door for exclusive control under 
the patent paradigm. For instance, bacteria and other expression "vehicles" that are used by 
biotechnology companies to produce purified versions of naturally occurring proteins will be 
subject to patents, claiming the purified versions of products that exist in nature.  
“In these cases, it can be argued that it is stretching the concept of inventing greatly to say 
that the patentee really invented the products. The true invention seems to be found in the 
method used to produce them in a desirable form. But because a product claim is typically 
broader than one simply focusing on a particular way of making that product, patentees 
seek -- and often obtain -- product patents”708.  
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 The contentious content of the TRIPS Agreement and national legislation, as well as the 
correlated case-law efficiently demonstrate that patentability standards had to steadily be lowered 
or at least re-interpreted in order to accept biotechnology and biological research tools within the 
realms of the patent paradigm
709
. Technological strides with a growingly industrial focus, intensive 
lobbying and a clear political agenda have shifted the patentability line towards a pole dangerously 
closer to the fruits of basic research and discoveries, whether having recourse to the shaky notion 
of “technical step”, or having to reconsider what constituted a “person skilled in the art”710. The 
requirement of non-obviousness or of the existence of an inventive step found in all national patent 
systems indeed theoretically prevents the patentability of living organisms as such, unless the 
criteria for such patentability are revised towards lower standards
711
. However, enzymes, 
polymerase or isolated genes have growingly been purified and fallen under patent protection in 
numerous jurisdictions. Even though the obvious character of most plant-related process 
innovations is frequently highlighted in the doctrine, the gene products of such methods seem to be 
treated as non-obvious in the patent paradigm developed rather for the purposes of inanimate and 
chemical rather than self-replicating biological inventions, creating extensive objections before 
competent Courts and Patent offices on the damaging spectre of broad biotechnology patents
712
.  
Furthermore, as is the case with synthetic biology, a sphere that draws inspiration from 
biotechnology, most of the innovations present in the conventional or molecular plant breeding 
innovation chains constitute in too many ways a novel recombination of already existing 
components or varieties to effectively be protected under the patent paradigm, or cover the use of a 
method that has become routine or widely known
713
. The inherently incremental nature of the 
controlled improvement of plant varieties leads to the assertion that major leap forwards should be 
witnessed much rarely than in other more classical fields, such as electrical engineering for 
instance. Agricultural biodiversity-related innovations are not just knowledge products, the use or 
acquisition of which not depriving the use of others, but they also first and foremost comprise of a 
combination of knowledge disseminated in a wide array of informational tools and products 
produced by other actors. Crop genetic improvement is essentially a process of derivation. It is a 
process where each incremental innovative contribution holds the potential of becoming a 
commercial product, whether it is realised through plant breeding on account of sexual or asexual 
crosses, or through various biotechnological techniques. Follow-on innovations or improvements 
directly derived from an underlying actual creation or invention are the cornerstone of any 
"cumulative innovation chain", raising critical interrogations as to their degree of appropriability 
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and control, and thus their optimal treatment
714
. The spreading and cumulative creation of 
information is duly captured by the example of hybrid corn, a primary innovation which creates 
directly related information on account of the partially appropriable improved variants of other 
corn hybrids, while also producing indirectly related and theoretically not appropriable public 
domain information as to the hybridisation process in itself
715
. This last type of information, 
coined stimulative, epitomises the inherent desire of information to be free, thereby showcasing 
the inadequacy of patent-like control over the course of cumulative innovation chains
716
. Both 
phenotypic and genotypic information can indeed be viewed either within the public domain as 
tools for further research, or as products in themselves
717
. Furthermore, so-called submarine 
patents accompanied by "reach-through provisions" have become increasingly common in the 
biotechnology industry. They allow for substantive rent extractions at subsequent innovation 
levels, thereby constituting roadblocks that innovators attempt to circumvent by "diverting scarce 
research resources from product development to 'reinventing the wheel"
718
. These provisions 
found in the patent system which enable monopoly owners to collect royalties on subsequent 
innovations created byusing the patented technology, have been vehemently compared to the 
eventuality of "a software company demanding royalties from a best-selling author who used its 
word-processing program"
719
. This trend has been heightened by the broadness of claims in the life 
sciences. Indeed, “frequently claims refer to nucleic acids or polynucleotides other than DNA—a 
broadening of language that will include other natural and synthetic polynucleotides that can carry 
the same information as the disclosed DNA »720. This assertion not only holds true for utility or 
product patents obtained on gene sequences, it also is valid for process patents awarded on 
foundational molecular research tools. An example of such “reach-through” royalty seeking 
strategy comes from the Cre-lox technology developed by Dupont, which enables scientists to 
mark a targeted gene in a DNA sequence, and then cut off said gene from the sequence using a 
specific enzyme. Instead of generally licensing the pure research tool, “Dupont asked the licensees 
for full-fledged reach-through rights on the scientific findings reached through experimentation 
with test animals that were genetically modified using the Cre-lox technique”721.  
All of these worrying realities make the crucial action of « inventing around the patent » 
essentially close to impossible. Not only is the expansion of IPR and its consolidation inadequate 
to address the inherently incremental nature of plant innovation, these phenomena are furthermore 
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 linked to “industries whose business models depend on the exploitation and reproduction of 
knowledge”, rather singularities that have been promoted by innovators or authors722. In this 
context, the fence line between the ownerships of former and subsequent innovations finds itself 
determined rather by legal muscle than moral entitlement
723
. 
7.2.2. Recycling public knowledge 
The growing private and upward corporate appropriation of genetic resources has been viewed as a 
reminiscence of the primeval "primitive accumulation" process of agricultural expropriation, 
especially from the perspective of developing nations and civil society
724
. First and foremost, the 
cumulative nature of plant improvement means that the knowledge or products developed by 
public researchers may and will be used by a plethora of other actors. Acting within the strong 
paradigm, these actors may enclose the fruits of public research, building on publicly available and 
unrestricted knowledge. Throughout time, most agrobiodiversity-related knowledge used by 
private plant breeders, molecular start-ups and integrated biotechnology giants has indeed always 
found thorough origins in the public domain fed by publicly funded projects or scientists. This 
assertion is especially true in light of the growing number of joint research projects carried out 
with institutions favouring less exclusive takes on the fruits of their research. The link of 
proprietary agrobiodiversity innovation and public science is well illustrated by the soaring 
proportion of citations originating solely in public science institutions universities, medical 
schools, and research institutes in screened biotechnology patents. In a study conducted in 2000, 
this proportion amounted to seventy one per cent, while twelve per cent of the patents cited joint 
efforts by public and private institutions, and only sixteen point five per cent of cited papers 
emanated entirely from private companies
725
. These figures corroborate the assertion that publicly 
available knowledge is intensively used to develop patented technologies, especially in the 
field of biotechnology. The university-industry knowledge complex has been considerably 
strengthened owing to the growing recourse to acute knowledge in molecular biology and plant 
sciences, crowning the dependence of the private sector upon basic research carried out by public 
institutions. This quite naturally urged calls for caution as to the possible "recycling of public 
knowledge for private reward"
726
. In other words, public researchers may be victims of 
misappropriation themselves, especially when patentability requirements are loosened up. They 
may find themselves having to negotiate licensing arrangements for the use of products or 
processes that only constitute minor improvements to their own research and discoveries, or even 
to those products that constitute no real improvements at all. 
Notwithstanding such recycling, the cumulative nature of plant improvement also means that the 
knowledge or products developed by public researchers are also always derived from other 
sources, and are highly linked to other actors’ contributions. These actors may include other 
public researchers, private breeders, but also may designate farming or indigenous communities. 
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Public researchers are therefore not immune to be perpetrators of biopiracy themselves, and the 
debates surrounding their onus have flourished with the recognition of “traditional knowledge” 
under the Convention on Biological Diversity
727
. Notwithstanding the wider reaching debate over 
the protection of such knowledge, agricultural innovation also stands the test of recognising 
farmers’ contribution to the cumulatively observed characteristics attributed to particular plant 
varieties today. The caveats of establishing the reach of prior art in plant innovation is best 
epitomised by the aforementioned example of Oryza longistaminata, a wild rice variety from 
Mali
728
. This wild variety is resistant to bacterial rice blight, a trait that was not known by Malian 
farmers who considered it to be weed. However, a landless community had detailed knowledge of 
the resistance. Indian public researchers took on this interesting trait and transferred the variety to 
the International Rice Research Institute, who then developed varieties with blight resistance and 
distributed them in accordance with the CGIAR’s public domain-oriented approach. The 
University of California in Davis then mapped the variety’s gene responsible for the resistance 
trait, the Xa21 gene, which was patented in the United States in 1999. Acknowledging the 
complexity of prior art in this specific case, the University recognised the need for benefit 
sharing
729
. The history of blight resistance in rice shows the two contentious aspects of plant 
innovation monopolies, first with regards to the recycling of public knowledge, and second to the 
use of ethno-botanical indigenous knowledge, whether held in the hands of farmer communities or 
even remote landless groups. This tale vividly exemplifies the need to carefully assess the 
protection criteria of novelty, whether in patents or plant variety rights, respectively accounting for 
prior art and common knowledge. This finding is corroborated by several other cases which show 
that material obtained through international agricultural research was actually in itself recycled 
material from other sources. Indeed, freely distributed material was frequently found to have been 
enclosed by public institutions with little change or little additional breeding. The Rural 
Advancement Foundation International, now ETC Group, has for instance published a poignant 
account citing “147 Reasons to cancel the WTO’s Requirements for Intellectual Property on Plant 
Varieties: the Biopiracy and Plant Patent Scandal of the Century”, which recalls at least one 
hundred and seventy four cases of misappropriation
730. Citing that “breeders’ wrongs” take the 
form of systematic abuses where “plant patents are predatory on breeding work undertaken by 
farmers and indigenous peoples around the world”, the report urges governments to take action 
against “intellectual kleptocracy”. The report shows that public researchers have not only become 
unwilling intermediaries to the kleptocracy committed by private entities, but they have also at 
times been the perpetrators themselves. For instance, two Asian chickpea varieties held under the 
“in trust agreements of the CGIAR” and accessed by an Australian public institute went on to be 
claimed by the latter without any subsequent breeding work, and were thereafter “licensed to 
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 private companies for re-sale back to their region of origin”731. This last case epitomises how a 
public entity that has embraced the strong paradigm may blatantly undermine and disregard other 
public research actors but also farming communities’ contribution to their “innovative” product or 
process.  
The reification and reign of intellectual property rights have as a result been viewed as the novel 
forms of "accumulation by dispossession"; depriving communities from the commons they had 
traditionally contributed to. Nonetheless, piracy or title infringements only exist to the extent that 
exclusive or even collective protection titles are warranted over the innovation. Without patents, 
copyrights or plant variety rights, or other active regulatory action, the subsequent uses of the 
fruits of public research efforts cannot be controlled
732
. The reality of public knowledge recycling 
in plant improvement therefore warrants action to be taken in order to fence off the public domain, 
so as to allow compensation to occur when material or knowledge is used, copied or merely 
slightly modified to qualify for exclusive rights protection. Both the incremental and cumulative 
nature of plant improvement clearly emphasise the need for greater diligence in the assessment of 
protection standards and patentability requirements, whether assessing the inventiveness or 
novelty of the product or process under scrutiny.  
7.3. Unpleasant encounter of research tools anti-commons and foundational patents in 
complex technologies  
While the “second enclosure” idiom epitomises the pivotal role awarded to innovation, intangible 
information, and knowledge goods in our societies, it also highlights the inherent threat hanging 
over the very production of such goods. Monopoly rights awarded on “the intangibles commons of 
the mind” indeed greatly impact the production of innovative endeavours, especially in 
incrementally cumulative disciplines. They have raised howling concerns from public researchers 
facing a shrinking public domain, not only because of the need to preserve science norms or the 
difficulty of delineating exclusive protection in molecular biology and plant breeding, but also 
because of the detrimental impacts of foundational technology enclosure down the drain of 
complex technology development. Public researchers have felt these impacts prominently, being 
faced with patents howling over opportunities for molecular research
733
. In this context, overly 
exclusive and extensively scattered informational property rights may seriously risk slowing down 
vital “free-wheeling give and take” in the entire research chain734. Just as the absence of 
proprietary boundaries around natural resources may lead to free-riding and under-production in a 
tragic mind-set as to the fate of the commons
735
, overly strict proprietary rights over resources, 
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especially those of an informational nature, may in turn lead to excessive monopoly costs of 
intellectual property rights
736
.  
“It is the ability of patents on genes to “reach beyond” the original utility included in their 
claims that gives them the potential to have such a significant influence on innovation. 
Rather than just controlling a specific invention, the control they seek over the gene’s 
“information content” means that they produce a monopoly with considerably more 
leverage. This innovative leverage—whose effect could be positive or negative—is the 
most central characteristic of genome patents. As a result, in contrast to most discussions of 
gene patenting, the question is not whether these patents are valid under current law, but 
how the leverage they imply for current and subsequent innovation makes their issuance 
positive or negative from the perspective of society”737. 
This premise stands at the heart of the "control-criticism" literature established around the anti-
commons property rhetoric, according to which the possession of restricting or blocking rights 
over a resource by too many individuals allows for upstream license stacking, thus resulting in the 
under-use and under-production of said resource
738
. So-called patent anti-commons can emerge 
when numerous property rights claims are appointed to separate building blocks for a particular 
product or a research cluster. They can also emerge on account of the “self-interested use of even 
just one patent – although lacking the encumbrances of multiple claimants characterising an 
‘anticommons’ – [which] may impede innovation where a technology is cumulative (i.e., where 
invention proceeds largely by building on prior invention)”739. Public researchers’ opportunities 
and costs to carry out their activities may be hindered not only by the fresh need to obtain mere 
knowledge of the radius of exclusive property claims, but also by the subsequent need to negotiate 
multiple access to multiple technologies required to carry on socially beneficial research. Legally 
sanctioned monopolies show their most gruesome side when the protected technology bears 
foundational aspects, which is even more enhanced given the incrementally cumulative but also 
complex nature of agrobiodiversity molecular research. This is especially true when patents are 
gruesomely enforced, in the likes of the PCR method patents, where Hoffmann-LaRoche 
“specifically named more than forty universities and government laboratories and more than two 
hundred scientists as directly infringing certain patents through their basic research”740. Rising 
transaction costs and direct impediments to research efforts have been as a result much debated in 
the particular context of molecular research tools in biodiversity related innovation.  
7.3.1. Knowing about the multiple patents and their multiple owners 
Anti-commons emerge within hostile innovation environments, characterised by the under-use and 
thus the under-production of innovative technologies, pushing legal scholarship to deplore the 
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 inappropriateness of such restrictive approach to the grant of artificial lead-time through 
proprietary exclusiveness. Amongst the symptoms of anti-commons on research tools are patents 
thickets and royalty-stacking practices, even though evidence remains mixed on their existence 
and reach
741. The “bewildering and overlapping array of exclusive property rights” that are 
ostensibly found in virtually all improved plant and genetic material upon which breeders or 
researchers base their activities upon nonetheless riskq to “discourage follow-on applications of 
routine technical know-how”742.  
The challenge does not only stem from the high number of patents in agricultural biotechnology, it 
also derives from the fact that “very fundamental methods and tools are patented”, and that the 
“patents overlap in a way not found in the pharmaceutical industry”743. The proliferation of not 
only strong, but also of broad foundational patents that designate not only one technological 
application but rather encompass a range of claims, is as a result thought to impede the entire 
research community's range of action
744
. This gruesome reality potentially threatens an innovators' 
inherent right to build upon another innovators' creation, hampering with the intricate balance of 
IPR between the appropriation and the diffusion of protected products and processes. Patents in 
the field of green biotechnology are not only broader, they also bear the risk of covering basic 
research tools, as has been the case for instance in the genetic engineering of transgenic cotton 
plants and lines
745
. Opportunities to control so-called enabling or platform technologies have as 
a result been criticised for their anti-commons -akin detrimental effects. As specific sets of 
technological steps that can be utilised in various research areas, thereby leading to a wide range 
of subsequent innovations, platform technologies generally have no direct value for end-users, but 
represent a critical input for the development of commercial products
746
. The risks of awarding 
wide reaching control to upstream developers of platform technologies are numerous; yet always 
wander around their potential to stifle research and development
747
. What is worse, the controller 
might not even market the protected product or process as such, he might be what is pejoratively 
coined a “patent troll”. Hiding behind a patent without contributing to any economic activity 
linked to production, these trolls hunt potential infringers down to make money from their patent 
portfolios. This practice is definitely hunted by public authorities, and both the judiciary and 
legislators are steadily taking tougher stances against it. Notwithstanding such unlawful practices, 
the grant of far-reaching exclusive rights to foundational innovations also causes inherent 
difficulties that are particularly heightened by the cumulative and contingent nature of plant 
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breeding innovation relying on molecular biology tools. In upstream hybrid research streams, the 
data produced for instance by sequencing consortiums and some selected research tools remains 
within the public domain. However, research efforts that aim to single out the exact utility of 
molecular biology research tools may lead to patent protection over what unvaryingly consists of 
platform technologies. These research tools constitute the new core of crop-genetic improvement, 
as an indispensable input for further research, side by side with both improved and exotic crop 
varieties that represent the operational background of crop-related research. Indeed, tools such as 
molecular markers, high-density genetic maps and structured mapping of populations provide 
breeders with the ability to "simultaneously define gene action and breeding value at hundreds of 
loci distributed relatively uniformly across entire genomes"
748
. The example of polymerase chain 
reaction (PCR) speaks volumes in this context, as a foundational technology used daily by all 
molecular biologists around the globe
749
. The method in effect amplifies small DNA pieces in 
vitro using a naturally occurring enzyme called DNA polymerase. Its invention can be traced back 
to 1983 and to a scientist, Kary Mullis, but was patented by Hoffman La Roche, first in the United 
States. However, the method was not the only patented element surrounding the technology, since 
the enzymes used in the process, as well as the machines such as the thermo-cycler, were also 
patented by Hoffman. 
Public researchers are stung by the clearly predominantly private and nearly monopolistic 
nature of patent ownership in agricultural biotechnology and molecular plant breeding. There is 
mounting evidence that the plant genetics and genomics industry’s concentration rate has been 
considerably heightened through the grant of patents on germplasm. Indeed, “half-dozen major 
firms […] hold substantial numbers of key patents […and] have coverage of the related enabling 
technologies”750. Not only have "trait development" activities created the contemporary notion of 
"traits market share", vis-à-vis biotechnology enhancement traits such as disease resistance or 
herbicide tolerance, it has consequently generated complex cross-licensing practices, where 
multinationals and small-scale companies alike find themselves more intricately linked to each 
other and to the market leader than in merger or acquisition situations. Indeed, in 2003, the 
“private sector accounted for seventy four per cent of the IP in [agricultural biotechnology], much 
of it aggregated into a few very large IP portfolios at major corporations, the top five of which 
control forty one per cent in the United States [while] the rest of the private sector, including 
independent biotechnology start-ups, holds thirty three per cent of agricultural biotechnology 
IP”751. The authors acknowledge that the percentage of private sector patent control may “likely be 
an underestimate, as a portion of the public-sector portfolio has also been licensed to companies in 
the private sector”. In this context, research costs and benefits are assessed on account of the 
ability to capture a return on it through IP protection, judging “expected return on traits based on 
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 the ability of the company to charge a premium for that trait multiplied by the expected number 
of units sold containing that trait”752. 
Due to the complex and incremental nature of their fields, public researchers are not only affected 
by the licensing practices of technology-controlling giants, they are also further wounded by the 
need to access multiple technologies before multiple actors, significantly raising the costs 
attached to research and development endeavours. Indeed, the monopolistic nature of the global 
seed and trait market is also supplemented by another aforementioned trend, that of the 
proliferation of highly specialised molecular biology start-ups that are wired to develop a strong 
patent arsenal, albeit smaller, but as efficient, that the ones harboured by integrated giants. A 
“major challenge for management of public-sector IP is the high degree of fragmentation of 
technology ownership across numerous institutions, especially in light of the need for multiple 
technology components to provide freedom to operate in transgenic crops”753. For instance, 
promotors that are inserted into plants along with the new substantive genes have been patented, 
just as claims for the use of transgenic Bacillus thuringiensis (infamous Bt) maize have been 
awarded to multiple entities: the first firm to clone the gene, the first that put it in a plant, and the 
first to put it in a crop plant
754
. A study conducted by the Joint Research Centre of the European 
Commission on "new breeding techniques" such as the Oligonucleotide-directed mutagenesis 
(ODM) or the Zinc-Finger Nuclease (ZFN) technologies identified a total of eighty four patents on 
the seven new plant breeding techniques, amongst which seventy per cent were submitted by the 
private sector, twenty six by universities and four per cent by joint collaborations between private 
and public institutions
755. The “proliferation of IP rights among multiple owners in agricultural 
biotechnology appears to have affected the rate and direction of innovation, a result of the so-
called intellectual anti-commons”756. According to Paul DAVID757, this phenomenon’s anatomy 
first needs to be sought in the “search costs” associated to researchers’ knowledge of patent 
landscapes around their innovation clusters. It is supplemented by the “transactions costs” that are 
associated to obtaining the license to actually use targeted technology. Faced with complex 
technologies, it is also enhanced by a phenomenon of “multiple marginalisation”, where the 
“pricing of components ignores the pecuniary externalities on the demand for the project as a 
whole”.  
For the IP system to function effectively, knowledge on protected products and processes 
remains the first key. It is the primordial and tacit condition to achieve the inherent balance of 
exclusive rights with the innovation’s disclosure. IPR navigation skills to access information about 
the mere existence of research tools and biological material are pretty straightforwardly crucial. 
They are not only crucial for fellow innovators, but also for patent examiners.  
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“Since word meanings determine the precise boundaries of claims, a good deal of practice 
is required to draft claims in a patent, and a good deal more is required to understand what 
they say”758. 
Prohibitively high discovery costs may be rooted in the nature of innovations as such, whether 
these are easily defined and indexed in the mechanisms ensuring the disclosure of protected 
products and processes. Examining scaling within the patent system, the indexable or non-
indexable nature of the patents and their correlated technology (i.e. our ability to place the items in 
a predictable order) has been demonstrated to play a key role in the mere knowledge of pre-
existing exclusive rights on the new product that has been developed
759
. When innovations are 
indexed quite easily such as in the chemicals’ sector, it is quite feasible to clearly determine 
whether patents exist on the molecules that are present in one’s innovation. However, in non-
indexable innovations such as software, or phenotypic and genotypic information for plant 
varieties, “the patent system scales so poorly that it’s effectively impossible to know whether 
software you have written infringes other patents”760. With regards to 'complex technologies' such 
as molecular plant breeding or synthetic biology, intellectual property rights are often extremely 
hard to identify, as they remain fragmented across many owners and sometimes even cover broad 
sections or applications. This fragmentation significantly increases the known and unknown costs 
of research and development and undermines researchers' freedom to operate and navigate in the 
“patent thicket”761. Changing patent landscapes related to particular technologies not only create 
difficulties in the primary drawing of these landscapes in itself but also vis-à-vis its follow-up. 
This is especially valid for overlapping claims at both national and foreign offices, which "create a 
great deal of uncertainty in making product development and investment decisions that rely on a 
realistic "freedom to operate" assessment", both within the private and public sectors
762
.  
There is a clear uncertainty attached to the value and quality of patents granted under 
currently applicable rules, « which is not an accident or a mistake. Rather, it is an inherent 
part of our patent system, an accommodation to the hundreds of thousands of applications 
filed each year, the inability of third parties to participate effectively in determining 
whether a patent should issue, and the fact that for the vast majority of issued patents, 
scope and validity are of little or no commercial significance »763. 
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 The consecration of the strong property paradigm implies as a result serious capacity-building 
efforts not only in national offices that grant titles, but also public research institutes, and all 
private actors, whether scientists or breeders.  
7.3.2. Accessing patented tools despite blocking or delaying strategies  
Not only do public molecular biologists and breeders need to identify if the material or techniques 
they are using are protected through patents or plant variety rights, they also need to be able to 
access the protected material or processes, and commercialise their own products developed on the 
basis of the latter. “National agricultural research systems and CGIAR institutions could 
jeopardise their funding if they systematically violated patents to develop useful applications of 
biotechnology”764. There is cumulative rationale and evidence pointing towards the hindrance of 
socially desirable research and development by the strong PGRFA property paradigm.  
« All patents restrict innovation. Privatising some part of technology-space unavoidably 
blocks the way for some later innovators. As a result, the fact that gene patents can block 
innovation is neither unusual nor unique. Due to a number of different characteristics, the 
potential for gene patents to restrict areas of innovation appears to be significantly greater 
than many other categories of patent monopolies »765. 
Amongst other phenomena lie the high number of patents, their concentration in the hands of small 
groups of enterprises and their alleged broad scope, but also the non-resilient licensing practices 
driving away the innovation's availability, as well as the fierce enforcement strategies 
characterising protection have raised concerns. Indeed, “if competing firms hold patents on 
different components of a complex technology, and they fail to cross-license them (which can 
happen for many causes, not all of them rational), development in an entire industry can be slowed 
down or even rendered impossible”766. Patents are considered to be inherently disadvantageous for 
complex technologies, as they stand for stimulus for research and development, but also find 
themselves used as a trading currency or bargaining chips
767, more often so than plant breeders’ 
rights. Patents have in this context become a defensive means to prevent lockouts that could be 
formed through the denial to use an invention, in contrast to simple technologies such as chemicals 
for which patents remain an indispensable and less disputed tool
768
. Alongside the potential 
lockout that might be created within the private sector itself, "patent thickets" may impact public 
agricultural research and food security more widely, as exemplified by the case of pro-vitamin A-
enriched ‘Golden Rice’. Even though the patents were seemingly relinquished in favour of the 
poor in this particular case, the variety developed upon a public domain premise through the 
initiative of the Rockefeller Foundation, required permission with regards to about seventy patents 
in the United States alone, widening concerns for the sacrosanct "freedom to operate" in 
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biotechnology-backed plant breeding activities
769
. At this point emerges other critically 
condemned phenomena; regarding the exclusive control of a single actor over foundational 
patents, the issue of "blocking patents" on complementary technologies
770
, and their concomitant 
impact on transaction costs associated with the growingly numerous licensing deals signed by 
public research institutes.  
Indeed, “patents are property rights but from a transaction perspective they are not like any 
other property right. The unclear metes and bounds of a patent make it an ill-defined entity 
with which to transact”771. 
When analysing the magnitude of the rewards that ought to be attained through innovation, 
especially within a cumulative cycle with few ground-breaking discoveries, it should be 
remembered that actors possessing restrictive monopoly rights have the ability to "choose the 
optimal level of output for the intermediate good embodying the patented technology"
772
. The 
position of molecular research tools and other foundational, enabling or platform technologies, as 
the groundwork of the innovation process in all modern agricultural biotechnology and plant 
breeding, elevates the conditions surrounding their appropriation and further use to an absolutely 
essential issue. Much like the largely cited example of the Human Genome and the uproar caused 
by the "Craig Venter" intellectual property protection strategy pattern, controversies have also 
surrounded research concerned with agricultural biotechnology oriented molecular biology strides. 
The aforementioned example of the polymerase chain reaction speaks volumes in this context, 
where the end of the protection term in March 2005 came as a relief for public and private 
researchers alike who “endured years of what many considered exorbitant prices for proprietary 
enzymes such as Taq PCR polymerase”773. The patent landscape surrounding the zinc finger 
nuclease also raises similar questions as to the tense relationship of private patent portfolios with 
the public domain. Indeed, with regards to ZFN, the “secrets of a cutting-edge technology that 
could transform gene therapy lie hidden in the IP vaults of a small biotechnology company”. 
Sangamo BioSciences holds key patents and trade secrets “not only on the design of zinc fingers 
and zinc finger chimeric endonucleases, but also their uses in drug discovery and the regulation of 
gene expression”774. These key patents are nevertheless part of a larger patent estate, which also 
comprises of universities and public laboratories. However, even scientists “whose inventions are 
part of the patent estate instrumental to the company’s fortunes are often not privy to key aspects 
of the technology”775. The company’s extensive monopoly rights and its subsequent “catbird’s 
seat” has led to growing unrest in the entire industry, as licensing deals have been known to be 
extremely difficult to negotiate, and have at times also been refused. The public case of a company 
who incidentally needed the technology for a sub-license, having secured a licensing deal with a 
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 university scientist for an invention that required the use of a Sangamo patent, which was 
ironically based on work carried out by another university scientist, speaks volumes. Faced with 
such facts, sarcasm might be as welcomed as deep unrest as to the creation of “patent empires” and 
the pressing need to creatively innovate around such artificial monopolies, which have derailed a 
great deal from their initial purpose.  
Aside the challenging situation where a single actor obtains control over a foundational patent and 
decides to use it as a bargaining chip by rendering or refusing licenses unfairly, agricultural 
biotechnology also faces the issue of "blocking patents" on complementary technologies. 
Robert MERGES describes such situation as one where “one patentee has a broad patent 
on an invention and another has a narrower patent on some improved feature of that 
invention. The broad patent is said to "dominate" the narrower one. In such a situation, the 
holder of the narrower ("subservient") patent cannot practice the invention without a 
license from the holder of the dominant patent. At the same time, the holder of the 
dominant patent cannot practice the particular improved feature claimed in the narrower 
patent without a license”776.  
This blockage perceptibly arises when the prior art assessment shows that the subservient patent 
discloses an improved feature which meets the statutory tests of novelty and nonobviousness
777
. If 
research tools are diffused widely without restrictively appropriative stances, research efforts are 
not obstructed. However, the crude reality of public research sings a significantly different tune. 
The International Research Institute for Rice has for instance very publicly had trouble accessing 
licensed technology for the development of its Green Super Rice
778
. “This talk of violation 
indicates that the reach of US patents rights in the non-profit sector can extend well beyond the 
geographic bounds of their legal, if not their political, reality, and certainly beyond the scope of 
protection recognised by well-informed private firms”779.  
Access to patented technologies will be affected by their licensing terms and the corroborating 
practices such as high licensing fees, both also by refusals to license or the conditioning of license 
decisions to unacceptable terms. Low licensing fees are quite unsurprisingly linked to a potential 
wide distribution of the innovation, while a resulting decrease in profits deemed absolutely not 
inevitable, as the extremely lucrative example of the Cohen-Boyer patent on recombinant DNA 
has exposed
780
. On the other side of the spectrum, high license fee levels have in certain cases such 
as the polymerase chain reaction technology and the Taq polymerase, spurred heated 
controversies, not only because the "novel" character of the innovation was challenged before 
authorities, but also as fees for the use of such a crucial enzyme were deemed particularly 
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elevated
781
. However, studies conducted at the end of the patent protection term have shown that 
monopoly rights did not necessarily prevent the dissemination of the technological advance as it 
had sometimes been expected. Appropriate business practices could indeed guarantee the 
availability of the technology either through business partnerships, broad corporate licensing 
practices, adaptive licensing strategies or a sensible restraint in filing lawsuits against infringing 
researchers
782
. Such guarantee could even survive under an increasingly shrinking doctrine of 
experimental use in United States patent law
783
. The loosened licensing strategy from the 
technology holder, as for instance has been the case of PCR, also eased the past temptation of 
actors wishing to run the chain reactions to circumvent the intellectual property protection and find 
un-infringing approaches around the terms of the patent. Greater availability thus prevented the 
prominent inducement of free riding. Nonetheless, the cost of PCR applications for the developed 
and developing worlds was substantially reduced on account of the now 'generic' status of the Taq 
enzyme and the expiration of the core process patents on PCR technology
784
, a development that 
might spread the use of the technology in fields neglected in the past or set off its entrance into 
new fields of research, such as tropical plant breeding. As aforementioned, another patent estate 
that is likely to resonate and impact the future of plant breeding deeply relates to the engineering 
and use of zinc-finger proteins
785
. This technology indeed enables scientists to virtually bind any 
DNA sequence of interest, and was initially owned by several different companies and academic 
institutions. This situation raised concerns as to the prohibitive costs faced by subsequent users 
and developers in the negotiation of multiple licenses.  
It should be noted that the public research sector is not always the victim of patent anti-commons; 
they have, arguably less frequently, also induced “patent monopolies”, or at least been accused 
of creating them. One example stems from the so-called “Axel patents”, a string of extremely 
valuable inventions concerning notably gene-splicing technology. One of the patents, number 
6,455,275 issued by the U.S. Patent and Trademark Office in 2002, held by Columbia University, 
was challenged in 2003 by several biotechnology companies, Biogen Inc, Genzyme Corp. and 
Abbott Bioresearch Center in a joint lawsuit. Many observers have asserted that the case remained 
“extremely unusual within the world of technology transfer, [and] was initiated because of the 
large sums of money the patent has generated”786. Issues have also arisen regarding the actual 
exploitation of public institutes’ patented technology and the subsequent licensing strategies 
adopted by the licensees. Setbacks experienced by the relatively large-sized American Cyanamid 
(since then acquired by BASF) in product development due to the exclusive licensing agreement 
signed by the "Biolistic Particle Delivery System" gene gun technology developer, Cornell 
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 University, towards the university researchers' own start-up company, Biolistics, bought by 
DuPont speaks volumes in this context. Negotiations between the two companies have indeed not 
succeeded, partially attributable to their competitor status in a different product market, which 
caused considerable delays in Cyanamid's alternate product development cycle
787
. The example of 
the infamous gene gun is further intriguing, since the innovation's initial developer, Cornell 
University, had failed to retain its own rights to use the gun for research and technology transfer 
purposes, while also falling short to separate certain philanthropic or humanitarian uses from the 
commercial license, thereby generating weighty problems for those "wishing to use the technology 
without having to abide by constraints imposed by DuPont and its sub licensees", as well as heavy 
criticism directed at the University
788
. Quite disturbingly, the actor who actually managed the 
intellectual property rights over the innovation was not its developer but merely its exclusive 
distributor. Commentators as a result asserted that monopoly rights had effectively become a mere 
instrument for maintaining lead-time over competitors, breaking the symbiotic link between the 
inventor and the innovation; even though such link continued to justify the award of exclusive 
rights over knowledge, due to the need to recoup research investments. In another disturbing 
scenario, researchers from the University of California Berkeley had developed transgenic wheat 
lines in 2003, shown to be less allergenic and obtained patent protection for their inventions. Yet 
they licensed their technology to a firm that did not pursue the development of hypoallergenic 
wheat, while the “sublicensing of rights back to the university, to allow product development of 
the hypoallergenic wheat to proceed, was delayed, hampering negotiations for further development 
with other firms that were potentially interested in this opportunity at that time”789.  
Even though strong patent protection may lead to a more rapid development of platform 
technologies themselves, the deterrent effect of such control over the wide-ranging stream of 
downstream innovations stands in dire need of further consideration and likely correction. The 
rising trend in patenting biological research tools has at first generally not been seen as a threat by 
the scientific community in itself, much to the contrary of civil society organisations focused on 
developmental divides or those vouching for more open source biotechnology research
790
. 
Consensus nonetheless emerged on the premise that the growing recourse to IPR tools 
considerably affected academic research, as the latter was altered by commercial concerns, 
competition and physical material allocation disputes
791
. Recent surveys conducted before 
academic agricultural biologists show that the major impediment actually relates to the 
institutional imperative that patenting and licensing strategies have become
792
.  
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CONCLUSIONS. Public research and the strong IP paradigm  
Public research, whether solely developing molecular research tools or developing improved plant 
varieties through a global public goods perspective, unmistakably bears elements of open or at 
least partially open innovation. These researchers act upon institutionalised norms of 
communalism, cooperation and diffusion that are ill-fitted to the market-oriented approach of the 
strong intellectual property paradigm. It has nonetheless very much become a gruelling reality for 
public researchers involved in applied plant breeding or molecular biology, and raises numerous 
challenges. The strong property paradigm, by permeating the social system where public 
researchers navigate from the inside and out, enters into vital conflict with the institutionalised 
norms that guide scientific endeavours and public agricultural research. In stark contrast with the 
communal and diffusion oriented nature of public research, private property rights have ignited 
solemn challenges as to the conduct and norms surrounding research projects, but also as to the 
diffusion of research products far from the innovation frontier.  
The enclosure of an inherently incremental and cumulative innovation system such as plant 
improvement is also problematic on account of the overly restrictive and inadequately distributive 
nature of dominant informational monopoly rights. Not only may the race for exclusivity and the 
parallel growing enclosure pursuits fail to deliver the international public goods that researchers 
strive to produce, they may also create worrying cases of misappropriation; a phenomenon 
researchers may be both the perpetrators and the victims of.Enclosure, coupled with aggressive 
practices, may also worryingly prevent public researchers from carrying out or commercialising 
the socially beneficial products and processes they have developed. Despite their confidence in 
industry's rational tolerance for research infringement, public researchers are realistically sceptical 
as to the existence of any research exemption on their behalf. Academic or public research in 
agricultural biotechnology is indeed more compressed than the private actors which develop 
molecular biology research tools due to the inherently complex nature of licensing and material 
transfer agreement, unnecessarily raising transaction costs, not so much in terms of financial 
weight or technical difficulty, but rather in terms of delays in research, whether related to access to 
informational or physical compounds
793
. Difficulties linked to the strong agrobiodiversity property 
paradigm show only minor differences that can be attributed to the legal order or market segments 
they operate in, or to the personal history and approach of concerned public and/or commercial 
entities. All illustrative examples highlight “some features of a market for intellectual property that 
may impede agreement upon terms of exchange, including high transactions costs relative to likely 
gains for exchange, participation of heterogeneous institutions with different missions, complex 
and conflicting agendas of different agents within these institutions, and difficulties in evaluating 
present and future intellectual property rights when profits are speculative and remote”794. 
Challenging the seeming lack of problems deriving from the encouragement of patenting in 
upstream biological research tools, scientists henceforth contest the effects of exclusive rights on 
the supply of innovation. 
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PARADIGM TRENDS SHORTCOMINGS EXPERIENCED BY PUBLIC RESEARCHERS 
Reign of exclusive 
individual rights: 
Protect or perish? 
Disregard for communalism and openness in public research 
Lack of incentive for non or little market oriented research 
Enclosure of cumulative 
innovation 
Biopiracy risk vis-à-vis old users of biodiversity / knowledge (need to 
assess prior art / common knowledge) 
Recycling of public knowledge by third parties (need for proprietary 
boundaries) 
Proliferation of patents 
with aggressive licensing 
practices: 
Anti-commons in 
molecular research tools  
Raising search and transaction costs of socially beneficial research 
(information, negotiation) 
Use-blocking licensing: refusal – delays in research  
Uncertainty as to the legality of actions or possible exploitation of 
developed products 
 FIG.2: Shortcomings faced by public researchers in molecular biology and conventional plant breeding 
confronted to the strong PGRFA property paradigm 
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 CHAPTER 8: CONVENTIONAL AND MOLECULAR PRIVATE PLANT BREEDERS 8.
DEVELOPING IMPROVED PLANT VARIETIES 
Propelled by the TRIPS Agreement and new technological strides, the new property paradigm was 
carved around strong intellectual property rights protection characterised by enhanced plant 
breeders rights and lenient understandings of patentability requirements. While the conventional 
plant breeding based Green Revolution was anchored upon un-proprietary public processes for 
crop genetic improvement, gradually providing protection for the product of research efforts, the 
molecular biology-supported Gene Revolution did not rely on the same institutions. The actors 
involved in plant breeding continued to rely on the development and probable protection of their 
commercial product as such, i.e. plant varieties, even though they tried to keep up with new 
technological strides. Their success nonetheless also became contingent upon securing both the 
components (such as reagents) and the processes (such as molecular breeding techniques) that 
could be used along the way in order to gain precious time and precision in the breeding process. 
Most of the upstream agrobiodiversity innovation was however enclosed outside of the public 
domain, requiring considerable adjustments in private plant breeders’ modus operandi. 
Meanwhile, the essence of plant breeding itself did not change. The relatively open approach 
inherent to plant breeding in terms of germplasm access perdured over time, all the while severely 
hitting the wall of hidden molecular enclosure prerogatives. 
Current informational monopoly rights not only protect the plant variety, product of plant breeding 
programs as such, but may also cover the entire array of indispensable components and research 
tools that accompany the development of improved crops on account of the hefty re-definition of 
the rights and obligations surrounding PVP and patents. Breeding programmes have been heavily 
affected by its new, seemingly more efficient and profitable cousins of molecular biology and 
genetic engineering. They have also been affected by the concomitant strengthening of intellectual 
property rights, which assigned ever-growing limitations on the use of protected products, 
processes and varieties. The extremely high rates of consolidation in agrobiodiversity research and 
development activities have discouraged outsourcing for the benefit of internalisation, making it 
materially impossible for those companies with more moderate research capacity to fairly bargain 
for access to technology
795
. These companies operate as traditional breeding entities, relying upon 
the marketing and sales of propagating and planting material for their income-generation, either 
within a direct line of distribution or through a licensing model for propagation, usually based on 
plant breeders' rights, a choice determined according to product complexity and market size
796
. 
Their income is not generated by patented biotechnology research tools or process licenses, and 
they therefore continue to unreservedly rely on the accessible nature of both improved and exotic 
agricultural biodiversity. As conventional and molecular private plant breeders mainly rely on 
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 improved varieties and proven market successes in their research and development 
programmes
797
, they are for sure directly impacted by the restrictions stemming from plant variety 
rights (and arguably plant patents in the United States), which protect phenotypes as a whole. But 
they are also increasingly wedged by those “invisible” and unpredictable restrictions stemming 
from exclusive rights awarded to patent holders over products or processes, or those restrictions on 
the use of upstream biological material. This truth resonates in the growingly important place 
awarded to patents in different opinion papers published by industry organisations, whether at the 
international
798
 or national
799
 levels. Indeed, even though restrictions on the accessibility of 
improved genetic material may tentatively preserve the positive prospect of royalty income and 
foster innovation, it may also hamper the so-called sacrosanct “freedom to operate” that breeders 
long for, and therefore hamper innovation. The strong property paradigm fails as a result to meet 
the needs of non-integrated plant breeders on account of the seemingly less substantial weight of 
actual plant variety protection in light of the technological strides that have expedited bootlegging 
prospects, but also because of the disruptions in the breeders’ access to upstream research tools 
and mounting complications attached to the use of exotic genetic material.  
8.1. Inadequacy of plant variety protection scope 
The ratio legis of plant variety protection, which had stood out as a better and fitter alternative to 
patents in agrobiodiversity innovation, has unfortunately not lived up to the expectations of 
effectively balancing private reward and public interest. At the outset, this legal hybrid was drawn 
up for the specific needs of the seed industry, especially those entities active in major field crops 
where hybrids were rare, such as wheat or soybean
800
. It nonetheless faced the difficulty of 
adapting to thrillingly fast evolving technologies in plant breeding science. Even though the 
cumulative nature of plant improvement still does take central stage in plant breeders’ rights, these 
titles, including those awarded in accordance with the UPOV 1991 Convention provisos, have not 
been immune to deficiencies. They have on the one hand been hit by “obsolescence” claims 
stemming from the brave new world of genotype-based breeding, asking for more precise 
protection scope in light of easier reverse-engineering possibilities. On the other hand, they have 
also been hit by critics asserting the ever-shrinking freedom to operate awarded to subsequent 
breeders, and the growing need for legal training in essential derivation disputes.  
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8.1.1. Addressing the need to maintain the scope of plant variety protection  
Scientific and technological developments in our understanding of heredity have had a tremendous 
impact on the seed market itself. But they have also widened the possibilities offered to plant 
breeders to use existing improved varieties, rewarding breeders with speedier and cheaper 
opportunities to dig into proven market successes. This development thus in turn requires a 
widespread assessment of the scope of plant variety protection. Indeed, the legal scope and 
inherent rationale of such sui generis protection mechanism may be significantly hampered and 
downgraded through the impact of new technological abilities. Not only has the scope of 
prerogatives granted been validly challenged, but the inherent difficulties to enforce one’s 
exclusive rights over self-replicating technologies have also taken centerstage in recent debates 
concerned with plant breeders’ rights. When effective premiums from the marketplace are not 
soundly available, whether because of a farmers’ exemption with no boundaries or high 
transaction costs in the enforcement of IPR, private actors unvaryingly show a lack of interest in 
investing in related research programmes
801
. 
A central challenge to the plant variety protection has come to question the validity of the 
industry-specific contours of protected subject-matter, as well as the cogency of attached 
prerogatives in a rapidly changing innovation environment. While the main arguments were linked 
to a need to reinforce protection in order to better capture the benefits of plant varieties protected 
through plant breeders’ rights, some challenges were also raised at foundational levels of the 
system’s raison d’etre and its underpinning concepts. It has in this regard been rather successfully 
argued that the notion of “plant variety” and the rubric of “DUS testing” have rather become 
obsolete because of their intimate bond with underlying technological concepts that have been 
considerably altered by the shift from phenotypic observation to genotypic analysis and 
manipulation
802
. Even under the crown of the genotype, the notion of “plant variety” has remained 
fuzzily carved first around the criteria of homogeneity and stability and then through the 
taxonomic characterisation that is adjunct to the new more liberal stances of distinctness, 
uniformity and stability
803
. This approach has led commentators to understand the notion of variety 
as “a construct that developed as a pragmatic response to the marketplace, […] employed as a 
convenient legal construct to facilitate consensus on intellectual property rules [rather than] an 
inevitable consequence of biology”804. Furthermore, the merely legal and phenotype-oriented 
definition of a plant variety is carved around so-called DUS testing, deeply anchored into the 
analysis of morphological characteristics based on phenotypic observations. These tests 
nonetheless take a lot of precious time linked to the necessary passage from field trials. These 
trials may not only take away the competitive advantage of the breeder entering securely into the 
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 marketplace with a protection title at least six months after it could originally do so. These tests 
are likewise extremely costly, subjective, dependent on environmental interactions, and 
increasingly subtle as “marketplace pressures drive breeders towards incorporating very similar 
traits in phenotypically similar plants”805. They may as a result hinder the customers’ and farmers’ 
access to interesting, socially and environmentally useful new plant varieties. These findings have 
ignited cry outs asserting that plant variety protection was at a “critical juncture” pushing for its re-
examination
806
. As a result, UPOV, as well as national testing centres have strived to incorporate 
molecular biology tools into their DUS protocols by adopting several intricate guidelines
807
, in 
order to ensure time and efficiency gains. Such inclusion however fails to operate the necessary 
technological shift, not only because these criteria need to be adapted in accordance with the 
specific varieties to be testes, but also because most of the time researchers and analysts do not 
find adequately relevant significance between the data generated through molecular markers and 
morphological analysis808. These tools are as a result considered more as welcomed additions to the 
DUS testing protocols, but cannot by any means replace the time-consuming and costly 
phenotypic and subjective analysis on the field809. 
Technological strides have not solely shaken down the sturdiness of protection criteria and its 
accompanying definitions. They have also challenged the effectiveness of the incentive lying at 
the foundation of plant variety protection. Indeed, there has been mounting frustration at the 
potency of prerogatives granted to plant breeders. “Central to this dissatisfaction is the idea that 
the natural copying mechanism inherent in plants poses a major protective risk for those involved 
with developing new plant varieties”810. This protective risk has been considerably heightened on 
account of the precision and speed injected to plant breeding by molecular biology tools, which 
altered seed replacement cycles alongside the structural changes witnessed in the provision and 
creation of genetic diversity. Technological strides have considerably shrunk the commercially 
successful life of modern varieties, ranging from three up to seven years
811
. This dwindling and 
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limited time-span during which plant breeders are now required to amortise the costs of their 
research and development efforts has pushed them not only to increase the price of their seeds, but 
also to rethink and refocus their intellectual property rights approach towards fuller enforcement, 
both vis-à-vis farmers and other breeders. Several roads were taken in order to strengthen the 
title of plant variety protection, all of them targeted at raising the amount of potential royalties to 
be touched by the breeders, either from farmers or from fellow breeders protected material to 
develop and thereafter commercialise directly competing and worryingly similar products. Action 
has to that end been taking place in the legislative front, through direct amendments operated to 
the UPOV Conventions, accommodating the new needs of the changing plant breeding industry, 
but to limited avail. Two main amendments were brought in with the view of enhancing protection 
for plant breeders, both touching the prerogatives granted to the latter, either by mending the 
farmers’ privilege, or by expanding the reach of the bundle of rights to so-called essentially 
derived varieties.  
The gradual restriction of the farmers’ exception in UPOV Conventions has indeed been 
advocated with a clear policy objective of enticing the private sector’s interest in plant breeding, 
especially in market segments with strong farm saving opportunities and practices. However, it is 
incredibly difficult to monitor such farming practices and pursue infringers. The issue of farm 
saved seed royalties is much more important in cereals where exploitations tend to be larger in 
size, and the financial return from eventual farm-saved-seed royalties to breeders is estimated to 
amount to sixty five to seventy five million EUR per year
812
. In the absence of absolute permission 
rules, farmers decide in effect whether and to what extent they will make use of the farmers’ 
privilege under plant variety protection. This means that “an incalculable number of plantings are 
undertaken each year, so that the holder or, as the case may be, the organisation representing him 
are not in a position to uncover by themselves cases of planting which entitle them to 
remuneration”813. 
Plant breeders had gradually been not only losing royalty income to farmers, but also increasingly 
to their direct competitors, on account of the self-replicating nature of plant innovations and the 
growingly less costly technological means to open up a stable variety’s heredity. Indeed, owing to 
the new opportunities offered by molecular biology and the development of plant breeding science 
in general, the existence of the breeders’ exception in plant variety protection also meant that an 
almost unfettered access would accompany the release of a carefully developed plant variety into 
the market. A product that took years to stabilise could directly end up in a competitors’ gene pool, 
rapidly igniting research and development activities to improve the material through the natural 
and human resources at the breeders’ disposal. Worse, the competitor could even commercialise 
and directly compete with one’s own product relatively quickly, by operating only minor changes 
to the initially protected variety, having recourse to so-called “plagiaristic breeding”. 
Technological strides digging deeper into applied molecular biology have considerably eased 
reverse breeding opportunities. This is particularly intriguing for breeders as the purification and 
thus use of parental lines has become much easier than before, opening competitors’ gateway to 
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 their sacred Grail. These tough realities propelled the need to better enforce the PVP system and 
provide more exclusivity through a tougher stance on “plagiaristic breeding”. It is to this end that 
the 1991 UPOV text has introduced a novel concept, that of essential derivation, which extended 
the range of acts requiring the initial breeder’s authorisation, as aforementioned. As 
aforementioned, the 1961 and 1978 acts were indeed deemed insufficient in light of the globalised 
industry’s new needs814, and could not "prevent converted lines from infringing and pirating 
breeder's genetic material"
815
. As a result, Article 14(5) of the UPOV 1991 text now warrants the 
negotiation of a licensing agreement not only when the protected variety's use in a breeding 
programme leads to the commercialisation of a new variety that is not clearly distinguishable from 
the initial protected variety, but also when it leads to an "essentially derived variety". This 
expansion of protection was viewed as “the UPOV system’s most salient response to technological 
obsolescence”, drawing from “debates in patent law over non-literal infringement and in copyright 
law over the distinction between unauthorised derivate works and transformative fair uses”816. As 
aforementioned, this extension was also echoed in Article 13(1) and (2) of Council Regulation 
EC/2100/94, but both texts are worryingly silent on whether the differences that are sought after to 
assess essential derivation ought to be quantitative or qualitative.  
The efforts to overcome the shortcomings of PVP protection on account of technological 
developments have as a result unsurprisingly not really triggered the projected success, mainly 
on account of the inherent difficulties to pursue legal action against potential infringers. Court 
decisions are indeed extremely rare in the case of EDV’s, as plant breeders prefer settling for 
arbitration with their direct competitors rather than entering into costly and lengthy trials. The first 
judicial interpretation of the notion came only in 2005, fourteen years after the enactment of the 
principle, from the District Court of The Hague in the Netherlands, in a case opposing Astée 
Flowers and Danziger 'Dan' Flower Farm817. The Court considered that 'a variety, even if it is to be 
regarded as deriving from another variety, may not differ significantly from the original variety',  
“The Court holds the opinion that it can be concluded from (the creation history of) the 
rules in both the UPOV Convention and the EU Regulation that a variety must not deviate 
considerably from the initial variety in order to consider it an EDV. First of all, the simple 
fact that the variety has been used at some point during the development of the new variety 
is not enough ground to consider the latter an EDV. To that end the Court points at the 
wording “essentially derived”, apparently to express the discrepancy between the EDV and 
the initial variety should not be too substantial […]. As a result of such analysis, the Court 
argued that “it was insufficiently motivated that and why that variety should be considered 
an EDV”, since “the differences were so substantial in number and significance”, and “it 
was insufficiently demonstrated how the large number of morphological differences could 
have been obtained with only relatively simple ‘acts of derivation”818 (Astée Flowers vs 
Danziger 'Dan' Flower Farm, District Court of the Hague).  
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This approach would preclude the launch of genetic comparison if faced with important 
morphological distinctions; an opinion not shared unanimously in the industry
819
. The claimant 
would indeed need to provide substantial evidence linking the small genetic differences to the 
carrying out of acts of derivation, i.e. that the initial protected variety had been used as a parent or 
grand-parent to the new variety. Such an approach, while maintaining the breeders’ exception 
alive and well, may nonetheless considerably tone down the appeal of this new extension of 
prerogatives grounded on the greater ease of reverse engineering. The number of court cases 
addressing issues of plagiaristic breeding has arguably risen since then, but to too little or very 
limited avail. A major turning point was reached recently when an Italian judge from the Milano 
district court condemned Agriseeds to pay two hundred and five thousand EUR of damages (which 
covered all unjustified profits made with the sale of the copied variety, and an additional 
compensation for legal costs) to Rijk Zwaan in a case involving the international copying of a 
protected lettuce variety, which lasted seven long years to end in 2013
820
. Nevertheless, the 
relative simplicity of the case, which only involved the copying and identical reproduction of a 
protected variety, and its length of seven years compared to such straightforwardness, do push the 
commentator to raise the absence of effectiveness of plant variety protection. Company 
representatives from Rijk Zwaan conclude nonetheless that even though “cases like this are 
undoubtedly complicated and time-consuming, this example shows that fighting infringement in 
court can indeed be successful, [while they] hope that this positive outcome will motivate other 
seed companies to pursue infringement cases too”821. If the mere unlawful reproduction of 
protected plant varieties has to be fought for seven years, it becomes difficult to imagine how a 
traditional plant breeder can litigate disputes involving claims of essential derivation. Indeed, the 
EDV concept introduces numerous thresholds for triggering legal obligations for subsequent 
breeders. First of all, it relies on an overarching concern to establish the distinctness between the 
two concerned plant varieties, since if a subsequent plant variety is not distinct from the protected 
initial variety, the question of essential derivation should not even be addressed. Then it adds in 
the conditional layers of ‘derivation’ and the pursuit of ‘conformity of the subsequent variety to 
the essential characteristics’ of the initial variety. The concept of EDV has as a result failed to 
convince commentators because of the lack of precise thresholds and their inherent deficiencies to 
elucidate “the precise boundaries lines to define the scope of protected subject matter”822.  
At last, the UPOV 1991 text also relies on the principle of “limited dependence”, which 
differentiates the cascade of derivation and that of legal dependence. According to such principle, 
a variety that is already considered to be essentially derived from another cannot be considered as 
an initial variety to another distinct plant variety, since “an initial variety cannot in any case be an 
EDV of some pre-existing protected variety”823. This limited dependence has been vehemently 
criticised in its inherent risk of overcompensating initial variety developers to the detriment of 
follow-on breeders of “intervening varieties” that may come in play further down the chain of 
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 incremental plant improvement
824
.  That is why the complexity of the “project to use EDVs to 
delineate [greater] scope of plant protection [has] become apparent […], as initial enthusiasm 
about EDV provisions is giving way to more sober reflections about the costs and challenges that 
they entail”825. The main legislative response to the lack of effective PVP protection in the 
molecular breeding age has therefore not solved the challenges experienced by non-integrated 
smaller-scaled private plant breeders. Not only has the notion of EDV further blurred the contours 
of protection for follow-on innovators, it has also failed to address the disconforts accompanying 
definitions of plant varieties and DUS testing operations.   
8.1.2. Fronting the tragic fate of the breeders’ exception 
The breeders’ exception is undoubtedly one of the cornerstones of the plant variety rights regime. 
It is the essence of this “legal hybrid”, which allows for the continuous exchange and use of 
agricultural biodiversity between variety developers. It has in this sense been advocated very 
vocally as one of the main tools through which plant breeders continue to contribute not only to 
the overarching conservation and sustainable use goals of international environmental law, but 
also as a means to share the benefits deriving from the use of genetic resources. Indeed, the 
breeder’s exemption and other exceptions to the breeder’s right are viewed as “inherent benefit-
sharing principles” found in the UPOV Convention826. Leaving improved varieties open for 
research undertaken on the material but also for the development of new and potentially competing 
plant varieties can indeed be likened to a form of technology transfer. Such transfer is vital for 
small and medium plant breeding companies, as it allows them to constitute and feed their gene 
pools without weighty costs. However, important tensions have arisen “between first generation 
breeders who have secured legal protection for new varieties and second generation breeders who 
seek to utilise those new varieties to develop more varieties”827. These tensions need to be duly 
addressed so as to continue to permit second generation innovators to engage in the production of 
public goods without the authorisation of first generation breeders, while also giving sufficient 
incentive for breeders to continue innovating and seek formal protection. 
The breeders’ exception has seen its range considerably shrink over time. Former industry 
players openly admit that  
“some major seed companies are loudly thinking about amendment of the breeder’s 
exception, which is the cornerstone of the UPOV Convention. The idea is to delay access 
to protected plant varieties for breeding purposes for a number of years, whereby the 
delayed access might be different depending on the species”828.  
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This daunting prospect has nevertheless not yet seen the light of day, even though the breeders’ 
exception has been considerably shred through amendments made to the UPOV Convention. 
Indeed, while under the 1961 and 1978 texts, this prerogative transpired like a true exemption, the 
1991 version raised it to the rank of a “compulsory exception”, through which certain actions 
would exceptionally not fall under the breadth of PVP protection. In all scenarios, licensing 
negotiations would emerge if the use of a protected variety in a breeding program had led to the 
commercialisation of a new variety that is not clearly distinguishable, or whose production 
required the repeated use of the protected variety. Under the latest Convention text however, the 
authorisation of the initial breeder will further be waived provided that its competitors’ breeding 
programme does not produce an essentially derived variety. Even though “absolute permission 
rules” still delineate informational property titles (in accordance with which the permission of the 
monopoly-owner ought to be sought for using the protected information), liability rules (whereby 
the entitlement can be used without permission so long as adequate compensation is granted later), 
embody the specificity of cumulative plant-breeding innovation through the unequivocal breeders’ 
exemption of PVP legislation
829
. The concept of essential derivation was not in essence designed 
to weaken such exemption, but rather to fight plagiarism. But it may have actually perhaps done 
so.  
The main challenge faced by conventional plant breeders in this regard relates to the shrinking 
room for manoeuvre left for the use of protected material in breeding programmes. This shift has 
arguably converted plant breeders’ prerogatives to use protected varieties to develop new 
biodiversity from a complete exemption from authorisation into an exception to the rights 
conferred to breeders. The aforementioned District Court decision of The Hague attempted to 
remedy such shift by stating: 
“The Court finds it important that the extension of the protection of initial varieties to 
EDV’s can be considered an exception provision to the main rule of independence of 
distinguishable varieties. Being an exception, it should be interepreted in a limited manner” 
(Astée Flowers vs Danziger 'Dan' Flower Farm, District Court of the Hague).  
Nonetheles, the wording of both the UPOV 1991 Convention and the EC Regulation remain very 
vague, and the interpretation it received in practice seemed to consider its reach as a tool to be 
used against all varieties tenuously resembling and thus directly competing with the "initial 
variety". These elements meant that the EDV concept bore the perilous risk of reducing the nature 
of statutory undeniable-use exemptions. Such an extension retains a disquieting potential to be 
used as a weapon to shut down or delay competitors possessing potentially better-performing yet 
dangerously similar products which would directly enter into competition with protected varieties, 
especially in relatively constrained markets such as the Mediterranean market for brown tomatoes 
for instance. Rather than trying to identify infringers, the extension of plant variety protection may 
create unnecessary and unproductive hostility within an innovation chain that is bound to create 
similarly derived products. That is why certain commentators take a restrictive interpretation to the 
notion of EDV, asserting that “the extension of breeders’ rights to cover essentially derived 
varieties may be limited to varieties that take over virtually the whole of the genome of the 
                                                                    
 
829
 MERGES, "Institutions for Intellectual Property Transactions: The Case of Patent Pools," op.cit. 
CHAP. 8 Private Plant Breeders and Shortcomings of the Strong Property Paradigm 
195 
 protected variety”830. It seems nonetheless correct to assume that with little consensus over the 
genetic conformity threshold required to activate this extensive protection granted to cosmetic 
modifications, the EDV addition could be detrimental to small-scale breeders
831
, especially those 
who do not have experience or training in legal proceedings. The current nebulous bundle of rights 
stemming from plant variety protection needs to be reforged into a fair and consistent system832.  
The essence itself of plant innovation, i.e. its self-replicating nature and its inherent link with 
cultivation, as well as technological developments in plant breeding science, have thus raised 
considerable challenges when it comes to ensure that plant variety protection’s scope still remains 
interesting for breeders, without annihilating its inherent balance. These challenges are reflected in 
the shadows surrounding the criterion for protection, whether in its phenotypic focus or its 
newfound boundary of essential derivation. They are further enhanced by the substantial 
difficulties that detract from the enforceability of such protection titles, whether against farmers or 
fellow breeders. As a result, the new balance found in the international breeders' rights legislation 
is found to have failed to grant breeders adequate and clear protection promises that should 
warrant against an argued obsolescence and allow the full capture of fair benefits of an IP title 
faced with new imitation technologies. Instead, it has rather managed to overlook or at least curtail 
the role of liability rules embedded within the breeders’ exception in the successful use of 
agrobiodiversity on farm and other small breeding programmes. Rather than addressing the 
arguably obsolescent failures of plant variety protection in terms of scope, the changing approach 
to the breeders’ exception and the concept of essential derivation have exacerbated the drift away 
from a balanced public domain between initial and subsequent innovators.  
8.2. Disruptive access to upstream research tools, patented products and processes 
Today, the smallest portions of biological material may have a great impact over the entire plant 
breeding process. Researchers working on molecular breeding tools and breeders who wish to use 
them in their variety development program increasingly encounter numerous and fairly different 
intellectual property rights titles along the way, whether broad or restrictively defined. As a result, 
they face problems that highly resonate with those witnessed by public researchers, who are also 
faced with the plethora of legal entitlements that surround the research tools they need to in the 
cumulative chain of agrobiodiversity improvement. The issues appear nonetheless heightened in 
the case of plant breeders who encounter first-hand the great incrementality of their activity, and 
whose only sources of income stem from the marketplace. They are forced to adjust their practices 
to the co-existence of their old friend, plant variety protection, with other forms of legal 
entitlement attached to invisible and unimaginable portions of their gene pools. Encounters with 
patents are frequently problematic, requiring new assessments, strategies and thus training in order 
to be comprehended first, and dealt with later. Furthermore, the aforementioned example related to 
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the "Biolistic Particle Delivery System" gene gun technology has proven that adequate strategies 
may not always suffice to obtain authorisation to use patented technology. The example has 
further shown that refusals to license may at times also be anchored in unjustifiable rationale such 
as the potential licensee’s competitor status in a different product market, hampering the 
production of socially beneficial goods
833
.  
8.2.1. Issues of co-existence of patents and plant variety protection 
Even though patents tend to take centerstage in breeders’ difficulties to access products or 
processes important for their research and development programs, other instruments may also be 
found on the path to accessing, developing or commercialising new socially desirable plant 
varieties. Relying heavily on the physical security that may cover the companies' facilities, trade 
secrets may also cover new research programs or technologies under development, but may also 
realte to aspects of plant biotechnology that cannot be detected in the final plant product, such as 
markers and regeneration methods, thereby avoiding the disclosure requirements entailed in PVP 
or patent protection
834
. The withholding of technical information undisclosed through the recourse 
to trade secrets does in truth not serve the public interest. This finding does reinforce the case for 
strong disclosure-based intellectual property tools such as patents or PVP, which at least allow for 
direct mechanisms to access protected technology
835
.  
Notwithstanding the even more invisible threat of trade secrets hidden within plant varieties, 
smaller-scaled private plant breeders are increasingly confronted with an unfamiliar and strong 
legal entitlement, i.e. patents. They are in this regard first confronted to a major feature of this 
strong entitlement, its almost inexistent breeders’ exemption. Indeed, as aforementioned patents 
traditionally award relatively restricted room to follow-on use possibilities vis-à-vis protected 
innovations, especially in active breeding programmes. Patent legislation worldwide extremely 
rarely provides for exceptions to exclude third parties with specific respect to research conducted 
within the protection innovation, or to breeding. When both the patent and PVP systems are in 
interplay, “the highest level of protection afforded by patents for biotechnological inventions 
threatens the existence and weakens the functionality of the breeders’ exemption, which is an 
essential feature of any sui generis PVP system”836. While the breeders' exemption that recognises 
immediate rights over protected material for further use in breeding programs, does remain the 
absolute foundation of plant variety rights protection worldwide, it is scarce in patent legislation. 
Indeed, under the tight-lipped TRIPS framework and the worryingly mute European Directive, 
merely a handful of national legal orders allow for breeding-specific research possibilities outside 
of negotiated licenses. In Germany, France and Switzerland (and probably soon in the 
Netherlands), the infamous PVP breeder’s exemption has found its echo in patent legislation, 
where breeding programs could be initialised, even when the material contained patented traits, the 
consent of the patent holder needing to be sought at the commercialisation stage. The lack of 
consent from the right holder for carrying out active commercial research using the innovation 
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 remains at first sight quite a positive departure from traditional patent protection, but its 
efficiency still needs to be tested
837
, as early indicators show that such flexibility has in practice 
resulted in hostile reactions from competitors wishing to shut down on-going research activities
838
.   
In order not to diminish the incentive of patent protection, these options remain exceptional, and 
are awarded relatively restricted room. Licensing negotiations will thus largely triumph over the 
mandatory cavities that ensure less contrived further cumulative research or traditional seed saving 
practices for non-commercial purposes. However, companies that still generate their income from 
plant-variety licensing, sale or distribution, rather than patented biotechnology research tools or 
process licenses, continue to unreservedly rely on the accessible nature of both improved and 
exotic agricultural biodiversity
839
. The seed industry itself has quite vocally expressed its reserves 
to the inherent risks of seeing patents and plant variety rights co-exist in the same genetic 
material. Adopted in 2003, the International Seed Federation’s view on Intellectual Property 
recalls that it is “strongly attached to the breeders’ exception provided for in the UPOV 
Convention and is concerned that the extension of the protection of a gene sequence to the relevant 
plant variety could extinguish this exception”840. The 2003 Bangalore position paper, which 
mainly focused on plant variety protection and addressed patents and their co-existence in the last 
two of its total of fifteen pages, has been revised in 2012
841
. It now is thirty five pages long, and 
consecrates a greater deal of attention to patenting than before, epitomising the clear industry need 
to come up with common and workable solutions to the issue of co-existence of patents and plant 
variety rights, especially in a predominantly nationally regulated subject-matter that could have 
extremely damaging consequences for global seed trade.  
8.2.2. Impact of ownership landscape and enforcement practices  
Notwithstanding the new challenges of determining freedom to operate when faced with plant 
variety and patent protection on the same material, private plant breeders, just as public 
researchers, are also confronted to the nearly monopolistic nature of patent ownership in 
agricultural biotechnology and molecular plant breeding. Even when patents are favoured rather 
than trade secrets, companies with more moderate research capacity have been pushed in a really 
delicate bargaining position to gain access to technology. Both small and large actors of the private 
sector have been forced to negotiate licensing agreements with the "gene holders"
842
, mainly on 
account of the legal exclusive rights granted upon the traits themselves. Just as public researchers, 
the challenges faced by plant breeders do not only stem from the high number of patents in 
agricultural biotechnology, they also derive from the enclosure of foundational or platform 
technologies, and the multitude of actors with multitudes of claims on complementary 
technologies or products
843
. The plant genetics and genomics industry’s concentration rate has 
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been considerably heightened through the grant of patents on germplasm. As aforementioned, the 
contemporary notion of "traits market share" vis-à-vis biotechnology enhancement traits such as 
disease resistance or herbicide tolerance, has generated complex cross-licensing practices, where 
multinationals and small-scale companies alike find themselves more intricately linked to each 
other and to the market leader than in merger or acquisition situations. Again, in 2003, much of the 
IP in agricultural biotechnology was aggregated into a few very large IP portfolios held by major 
corporations, the top five of which controled forty one per cent in the United States
844
. Indeed, 
today “half-dozen major firms […] hold substantial numbers of key patents […and] have coverage 
of the related enabling technologies”845.  
The most bothersome aspect of wide control over agrobiodiversity research and development tools 
remains the unknown nature and range of existing patents or other intellectual property rights, 
combined with the possibility of a use-blocking license negotiation. Restrictive regulation, but also 
aggressive practives can in this context certainly increase the transaction costs involved in research 
and development activities. These characteristics have notably led to the crowning of the 
expression “freedom to operate” in plant-related research, as an incessant quest to ensure that 
the fruits of methodical selection or other developments can be commercialised in the long run, a 
freedom determined by the status of exclusive rights which may exist on the material and thus 
requiring continuous and prohibitively expensive surveillance
846
. A researcher who for instance 
wishes to transform plants using Agrobacterium related techniques, would not only need to seek 
the authorisation of the owner of the patents on the transformation methods themselves, but also 
cope with those possessing monopoly rights over the promoters, the marker genes and the actual 
gene of interest that is being introduced in to the plant
847
. The obstructive potential of licensing 
practices becomes especially frightening and genuine in light of a prospective obstruction in the 
commercialisation of socially useful innovations. Indeed, an innovation thought to be ready for the 
market might be completely blocked or inconveniently delayed through the upstream technology 
controller's decision. Breeders ought to make considerable yet often times insufficient efforts not 
to use proprietary transformation or fingerprinting techniques, to finally find that specific genes 
they were actively working on, or that simply found their way into the new combination, were 
protected by exclusive property rights, thereby requiring heavy licensing negotiations at the end of 
lengthy product development phases. These deals, occurring often times at the last stages of years-
long research, when foundation seeds for distribution or cultivation may even be ready, have 
known to be quite ferocious. "Delay in obtaining access to a component of a complex technology 
is of course especially damaging to firms in technologies with a short life cycle, where the first 
firm to the market has every chance of setting the standards and even of locking the others out"
848
. 
This is especially true when patents are used as trading currencies rather than exclusive rights over 
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 a particular innovation. Maize breeders' practice raises serious concerns for the future of 
innovation in this regard, since they openly admit they would rather use their own gene pool rather 
than adventurously seeking new biological material, out of fear of falling against patent 
inquisitions aggressively operated in the United States
849
. Examples regarding delays in attaining 
research results, or simply conveying the difficulties to gain access to technologies are regrettably 
numerous. A blatant example of the linkage between strong IPR and the damage to the freedom to 
operate stems quite surprisingly from the cereals market. The flax breeding world has indeed been 
identified as relatively easy to navigate, on account of the market’s relatively small dimension, the 
important presence of public sector initiatives and the limited use of biotechnology and molecular 
biology tools
850
, compared for instance to the realities of the canola or soybean markets, where 
intellectual property rights have shrank breeders’ freedom to operate. Another more specific 
example stems from the aforementioned polymerase chain reaction patent landscape, which 
remains central to molecular plant breeders, even though its reach has been wider in the 
biomedical sector. The technology, along with all associated components such as enzymes, but 
also all machinery and applications, has been at some point covered by six hundred patents 
claiming different aspects of PCR
851
. Most of the fundamental ones belonged to Hoffman – La 
Roche who capitalised all research applications linked to PCR by manufacturing the instruments 
and reagents needed for the process through joint ventures and licensors
852
.  
Just as public researchers, private plant breeders are the “middle men” of a cumulative cycle with 
few ground-breaking discoveries, where actors who possess restrictive monopoly rights upstream 
in the innovation chain have the ability to "choose the optimal level of output for the intermediate 
good embodying the patented technology"
853
. They face the extremely detrimental consequences 
of such weak position in the chain, trying to develop improved and stable new plant varieties 
which may unfortunately, knowingly, or unknowingly contain patented technology. Used to the 
legal hybrid of plant variety protection where the public domain is defined more loosely thanks to 
the breeders’ exception, plant breeders have been taken aback by the risks of seeing their 
mareketable varieties blocked by the upstream technology controllers’ decisions.  
8.3. Access and use of upstream biological material 
As aforementioned, most plant breeding programs rely predominantly on proven market successes, 
and are therefore impacted more greatly by intellectual property rights vested in such stabilised 
and improved germplasm. Yet they also depend upon the availability of landraces or wild 
relatives. Arguably, all improved germplasm also finds its origins in farmers’ varieties, gene bank 
resources and wild germplasm; albeit having gone through an exponential number of crosses over 
breeding cycles. Furthermore, exotic resources and landraces still directly constitute a smaller yet 
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vital part of private breeding pools, as they are esteemed highly by variety developers in terms of 
long-term security
854
. As aforementioned, breeders totally renew their stocks every ten to fourteen 
years, renewal for which natural diversity pools need to remain at their widest range
855
. It has in 
this sense been argued that “the worldwide community of breeders needs access to all forms of 
breeding material to sustain greatest progress in plant breeding and, thereby, to maximise the use 
of genetic resources for the benefit of society”856. 
The opportunities to access exotic or local biological material, notably through international 
or national gene banks, in order to feed or refresh their private collections has therefore an 
impact on the variety of resources that may be found in breeding pools. Private plant breeders thus 
feel the weight of public domain restrictions stemming from international environmental law857. If 
access to external resources is deemed difficult or overly costly, both financially and in terms of 
administrative burden, breeders would indeed spend greater effort in the maintenance of their 
exotic material. But they could also restrain from using exotic and local material as a whole, rather 
focusing on opportunities offered by improved material developed by their competitors around the 
globe for instance. The variability of breeding pools would inevitably suffer from such internal 
fall-back. The preservation but also the access to agricultural plant germplasm’s wild relatives 
directly influences the future of agricultural research and development and concurrently agro-
biodiversity as a whole
858
. Its natural basis cannot be reduced. In this regard, the importance of 
wide genetic diversity in plant breeding activities seems to counteract with the homogeneity found 
in the resulting new high-yielding varieties. Restraining the genetic pool available for both natural 
and human selection (by farmers and plant breeders alike) and narrowing the genetic base of 
agricultural crops may have extremely detrimental effects. It indeed increases the vulnerability of 
agricultural crops to sudden changes in climate, and to the appearance of new pests and 
diseases
859
, an immense threat to future food production
860
. Enabling access to exotic material, but 
also, and more importantly, to characterised, halfway material or plant varieties and associated 
knowledge would contribute to the fight against homogenisation. It would as a result be conducive 
of more social welfare inducing agrobiodiversity uses.  
Such access nonetheless needs to accommodate the biopiracy concerns that have been rightfully 
raised and consequently consecrated in the public domain fenced by international environmental 
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 law. The caveats faced by public research in this regard included not only the novelty of plant 
varieties and the correlated determination of “common knowledge”, but also extended to prior art 
considerations. Private plant breeders who are solely concerned with obtaining exclusive rights 
over their new plant varieties through plant breeders’ rights are solely facing the former call for 
caution. Biopiracy cases have nonetheless equally targeted improved plant varieties developed by 
small-scaled plant breeders. The aforementioned RAFI study that highlighted “plant breeders’ 
wrongs” included biopiracy cases where plant variety protection was awarded to mostly public 
research institutes, on slightly modified landraces subject to little additional breeding
861
. They 
have been generally identified with regards to specific compounds or functions of biological 
material, rather than the complete phenotype. One main reason for this lies in the inherently non-
uniform nature of landrace populations or wild relatives, which unmistakably need to be stabilised 
and further developed to qualify for plant breeders’ rights protection. In parallel, the Australian 
Heritage Seeds Curator's Association ('HSCA') has also “argued that at least one hundred and 
eighteen plant breeder's rights claims in Australia could be invalid because they had not been 'bred' 
and were not distinct”, arguing that “the threshold for breeding was too low”862.  
CONCLUSIONS. Private plant breeders and the strong IP paradigm 
The ratio legis of plant breeding, as practiced by relatively small to medium, non-integrated 
private seed companies, needs to cope with several new ordeals stemming from the reification, 
development and implementation of the strong property paradigm. They face increasingly 
restrictive opportunities at the phenotypic level through plant variety rights, but also at the 
genotypic level through patents. These titles have indeed not been unreservedly considered as a 
vehicle to foster innovation, even within the world of market-oriented private plant breeding. Plant 
variety rights have been put to the test of technological strides of the genotype era, but also to the 
test of an enduring breeders’ exception. This sui generis instrument that accommodates the 
specificities of plant improvement indeed remains in dire need of further guidance for the full 
capture of innovation benefits, all the while maintaining its distinct approach to the public domain 
through a viable and inclusive scope. Technological strides have allowed quicker access to 
parental lines and enlarged the opportunities of plagiaristic breeding, pushing certain better-
endowed actors to advocate wider protection scopes. Plant variety protection is thus faced by an 
inherent conundrum of maintaining the breeders’ exception alive and well (as its inherent feature 
adapted to the needs of cumulative agrobiodiversity innovation), while also ensuring that 
protection titles still generate revenue that is adequate enough to remain an actual incentive to 
innovate. Rather than addressing the arguably obsolescent failures of plant variety protection in 
terms of scope, the changing approach to the breeders’ exception and the concept of essential 
derivation have rather exacerbated the drift away from public domain principles enshrined in the 
initial balancing act of granting exclusive prerogatives over plant varieties.  
Breeders have been concomitantly been put to the test of patents, often co-existing next to their 
familiar breeders’ rights protection. They naturally share a number of anxieties with public 
breeding institutes, especially with regards to the provisos surrounding upstream research tools or 
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the recapture of publicly available knowledge, even though the private breeders’ endeavours are 
quite naturally not assigned to non-monetary approaches, and are not governed by norms of 
science but rather by the rules of the market. Non-integrated actors of molecular and conventional 
plant breeding are nonetheless challenged by the high number of patents on upstream molecular 
research tools, with broad scopes, concentrated in the hands of small groups of enterprises. These 
companies, which resort to restrictive licensing practices, significantly drive away the innovation's 
availability to smaller-scaled plant breeders. Integrated competitors have furthermore pursued 
fierce enforcement strategies, which further increases the costs of research and development, all 
the while rescinding breeders’ sacrosanct “freedom to operate”. Moreover, both patents and plant 
variety rights also need to consider and accommodate restrictions that may surround the access to 
upstream biological material. They need to reclaim their built-in mechanisms that allow for social 
welfare enhancing uses of agricultural biodiversity, such as the farmers’ and the breeders’ 
exemptions. Private breeders nonetheless contribute to social welfare enhancing uses of 
agrobiodiversity by creating new genetic diversity that is adapted to regional or national needs, 
and by tapping on the inherent benefit-sharing opportunities provided by more relaxed intellectual 
property rights. 
 
TRENDS IN THE STRONG 
PROPERTY PARADIGM 
SHORTCOMINGS EXPERIENCED BY SMALL-
SCALED PRIVATE PLANT BREEDERS 
Speedy reverse-engineering and the 
reign of molecular breeding 
Lack of adequate protection levels: is the incentive to innovate 
still present? 
Insufficient royalty collection from breeders and farmers 
Reign of exclusive individual rights in 
cumulative innovation 
Biopiracy risk vis-à-vis old users of biodiversity / knowledge 
Proliferation of patents with aggressive 
licensing practices  
Uncertainty of freedom to operate: legality of actions when co-
existence PVP-patents 
Raising search and transaction costs of socially beneficial 
research (information, negotiation) 
Use-blocking licensing: refusal – delays in research 
 FIG.3: Shortcomings faced by smaller-scaled private plant breeders in molecular and conventional plant 
breeding confronted to the strong PGRFA property paradigm 
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 CHAPTER 9: MASS SELECTORS RELYING ON SEED EXCHANGE NETWORKS 9.
The Green Revolution severely ruptured the relationship between farmers and agricultural 
researchers by excluding the former from the "institutionalisation and professionalisation of 
breeding" activities
863
. This rupture was not inexorable, as during the timid beginnings of plant 
breeding science, it was assumed that farmers could and would produce their own hybrid seeds
864
. 
However, the supremacy of the model favouring the peripheral and commercial provision of seeds 
with complex traits did settle on account of various technological strides and a favourable 
legislative framework. Farmers lost the genetic enhancement aspect of PGRFA management, to 
rather be considered as mere 'conservers' than variety developers today. Nevertheless, as 
aforementioned, mass selection, whether operated by farmers, gardeners or the rather new low-
input breeders perdured. As aforemenetioned, farmer-saved seed did for instance still account for 
an estimated thirty five percent (or eighteen billion USD) of the total estimated value of fifty 
billion USD for all agricultural seed used worldwide in the mid-1980s
865
, a proportion that 
culminated at the level of eighty percent in developing countries
866
.  
The regulatory landscape changes that accompanied both the Green and Gene revolutions did 
considerably weaken the ability of farmers to generate improved varieties. There are clear 
“distributive inequities” inherent to the TRIPS Agreement, and especially its Article 27§3b when 
analysed through the perspective of mass selection-based plant improvement. These 
preconceptions stem for the Agreement’s clear focus on end-producers and on those actors who 
developers knowledge or products with greater market value, purposefully setting aside other 
forms of knowledge that may present a more community-oriented and free-exchange-based 
outlook on innovation, especially with regards to agricultural or indigenous communities
867
. The 
property paradigm that derives from such focus concomitantly restricts public domain uses that the 
farmers’ innovation system relies upon. It does so through stringent certification schemes on the 
one hand, and obstructive intellectual property rights on the other. Neither do these two aspects of 
the property paradigm recognise mass selectors’ contributions to the entire chain of 
agrobiodiversity innovation, nor do they protect the products of their own innovation, landraces or 
low-input plant population, from misappropriation by leaving them outside of any property 
regime. Even though they are not “averse to the recognition of a plurality of right holders”, 
intellectual property rights “geared towards providing economic rewards to a single creator [seem 
to be] incapable of accommodating the contribution of communities of farmers”868. The property 
paradigm’s shrunk public domain and its extensive exclusive appropriation opportunities thus fail 
to accommodate the needs of farmers-selectors. 
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9.1. Forceful Illegality through Restrictive Seed Certification Schemes 
First and foremost and in comparison with other socio-technological contexts of agrobiodiversity 
innovation, mass selection endeavours operated by farmers face a primeval and unique inadequacy 
in the strong property paradigm, that of stringent seed certification requirements. Indeed, modern 
seed laws have considerably restricted the actions of farmers-innovators both on the market and on 
their fields. Mass selectors have been forced to infringe upon market and certification rules, 
unwillingly creating unfair competition by using and exchanging their non-registered varieties 
because of the lack of adequate balance in applicable semi-proprietary legislation.  
As aforementioned, seed marketing rules traditionally remain a “quality assurance process”869 
which attempts to resolve the inherent asymmetry in information flows
870
, whereby public 
authorities control and inspect seeds intended for commercialisation. The desire to regulate seed 
markets and ensure their swift functioning finds its origins in the numerous prospects to cheat or 
adopt opportunistic behaviour in a market where the product sold cannot be identified at the 
moment of the sale or exchange. Nonetheless, it has also been openly argued that the issue was not 
merely one of quality but also reflected an active political choice espousing a particular 
agrobiodiversity innovation context, producing productivity and uniformity oriented improved 
plant varieties. As aforementioned, the proliferation of less uniform landraces could theoretically 
“wipe out the formal sector supply because they are priced lower and do not include licensing and 
other technology fees”871. Indeed, certification requirements have been traditionally more 
important in field crops, where numerous varieties have been released publicly released
872
. Backed 
by the first seed catalogues, which came to be the primary sources of gardening knowledge and 
germplasm for cultivators, seed merchants had to persuade their customers, used to saving seed 
free of charge, to return to them annually, and ‘‘convince customers not to harvest seeds from their 
own gardens’’873.  
In most developed countries, and increasingly in developing nations, seed distribution is only 
allowed after certification procedures based on the distinctness, uniformity and stability of plant 
varieties (so-called DUS testing), and the inclusion of either actors and/or varieties into official 
catalogues
874
. These instruments are best epitomised by the OECD Seed schemes, with its 
enlarged geopolitical influence outside the strict boundaries of the intergovernmental organisation, 
and which very much remain a perspective of a growingly industrialised seed sector. While 
farmers are protected against crooked seed distributors and impure seed lots by the establishment 
of official catalogues and clear insurance or liability regimes, the varieties they would perhaps 
want to cultivate for agronomical, environmental or cultural reasons fail to meet the requirements 
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 of the stringent marketing rules of distinctness, uniformity and stability. Furthermore, the focus 
of formal seed markets on approval and guarantees as to the identity, purity and performance of 
distributed seeds, cannot take into account the cultural norms that come in play within the informal 
seed exchanges and associated on-farm innovation attempts
875
. This reality challenges farmers, 
gardeners and organic plant breeders by restricting the choice of products circulating in the 
market, and also by restricting the range of action of seed exchange and improvement networks. 
Marketing requirements in practice push informal seed exchange networks not only to the side-
lines, but also at times force them in the confines of illegality.  
“Many [seed laws] are meant to organise the formal seed system but have effects that go 
well beyond. Many seed laws of the former Soviet Republics, for example, prescribe that 
all seed (that is used for planting) has to be certified, which in fact outlaws the saving of 
seed on-farm. More common, however, is the rule that only seed that is commercialised 
has to be registered and certified. This is the case in the seed laws of Cameroon, Niger, 
Senegal and many others. In most of these laws, however, the term 'commercialised' is not 
defined. The seed laws of South Africa and Malawi do specify that exchange and barter are 
included under the term 'sell'. This means that even the informal exchange of seed among 
farmers is illegal there”876.  
While intended to standardise crop names, protect consumers and foster investment in breeding, 
existing mainstream certification and informational protection legislation has had “the unintended 
consequence of drastically reducing the numbers of cultivars grown and impinging on the ability 
of farmers to grow older varieties or landraces not present on the list”877. The focus of formal seed 
markets on approval and guarantees as to the identity, purity and performance of distributed seeds, 
cannot indeed take into account the cultural norms that come in play within the informal seed 
exchanges and associated on-farm innovation attempts
878
.  
In this perspective, compulsory seed regulation and commercialisation have engendered “a process 
of horticultural “deskilling”, in that the management of diversity has been completely delegated 
to commercial breeders and seedsmen, which in turn results in the erosion of the genetic 
heterogeneity due to commercial imperatives to produce new cultivar lines, combined with a 
narrowing genetic base of commercially bred vegetable species in the global North”879. This 
deskilling has been particularly felt in the South, where compulsory seed certification has gained 
incredible momentum in the aftermath of the Green Revolution. 
“Under the 'Green Revolution' approach, seeds and other inputs are subsidised in order to 
facilitate adoption of new varieties and associated technologies. Within this paradigm, 
centralised seed production units have been built in many countries as public institutions or 
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enterprises to resemble the private European and North American seed industries. These 
formal seed systems subsequently developed specialised seed quality control institutions to 
create a quality-awareness with both seed producers and customers, and to safeguard the 
interests of farmers, similar to the official seed certification agencies in the North. In the 
era of privatisation of public institutions at the end of the 1980s, following structural 
adjustment policies, these seed quality control institutions became the driving force behind 
the development of seed legislation in the South. Such legislation was meant to provide 
these institutions with a legal backing, which was thought necessary to perform its police 
tasks especially with the new, private seed producers. As a result, many seed laws in the 
South strongly resemble those in the North. However, whereas in the North, the farmers' 
interest was often represented by a strong voice in the seed quality control systems, in 
several countries in the South this was not the case. The seed regulations were tacked onto 
existing bureaucratic structures and imposed upon both seed producers and users”880. 
The shortcomings of the highly regulated and compulsory approach to seed certification has not 
just altered seed supply in the South, it has also had detrimental consequences on the informal 
mass selection operating in the North as well. On the one hand, the networks that do not 
commercialise their material but yet become caught within the strongly appropriative and 
exclusive market they subsist in the margin of, will be “merely” disregarded by regulation. They 
will rather be viewed as trivial initiatives taking place outside of their scope, mostly considered in 
policies linked to environmental conservation or rural development schemes. The French network 
"AgroBio Périgord, Maison de la Semence" provides a good example of such partial desperado 
collective action initiatives that exist in the dark confines of restrictive seed laws. In order to 
conserve non-proprietary agricultural biodiversity, this network of two hundred and fifty growers 
located in Western France experiments on local populations or 'landraces', selecting those 
individuals presenting similar characteristics following two or three years of natural local 
adaptation, without ever falling under the range of six hundred individuals in order to avoid 
degeneration and maintaining so-called "security stocks" to minimise loss risks. They disseminate 
a technical book on the multiplication and selection of maize and sunflower on farm, based on the 
principles of mass selection. The experiment, which started in 2001 on a collective initiative, now 
receives support from regional institutions as an in situ biodiversity conservation project. The 
results of these conservation endeavours being not commercialised and therefore remaining 
outside of the regulated seed market, the products should in principle not face great difficulties 
within the currently applicable regulatory environments favouring high quality certification 
mechanisms. Indeed, market entry will generally not be sought within this kind of conservation-
oriented exchange networks. Strict regulation will nonetheless forbid them to take their initiatives 
to another level and spread the products of their innovative endeavours more widely. Even though 
most farmers-selectors would in practice not be disrupted by seed marketing laws if they remain in 
their small informal sector and respect the customarily set limits of action, it has been shown that 
seed saving schemes that “attain relative success and reach a size that merits up-scaling, officials 
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 or the locally established commercial seed companies may use the law to challenge such 
initiatives”881.  
Litigation has prospered with regards to those more contemporary networks, which, in an attempt 
to maintain genetic diversity and reach a wider range of customers, whether farmers or gardeners, 
sell their seeds. Conflicts have especially arisen over the lack of equivalent certification 
requirements for the commercialisation of conservation varieties, where the lack of 
registration of farmers’ varieties in national catalogues has generally been ruled to be in violation 
of the formal seed market rules and has also raised suspicions over the creation of unfair 
competition. Indeed, in the absence of a “light catalogue” for farmers’ varieties or a general 
exemption from certification, and thus in absence of a legal recognition of seed exchange 
platforms, litigation between formal and informal seed market actors has prospered and will 
continue to do so. This bitter reality is epitomised by the French case opposing Kokopelli to 
Graines Baumaux, which has been referenced by the Court of Nancy to the European Court of 
Justice in February 2011 (Case C-59/11)
882
. The latter was asked to assess whether seed catalogues 
violated principles of the acquis communautaire related to the liberty of trade, free movement of 
goods, proportionality, equality and non-discrimination, as well as the Union’s obligations under 
international law, especially with regards to the Convention on Biological Diversity and the FAO 
International Treaty. The opinion of Attorney General Kokott, issued on 19
th
 January 2012, 
seemed to indicate that the International Treaty did  
“not include any provisions which are unconditional and sufficiently precise as to 
challenge the validity of EU legislation on the marketing of seeds”. However, in the light 
of the principle of proportionality, “the disadvantages of the marketing prohibition, [which 
include a negative impact on the freedom to conduct a business and agricultural 
biodiversity] manifestly outweigh its advantages” (ECJ, Kokopelli vs Graines Baumaux, 
Opinion Att.Gen. Kokott).  
It was argued that this disadvantage was not sufficiently attenuated by the derogations carved out 
by Directive 2009/145. The Advocate General further contended that the conservation varieties 
Directive, by not giving “sufficient consideration to the interests of economic operators and 
consumers”, did not allow for sufficient scope vis-à-vis the use of old varieties and those products 
of mass selection, thereby concluding that  
“the prohibition on the sale of seed of varieties that are not demonstrably distinct, stable 
and sufficiently uniform […] is invalid as it infringes the principle of proportionality, the 
freedom to conduct a business […], the free movement of goods […] and the principle of 
equal treatment”.  
The judgment of the Court, issued on 12
th
 July 2012, ran counter to the initial conclusions set out 
by Attorney Kokott, by taking a rather positivist approach to the principle of proportionality within 
the European acquis communautaire. In this regard, the Court assessed whether the exclusion of 
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non-distinct, stable and uniform varieties from the formal seed market was appropriate for 
attaining the legitimate objectives pursued by official catalogue legislation. These objectives were 
identified as the increase of agricultural productivity and the reliability of the characteristics of the 
seed, which were adequately pursued by the litigious measures, setting the grounds of an efficient 
market without completely ruling out the marketing of old varieties. The Court ruled that:  
“the rules set out in Articles 3 to 5 of Directive 2002/55 are intended to secure improved 
productivity in vegetable cultivation in the European Union, the establishment of the 
internal market for vegetable seed by ensuring its free movement within the European 
Union, and the conservation of plant genetic resources, which are objectives of general 
interest. As is apparent from the grounds of the present judgment relating to the alleged 
breach of the principle of proportionality, those rules and the measures laid down by them 
are not inappropriate to the attainment of those objectives, and the obstacle to the freedom 
to pursue an economic activity which such measures represent cannot, in the light of the 
aims pursued, be regarded as disproportionately impairing the right to exercise that 
freedom” (ECJ, Kokopelli vs Graines Baumaux, para.79). 
 
“the acceptance regime laid down by Directives 2002/55 and 2009/145 contributes to 
improved productivity in vegetable cultivation in the European Union and to the 
establishment of the internal market for vegetable seed by ensuring the free movement of 
such seed within the European Union. Accordingly, the regime promotes, rather than 
restricts, the free movement of goods” (ECJ, Kokopelli vs Graines Baumaux, para.81). 
The findings of the case have raised serious doubts as to the ability of conservation and innovation 
oriented seed exchange networks could continue to survive in the current European legislative 
environment. Since the facts pertaining to this specific case, the European Union has developed 
legislation on 'conservation and amateur varieties' for seed and seed potatoes in 2008
883
, for 
vegetable seeds in 2009
884
 and grass mixtures with wild plants in 2010
885
. In 2012, the Common 
plant variety catalogues contained six hundred and fifty-six conservation or amateur varieties, one 
hundred and fifty-eight agricultural and four hundred and ninety-eight vegetable species
886
. 
However, European seed legislation has undergone an extensive review process and the first 
proposed draft for a Regulation on the “production and making available on the market of plant 
reproductive material”887 has considerably heightened concerns for the ability of associations like 
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 Kokopelli to continue their operations. The revised 2013 draft, which is at the time of writing still 
being discussed before the European Parliament after an initial rejection, wishes to “adapt to the 
technical progress of plant breeding”, but also to “reduce the cost and administrative burdens and 
support innovation”, by overcoming the “uncertainties and discrepancies in the implementation” of 
existing complex and fragmented legislation, which create “an uneven playing field for 
professional operators on the single market”888. The replacement of twelve scattered Directives by 
one Regulation is an endeavour that can only be praised in the name of regulatory clarity and 
coherence; yet such enterprise has created civil society uproar in its failure to fully accommodate 
the needs of all plant innovation. Indeed, its main focus remains on the surface a strictly OECD 
approach oriented towards the productivity driven professional seed market and the facilitation of 
seed movement, even though it contains a number of provisos that accommodate the needs of 
“farmer-breeders or gardener-breeders”889, while nonetheless confining such needs to so-called 
“niche markets” 890.   
Besides stringent certification schemes that push mass selection to play dangerous games with the 
boundaries of lawfulness, national strategies related to subsidisation have also ignited quite 
fiery critiques, accusing them of falling into partisan choices by linking the used of certified seeds 
to the reception of direct payments
891. This policy was notably used in the 1990’s and resulted in 
impressive increases in certified seed use ratios in the European Union. Such was the case in 
Spain, where merely twelve point six per cent of the seed market comprised of certified seed at the 
beginning of the 1990’s, and where such figure mounted up to seventy five per cent after the 
introduction of direct payments for certified seeds
892
. This policy, which is in itself not an 
inherently detrimental financial support to farmers who could not choose improved varieties by 
lack of means, has unfortunately not found its equivalent in supporting farmers or even 
conservation varieties, or only quite late in time in a number of countries. The European agri-
environmental measures scheme takes the use of so-called conservation varieties into account for 
instance, while the Swiss use a fixed price mechanism for old varieties of spelt
893
. In countries like 
Turkey on the other hand, subsidies are still solely directed towards certified seed in an effort to 
boost transparency and quality, but also support the national seed industry. As much as 
subsidisation policies have contributed to acclaimed, and often times very much-needed, 
improvements in yield and productivity, their one-sidedness and limited range have failed to 
compensate the loss of genetic diversity that has resulted from the direct support of a single 
innovation chain for crop improvement.   
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Stringent seed certification and marketing frameworks raise questions regarding the place left for 
farmers’ innovation within a productivity-oriented seed market. They challenge commentators to 
determine whether mass selectors and their correlated seed exchange networks find adequate room 
to carry on their activities, which contribute equally to the conservation and generation of new 
genetic diversity. While rational and well-defined seed certification laws may definitely contribute 
to ensuring that a higher number of improved varieties do reach farmers, their partisan focus may 
very well lead to contradictory results. Not only would farmers’ varieties not be able to reach their 
users any longer, their use and exchange might even be considered illegal. These institutional 
characteristics therefore lead to a systematic breakdown of the strong exclusive appropriation 
oriented paradigm with regards to the less technology-driven and more community-oriented mass 
selection innovation. This particular context does nonetheless continue to remain central not only 
to the conservation of agricultural biodiversity but it also constitutes the sole livelihood of small-
scale farmers, urging therefore legislative and/or judiciary redress. 
9.2. Obstructive Intellectual Property Protection 
As we have seen, the seed certification element of the strong property paradigm pushes farmers’ 
innovation into the confines of illegality by adopting a solely marketplace and productivity stance. 
The same phenomenon can also be witnessed in the paradigm’s second tier. Indeed, its intellectual 
property component bestows an additional obstructive layer to the public domain that farmers 
heavily rely on to use and build new knowledge and landrace populations, even if they only 
concern a more limited number of plant varieties or related knowledge. As aforementioned, seed 
certification applies to the entire range of plant varieties made available on the market, while 
intellectual property rights need to be duly applied for by breeders and researchers and granted by 
patent or plant variety protection offices. Their range is thus more limited, answering stricter 
criteria set out in national legislation according to the minimum standards set out by the TRIPS 
Agreement. However, the reach of the bundled rights granted to right holders and the ensuing 
restrictions of public domain uses significantly impact farmers’ range of action. Mass selectors 
who wish to build on existing knowledge and innovate collectively by relying on informal 
exchange networks cannot merely exist in the confines of intellectual property, and face ever-
greater risks of infringing exclusive titles. Such risks have been impressively extended by 
legislative changes but also through tough judiciary stances, regarding both the shrinking farmers’ 
exception and the fate of harvested material in patents and plant breeders’ rights. 
9.2.1. From farmers’ privilege to a strict exception 
The contours of the rules of diffusion that accompany patents or plant variety rights frame the 
possibilities for subsequent uses of protected material. Within such diffusion opportunities, the 
most striking aspect of intellectual property instruments targeting directly plant innovation has 
been the presence of strong liability rules operating as a “take now, pay later” understanding894. In 
the context of mass selection, a particular liability rule comes into play, that of the “farmers’ 
privilege”. Embedded in most PVP legislation, this privilege generally designates the specific 
actors that may benefit from the unlicensed use of the protection informational matter by farmers 
on account of national developmental specificities and the particular needs of the crop. This 
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 privilege enables farmers to save and exchange protected improved varieties, in light of ancestral 
traditions and socio-economic considerations as to their subsistence and their primordial role in the 
further in situ use and conservation of agrobiodiversity. Even though the strategic importance of 
these exemptions from protection retains the highest regard, their implementation has gained in 
complexity, in view of technological but also regulatory changes. The shrinking range of 
manoeuvre left to farmers for seed saving, using and exchanging within the strong IPR paradigm 
and a seemingly generalised lack of awareness or training in legal issues from the cultivators’ side 
have led to mounting disagreements between variety developers and sowers, which are incresingly 
taken on by the judiciary.  
The farmers' exemption, which allows farmers to sow protected seeds for the purposes of saving, 
using or exchanging them, remains a main feature of the dominant sui generis plant variety 
protection that is the UPOV system. Nonetheless, as aforementioned, its range and impact have 
considerably shrunk in time, especially in light of the fact that the privilege was full in the 1961 
and 1978 Acts, where PVP protection did not reach acts perpetrated without any commercial 
purpose by third parties, including unmethodical selectors or farmers
895
. The 1978 Convention, 
being a minimal standards agreement, granted opportunities for the more precise design of the 
implicit rights’ contours at the national level and thereby limit non-commercial uses. However, 
under the practice of so-called “brown-bagging” in accordance with this Act, farmers were even 
allowed to sell limited quantities of protected seeds for reproductive purposes
896
. Today, this 
privilege has become formally conditional to elements regarding national conditions, farm size or 
the necessity to use of the seed on the same farm, but it has also been surrounded by a licensing 
obligation
897
, in accordance with the terms of article 15§2 of the 1991 UPOV Convention, and 
implementing national legislation. In the European Union, the contours of farm-saved seed have 
been dressed quite restrictively, conditioning the farmers’ privilege to the payment of farm-saved-
seed royalties, and limiting it to certain varieties in article 14§1 of EC Regulation 2100/94. While 
small farmers seemingly benefit from full exoneration, others ought to provide “an equitable 
remuneration to the holder, which shall be sensibly lower than the amount charged for the 
licensed production of propagating material of the same variety in the same area; the actual level 
of this equitable remuneration may be subject to variation over time, taking into account the extent 
to which use will be made of the derogation provided for in paragraph 1 in respect of the variety 
concerned” (EC Regulation 2100/94, Art. 14§3).  
Having become an optional exception to the exclusive rights of breeders, rather than an array of 
acts considered outside the scope of the IP title in itself, the farmers’ privilege has been 
“drowngraded” in the legislative context and judicial interpretations. Landmark cases on the other 
side of the Atlantic have reiterated that the farmers’ exemption should be interpreted in a narrow 
fashion vis-à-vis the sale of the protected varieties’ progeny, such as the ruling in Asgrow vs. 
Winterboer that secluded “brown-bagging” as a marketing practice violating United States’ 
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legislation. In the European legal order, due attention has been given to the concept of a 
remuneration level that could be considered “sensibly lower” than the amount charges for the 
licensed production of propagating material. The European Court of Justice has for instance ruled 
that a flat rate of eighty per cent would not fall under such category898, also mentioning that the rate 
applicable should be determined by taking into account “the varieties at issue and the area 
concerned”, all the while confirming that a fixed and unnegotiable rate of fifty per cent of certified 
seed rate had been unequivocally imposed by the legislator899. The issue of farm saved seed 
royalties is much more important in cereals where exploitations tend to be larger in size, and the 
financial return from these royalties to breeders is estimated to amount to sixty five to seventy five 
million EUR per year, which, when divided into farming land, would not necessarily impose 
heavy burdens on the individual farmer
900
. In the current state of European Regulation, we should 
remind the reader that one of the most important cereal, i.e. maize, is not listed in the species to 
which the farmers’ privilege is extended.  
As a result, the move towards almost generalised royalty for seed saving was highly protested by 
farmers’ organisations, which claimed that the amendment violated an ancestral right and a 
fundamental obligation that had both been recognised internationally
901
. Such attack should 
nonetheless be tempered, since the legislation does provide for an absolute exemption for so-called 
“small farmers”, which nonetheless need to be determined with more detail, missing the 
opportunity for greater transparency vis-à-vis mass selectors, who will probably not be aware of 
their status, whether they met “comparable appropriate criteria” or not. In European national 
orders, French legislation has shown the strictest reaction to the privilege, establishing it solely 
with regards to wheat through a voluntary compulsory contribution system and considering all 
other farm saved seed as counterfeits, falling within the realms of the strict legislation 2007-1544 
dated as of 30
th
 October 2007. Under Australian law, “PBR owners who believe that farmer’s 
privilege prevents them from obtaining a fair return on their investment in breeding can apply to 
have the exemption declared not available for specific taxa”, even though none have done so902. 
The farmers’ privilege has not only seen its reach shrink in plant variety protection legislation and 
correlated case law; it has also been shaken down by the coexistence of patented elements next 
to protected plant varieties. Indeed, farmers are absolutely prohibited to save, exchange, or re-
use varieties that might be covered by a patent or might contain a patented element without 
authorization of the right-holder and negotiations on royalty payments. The inherent concern of the 
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 PVP system vis-à-vis farmers is not omnipresent within patent laws as such, as these statutes tend 
to remain abstract in their nature, seeing that they are not designed to solely apply to 
agrobiodiversity-reliant innovations as PVP legislation is, with its inevitable links with the loftier 
issues of food security or environmental protection. This approach means that farmers should be 
“considered the licensees of a patented product”903, as they are traditionally not granted any rights 
or prerogatives over the seeds they plant, if these are protected through a plant patent, or if they 
contain a patented product or process. Litigation has flourished over a range of infringements, 
from the possession of protected seed in itself to its re-use outside the scope of the legislation, 
without royalty collection or in larger farms than those targeted by applicable legislation for 
instance. In the United States, where the principle of independence between different IP systems 
did not warrant the adoption of specific rules addressing the co-existence of patents and plant 
variety rights, case law points towards the prevalence of patents. The legal challenge of multiple 
protection was epitomised by the wide array of enclosing instruments surrounding Round Up 
Ready canola, protected all at once through process and gene patents, plant variety rights, 
trademarks and the private contract that is the “Technology Use Agreement”. In 1998, an infamous 
case opposed Monsanto to Percy Schmeiser
904
, a Canadian canola farmer who replanted the seed 
he saved from batches of Round Up Ready canola seeds he had bought from the plaintiff. 
Although he argued that he was cultivating his own traditionally bred canola seeds, and that the 
batches were unknowingly contaminated with Monsanto’s technology on account of cross field 
breeding by wind or insects, he was found to be infringing patents by using technology without a 
license
905
. An even more epinous challenge may arise when a mass selector is faced with a 
protected plant variety in accordance to which he could save and select protected seeds in certain 
circumstances, and within which a patented element may occur, such as a specific genetic 
sequence. Just as private plant breeders are faced with the challenge of making patent and plant 
variety protection coexist, farmers-selectors are confronted to the reality check new and unknown 
boundaries of the strong property paradigm. Their seed-saving and exchange practices may be 
further pushed into the realm of illegality not only through the evolution of plant variety 
protection, but also its concomitant implementation with patents. 
9.2.2. The twisted fate of harvested material 
In a parallel trend to the expansion of both breeders’ rights and patent protection in their respective 
bundle of rights (an expansion that has awarded greater exclusion prerogatives to right holders) the 
scope of protection has also in parallel expanded in both instruments, through legislative 
amendments and judicial interpretation. Indeed, with regards to plant breeders’ rights, protection 
has been extended to harvested material in the 1991 UPOV text. Such expansion is also present 
in the Community Plant Variety Organisation system, and has definitely reduced the margin of 
manoeuver that was formerly granted to farmers. While such expansion may be completely 
justifiable in view of the rising costs of developing new varieties and the losses generated by 
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uncollected royalty payments for professional plant breeders, these rights still need to be put to 
balance with the necessity to ensure the continuity of farmer seed saving practices, as a 
biodiversity conservation tool and also as a mechanism fostering another viable and very much 
present innovation chain. That is most probably why the extension of the scope of protection to the 
harvested material (art. 14§2 UPOV 1991) or to the end product that has been derived from the 
harvested material (art. 14§3 UPOV 1991) has been carved around specific limitations. The 
prerogatives shall only be extended to such material under certain conditions, as the authorisation 
of the breeder shall be sought only if the material has been “obtained through the unauthorised use 
of propagating material of the protected variety […], unless the breeder has had reasonable 
opportunity to exercise his right in relation to the said propagating material”. These conditions 
are cumulative, although their exact scope is not defined in the Convention text, and will need to 
be clarified either in national instruments or through judicial proceedings. In this specific regard, 
“there are significant concerns in the grains industry in relation to extended rights, [including the] 
uncertainty over what constitutes reasonable opportunity and whether crops grown from farm-
saved seed are subject to extended rights”906. Breeders’ concerns are particularly heightened in the 
horticultural sector where asexual propagating material (buds, cuttings or grafts) can not only be 
sold but also easily be used to grow another identical plant, which leads to very restrictive 
contractual clauses in order to ensure a return on breeding investment. These concerns were 
echoed in the 1991 UPOV Convention, which in effect introduced a “cascading right in which 
plant variety owners can, in certain circumstances, protect their harvested material”, making it 
even more difficult to assess the effective scope of protection that is granted through plant 
breeders rights
907
.  
In general, governments have recommended that royalties may be obtained on harvested grain, 
which means that the farmers’ rights to save and replant the seeds they have duly purchased are 
further limited. Furthermore, most plant breeders are increasingly making growers sign a so-called 
“end-point-royalty” license that foresees the provision of yearly information on the quantity of 
harvested material of protected plant varieties and the calculation of royalties due on account of 
sold or consumed harvested material. This system has the “benefits of reducing upfront seed costs 
for growers, overcoming loss of sales through farmer’s privilege and sharing the risk of crop 
failure between growers and PBR owners”908. Indeed, “new forms of direct contracts with farmers, 
not with propagators, are now proliferating, because breeders find it more attractive to capture 
added value in a system based on licenses for harvested material. Such contracts include “licenses 
for producers or traders for harvested material” under which royalties are established on harvested 
material”909. Considering that the cost of research and development is already often included in the 
initial price of seeds (even though market prices may hinder such cost-meeting opportunity), 
additional contractual obligations pertaining to royalty payment can be viewed as unnecessary. For 
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 instance, Monsanto is known to protect its research investments “by first obtaining intellectual 
property rights to its technologies and then "leasing" rather than selling, them to customers, 
[through a] lease agreement [that] obligates the purchasing farmer to a one time use and gives 
Monsanto the right to inspect the farmers fields for the next three years”910. Any assessment of the 
scope of PVP or patent protection in seed is thus intricately linked to the conditions that surround 
the sale of seeds to farmers; sale that is increasingly operating under extremely strict terms that act 
in effect as licensing agreements. Pioneer, one the integrated industry giants, uses the following 
wording on its bag tag license:  
“if the tag indicates this product or the parental lines used in producing this product are 
protected under one or more US patents, Purchaser agrees that it is granted a limited license 
thereunder only to produce forage, or grain for feeding or processing. Resale of this seed or 
supply of saved seed to anyone, including Purchaser, for planting is strictly prohibited 
under this license”911.  
In a parallel fashion, all industry giants with important intellectual property portfolios surround 
their sales with “technology agreements”. For Roundup technology, farmers agree “to use 
the seed containing the Monsanto gene technologies for planting a commercial crop only in 
a single season. To not supply any of this seed to any other person or entity for planting, 
and to not save any crop produced from this seed for replanting, or supply saved seed to 
anyone for replanting. To not use [the] seed or provide it to anyone for crop breeding, 
research, generation of herbicide registration data or seed production”.  
The recourse to such contractual tools holds detrimental effects on growers, since the royalty 
collection extends as a result not only to propagators and seed producers, reaching further down 
the cultivation chain. The very active farmers’ organisation Via Campesina indeed states that the 
“legal basis for contracts allowing for vertical integration in the supply chain is dubious and may 
not comply with the UPOV Convention, in particular with the principle of exhaustion of the 
breeder’s right”912. In accordance with the principle of exhaustion, no further remuneration should 
be required following the consensual marketing of a protected plant variety. The minutes of the 
Diplomatic Conference of the 1991 UPOV Convention state that this requirement was 
implemented “because the breeder should exercise his right only once and receive a royalty only 
once and should do so at the earliest possible stage”913. However, it is still extremely uncertain 
whether such argument based on exhaustion could trump the initial rationale of plant breeders’ 
rights protection, which is to recoup investment and allow for efficient royalty-collection. The 
judiciary seems to point towards this direction, highlighting the difficulties inherent to the 
collection of royalties in agriculture. The European Court of Justice has recently had to pronounce 
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itself on a preliminary ruling introduced in a case opposing Geistbeck v. Saatgut
914
, mostly on the 
amount that should be considered to constitute a “reasonable compensation”; compensation that 
ought to be played by farmers who have used propagated material of a protected variety. The 
European Court held that such “reasonable compensation” should be appropriately calculated on 
the basis of the amount of “fees payable for the licensed production” of the same quantity of 
material, rejecting that such compensation should mirror the lower threshold of “equitable 
remuneration” that is calculated in the exceptional case of authorised farm saved seed uses. 
The same concern vis-à-vis the extension of protection scope to harvested material and cultivated 
foodstuff is also very much present in the case of patents. Indeed, the issue of patent exhaustion 
has been particularly contentious in presence of self-replicating technologies
915
. The particular 
issue of exhaustion has not been vehemently raised in all legal orders
916
, and has been primarily 
addressed in the United States, where an important number of lawsuits have been brought against 
infringing farmers
917
. This trend is chiefly explained by the choice of regulation in this legal order, 
and the relatively smaller place occupied by plant variety protection as opposed to patents in 
agricultural plant innovation. Indeed, in the absence of fit-to-purpose plant variety protection 
accodomodating for the needs of farmers, the issue of the exhaustion of rights become absolutely 
crucial. 
“The patent-based policy set by the Federal Circuit is preferable to alternative legal 
regimes--such as trade secret and contract law--because it avoids disincentives to 
competition, innovation, and dissemination of new self-replicating technologies while 
reducing transaction costs inherent in their commercialisation. However, a categorical rule 
exempting them from patent exhaustion doctrine is unwarranted, [and…] should [rather] 
depend on the patentee's ability to charge supracompetitive prices in its primary market 
where consumers are able to substitute secondary-market embodiments”918.  
In a relatively short recent opinion, a unanimous Supreme Court seems to have corroborated the 
existence of such categorical rule, at least in the presence of stricter conditions of sale, even to 
subsequent generations of seeds. The Court in effect followed and widened the dominant 
jurisprudence that had already been established through cases such as Pioneer Hi-Bred 
International, Inc. v. Ottawa Plant Food, Inc.
919
, which solidified the strength of “shrink-wrap 
licenses” under which all purchasers could agree to additional provisions written on the bag upon 
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 opening the products, including the absence of exhaustion. In Monsanto Co. vs McFarling
920
, the 
main issue was to determine whether the royalty rate that was asked by Monsanto for seeds that 
had been saved by farmers was in effect reasonable, establishing that a low rate “would give 
infringers like McFarling an unfair advantage over farmers that complied with all of the provisions 
of the Monsanto license”. Interestingly, the arguments put forward by the defendant stated that 
“prohibiting farmers from saving and replanting their own seed destroys a "secondary market," 
which would cause an artificially high price for Roundup Ready® seed”. The rationale of the 
Court nonetheless did not focus exclusively on the economic position of the farmer. As Jason 
SAVICH argues,  
“had the Federal Circuit failed to protect subsequent generations of Monsanto's seed 
technology, innovators [would have been] pushed towards pursuing innovations that 
eliminated the self-replicating characteristics of this technology. As a result, inventors 
[would have had] sole control of the technologies and the resulting innovation will [would] 
be outside the regulation of patent laws”921.  
In a similar case, Monsanto Co. vs Scruggs
922, the “‘first sale’ doctrine of exhaustion of the patent 
right [was also considered not to be] implicated, as the new seeds grown from the original batch 
had never been sold”, seeing as the sale was not unrestricted and that the use of seeds by growers 
was conditioned on obtaining a license. The United States judiciary has thus a clear history of 
siding with the “economic concerns that require protecting an inventor's right to subsequent 
generations of seed […] because every consumer turns into a potential producer”923. Even though 
the technology has finally been put in freezers, such self-policing has nonetheless proven to be 
conceivable through the development of the contentious “Genetic Use Restriction Technologies 
(GURTs)”924. These technologies “offered plant variety owners the technological means for 
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controlling the use of their products outside of the privileges afforded by the law”925, outside the 
reach of institutions that aim to maintain the inherent balance of IPR laws. 
Fed by a Federal Circuit that focuses on the need to recoup investment in self-replicating 
technology, the Supreme Court had to address the scope of the patent exhaustion doctrine, first in 
the field of microprocessors (Quanta Computer Inc v. LG Electronics
926
), and then specifically 
with regards to seeds. The former decision held that “the patentee had direct power through only 
the first level of the production and marketing process; [even though] if seed companies construct 
the sale of their seed such that the ultimate farmer is the first transaction in which title passes, then 
patent exhaustion will likely not apply”927. That is why the Court unsurprisingly held in 2013 that 
the doctrine of patent exhaustion with regards to biotechnology patents “does not permit a farmer 
to reproduce patented seeds through planting and harvesting without the patent holder's 
permission”, siding with the plaintiff Monsanto against the defendant Mr. Hugh Bowman, an 
Indiana farmer
928
.  
As Justice Kagan holds, “under the doctrine of patent exhaustion, the authorised sale of a patented 
article gives the purchaser, or any subsequent owner, a right to use or resell that article. 
Such a sale, however, does not allow the purchaser to make new copies of the patented 
invention. The question in this case is whether a farmer who buys patented seeds may 
reproduce them through planting and harvesting without the patent holder's permission. We 
hold that he may not.”  
When using soybean that originated from prior harvests of other local farmers in the area 
regrouped in a grain elevator, Mr. Bowman could not “‘replicate' Monsanto's patented technology 
by planting it in the ground to create newly infringing genetic material, seeds, and plants.” In 
essence, the Court has developed a wide doctrine opposing patent exhaustion, which was 
traditionally set out to counterbalance the artificial lead-time and monopoly awarded to an 
innovator. The dominant opposing doctrine of conditional sale seems today to indicate that “a 
patentee may use an enforceable contract to restrict the rights of a buyer using a patented article, 
even after a subsequent sale”929.  
Only time will tell how the inherent need to allow for the diffusion of protection innovations, but 
also the socio-economic dimensions of agricultural cultivation on the one hand, and of high-end 
research and development will be addressed in this context of ad hoc patent exhaustion principles 
coupled with ever-widening contractual clauses. When read in combination with the evolutionary 
fate of the farmers’ privilege or exception, it seems clear that the strong property paradigm does 
not primarily cater for the needs of mass selectors, it rather seems to obstruct their innovative 
activities by essentially viewing them as mere cultivators and customers. The paradigm’s 
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 boundaries could nonetheless accommodate the age-old, inherently collective and informal 
innovation chain of mass selection, keeping all the while in mind the need to foster more 
industrialised plant improvement models. 
9.3. Misappropriation and lack of protection of farmers’ traditional knowledge  
Notwithstanding the relatively small contribution of wild relatives and indigenous knowledge to 
the development of new plant varieties or other related products and processes, “sustained 
legitimacy of IPRs protection for biotechnology cannot be achieved without effective and long-
term protection of traditional knowledge and genetic resources”930. Mass selection produces not 
only material goods that shine through their sustainability and higher adaptability to the local 
climate, it also produces a wide range of associated knowledge, like any kind of grassroots 
innovation system, generating “an incredibly valuable diversity of knowledge and know-how for 
innovation for sustainability […], even if policies and markets only adapt and appropriate a part of 
it, or more frequently overlook it entirely”931. The currently applicable strong intellectual property 
paradigm falls short of such “fundamental amending and rebalancing” needed to “bring about 
sustainable development and equitable distribution of revenues and benefits of the technology”932. 
Such failure arises not only in the unavoidable consequence of knowledge misappropriation, but 
also in the lack of efficient protection and compensation mechanisms around farmers’ knowledge.  
The currently dominant intellectual property paradigm may not only be considered to have 
enclosed what is by definition not enclosable, but it has also failed to duly recognise all past 
contributions, small or big, of previous germplasm users and conservers. Several litigated and 
confirmed cases of misappropriation exist. The aforementioned case of the wild rice variety 
resistant to bacterial rice blight, the Oryza longistaminata, shines not only with regards to the 
contentious issue of recycling of publicly produced knowledge, but also with regards to the use of 
ethno-botanical indigenous knowledge, whether held in the hands of farmer communities or even 
remote landless groups. Indeed, the resistance trait that was later patented by the University of 
California in Davis was not known by Malian farmers but rather by a landless community
933
. 
Acknowledging the complexity of prior art in this specific case, the University recognised the need 
for benefit sharing.  
Other infamous cases of ‘biopiracy’ relate to hoodia, neem, quinoa, enola bean, turmeric or 
basmati rice. The former case of hoodia was concerned with the development of a variety of drugs 
and products using the appetite suppressant characteristics of this plant that were known to the San 
people (living in the Kalahari desert of Southern Africa). This practice was first noticed by South 
African soldiers during the Namibian independence war and thereon passed on to the South 
African Council for Scientific and Industrial Research
934
. The latter filed for patent protection, 
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entered into licensing agreements with private sector actors such as the UK-based Phytopharm and 
then Pfizer, but was forced to negotiate the terms of an all-encompassing benefit-sharing 
agreement with the San following political pressure and intense media coverage of the shady 
affair
935
. The validity of the patents was not questioned in this particular case, but the tide had 
turned and opened the gateway for direct challenges. A patent on quinoa (Chenopodium quinoa), 
filed in 1994 in the United States covered the “cytoplasm conferring the property of male sterility 
derived from the Apelawa variety of quinoa”936. The application was dropped in 1998 following a 
strong campaign by RAFI and Bolivia’s National Association for Quinoa Producers, since the 
innovative property had actually been transferred naturally from a weed species in Colorado, 
making it possible to interpret the patent very broadly in ways that the inventors may not have 
intended
937
. Another case relates to a patent granted by the United States Patent Office in 1999 on 
an edible herbal mixture comprising karela, jamun, gurmar and brinjal, even though karela juice 
had long been used in India as an anti-diabetic mixture, as “documented in authoritative treatises 
such as Wealth of India and the Compendium of Indian Medicinal Plants”938.  The plethora of 
patents granted on and around the neem tree (azadirachta indica) also caused international uproar 
and ended in challenges before both the United States and the European Patent Offices. In a 
similar vein, patents granted to the Texas-based RiceTec on rice varieties derived from Indian 
Basmati crossed with semi-dwarf varieties, including indica varieties, have been criticised as being 
“essentially derived from a farmers' variety, [that should therefore] not be treated as novel and the 
patent falsely claims a derivation as an invention”939. 
Even though traditional exclusion rights embedded in IP tools do not adequately fit the collective 
nature of innovation based on mass selection, the diverse and unstable, yet locally adapted 
varieties ought to be protected against subsequent re-appropriation by either other farmers or 
the industry, and compensation should be triggered, in case of re-appropriation for instance, at the 
commercialisation stage of new varieties incrementally developed by third parties. The ability of 
farmers to develop new varieties based on mass selection is regrettably still largely ignored by 
policy-makers. Regulators are confronted with a regulatory conundrum where protection should 
not only be granted to the conserved germplasm or created material, but also appreciate the 
farmers’ “dynamic and collective system of technology development and diffusion through every 
season”, based on skill sharing and seed exchange940. The strong protection paradigm’s focus has 
unfortunately solely remained the end-producer and developer of knowledge or products, 
purposefully setting aside other forms of knowledge that may present a more community-oriented 
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 and free-exchange-based outlook on innovation, especially with regards to agricultural or 
indigenous communities
941
.  
Within a truly cumulative innovation chain such as plant breeding, the communalised nature of 
research and development innately surfaces, as all agrobiodiversity improvement projects “benefit 
from the countless small-scale contributions to the prior art by individuals who draw from the 
public domain to make improvements, […] generating new information that other may exploit to 
their own advantage”942. The need for vigilance in enclosure indeed arises in view of the 
cumulative and ancestral contributions stemming from indigenous communities and all past 
innovators. All former contributors to plant improvement and conservation, whether fellow 
inventors or holders of traditional knowledge, and especially farmers in developing countries, have 
in a way “subsidised the commercial agricultural sector which appropriates most benefits deriving 
from [plant genetic] resources”943. The “ecological debt” of follow-on resource users is considered 
to be important in agriculture, even though it remains extremely difficult to quantify due to the 
interdependent nature of agricultural plant genetic resources, and also the incremental and 
cumulative nature of plant improvement. It has nonetheless been considered that in the year 1982 
alone, the US wheat industry had been pushed forward of five hundred million USD a year 
through the use of the South’s plant genetic resources944. Turkish wheat landraces, which have 
been developed and maintained through informal seed exchanges, have for instance supplied genes 
used for stem nematode, bunt and hessian fly resistance but also for stripe rust resistance. This last 
contribution was estimated to amount to fifty million USD a year to the United States seed 
industry
945
. The pleas for redistribution and compensation are better understood in light of these 
figures, even though their absolute accuracy may still be challenged with not too much trouble. 
The issue here lies in determining where one’s invention ends to become another’s, and how such 
contribution should be compensated for. Taking into account the incremental nature of plant 
innovation, the grant of IP titles carry additional cravings for vigilant consideration with regards to 
the pivotal notions of prior art, novelty and non-obviousness. It is complemented by a need to 
establish a trigger point for compensation, recognition or benefit-sharing when privately, publicly 
or collectively held information is used to develop a new variety, biological product or process. 
The need for vigilance arises with regards to the intricate relationship of crop improvement with 
the public domain of traditional knowledge, and the inherent considerations for the sharing of 
benefits arising from the use of genetic resources and associated knowledge.  
The shrinking space for manoeuvre left to farmers for seed saving, using and exchanging within 
the strong IP paradigm, and a seemingly generalised lack of awareness or training in legal issues 
on the cultivators’ side, have led to mounting disagreements between variety developers and 
sowers, leading to numerous court cases. Litigation has flourished over a range of IP 
infringements, from the possession of protected seed in itself, to its re-use outside the scope of the 
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legislation, without royalty collection or in larger farms than those targeted by applicable 
legislation.  
CONCLUSIONS. Farmers – Mass Selectors and the strong IP paradigm 
Traditional exclusion rights embedded in intellectual property tools do not adequately fit the 
collective nature of innovation based on mass selection. The actors of mass selection, whether 
designating farmers, gardeners, or low-input breeders, are pushed to forcefully infringe third party 
proprietary interests or marketing rights, while the products of their own innovation are not 
protected against misappropriation.  
Mass selectors have indeed been steadily pushed to the confines of illegality by seed legislation 
unapologetically oriented towards industrial agricultural production. Whether acting as partial 
desperado initiatives that exist in the dark confines of restrictive seed laws with a focus on 
landrace conservation and exchange, or trying to recoup the costs of selection and conservation 
efforts through commercialisation, the 21
st
 century mass selectors and associated seed exchange 
networks have steadily hit the wall of unlawfulness. By trying to define themselves a place in a 
solely productivity oriented seed market, a place that has not always been granted to them, they 
have been accused of creating unfair competition by not complying with strict marketing rules. 
Mass selectors today also need to comply with additional obligations stemming from third party 
IPR, whether in the form of plant variety protection or patents. They need to reassess their 
selection efforts in light of increasingly restrictive farm-seed-saving opportunities. These 
restrictions arise as a result of shrinking farmers’ privileges in IPR legislation. They also arise on 
account of regulatorily or contractually enhanced protection over harvested material and ad hoc 
approaches to the exhaustion of rights, calibrated to the needs of self-replicating technologies.  
Furthermore and perhaps most startlingly, the contributions of the diverse and unstable, yet locally 
adapted varieties that stem from farmers’ mass selection efforts and all associated knowledge 
ought to be taken into account in the incrementally cumulative agrobiodiversity innovation realm. 
These landraces should be protected against any subsequent re-appropriation that could be 
perpetrated either by other farmers or by the industry. Today no compensation is triggered at the 
commercialisation stage of new varieties incrementally developed by third parties on the basis of 
farmers’ varieties. The ability of farmers to develop new varieties based on mass selection is 
regrettably still largely ignored by policy-makers, driven by the internationally reified property 
paradigm focused on the end-producer and developer of knowledge or products with high market 
value. The approach to the agrobiodiversity public domain as it stands today cannot adequately 
cater for the needs of mass selectors; thereby setting aside an important portion of socially and 
environmentally beneficial innovation that is dynamic and inherently collective.  
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FIG.4: Shortcomings faced by mass selectors (farmers, gardeners and low-input plant breeders) confronted 
to the strong PGRFA property paradigm 
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PART III CONCLUSIONS Agrobiodiversity User Experiences and Contextualised 
Shortcomings of the Strong Intellectual Property paradigm 
The strong IPR paradigm responds chiefly to the needs of integrated biotechnology giants that 
navigate the increasingly intricate, knowledge-intensive, and incrementally cumulative context of 
agrobiodiversity research and development using molecular plant breeding and DNA 
recombination. As a result, it operates to the detriment of other existing innovators, be it at 
community or farmer level, within both the public and private conventional breeding sectors, or 
with regards to the development of molecular research tools in publicly funded institutions. The 
reality of extensive and layered private property has had detrimental effects further down the chain 
of the sequential, cumulative and incremental innovation that is plant improvement. There is a 
greater prospect to see specific genetic compounds protected through two separate yet closely 
interlinked angles, first, in terms of genetic material, and second at the level of the isolated and 
purified “useful” compound946. Furthermore, the combined resort to plant variety rights and 
patents has spawned the brand new problematic of these two protection tools’ co-existence, 
causing setbacks and an urging need for legal training within the public and private sectors alike. 
The expansion of the realms of product protection restrained the conditions designated for the 
lawful use of the plant-related innovation, pushing for the development of iron-clawed licensing 
skills to be able to use improved agricultural biodiversity. The range of manoeuvre left to 
researchers, breeders and farmers has been considerably slackened by the need to fuel private 
sector involvement in research and development and protect the products of its breeding efforts or 
molecular research. This need was notably propelled by technological developments allowing for 
speedier and more cost-effective copying of products that concomitantly are commercialised more 
extensively across national borders. It was impressively reinforced on account of the time-
consuming, uncertain and difficult nature of title enforcement. The quite different statutory 
exemptions that pertain to breeding and farming share one commonality, related to their broad 
regulatory rationale and effect, since they initially remain constructs awarding an array of rights to 
members of society relying upon the use of agrobiodiversity, either for cultivation or for research, 
as a counterbalancing act vis-à-vis the grant of monopoly rights to a single actor who wishes to 
protect its own informational contribution to the field. 
The increasing expansion of the rules of appropriation that characterise intellectual property rights 
regimes, coupled with the ever-shrinking rules of diffusion that originally stood as the balancing 
act ensuring the efficiency and equity of monopoly regimes, as a barrier against the drifts of over-
protection, have triggered virulent societal and doctrinal criticism over the shortcomings of 
currently applicable intellectual property rights to effectively ensure and foster the innovatively 
successful use of agro-biodiversity. Prerogatives granted for the commercialisation or the 
subsequent use of new products or processes reward the often times colossal investments made for 
the development of plant varieties. They also intend to favour the diffusion of information and 
technology, through the marginal social return of avoiding trade secrecy. However, the very dual 
nature of plant improvement, which embodies both technology and information within the same 
physical object, whether in a plant variety or a gene sequence
947
, turns this balancing act into an 
extremely difficult exercise. Furthermore, modern tools of informational innovation protection 
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 have failed their initial objective with the development of the "commerce of intellectual 
property", unfairly playing a knowledge game the foundations of which direly needs to be 
undisputedly strong for society to respond to all the future challenges that await us, especially with 
regards to agriculture facing the challenges of climate change and population growth. Mere 
exclusivity-seeking practices have weakened the primordial foundational link between the 
innovator and its innovation that still prevails as the legal rationale behind the grant of monopoly 
rights, through the excessive formalization of this link within a strategic portfolio, occasionally 
developed through research programs as such, but mainly achieved through the financial 
acquisition of the legal structure surrounding the innovator. There is profound discontent over the 
equity and sustainability of intellectual property protection within an incrementally cumulative 
innovation context such as plan improvement. Their suitability is contested as to their ability to 
protect the fruits of innovative efforts, but also to their capacity to ensure innovative products and 
processes are diffused. As a result, it is the strong agrobiodiversity paradigm’s capacity to really 
foster socially and environmentally beneficial innovation that has been questioned.  
This discontent has also not been felt in a uniform fashion by all actors of agrobiodiversity 
innovation. Certification regimes have for instance impacted mass selection more greatly
948
, even 
more so when the latter has been completely disregarded by national or supranational legislation. 
While conventional plant breeders have rather been victims of the coexistence of plant variety 
rights and patents. Molecular breeding is on the other hand more vulnerable to the restrictions 
inherent to patent laws as such. Even though the tougher stance adopted in protection opportunities 
is viewed as a necessary encouragement of breeding efforts conducted on minor less commercially 
important crops, the new limits surrounding the statutory uses of plant-related innovations pose 
worrying threats to the economic survival of farmers relying on seed saving practices, smaller-
scaled and non-integrated plant breeders, and public researchers relying on access to extensive 
gene pools and straightforward rewards for their contribution to agrobiodiversity
949
. By favouring 
“exploitation modes which focus mainly on the commercial potential of the resources, [the strong 
property paradigm] neglects their use to satisfy basic subsistence needs”950. Valid concerns of 
dispossession and unwarranted accumulation also raise legal interrogations as to the dominant 
paradigm’s ability and capacity to recognise the cumulative and ancestral contributions stemming 
from the public domain, indigenous communities, or past innovators. Drawing on such concerns, 
the pivotal notions of prior art, common knowledge, novelty and non-obviousness carry additional 
cravings for vigilant consideration in the grant of IP titles and the extent of exclusive rights that 
accompany them. In the context of the TRIPS-propelled and internationally reified property 
paradigm, “an effective international system must permit States to gear their domestic laws to the 
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needs of their local creative sectors and to deal with the distributive consequences of raising the 
cost of accessing the fruits of humankind’s ingenuity”951.  
This customisation effort cannot however only take into account the strong intellectual property 
paradigm it proposes to redefine; it can be guided, but also needs to respect, the PGRFA public 
domain carved by international environmental law agreeements which focus on equity and 
sustainability rather than appropriability and innovation. These agreements nonetheless appoint 
distinct property rights and prerogatives, which can be viewed at times as solutions to identified 
paradigmatic shortcomings, but which can also lead to greater hinderance of cumulative plant 
improvement opportunities, as the “third enclosure” movement of biodiversity. 
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 PART IV INSTITUTIONAL SHIFTS RESHAPING THE PUBLIC DOMAIN, 
TOWARDS SUSTAINABILITY AND EQUITY 
The array of institutional and regulatory tools that today design the cumulative dominions over 
biodiversity stem primarily from property regimes that are assigned to improved plant varieties, 
specific components of, or processes linked to genetic resources. These regimes try to reward 
innovative human interventions built around genetic resources mainly outside of their natural 
habitats. This means that in the “life sciences industry, only the secondary stage of the research 
process is actually granted protection”, while free access has been considered the rule for the 
primary traditional knowledge and information, as well as those tangible plant varieties that have 
populated fields for centuries
952
. Focused mostly on the conservation and sustainable use of 
biodiversity components, international environmental law agreements have nonetheless carved 
new understandings of control and appointed new collective rights over genetic resources. They 
have redefined the boundaries of the PGRFA public domain, at times broadening its scope so as to 
allow for facilitated access to genetic resources or for age-old seed saving practices, and at times 
restricting its reach, mainly in order to fight misappropriation of longstanding knowledge and 
usages by using the same weapons as the blight that they respond to, i.e. the exclusive enclosure of 
plant genetic resources. As a result, an additional layer of property regimes has been set out around 
tangible genetic resources that constitute the initial stage of all plant innovation research. 
Sovereign rights have been gradually recognised over resources deemed to be of “common 
concern” to humankind in environmental law, while agricultural genetic-resources have evolved 
from a common heritage understanding to a unique and specific, facilitated multilateral access 
mechanisms
953
.  
Several legal instruments were drafted around the need to halt the depletion of biodiversity, 
notably around sovereign rights over resources that came hand in hand with duties to conserve and 
use them rationally for the future generations, as embodied by Principle 2 of the 1972 UN 
Stockholm Declaration on the Human Environment954. In this conservationist perspective, the 
mechanism of compensation emerged as an incentive for the conservation of biodiversity in 
developing countries, enshrined in Principle 10 of the aforementioned 1972 UN Stockholm 
Declaration, which focuses on “adequate prices for raw commodities”955. However, the principles 
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of benefit sharing and sovereignty were also seen by developing countries as important tools to 
ensure legal protection for resources found in their territory. Since developed countries had built 
up a strong system based on intellectual property rights to fully capture the benefits stemming 
from innovative endeavours and research programs, international environmental law would be the 
resource-rich South’s forum to fight the misappropriation of genetic resources and all associated 
traditional knowledge. It would respond to the “biopiracy” operated by the grant of exclusive titles 
in developed countries without compensation for the holders of knowledge or the conservers of 
genetic resources. This dynamic stream drawing from the right to development has clearly 
dominated international environmental law making. It is upheld by the instruments linked to the 
1992 Convention on Biological Diversity (“CBD”), especially the recently adopted Nagoya 
Protocol on the Access to Genetic Resources and the Sharing of Benefits Arising from their 
Utilisation. It is also enshrined in the ad hoc FAO instruments targeting plant genetic resources, 
whether the 1982 International Undertaking and 2001 International Treaty on Plant Genetic 
Resources for Food and Agriculture (“ITPGRFA”), which both consider benefit-sharing as an 
equitable compensation to the contribution of indigenous communities and farmers to innovation. 
Examining first in a historical perspective the rationale and emergence of different international 
environmental and agricultural instruments (Chapter 12), we shall thereafter delve into the 
delineation of property rights in instruments such as the CBD and the ITPGRFA (Chapter 13). We 
believe that the illustration of the new public domain of agrobiodiversity constructed by 
international environmental law instruments may provide institutional tools to reclaim the inherent 
balance of property allocation; a balance that has been lost due to the stringently developmental 
practices that have been propelled by the dominant international trade and industrialised 
perspectives to PGRFA management and use. Emphasising the need to conserve agricultural 
biodiversity, international environmental law instruments nonetheless also mainly respond to pleas 
for equity and economic development. 
 CHAPTER 10: RATIONALE FOR THE INTERNATIONAL REGULATION OF 10.
AGRICULTURAL PLANT GENETIC RESOURCES 
International standards and objectives for the prevention or mitigation of environmental harm have 
been established from the 1940’s onwards956. The regulation of biological diversity first grew into 
a global priority with the international environmental negotiations back in the 1970’s957, supported 
both by conservationist pleas and requests for financial compensations deriving from the use of 
genetic resources
958
. In this context, the pivotal role of agricultural diversity to tackle the world’s 
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 biggest biotic and abiotic challenges in food production and food security was also widely 
recognised, in light of the world’s bitter realities of hunger and malnutrition959. This focus was 
accompanied by concerns as to the sustainable but most of all equitable use of plant genetic 
diversity, igniting sovereignty and protectionist bilateralism-oriented rights and obligations for 
genetic resources providers and their users, including innovators. Before tackling the exact content 
of these rights and obligations and the reach of such property regime, we shall underline the 
rationale lying behind the push for international regulatory action in agrobiodiversity management, 
describing the ecological, historical and sociological causes of regulation, also propelled by the 
nature of the good itself, as both a private good producing tangible and informational public goods 
with both intergenerational and interregional dimensions960.  
10.1. The need to conserve agrobiodiversity in a sustainability perspective  
Biological diversity has traditionally been understood as covering both the variability of all 
ecosystems and the multiplicity of the species they contain, while being complemented by the 
genetic diversity found within these species
961
. Diversity then does not only include the variety 
of life on Earth at all its levels, from genes to ecosystems, but also the ecological and evolutionary 
processes that help sustain such diversity
962
. Human actions impact particular levels of diversity, 
by threatening a specific ecosystem, species or a variety through over-use. They also profoundly 
alter ecological processes, through for instance extensive agricultural cultivation. Substantive 
literature is available on the loss of the world’s biological diversity at all geographical and 
structural scales. They all underline the difficulty of establishing effective criteria to evaluate the 
impacts of human activities or natural phenomena on diversity. It is as a result an impossible task 
to precisely determine actual depletion rates
963
. Estimations of currently existing species also quite 
shockingly range from 3 million up to 50 million
964
, while recent comprehensive conservation 
studies carried out by the World Conservation Union state that the best working estimate of the 
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number of species in 2008 lies between 8 and 14 million
965
. These difficulties and quite significant 
differences mainly strive from the multidimensional structure and definition of biodiversity 
favoured by scientists and law-makers alike, where loss is determined in terms of species richness 
within specific taxonomies, through their proportional and relative abundance
966
. Linear 
approaches are indeed seldom able to take the functional aspect of diversity into account. In 
addition, plants have not been inventoried as well as mammals or birds and therefore their 
extinction rates estimates tend to be based on models, rather than reported and documented 
extinction figures
967
. This raises considerable uncertainties and leads to diverging predictions. 
Quantitative studies thus differ widely, while the sole common feature of the doctrine, also 
reflected in the Millennium Ecosystem Assessments, is to assert that “virtually all of Earth’s 
ecosystems have now been dramatically transformed through human actions” and show alarming 
signs of deterioration
968
. The Global Biodiversity Outlooks prepared by the Secretariat to the 1992 
Convention of Biological Diversity confirmed such premise
969970
.  
Human interaction with natural ecosystems is particularly complex in agriculture. As admitted by 
the Conference of Parties of the Convention on Biological Diversity, “far more understanding is 
needed of the multiple goods and services provided by the different levels and functions of 
agricultural biodiversity, […] such as the relationship between diversity, resilience and 
production in agro-ecosystems, […in light of] the traditional and newer practices and technologies 
used in agriculture, which utilise, or impact on, agricultural biodiversity in different ways.”971 
Biodiversity has been shown to perform ecosystem services beyond food or income production, 
mainly biological renewal processes such as the regulation of the abundance of undesirable 
organisms or detoxification, crucially important in agriculture
972
. Agricultural ecosystems display 
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 one fundamental material difference vis-à-vis natural ecosystems, as they comprise of 
domesticated plant or animal species and their associated genetic resources, intended for the sole 
purpose of food and agricultural production. The notion of species with regards to agricultural 
plant biodiversity covers a relatively small amount of crop species and is traditionally 
outnumbered by the varieties found within a given crop species. These varieties include landraces, 
farmer-selected cultivar types, their crop wild relatives, as well as advanced cultivars, resulting 
from genetic or genomic improvement efforts generated by scientific and technological 
achievements. The genetic material contained within traditional varieties, modern cultivars, and 
their wild relatives is considered to be the biological basis of world food security by directly or 
indirectly supporting the livelihoods of every person on earth
973
. As components of the 
fundamental structural level of agrobiodiversity, they are treated as the key feature of food 
production
974
, serving as a "repository of genetic adaptability and thus a safety net in the event of 
environmental change"
975
.  
The relationship between agriculture, especially modern agricultural practices, and the 
preservation of natural biodiversity on the one hand and the efficient management of agro-
biodiversity on the other, is nothing but a simple matter. Modern agriculture, especially 
monoculture and over-mechanisation, has been mentioned as a major cause of extinction with 
regards to agricultural genetic diversity. Yet the same modernisation, by reducing pressure on soil, 
has also been considered to help the protection of biodiversity outside agricultural fields
976
. 
Modern varieties can contribute to such sustainability by for instance propelling land-savings and 
reducing pesticide use by improving the resistance of varieties to biotic stresses
977
. However, the 
intensification of agricultural practices may also detrimentally affect biodiversity services, by 
causing species loss or altering ecosystem stability and resilience
978
. The specialisation and 
homogenisation of agricultural production permeates in the infamous figures relating to the 
number of species actually used for human food consumption. Indeed, seven thousand out of two 
hundred and seventy thousand plant species known to science have never been used for food, 
merely nine species provide for seventy five per cent of human food worldwide
979
, while only 
three crops provide sixty per cent of the calories we obtain from plants
980
. Such homogenisation is 
cited as a major cause of genetic erosion witnessed in agricultural plant diversity.  
                                                                    
 
973
 Genetic erosion indeed threatens good security, increases risks of diseases by diminishing resilience, and prevents 
future discoveries by narrowing the genetic base of agricultural research; for an account of the role of agricultural 
biological diversity in the achievement of food security and the threats surrounding such achievement, see LORI ANN 
THRUPP, "Linking Agricultural Biodiversity and Food Security: The Valuable Role of Agrobiodiversity for 
Sustainable Agriculture," International Affairs 76, no. 2, 2000: pp.265-281.  
974
 See for instance J.R.  HARLAN, "Our Vanishing Genetic Resources," Science 188, no. 4188, 1975: 618-621., where 
the author more specifically underlines the importance of landraces’ genetic integrity and diverse nature, which, as 
balanced populations, are the basic resources upon which future plant breeding depend.  
975
 PALACIOS, op.cit., 1997.  
976
 VIRCHOW, Conservation of Genetic Resources: Costs and Implications for a Sustainable Utilization of Plant 
Genetic Resources for Food and Agriculture, op.cit., 29-30.  
977
 BYERLEE, "Modern Varieties, Productivity, and Sustainability: Recent Experience and Emerging Challenges," 
op.cit.,  704-705., the author still stresses that the maintenance of a broad genetic base “provides insurance against 
losses from unexpected causes, such as new disease, and complement efforts to improve and maintain pest resistance”. 
978
 See PAGIOLA et al., op.cit., 1997. . 
979
  ORGANISATION, op.cit., 1996.  ; see also PRESCOTT-ALLEN and PRESCOTT-ALLEN, "How Many Plants Feed the 
World," op.cit.,  365-374. for an in-depth analysis of these figures. 
980
 BROOKFIELD et al., Cultivating Biodiversity: Understanding, Analysing and Using Agricultural Diversity, op.cit. 
PART IV. Institutional and Regulatory Shifts Reclaiming the Public Domain 
 232 
Interestingly enough, this pressuring force suffers greatly from the detrimental effects of its 
pressure on nature, since the primary agricultural inputs, i.e. seeds, continue to be based upon 
nature and depend on the maintenance of natural genetic diversity. Biological diversity continues 
to provide the foundation for all plants and animals used for agricultural purposes, 
considering that all domestic crops worldwide are derived from wild species that have either been 
modified through domestication, selective or methodical breeding, controlled hybridisation or 
genetic engineering
981
. Even though commercial research and development is generally carried out 
on standardised and stable plant varieties, which are already known to breeders, it has been 
demonstrated that researchers continued to rely, and in fact depended upon wild germplasm in 
order to ensure the long-term sustainability of their studies. Aforementioned figures revealed by 
Timothy SWANSON
982
 showed that eighty three per cent of agricultural crop improvement 
research and development was conducted on the basis of standardised varieties, while six point 
five per cent focused on wild species and landraces. The agricultural industry could therefore and 
did indeed not rely on a static range of genetic material, which would not provide the necessary 
variability to ensure the resistance of the new varieties, and totally renewed its stocks every ten to 
fourteen years, renewal for which natural diversity pools need to remain at their widest range. The 
preservation of agricultural plant germplasm, both in its improved form or in its wild relatives, 
thus directly influences the future of agricultural research and development and concurrently agro-
biodiversity, which will not overthrow homogenisation if its natural basis is reduced
983
. 
Researchers and variety developers ought to continue to be able to take full advantage of the 
library of successful survival and resistance strategies provided by evolution, whether at the 
phenotype or genotype level
984
.  
The rather novel and unmistakably uncertain act of branding “biodiversity” can be viewed as “a 
response given to a concrete situation that is certainly preoccupying but which goes well beyond 
the scientific domain”985. Notwithstanding the science that illustrates the numerous ecosystem 
services provided by the diversity of life, the relatively new commitment of doctrinal discourse 
towards such variety “anchors a discourse that articulates a new relation between nature and 
society in global contexts of science, cultures and economies”986. It is exactly this discourse that 
was translated into a legal obligation to conserve and use plant genetic resources sustainably, as a 
crucial component of agricultural biodiversity, as the primary inputs of cultivation and crop 
improvement, and finally as the providers of various public goods. 
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 10.2. The need to address the property regime of agrobiodiversity 
Taking into account the broad foundation of the new biodiversity discourse, international 
agreements have not only focused on purely biological aspects and affiliated socio-economic 
impacts. They have also rather uniquely set up an internationally agreed property regime over 
genetic resources, appointing great control but also numerous obligations to Member States’ 
institutions. This second tier of international biodiversity conservation law stems not only from a 
purely ecological prospect, but also from a developmental perspective, which is embedded in a 
desire to remedy longstanding socio-economic inequities. The need to address the property regime 
of agricultural plant genetic resources find its roots in the history of biological prospecting, 
starting from colonial times. The collection of genetic resources, understood in purely scientific 
fashion, pertains to the physical gathering of natural material on the field. It relates to the quest 
and appropriation of “exotic” objects, i.e., objects that cannot be naturally found in the territory 
where the legal entities pursue their research
987
. Mere resource collection activities thenceforth 
shift into “bioprospecting” through the inclusion of anthropocentric “commercial viability” and 
“potential human use” objectives in research endeavours988. The market potential attached to 
prospecting push collecting efforts to be viewed as a “process that enables individuals or groups to 
alienate particular bodies of material for their exclusive use”989. Collection and characterisation 
activities taking place upstream significantly shape the appropriation regimes that will gradually 
ensue up to the very end of a genetic resource’s cycle of use. From their genesis to their gradual 
institutionalisation, the patterns and actors of germplasm collections efforts illustrate the changes 
in our perception as to the functions and ownership of nature. The historical contextualisation of 
genetic material exchanges may thus qualify to understand the claims of biological piracy or 
misappropriation, as well as the struggle for a public domain fenced anew. Struggles for equity 
and compensation indeed lay at the heart of principles regulating the legal status of plant genetic 
resources in international environmental law. 
10.2.1. History of PGRFA Exchanges: Quest for exotic genetics and the dawn of biological 
collections 
Exotic and rare resources have always nursed research interests, since the dawn of biology and life 
sciences in general. Such interest was already present in the earliest of human civilisations, 
presented first hand as a need to ensure the specific society’s survival, and later as a necessary 
process to maintain its welfare conditions. In light of the ever-increasing population numbers and 
the parallel industrialisation process, “no society seemed to have enough ecological assets at 
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home to manage the quantum jump”990. It thus became apparent that the exploitation of 
ecological resources outside one’s sovereign territory would be extremely beneficial for those 
countries in wish of growth and expansion. Even though the collection of rare raw materials has 
been a praised leisure pursuit dating back to late medieval kingdoms, it is widely considered that 
the natural world was truly opened to investigation during the 18
th
 century
991
. Collectors of the 
time were indeed ordered to gather species of agricultural or medicinal value in the name of the 
“Empire” and bring them back home. These instructions initiated the 'tangled flows' of both wild 
and domesticated plants throughout the world, acquainting eager consumers with exotic 
foodstuff and setting the foundations of what has been coined agricultural germplasm 
interdependence
992
. The journey of tomato, originating in Mexico as a small yellow 'tomato', 
epitomises the vividness of these international exchanges and their agronomical and societal 
impacts. The tomato indeed travelled within South America and then to Europe through Spanish 
colonial expeditions, where it became the 'love apple', slowly turning red before heading back to 
the North American continent with French settlers
993
.  
Thoroughly organised collecting expeditions and the subsequent intensification of commodity 
flows primarily enabled naturalists to grab a better understanding of the materials collected, and 
thus of nature itself. The physical accumulation of biological material came hand in hand with 
the concentration of knowledge within the hands of a lucky few. The colonial collections of the 
18
th
 and 19
th
 centuries were indeed aimed at the consolidation of economic power through the 
potential use of the collected material in the service of agriculture and industry. They also served 
the greater objective of imperial expansion, in terms of both geography and cultural or scientific 
excellence
994
. Natural historians who accompanied the discovery expeditions carried out during 
this prosperous era indeed continue to represent grandeur and academic eminence in our 21
st
 
century psyche. The name of Charles Darwin today for instance still echoes with ethology and 
revolutionary scientific ideas
995
. This opening period put the emphasis on the individual carrying 
out the collecting activities as such, even though the initial impetus behind the resource flows 
were of national dimension. Indeed, colonial expeditions were by their nature state-funded and 
controlled by the State. However, quite interestingly, while all genetic resources found in the 
“discovered lands” were deemed to be freely appropriable, botanists accompanying these 
expeditions were carrying collection activities in a private capacity. Such individual-oriented 
approach enabled them to demand further expenditure from the State or other botanical gardens 
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 that desired to hold the material in their archives
996
. The example of Joseph Banks, who 
accompanied James Cook on its travels in the Pacific, stands out in this particular matter. All the 
specimens collected during the expeditions he took part in, whether they had been physically 
collected by him or not, were to remain under his direct control, in his personal home
997
. This 
understanding led to the establishment of one the greatest privately domiciled collections in 
England. From an international standpoint, the collections were thus made on biological material 
that could be considered res nullius as such, while they were coined the private property of the 
“individual gatherer” once isolated from their natural habitats.  
In the early-19
th
 century, materials collected during colonial expeditions fell under public 
ownership through the grant of public scientific or botanical garden status to institutions 
formerly controlled by private persons. The State could thereby exclude anyone from using the 
gathered biological resources and maintained control over them. The Kew Gardens were for 
instance transferred from the control of the Crown to the State’s authority in 1840, transforming a 
"privately funded pleasure garden into a publicly funded scientific research institute"
998
. These 
European public colonial gardens did not merely collect material in the “new world”. They also 
carried out empirical characterisation activities and established plantations according to the 
alimentary needs of their population, including those living overseas
999
. To this end, colonial 
powers slowly established wide networks for their botanical gardens. They opened “satellite 
stations” in the colonised and biologically-rich world, where the collected germplasm would be 
actively used for cultivation purposes. The stations remained under the management of the 
botanical gardens of the North, who continued to control the flow of genetic resources as power 
hubs or “centres of calculation”1000. These extended networks created the first modern agricultural 
experiment stations, concretely using the collected materials on field. However, such practices 
concomitantly exacerbated the high concentration of knowledge in the hands of a few colonial 
powers presenting no diversity centre within their boundaries. For instance, the United Kingdom 
possessed sixty-one botanical gardens without having any centre of biodiversity within its 
territory. Greece or Turkey on the hand lacked (and arguably still do lack) the institutional 
capacity to make use of the numerous diversity centres found within their sovereign borders
1001
. 
Endemic or threatened resources were therefore often not protected in their own botanic gardens, 
but rather needed to be transferred to skilled institutes elsewhere.  
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Due to the national appropriation strategies that prevailed, collection and cultivation endeavours 
paved the way for the North-South unrest vis-à-vis the dichotomy between the availability of 
biological resources on the ground and the capacity to use them. Germplasm movements may 
nonetheless also be viewed in a wider and more enthusiastic perspective, not only encompassing 
linear material transfers from 'Southern' colonies to European centres of calculation, but also 
including movements between colonial territories. Indeed, the undesirably unilateral character 
attached to germplasm exchanges under the colonial era needs to be slightly tempered by evidence 
of movements within and between Southern areas
1002
. Examples of such "transoceanic movements' 
include the sugar cane, initially collected by the French in Tahiti and disseminated in the East 
Indies and the Caribbean
1003
. These transoceanic movements have been further reinforced by the 
strong connections that existed between European botanical gardens themselves, and the 
subsequent human-induced exchanges between eager botanists. Within this landscape of extended 
resource exchange, most of the intentional flow and redistribution of biological material remains 
nonetheless attributable to the Northern botanical gardens and their affiliated Banksian network of 
collectors. The contribution of indigenous communities to these exchanges has indeed not been 
recorded extensively, except from a number of recent studies
1004
. Then again, the Banksian 
network of collectors warranted some interaction and cooperation with local populations. These 
communities' contribution was generally welcomed quite sceptically by the expeditions, due to the 
lack scientific categorisation of genetic resources and the geographical variations in their 
characterisation
1005
. Attempts to quantify the contribution of native communities to the 
accumulation of biological resources and associated knowledge have awakened demands for the 
re-examination of ownership issues attached to the genetic resources accumulated and studied 
during "the reign" of botanical gardens.  
The movement of biological material had become significantly institutionalised in the hands of 
botanical gardens, which gradually retrieved genetic resources themselves, and all information 
attached therein. However, the informational goods imported and studied by colonial powers were 
not viewed as commodities as such. Indeed, the emphasis of trade and research was clearly put on 
end products. For instance, the rubber obtained from a tree was viewed as a commodity by the 
Kew Gardens, while the genotype of that same rubber was considered freely appropriable. Indeed, 
no real property titles or other ownership claims were recognised on the information linked to the 
genetic resources collected and characterised during this period, even that of the gathering power 
or of the collector, in contrast with the end products of the plants these varieties related to
1006
. 
While plant varieties’ end products were considered to be the national property of the State 
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 harbouring or financing the collections, their genotypes and the correlated information were 
not. This approach reached even further. The “botanical chess game”1007 through which colonial 
powers appropriated exotic plant germplasm indeed considered exotic and non-institutionalised 
genetic resources as a freely appropriable good. They therefore attached no costs to biological 
prospecting activities but those related to the maintenance of the collections
1008
. However, they 
also found it unnecessary to constrain the future uses of these goods. The genetic raw material 
collected by botanical gardens or other national institutions was also considered to be in the public 
domain, with little or no conditions surrounding consequent uses by third parties. States, through 
centres of calculation and satellite stations, were the only major actors of an inherently tangled 
international exchange of biological material. The concentration of both resources and knowledge 
in the same expansionist hands forecasted the divide between the technologically rich ‘North’ 
versus biologically rich ‘South’, a divide that has dominated recent international negotiations. 
While end products were deemed appropriable, the information attached thereto was not. 
Operating wide-ranging collection and screening programmes during the 1960's, public research 
institutes focused on concrete discoveries in the advancement of science and societal welfare. 
They similarly created networks of collecting agents, in similar fashion to the Banksian 
understanding of collection activities
1009
. Modern prospecting activities were however granted a 
more institutional background as they were carried out on a contractual basis, as the State 
mandated botanical gardens to work with local associations in order to legitimise the 
collections
1010
. Gargantuan public agricultural research programmes were gradually established, 
relocating in parallel crop development as an internationally strategic political and economic 
pursuit. Following what had already began in past decades, the end of the 19
th
 and beginning of the 
20
th
 century saw an increase in State interest for undertaking biological collection expeditions and 
correlated research
1011
. The global food crisis of the 1950's and 1960's saw a need to 
institutionalise the informal flows and free exchanges of biological material at the global level, in 
order to respond to the urgency of the Malthusian concerns related to shortages in food supply
1012
. 
The total number of genetic resources that can be accessed through the international agricultural 
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research centres network amounts to six hundred thousand specimens today
1013
, rendering the 
Consultative Group for International Agricultural Research indispensable in the ex situ 
preservation of agricultural biodiversity worldwide. However, numerous uncertainties remained as 
to the legal status of their germplasm collections, whether they presented an international or 
national character, or were to be considered in the public domain or not. These uncertainties were 
also present within the Consultative Group itself, which ordered a study that revealed "a general 
lack of provisions for the ownership of genetic material or for its devolution in the event where an 
International Agricultural Research Centre ceased to operate. […] In general, however, the 
consultants [considered] that the germplasm collections would not pass automatically to the host 
government"
1014
, in accordance with the trustee role the Group wanted to endorse. The actual 
management of the genetic resources found within their auspices has in this sense been compared 
to a 'classic open source system for crop improvement'. It was based on a collaborative model 
where the original material was freely exchanged and distributed, information fully shared, 
participation opened in a non-discriminatory fashion and further research not prevented by 
intellectual property rights
1015
. The actual legal status of collections remained nonetheless blurry. 
The centres and their collections were to hit the wall of ownership reservations and biopiracy 
allegations raised at the end of the 20
th
 century, confronted to the new actors of agricultural input 
provision, and the new rules of the plant improvement and conservation game
1016
.  
10.2.2. Sowing the “seeds of discontent” 
Natural biodiversity provides the foundation for all plants used for agricultural purposes, whether 
to form wild relatives, landraces, stable, improved or genetically engineered varieties. 
Technological developments carving deeper into genetic resources transformed them not only into 
informational goods, but also propelled them as strategic economic and industrial development 
tools. Even though commercial research and development is generally carried out on standardised 
and stable plant varieties, researchers continue to rely on wild germplasm, and are growingly 
doing so on account of molecular biology tools
1017
. Numerous estimations have been made as to 
the contribution of exotic germplasm to the wealth generated by the industrial countries’ seed 
industry, a contribution that reached billions of US dollars
1018
. As aforementioned, it has for 
instance been shown that Turkish wheat landraces supplied genes used for stem nematode, bunt 
and hessian fly resistance but also for stripe rust resistance, this last contribution having been 
estimated to amount to fifty million USD a year to the United States seed industry
1019
. The 
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 realisation by germplasm-providing countries of the actual value of the resources they freely 
shared with public research institutions under the belief of their ‘common heritage’ status, but 
especially the limited re-distribution of this wealth to germplasm donor countries (or the lack 
thereof), spurred feelings of discontent and theft; a theft that would be labelled “bio-piracy”. 
Critics were also growingly concerned by the private sector's consecutive uses of the germplasm 
collections that international research centres harboured; especially in light of the proprietary 
claims made by several companies over the 'by-products' obtained through freely exchanged 
material
1020
. The dismantlement of colonial regimes and the expansion of intellectual property 
tools in the Northern hemisphere transformed genetic resources into “politically salient resources”, 
announcing the return of the normative principle of national sovereignty against proprietarian 
intellectual property rights
1021
.  
The material and intellectual appropriation efforts of the West overthrew all research or 
commercial aspiration that less-endowed nations might have had over genetic resources. Public 
agricultural research programmes were grounded on a “common heritage of mankind” 
understanding of genetic resources ownership, while those private endeavours were based on the 
maximum extent of enclosure one could ensure, whether in secrecy or under strong intellectual 
property rights. Next to such understanding, what was perceived to be "Green gold" had not 
brought any reward to the States sheltering used natural components or to those individuals having 
invested time and effort to conserve genetic resources for centuries. “The concern of developing 
countries focused on the free flow of genetic resources along a predominantly developing country 
pathway, with no flow of benefits back to developing countries”, especially when research led to 
commercialised products
1022
. International crop improvement efforts were also accompanied by 
biological piracy and misappropriation allegations, mostly directed towards the private sector. 
However, public agricultural research and their correlated germplasm collections could not escape 
the vigorous reactions of the main providers of genetic resources and centres of diversity
1023
. The 
CGIAR system has indeed been viewed as the “modern successor to the 18th and 19th century 
botanical gardens that served as conduits for the transmission of plant genetic information from the 
colonies to the imperial powers”1024, thereby formally endorsing bio-piracy. The fact that merely 
fifteen per cent of collected samples were stored in the developing world, against the eighty-five 
per cent that found their way to the safer and readier gene banks of developed nations sparked 
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criticism over the loss of control of the South in favour of the North, allegedly serving private 
interests once again
1025
.  
The technological strides that generated new innovation models heavily based on genomics 
science and informational components spawned strengthened regulation around the access and 
use conditions of genetic resources. Scientists manipulating and depending upon plant genetic 
resources had to face the fact that "the past collegial system of free exchange among researchers 
(was) breaking down", requiring the emergence of compensation mechanisms
1026
. These elements 
bore witness to the proclamation of the “dawn of 20th century biological colonialism and 
imperialism”, salvaging the South’s genetic resources through continuous practices of unearned 
appropriation and enclosure
1027. The world's “gene centres”, as identified by Dr. Nikolai Vavilov, 
would convert into fortresses, shielding the gold of a new genetic “El Dorado” against those rich 
in technology but poor in genetic resources
1028
. While the well-anchored principle pertaining to the 
free access to genetic resources continued to prevail well until the end of the 20
th
 century, most 
States established a permit system requiring scientists to ask for permission to collect material 
from national authorities
1029
. These systems were mainly launched to control germplasm flow, but 
the lack of subsequent verification by State authorities or efficient tracking rendered the permits 
nearly useless for regulating genetic resources’ outflow1030. Another development in the practice 
of genetic resource collection was the emergence of so-called ‘bioprospecting contracts’, through 
which the benefits from the use of biological material could be returned to the stewards of these 
resources. Inserting the notion of compensation into the framework governing the access to genetic 
resources, these contracts were also changing the definition of collection activities. This approach 
addresses the “inequity implied in the disparity between [economically poor but biologically 
affluent] communities and others with opposite attributes, […], transforming common heritage 
into a stream of compensation”1031. In this sense, it upholds the understanding that biological 
resources constitute a form of property that nonetheless ought to be used sustainably and 
appropriated equitably. In a similar mind-set, discussions arose on the use of ‘material collection 
or transfer agreements’ in relation to biological resources to address the imbalances between their 
providers and users. The rules of access would undergo substantial changes from the 1990’s 
onwards not only regulating access but also triggering a return stream of benefits, whether 
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 monetary or not, in the likes of technology transfer. This double feature aimed to sooth 
accusations of biological theft, and burn down the frustration of genetic resource-providing 
countries unable to see any real distribution of the wealth created by the use of material initially 
found on their soil.  
CONCLUSION. Greater Biodiversity in a Broad yet Equitable Public Domain 
Agricultural genetic variability is used, created, depleted and improved in a strategic context of 
global biodiversity loss. This reality has prompted pleas for biodiversity conservation and for the 
sustainable use of resources, which not only provide the foodstuff and income of farming 
communities, but also ensure the longevity of living processes and the efficiency of research 
endeavours. The collection of genetic resources, whether endemic, local or exotic, chiefly through 
colonial expeditions and then wide-scaled public research and extension programmes of the North, 
has concomitantly prompted compensation pleas. These pleas are grounded in the historical 
struggle for equitable rights to development in light of disparate and outwardly unfair socio-
economic realities. Tangled and constant international germplasm exchanges have indeed 
regrettably been accompanied by the concentration of knowledge and improved resources in the 
hands of a lucky few developed States.  
Concern as to the legal status of the genetic resources that were accumulated, used and developed 
throughout colonial times as a result also significantly shaped the spirit of international 
environmental negotiations, anchoring the greatest North-South divide to date. Personal and 
private appropriation has remained undoubtedly exceptional, heralding conceptions of common 
heritage and distributional equity. The unequal exchange patterns between the biologically-rich 
countries and technologically-apt entities nonetheless sufficed to sow the 'seeds of discontent' and 
set off the demands for concrete regulatory approaches to distributional justice pleas. The history 
of biological collections unmistakeably elucidates the foundation of genetic commoditisation, the 
buzzword status of biopiracy, the struggle of communalist international research efforts and the 
subsequent unhinged private control over surplus value. It corroborates the pleas for the return to 
public custody through perceptions of global genetic legacy, grounded on a broadly fenced public 
domain, which provides sufficient room to compensate the “ecological debt” of industrial nations 
over biodiverse countries. 
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 CHAPTER 11: WEIGHING THE PUBLIC DOMAIN IN INTERNATIONAL 11.
BIODIVERSITY CONSERVATION LAW  
Reactions to the “gene drain, […] siphoning off the Third World’s germplasm to ‘gene banks’ and 
breeding programmes of the North, [which have been] patenting the offshoots of this common 
heritage”1032 led to significant regulatory changes operating towards sustainability and equity. 
Major international agreements were as a result enacted primarily to support practices that 
conserve and use biodiversity in a sustainable fashion; all the while having regards to 
environmental justice and equity claims. In addition, and this is the specific concern of this thesis, 
they also contain important public domain and intellectual property governance principles that aim 
to foster both biodiversity use and research, while also preserving traditional knowledge and 
farmers’ livelihoods. By formally raising genetic resources to the rank of commodities, available, 
exploitable and officially tradable on markets, international biodiversity law has shaped a new 
economic space for biological material
1033
.  
Before the initiation of global environmental governance in the 1970's, the international regulation 
of biological resources had long remained an untamed and singular creature. Indeed, most of the 
environmental regulation had formerly been concerned with “truly” global resources, such as air 
for example, where “joint international strategies for their use, conservation and development have 
to be agreed”1034. As such and in their material form, biological resources are linked to land. They 
are thus domestic in nature, as public or private tangible goods, subject to the property regime set 
out in national laws. However, information found within these resources’ genotypes possesses 
global public goods qualities
1035
. Genetic resources do not conform to the traditional definition of 
global resources in international environmental law making. It is important to note that in the first 
international environmental instruments, natural resources were only consider as tangible goods, 
raw materials. Therefore, the aspect that was the target of regulation was the quantitative 
transaction for the economic exploitation of the resources, as knowledge on genetic resources was 
scarce in the 1950s and 1960s. It has nonetheless been argued that genetic resources would have 
been included in the claim for sovereign rights over natural resources
1036
. The 1949 United 
Nations Scientific Conference on the Conservation and Utilisation of Resources
1037
, made up of 
technical experts, focused on specific groups of natural resources such as land, water, forests, 
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 fuels, minerals, and wild life, included a session on land natural resources, which also included 
chemurgy, food yeasts, and microorganisms. The conference concentrated on the shortage of 
resources due to population increase and parallel demand, rather than the importance of the still 
unknown research information contained within microorganisms. No or little consideration was 
given to resources as objects of research, neither to what was then identified as the information 
contained in genetic material.  
The introduction of regulatory instruments dealing directly or indirectly with biological material at 
the international level created a new economic space for genetic material and formally raised them 
to the rank of commodities, available, exploitable and officially tradable on markets
1038
. The 
international law of biodiversity, targeting either all life forms or specifically addressing the needs 
of agricultural production, elevates sustainability and environmental justice to normative 
principles. These two aspects are notably found in the 1992 Convention on Biological Diversity 
and the 2004 International Treaty for Plant Genetic Resources in Food and Agriculture. In this 
context, their core concerns reside in the conservation and sustainable use of genetic resources. 
However, they also address equity and property allocation issues by ensuring compensation and 
benefit-sharing on the one hand, and participation on the other. The latter element of justice has 
been driven by “a strategy of regime-shifting to modify the principles, norms, rules and decision-
making procedures of intellectual property protection”1039. 
11.1. The Convention on biological diversity and related instruments  
While the idea of sustainable development is generally attributed to the infamous 1987 Brundtland 
Commission report “Our Common Future” as “a development that meets the needs of the present 
without compromising the ability of future generations to meet their own needs”, the origins of 
“environmental justice” are usually traced back to the 1960’s civil liberties movement. Arguably 
building on such heritage, international regulatory instruments were directed towards the 
conservation and sustainable use of biological diversity, and more specifically genetic resources. 
They have in this regard given international normative stance to environmental justice, in both 
distributive and participatory terms, in an effort to break the cycle of biological piracy, pushing 
further than classical conservation instruments by addressing property rights issues. Indeed the 
principles of environmental law not only include the conservation and the sustainable use of its 
components, but also encompass justice and equity prospects that address the legal status of 
genetic resources and their relation to the public domain. These principles have been formulated 
for the first time in the Stockholm Declaration and are key concepts in international regimes 
governing the climate or biodiversity, finding echo in the CBD, and its most recent Nagoya 
Protocol.  
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11.1.1. Principles of biodiversity conservation, sustainable use, and environmental justice  
As aformenetioned, genetic resources do not conform to the traditional definition of global 
resources in international environmental law making, due to their inherently dual nature, both as 
domestic tangible goods and informational public goods. Biodiversity depletion concerns were 
however gradually recognised on account of a “confluence of international dialogues that have 
existed for several decades”, including but not limited to debates focusing on protected areas, the 
sustainable use of natural resources or environmental funding
1040
. Amongst other endeavours, a 
soft-law instrument acknowledging mankind’s responsibility for all species inhabiting the Earth 
saw the light of day through United Nations General Assembly Resolution 37/7 in 1982, 
commonly referred to as the “World Charter for Nature”1041. The Charter asserted that  
“the degradation of natural systems owing to excessive consumption and misuse of natural 
resources […], leads to the breakdown of the economic, social and political framework of 
civilization”. (World Charter for Nature, UN/GA/37/7) 
Building on such initiative, the official advent of biodiversity came about during the 1992 United 
Nations Conference on Environment and Development
1042, otherwise known as the “Rio Earth 
Summit” and the adoption of the Convention on Biological Diversity (“CBD”)1043. It is interesting 
to note that the CBD is both an international treaty as such, and thereby constitutes a formal source 
of public international law, but it also represents an institutional framework for the continuous 
development of the law and practice of biodiversity conservation, through both legal and scientific 
initiatives
1044. The Parties to the Convention meet regularly during “Conferences” (commonly 
coined COP) with extensive decision-making powers. They also cooperate through different 
subsidiary bodies focusing on specific topics such as the Ad Hoc Open Ended Working Groups on 
Biosafety or on Access and Benefit-sharing. These initiatives have respectively led to the adoption 
of the 1999 Cartagena Protocol on Biosafety and recently the 2012 Nagoya Protocol on Access to 
Genetic Resources and the Fair and Equitable Sharing of Benefits Arising from their Utilisation.  
Contracting Parties to the Convention unite their forces in the face of different streams. They are: 
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 “Conscious of the intrinsic value of biological diversity and of the ecological, genetic, 
social, economic, scientific, educational, cultural, recreational and aesthetic values of 
biological diversity and its components,  
Conscious also of the importance of biological diversity for evolution and for maintaining 
life sustaining systems of the biosphere” (CBD, Preamble),  
In this context, the CBD’s primary aim is set as the comprehensive preservation of biodiversity, 
along with the “sustainable use of its components and the fair and equitable sharing of the 
benefits arising out of the utilisation of genetic resources” (CBD, Article 1).  
This imperative builds on a precautionary approach to halt the depletion of resources. Indeed, 
Contracting Parties are  
“Aware of the general lack of information and knowledge regarding biological diversity 
and of the urgent need to develop scientific, technical and institutional capacities to 
provide the basic understanding upon which to plan and implement appropriate measures,  
Noting that it is vital to anticipate, prevent and attack the causes of significant reduction or 
loss of biological diversity at source,  
Noting also that where there is a threat of significant reduction or loss of biological 
diversity, lack of full scientific certainty should not be used as a reason for postponing 
measures to avoid or minimize such a threat” (CBD, Preamble). 
The methods through which ecosystems’ and species’ diversity and their genetic variability can be 
conserved are numerous and include the constitution of protected areas, of listings of protected 
species, the adoption of recovery measures of threatened species, or the restoration of ecosystems 
from a strictly conservationist point of view
1045
. Although their efficiency and adequacy are being 
discussed
1046
, the two major conservation techniques commonly used by experts are traditionally 
identified with regards to the location of preservation endeavours, on and off their natural habitats. 
Ex situ conservation of the structural components of biodiversity refers to the management and 
collection of species or varieties outside their traditional natural ecosystems, being kept in 
institutions and environments solely managed by humankind. The establishment of culture 
collections such as botanic gardens or zoos exemplifies the conservation of natural biodiversity off 
site
1047
. On the other side of the spectrum lies in situ conservation, where all components are 
conserved and managed in their natural habitats. In situ management is best illustrated by the 
protected areas or parks institution, which, despite their shortcomings, has generally managed to 
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rise as an obligation under international agreements
1048. Both methods’ shortcomings have led the 
international community to declare the two approaches as opposite sides of the overall spectrum 
required for effective conservation
1049
.  
To this end, the CBD’s article 8 urges Member States to ensure that biodiversity is conserved in 
situ, notably through, inter alia, the establishment of a  
“system of protected areas, the regulation or management of biological resources 
important for the conservation of biological diversity whether within or outside protected 
areas, with a view to ensuring their conservation and sustainable use; the protection of 
ecosystems, natural habitats and the maintenance of viable populations of species in 
natural surroundings; [and also of] threatened species and populations” (CBD, Art.8), 
“For the purpose of complementing these in situ measures”, Article 9 of the Convention 
also addresses the “ex situ conservation of components of biological diversity, preferably 
in the country of origin of such components”, urging States to “establish and maintain 
facilities for ex-situ conservation of and research on plants, animals and micro- organisms, 
preferably in the country of origin of genetic resources”.  
The CBD is also an agreement of its time, and does also address the inherently utilitarian attitude 
through which biological material has been viewed in history. The sustainable use of biodiversity 
advocated for by Article 10 of the CBD highlights amongst other measures, the need to  
“protect and encourage customary use of biological resources in accordance with 
traditional cultural practices that are compatible with conservation or sustainable use 
requirements; [and] support local populations to develop and implement remedial action 
in degraded areas where biological diversity has been reduced” (CBD, Art.10), 
The actual regulatory content and characteristics of such sustainable use have remained 
purposefully fuzzy since the sole criterion is one of “avoidance or minimisation of adverse impacts 
on biological diversity”, yet it undoubtedly recognises the need to ensure local populations’ 
participation in all biodiversity related policies. The CBD system has come up with fourteen 
operational principles, the “Addis Ababa Principles and Guidelines for the Sustainable use of 
Biodiversity”, which largely put emphasis on the ecological and socio-economic scales of 
biodiversity use and its impact.  
The CBD system also makes room for specific forums assigned to the study of the particular needs 
of agricultural genetic diversity, even though the Convention does not contain an 
agrobiodiversity-specific provision. The Nairobi Final Act, through which the CBD was formally 
adopted, contains a specific resolution recognising the linkages of the Convention with sustainable 
agriculture, paving the way for future COP considerations regarding agrobiodiversity. Even 
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 though most of the subsequent work relates to the relationship of the CBD with the FAO Global 
System on PGRFA
1050
, an ad hoc thematic programme on agricultural genetic resources was also 
set up as early as the third conference of the Parties and formally adopted two years later
1051
. It 
focuses on different areas, including land and water resources, farm inputs, traditional knowledge 
and plant, animal and microbial genetic resources.     
11.1.2. Public Domain and Intellectual Property Rights in the CBD 
State sovereignty over natural and genetic resources 
Negotiated under the auspices of the United Nations Environment Programme, the Convention’s 
foundation is the reiteration of “national sovereignty” over genetic resources that are the “common 
concern of humankind”. Contracting Parties indeed “Affirm that the conservation of biological 
diversity is a common concern of humankind, [and] Reaffirm that States have sovereign rights over 
their own biological resources” (CBD, Preamble) 
The common concern perception highlights the importance of biodiversity, as an issue where all 
nations should have standing, and also underlines the duty to cooperate for efficient conservation 
and management policies, yet does not make any statements on its property regime, in contrast to 
prior “common heritage” approaches1052. Through this move, the CBD effectively upholds the 
long-existing principle of State sovereignty, which had already been distended to cover natural 
resources in 1962 through the General Assembly Resolution 1803 on Permanent Sovereignty over 
natural resources
1053
. This Resolution indeed recognised “the inalienable right of all States freely 
to dispose of their natural wealth and resources in accordance with their national interests” 1054.  
This principle emerged as an instrument of international economic law in the post-war era from 
two main concerns of the United Nations: economic development and self-determination of 
colonial people
1055
. In the 1950s, developing countries advocated this principle to secure the 
benefit arising from the exploitation of natural resources and to provide newly independent states 
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with legal tools to defend their economic sovereignty against property and contractual rights 
claimed by foreign states and companies. By the beginning of 1952, the United Nations General 
Assembly had already underlined that the use of natural resources by under developed countries 
was a pre-requisite to foster economic development “in accordance with their national interests”. 
Resolution 523 on “integrated economic development and commercial agreements” underlined the 
root of globalised market’s market, where the contractual power of less developed/newly 
independent states in selling raw materials and resources was not proportionate to those buying 
developed states.  
The Resolution recalled that a necessary requisite for “economic development plans in 
under developed countries is the creation of conditions under which these countries could 
more readily acquire machinery, equipment and industrial raw materials for the goods and 
services exported by them” (Resolution UN/GA/523, Preamble).  
Commercial agreements should as a result facilitate the movement of machinery, equipment and 
industrial raw material for the development and improvement of standards of living in under-
developed or less developed countries.  
Moreover it is “recommended” that such agreements should “not contain economic or 
political conditions violating the sovereign rights of the under-developed countries, 
including their rights to determine their own plans for economic development” (Resolution 
UN/GA/523, Para.1).  
Ever since its first mention by the United Nations General Assembly, the right to use and control 
national resources has thus been strongly linked to the right to development. Indeed, the General 
Assembly went back to these principles in Resolution 626 on the “Right to exploit freely natural 
wealth and resources”1056, adopted following the nationalisation by Iran of the Anglo-Iranian Oil 
Company by the end of 1952. The Resolution referred to the good faith and balance within the 
economic exchange of natural resources: it encouraged member States  
“to have due regard, consistently with their sovereignty, to the need for maintaining the 
flow of capital in conditions of security, mutual confidence and economic cooperation 
among nations” (Resolution UN/GA/626).  
States thus an arguably light obligation to keep a balance and avoid disproportionate flow of 
capital in economic transactions with developing states, within the use and exploitation of natural 
resources. These arguably weak but first contractual safeguards granted to countries selling natural 
resources can be seen as the root of the principles of access and benefit-sharing codified later by 
the Convention on Biological Diversity. Another step forward a toothed legal oligation was taken 
ten years later, with Resolution 1803 of 1962
1057
.  
                                                                    
 
1056 United Nations General Assembly Resolution 626 (VII) on the 'Right to Exploit Freely Natural Wealth and 
Resources', 21 December 1952. 
1057
 United Nations General Assembly Resolution 1803 (XVII) on the “Permanent Sovereignty over Natural 
Resources”, 14 December 1962. 
CHAP. 11 Property Regime of International Biodiversity Law 
249 
 This text underlined that “economic and financial agreements between the developed and 
the developing countries must be based on the principles of equality and of the right of 
peoples and nations to self-determination” (Resolution UN/GA/1803, Preamble).  
International soft law is here interfering with national commercial practices in favour again of an 
economic balance in the exchange of natural resources. The Resolution goes even further by 
stating that in case where an authorisation for activities of exploration, development and 
disposition of national natural resources is granted by a state to a foreigner, the profits arising from 
such activity  
“must be shared in the portions freely agreed upon, in each case, between investors and 
the recipient state”. It also added that “due care being taken to ensure that there is no 
impairment, for any reason, of that State’s sovereignty over its natural wealth and 
resources” (Resolution UN/GA/1803, Para 3).  
The sovereignty approach in effect bounds the public domain, especially at the national level, 
segmenting it international environmental law
1058
, protecting the tangible and intangible inputs to 
innovation by opting for a property rule and upholding traditional knowledge. Indeed, even if 
sovereignty merely implies the lack of superior authority that of the state at the international level, 
it does consign private-property rights- akin effects in domestic spheres, as “the state is the 
repository of sovereign rights”1059. Even though it is not directly concerned with the grant of 
intellectual property rights per se, the CBD regime fences the public domain upstream of 
innovation, which inevitably bears considerable consequences to the distribution of resources in an 
economics perspective, but also, and this is the focus of our analysis, advocates regime-shifting or 
legal change to the downstream fencing of the public domain linked to the products of innovation, 
i.e. intellectual property rights.  
Procedural justice: access and benefit-sharing regimes 
Building on the practical consequences of the customary principle of sovereignty over natural 
resources, the groundwork of the procedural and distributive environmental justice and 
property rights angle of the 1992 CBD lies in its article 15, which states that 
“the sovereign rights of States over their natural resources, [is recognised and] the 
authority to determine access to genetic resources [is considered to rest] with the national 
governments and is subject to national legislation” (CBD, Article 15§1, emphasis added by 
author).  
Even though “conditions to facilitate access to genetic resources for environmentally 
sound uses by other Contracting Parties [should be created] and restrictions that run 
counter to the objectives of this Convention not be imposed]” (CBD, 15§2).  
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Genetic resources therefore do not lie within a straightforward public domain. The latter is indeed 
contingent on and determined by national access and benefit sharing (“ABS”) regimes, where a 
liability system may operate to share the benefits of the resources’ use. It has been argued that the 
grounding of benefit-sharing and collection authorisation requirements upon the territorial 
foundation of germplasm was deliberately procedural, avoiding the controversies that would have 
fuelled the multiple political divergences over an equitable distribution argument
1060
. Access 
regulations were viewed as a victory by developing country negotiators, since they amplify the 
simpler market and negotiations-based flexible and unbureaucratic “bioprospecting contracts” 
regime favoured by bioresource user nations, but still facilitate bargaining between suppliers 
(governments) and users (companies or other institutions) and ensure the greater capture of 
benefits
1061
. The compensation provisos stem from the obligations penned in articles 15§4 and 
15§5, which set the grounds for the principle of access to genetic resources  
“on mutually agreed terms”, “subject to prior informed consent of the Contracting Party 
providing such resources, unless otherwise determined by that Party” (CBD, Art.15§§4-5).  
The provisions of the CBD, even if they don’t address the property regime of genetic resources as 
such, do break with the formerly unfettered access approach to genetic resources, based on the 
exercise of sovereign rights of States. The Convention does not only grant States the right to 
withhold access to the resources at their will, it also grants them the rights to receive compensation 
from the use of such resources. The public domain constructed by the CBD does as a result not 
grant free access to genetic resources, but rather fences the public domain around the new 
principles of prior informed consent and mutually agreed terms. It is in this sense a public 
domain accompanied by a bilateral liability mechanism that ensures ex ante that the benefits 
arising from the use of genetic resources have been shared and that the determined monetary or 
non-monetary compensation has been awarded to the sovereign right-holding State and the 
traditional knowledge holder communities. This new fencing has radically impacted the activities 
of public researchers and institutions, like gene banks for instance, which witnessed significant 
drops in accessions just after the signature of the CBD due to legal uncertainty and fear of 
infringing reproclaimed sovereign rights
1062
. Within the CBD system, all genetic resource uses are 
however not created equal. Indeed, the Convention has an intricately complex regard to those 
resources and uses which ensure that their products remain in the public domain, for instance when 
no commercial intent can be found at the time of access
1063. This “special treatment” can be 
attributed to the reflection of the permanent sovereignty principle in the CBD, which allows states 
to “determine access to genetic resources within their boundaries, with a duty to facilitate access to 
those resources for environmentally sound uses”1064. The non-binding 2002 Bonn Guidelines1065 
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 were an important milestone to establish the direction that would be taken in a binding 
international regime that would really bring out the aforementioned salvation
1066
. However, in 
light of the unsolved issues in the interpretation of Article 15 of the CBD
1067
, as well as the non-
binding nature of the Guidelines, their adoption have not majorly altered the behaviour and 
commitment of biodiversity and traditional knowledge users to seek prior informed consent and 
mutually agreed terms
1068
. The Nagoya Protocol, which has at the time of writing not yet entered 
into force, will, as a binding multilateral instrument, make both concepts a reality, and trigger 
extensive law-making for the realisation of benefit-sharing transactions, whether financial or 
not
1069
.  
By including a prerogative to ensure the “fair and equitable sharing of the benefits arising out of 
the utilisation of genetic resources”, the CBD strives away from the “classical conservationist 
design”1070, incorporating a wider range of socio-economics concerns, and a desire to use these 
resources for developmental purposes
1071
. This feature has been justified by the desire of 
biodiversity rich developing countries to counterbalance the global trade and linked intellectual 
property negotiations that were going on under the leadership of a wealthy few
1072
. In this context, 
a “fair and equitable” access and benefit-sharing regime based on sovereignty prerequisites has 
been viewed as the salvation to the phenomenon of bio-piracy
1073
, as a cornerstone of the CBD 
regime
1074
. The meaning and operational content of such “fair and equitable” terms is not as 
straightforward as one would have hoped, yet several dimensions have been highlighted, including 
but not limited to the enabling of the level-playing field,  
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“respect for human rights, value and legal systems across cultural borders, […allowing] 
democratic and meaningful participation in policy decisions and contracts negotiation by 
all stakeholders, […and] not unnecessarily restricting access to non-rival goods and 
resources”1075.  
In its most generic meaning, equity refers to 'fairness, impartiality and even-handed dealing', 
according to the Oxford Dictionary. With regards to legal theory, the concept has been 
traditionally linked to the administration of justice and thus directly to the scope of judicial review, 
both at the national and international levels, as a means to resolve disputes in fairness. Indeed, the 
term equity retains a strong connection with the praetor-inspired flexibility of the jurisprudential 
system witnessed in common law traditions
1076
. It is thus no surprise that equity has traditionally 
been established within the doctrine as a concept to be applied by courts of law outside the scope 
of legal provisions in force, in a judicial system making room for such flexibility
1077
. Within the 
international legal order, equity is now widely considered as a material source of law, alongside 
treaties and custom, within the category coined 'general principles of law'
1078
, by both the 
international courts
1079
 and the doctrine
1080
. The use of equity cannot thus be limited to the 
opportunities it brings with regards to individualised justice. Indeed, the concept also entails the 
prospect of introducing considerations of fairness or good faith within general provisions, by 
offering standards for the allocation and sharing of resources and benefits or achieving distributive 
justice
1081
. The appeal of equity is easily understood in international environmental law, which has 
to deal with very wide-ranging time conundrums in attempts to minimise our actions' impacts on 
future generations, but also very disparate signatories, representing highly unequal stages of 
wealth, welfare and priorities. That is why one of the most significant references to equity is still 
to this day found within biodiversity conservation law
1082
. The difficulty arising from such 
reference concerns the understanding of equity, since the wording might only refer to infra legem 
equity, interpreting principles to be found within the realms of international law, or could very 
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 well encompass a broader understanding, as an independent and autonomous source of principles 
that ought to inspire contractual arrangements deriving from the use of biodiversity
1083
.   
Whither scientific and technologic development? The CBD system and intellectual property 
rights 
The importance to support the development of scientific capabilities in developing countries 
had already been highlighted in the 1972 Stockholm Declaration. Science and technology are 
given a very noble role of contributor to economic and social development and their application is 
called to solve environmental problems “for the common good of mankind” in Principle 18 of the 
Declaration. 
As a result, “Scientific research and development in the context of environmental problems 
must be promoted in all countries; especially the developing countries and the free flow of 
up-to-date scientific information and transfer of experience must be supported and 
assisted. Environmental technologies should be made available to developing countries on 
terms which would encourage their wide dissemination without constituting an economic 
burden on the developing countries” (Stockholm Declaration, Principle 20). 
The importance of developing scientific and technical capabilities emerged in the preparatory 
discussions organised before the United Nations Environmental Programme (UNEP) leading to the 
infamous 1987 Brutland Commission Report. An entire portion of the document is dedicated to 
“broadening the technological base”, in a focusing rather on international relations, rather than 
sovereignty. ‘Our Common Future’ focuses on “institutional imperatives in addressing sustainable 
development issues, including political, economic, social and administrative systems. [It] 
explicitly addresses the matter of production and technological systems, but without anchoring the 
discussion in the realities of the patchy, embryonic state of global science and technology 
cooperation”1084. Scientific collaboration and technology transfer is nonetheless considerd a core 
element of sustainable development, as 
“The procedures and policies that influence [the international exchanges of technology] 
must stimulate innovation and ensure ready and widespread access to environmentally 
sound technologies” (Brundtland Report, Paragraph 65). 
In this context, the emerging property paradigm and also the shift in actors involved in innovation 
directly linked to sustainable development such as plant improvement is assessed critically.  
“Developing countries paid about $2 billion in 1980 by way of royalties and fees, mainly 
to industrial countries. The gap in scientific and technological capabilities is particularly 
wide in areas of direct relevance to the objectives of sustainable development, including 
biotechnology and genetic engineering, new energy sources, new materials and substitutes, 
and low-waste and non-polluting technologies” (Brundtland Report, Paragraph 67, 
emphasis added). 
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The principal policy issue as regards the impact of payments is the impact of patents and 
proprietary rights. In 1980, industrialised market economies accounted for sixty-five per 
cent of the world total of patents granted, and the socialist countries of Eastern Europe 
held twenty-nine per cent. Developing countries held only six per cent, and most of these 
had been granted to non-residents. Proprietary rights are a key element in the commercial 
development of technology. But their application in certain areas may hamper the diffusion 
of environmentally sound technologies and may increase inequalities. (Brundtland Report, 
Paragraph 68). 
In the past. publicly funded research provided new technology to small producers, 
particularly farmers, on a full or subsidized basis. The situation is not very different now, 
and in areas such as new seed varieties there is some reason to believe proprietary rights 
could act as a major barrier to developing countries' acquisition of new technologies. 
International cooperation is essential to maintain the flow of genetic material and to 
ensure an equitable sharing of gains. (Brundtland Report, Paragraph 69, emphasis added). 
Agricultural innovation thus receives particular consideration in the Report, as an area crucial for 
sustainable development, but also as an area where wide-scoped proprietary rights could have 
considerable detrimental impacts. As a result, the influential document also called for developing 
countries to narrow the gap in technological capabilities especially in the area of biotechnology 
and provide for the equitable sharing and widespread diffusion of the technologies developed.” 
This idea is still present in the 1992 Rio Declaration on Environment and Development where 
Principle 9 called for states  
“to cooperate to strengthen endogenous capacity-building for sustainable development by 
improving scientific understanding through exchanges of scientific and technological 
knowledge, and by enhancing the development, adaptation, diffusion and transfer of 
technologies, including new and innovative technologies”, (Rio Declaration, Principle 9).   
However, these considerations did not survive the negotiation of the Convention on Biological 
Diversity in their wide form, and the language of the Convention bears a very different tone from 
the one favoured by the Rio Declaration.  
Article 12 of the Convention requires signatories to “promote and encourage research 
which contributes to the conservation and sustainable use of biological diversity”.  
Through its Article 16, dedicated to the “Access to and Transfer of Technology” States 
further commit themselves to “provide and/or facilitate access for and transfer to other 
Contracting Parties of technologies that are relevant to the conservation and sustainable 
use of biological diversity” (CBD, Art. 16).  
Notwithstanding the restriction of the obligation to transfer technologies that contribute to 
conservation and sustainable use, the focus is only on transfer of and access to technology, and not 
more on development of technology and endogenous capacity building for sustainable 
development. The Brutland Report's idea of adding value to natural resources has become entirely 
marginalised in favour of an approach to natural resources as “in situ” resources to be conserved. 
The interface of science, technology and sustainable development for all genetic resources has 
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 only re-appeared in the Nagoya Protocol1085. The Protocol contains specific “provisions that 
address the global organization of scientific collaboration at the non-commercial stages of the 
research cycle”, in its Annex citing various non-monetary benefit-sharing measures in the 
upstream dimensions of research, and especially in its article 8, 10 and 11, which explicitly 
address the status of non-commercial research
1086
. In this context, article 8a of the Nagoya 
Protocol urges signatories to  
“create conditions to promote and encourage research which contributes to the 
conservation and sustainable use of biological diversity, particularly in developing 
countries, including through simplified measures on access for non-commercial research 
purposes, taking into account the need to address a change of intent for such research.” 
(Nagoya Protocol, Art 8a)  
The public domain conditions that surround the implementation of these derogatory provisions 
depend upon the definition of “non-commercial research purposes”, which is no easy task. Such 
notion could either include all “activities that are in the exploratory phase of research, i.e. not 
involving the sale of a genetic resource, its components or derivates for profit-making purposes; 
and whose research results remain in the public domain”, or it could rather merely point at 
activities “at the stage of basic research, which would generate no monetary benefits for profit or 
personal gain, and whose research results remain in the public domain”1087. While the first 
approach operates with greater flexibility by envisaging ex post re-negotiation of mutually agreed 
terms for accessing genetic resources, the second seemingly tries to get the most benefits possible 
ex ante, outside of a liability rules scheme.  
The Nagoya Protocol also provides for possible future scenarios for collaboration and benefit-
sharing in its articles 10 and 11, which might possibly also apply to some areas of activities of the 
research communities. The Protocol in this regard compels parties to consider the need for, and 
modalities of, a  
“global multilateral benefit-sharing mechanism to address the fair and equitable sharing 
of benefits derived from the utilisation of genetic resources and associated traditional 
knowledge that occur in transboundary situations, or for which it is not possible to grant 
or obtain prior informed consent” (Nagoya Protocol, Art 10).  
Moreover, its article 11 prescribes an obligation to collaborate in cases where the same genetic 
resources are found in situ within the territory of more than one party, with a view to 
implementing the obligations set out by the Protocol. The language of these references to the 
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global multilateral benefit-sharing mechanism remains nonetheless extremely vague and reflects 
the result of an achingly difficult compromise, which led to a procedural obligation to merely 
consider the opportunity of such a mechanism
1088
. The scope of the provision can be interpreted 
narrowly or extensively. In the wider sense, it might re-open the issue of the temporal or 
geographical scope of the Protocol, covering perhaps materials in ex-situ collections that were 
collected prior to the entry into force of the CBD; whereas in the narrow sense, it would merely 
address the status of genetic resources that are found in user countries’ jurisdiction but are of 
unknown origin or legal status
1089
.  It is important to underline that the benefits shared through this 
mechanism must be used to support the conservation of biodiversity and the sustainable use of its 
components globally. This means that the benefit-sharing is not going to the provider or providers. 
This could represent a disincentive for countries to build up such a mechanism; an assertion that 
has proven to this day true1090. 
Notwithstanding the inherently sovereign nature of genetic resources and the accommodating 
nature of non-commercial access, the CBD also carves the public domain through its direct 
approach to intellectual property rights. Indeed, the Convention urges Member States to 
concomitantly recognise that IPR might also carve into their legal status. First of all, the Parties to 
the Convention,  
“recognising that patents and other intellectual property rights may have an influence on 
the implementation of this Convention , shall cooperate in this regard subject to national 
legislation and international law in order to ensure that such rights are supportive of and 
do not run counter to its objectives” (CBD, Art 16§5). 
It nonetheless leaves the space open as to the real practical impact of sovereign rights in 
intellectual property rights application. Several references are rather made to IPR in the associated 
yet non-binding Bonn Guidelines. According to Paragraph 16(d), Parties should consider taking  
“measures to encourage the disclosure of the country of origin of the genetic resources 
and of the origin of traditional knowledge, innovations and practices of indigenous and 
local communities in applications for intellectual property rights” (Bonn Guidelines, 
Paragraph 16(d)) 
Even though nothing in the binding Convention text or in the Nagoya Protocol refers to such 
opportunity of both disclosure and prior informed consent disclosures, a number of subsequent 
COP decisions have tried to give substance, or at least nourish the debate as a means to ensure the 
respect of mutually agreed terms. The aforementioned decision VI/24, to which the Bonn 
Guidelines were annexed, for instance called for the gathering of future information, inter alia, on 
the “feasibility of an international recognised certification of origin system as evidence of prior 
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 informed consent and mutually agreed terms, [as well as] the role of oral evidence of prior art in 
the examination, granting and maintenance of intellectual property rights”1091.  
Decision VII/19 directly requested WIPO and UNCTAD to conduct analysis on “options for 
model provisions on proposed disclosure requirements, practical options for intellectual property 
application procedures with regard to the triggers of disclosure requirements”1092.  
This has led both institutions to produce substantial documents on the disclosure of origin, pushing 
also WIPO to establish an “Intergovernmental Committee on Intellectual Property and Genetic 
Resources, Traditional Knowledge and Folklore” at its General Assembly’s 25th Session in 
20001093. However to this date, the work of the Committee has not been able to set out an 
internationally agreed threshold regarding disclosure requirements in IPR applications. 
Furthermore and most importantly, the Committee is attempting to give legal substance to a form 
of collective rights acknowledged with the CBD. The Convention has indeed also appraised the 
protection of so-called traditional knowledge attached to genetic resources. In order to achieve 
the in situ conservation of biodiversity, article 8(j) of the Convention states that  
“each contracting Party shall, as far as possible and as appropriate: subject to national 
legislation, respect, preserve and maintain knowledge, innovations and practices of 
indigenous and local communities embodying traditional lifestyles relevant for the 
conservation and sustainable use of biological diversity”(CBD, Art.8j) 
The exact extent and nature of protection to be granted to such knowledge remains to be 
determined, since nothing in the Convention defines it in complete proprietary terms, pursuing 
instead the “aim of free flow of plant germplasm based upon public funding”1094. Indeed, the 
Convention does not apportion exclusive rights over genetic resources or their components as 
such. It does not determine who is the “owner” of specific resources or knowledge attached 
thereof. Nor does it determine the exact extent of prerogatives that accompany the recognition of 
sovereign rights or traditional knowledge. Nevertheless, “its principles – prior informed consent 
and benefit sharing with countries of origin and local communities – are based on the assumption 
that there are “providers” and “recipients” of genetic resources, and that they must establish, 
contractually, the conditions for access and benefit-sharing”1095.    The CBD has a result been 
considered to drive its approach extensively from the holistic concept of “Traditional Resources 
Rights”, which bring together “bundles of rights which are held to be widely accepted in legally 
and non-legally binding instruments, ranging from human rights, land rights, culture for 
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indigenous and local communities”1096. The legal basis of traditional knowledge protection has 
been subject to much criticism, especially due to the lack of equivalency and retaliatory force 
which makes it merely “conditional and subservient obligations attached to conventional 
intellectual property rights”1097. Legislative endeavours have nonetheless been going strong before 
the World Intellectual Property Organisation’s aforementioned “Intergovernmental Committee on 
Intellectual Property and Genetic Resources, Traditional Knowledge and Folklore”, which 
negotiates a binding international agreement on the extent of such knowledge and its relationship 
to existing property regimes. Notwithstanding its rickety international reification, the consecration 
of traditional knowledge does delineate the public domain carved out by the CBD system. Such 
delineation can be viewed either in a more restrictive fashion inscribed in the exclusivity of 
traditional IPR and the subsequent withdrawal of traditional knowledge from the public domain. 
Or it can be analysed through a wider construct comparable to a “paying public domain” where 
knowledge holders would be entitled to “a right to compensation” for follow-on uses, without the 
prerogative to block them and thereby keeping the knowledge within the boundaries of an 
accessible yet conditional public domain, a legally defined and temporary semi-commons
1098
.  
Neither the sustainability, nor the equity angles advocated by the rather unique system of the CBD 
have been welcomed with unanimous praise. Indeed, the choices made by the international 
community to regulate and conserve biodiversity have been conveyed as an unnecessary and 
ineffective “neoliberalisation of nature”, putting a price and trading nature in order to save it, in 
the name of “green developmentalism”1099. The relationship of the CBD and its Nagoya Protocol 
with other international agreements, especially those related to the regulation of trade, also gives 
rise to conflicting commentary. ABS requirements are in this sense either viewed as a potential for 
complementary synergy and deterrence of misappropriation
1100
, or through the lens of a vicarious 
push as a regulatory response to an unsolicited commodification of genetic resources upstream in 
innovation chains
1101
. The lack of equivalency and retaliatory force in the sovereign and 
                                                                    
 
1096
 COTTIER, "The Protection of Genetic Resources and Traditional Knowledge: Towards More Specific Rights and 
Obligations in World Trade Law," op.cit.,  p.565. Notably referring to UNEP view that even though it is still 
inadequate because enshrined in a mixture of legally binding and non-binding instruments, the concept of TRR “can 
grow as additional rights accrue and is adapted through the development of national and international legislation”, 
UNEP, Convention on Biodiversity, Traditional Knowledge: Critical Linkages, UNEP/CBD/TKBD/1/2, 1997.  
1097
 WEST, "Institutionalised Exclusion: The Political Economy of Benefit-Sharing and Intellectual Property," op.cit.,  
p.21.; where the author explains his hypothesis that the Nagoya protocol actually assists in the reification of 
intellectual property rights and fails to achieve the objectives initially set out in the Convention and the Protocol itself.  
1098
 This approach is notably advocated by Jerome REICHMAN, REICHMAN, "Of Green Tulips and Legal Kudzu: 
Repackaging Rights in Subpatentable Innovation," op.cit. And JEROME H. REICHMAN and TRACEY LEWIS, "Using 
Liability Rules to Stimulate Local Innovation in Developing Countries: Application to Traditional Knowledge," in 
International Public Goods and Transfer of Technology under a Globalized Intellectual Property Regime, ed. KEITH 
MASKUS and JEROME H. REICHMAN, Cambridge: CUP, 2005. 
1099
 Bioprospecting is, in this sense, the most controversial conservation strategy ever adopted in environmental policy, 
serving only those “establishment environmentalists”; notably see CASTREE, "Bioprospecting: From Theory to 
Practice," op.cit.,  p.36., and MCAFEE, "Selling Nature to Save It? Biodiversity and Green Developmentalism," op.cit.,  
pp.133-135. 
1100
 CBD, The CBD and the Agreement on Trade-related Intellectual Property Rights (TRIPS): Relationships and 
Synergies, UN Doc., UNEP/CBD/COP/3/23, 1996 or LI ENHENG, "Promotion for a Mutually Supportive and 
Complimentary Relationship between Trips Agreement and Cbd -the Essential Role of Wto in Conservation of 
Biological Diversity and Protection of Tk," in WIPO/ESCAP High-level Policy Forum on Intellectual Property Rights 
and Trade, 23-25 July 2007 (Macao, China2007). 
1101
 In this viewpoint, the Nagoya Protocol emerges from a reactionary regime-shifting process; see WEST, 
"Institutionalised Exclusion: The Political Economy of Benefit-Sharing and Intellectual Property," op.cit., interpreting 
the work of Laurence HELFER on the general interactions of the TRIPS Agreement with the CBD, and the 
CHAP. 11 Property Regime of International Biodiversity Law 
259 
 indigenous rights recognised under the CBD system has led commentators to deplore the creation 
of merely “conditional and subservient obligations attached to conventional intellectual property 
rights”, which continue to benefit from extreme legal dependency1102. The equity angle of the 
CBD has nonetheless produced political pressure for the disclosure of origin or evidence of prior 
informed consent before intellectual property offices
1103
, without unanimous triumph. Aside from 
unwarranted and moderately successful commodification, the CBD carries inherent 
shortcomings
1104
; these features also appear to be quite ill fitted for agricultural genetic resources, 
especially plants, in view of their historical flows and their current use patterns in cultivation or 
research and development. Indeed, “the mercantile approach adopted by the CBD does not take 
into consideration agricultural species of great local and regional importance for food security, 
which are not commodities, and, therefore, of little commercial interest”1105. Furthermore, the 
national implementation of CBD obligations seldom identify food security neither as a priority nor 
as a concern, just as it rarely provides for a wide-scope experimental use exception, hence creating 
a significant hurdle of crucial importance to PGRFA, especially in cases where the State in 
question is not a signatory of the International Treaty on plant genetic resources for food and 
agriculture, and therefore does not exclude those crops listed in its Annex I from the scope of their 
stringent access and benefit-sharing laws1106. 
11.2. The International Treaty on plant genetic resources for food and agriculture 
Regardless of socio-technological innovation contexts, agricultural plant genetic resources remain 
highly interdependent at the international level. This is not only attributed to the tangled flows 
impelled by the colonial era, but also to the intertwined nature of all varieties in non-methodical or 
science-based plant breeding, notably due to the processes of variety selection. International crop 
conservation efforts have in this context mainly been assigned to the “belief that the genetic legacy 
of our ancestors is threatened by modern conditions, especially record high populations, 
technological change, and infrastructural development”1107. While it is widely acknowledged that 
the social returns from research activities exceed the private returns of the particular developer, 
leading to the recognition of the public goods dimension of agricultural research
1108
, technological 
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changes witnessed in past centuries have transformed agricultural research. The interdependence 
of PGRFA has become rather precarious and ominous in view of the asymmetrical uses of genetic 
resources, which fail to balance exclusive appropriation and distributive aspects. The need to 
design an ad hoc instrument for the conservation, but also the sustainable and equitable use of 
PGRFA while ensuring the widest possible access to germplasm for research and development 
was espoused by the international community as early as the 1980’s, ultimately leading to the 
enactment of the the International Undertaking for Plant Genetic Resources in 1983. Its precepts 
nonetheless had to be reviewed in light of the bilateralism and sovereignty oriented CBD regime. 
In view of the specificity of agrobiodiversity, but also in view of the growing web of enclosure-
oriented international instruments favouring bilateralism, these considerations ultimately lead to 
the adoption of a binding treaty constituting an arguably more extensive public domain that the 
CBD, for a limited number of crops, following lengthy negotiations. This ad hoc regime attempts 
to rebuild the agrobiodiversity public domain in view of the specificities of plant improvement and 
the socio-economic dimensions of agricultural production. 
11.2.1. Principles of agrobiodiversity conservation, sustainable use, and environmental justice  
The concoction of an international regime governing expressly plant genetic resources for food 
and agriculture and addressing the specificity of agrobiodiversity conservation and its inescapable 
use was bequeathed into the hands of the Food and Agricultural Organisation of the United 
Nations. Policy discussions on the international management and status of PGRFA started in the 
1970’s, much like environmental dialogue. They led to the adoption of the FAO Global System for 
the Conservation and Utilisation of PGRFA in 1983. This package addressed both in situ and ex 
situ agrobiodiversity management, and comprised of a non-binding yet promising international 
agreement, the International Undertaking for Plant Genetic Resources (“IU”)1109. The 
International Network of ex situ Collections was established along with the Commission on Plant 
Genetic Resources for Food and Agriculture, the first permanent intergovernmental body 
specifically dedicated to PGRFA
1110
. The Undertaking, adopted at the twenty-second session of 
the FAO Conference held in Rome professed its goals to include the exploration, preservation, 
evaluation and availability of PGRFA for plant breeding and scientific purposes. The FAO 
Conference’s resolution 8/831111 in this regard recognised that  
“(a) plant genetic resources are a heritage of mankind to be preserved, and to be freely 
available for use, for the benefit of present and future generations; 
(b) full advantage can be derived from plant genetic resources through an effective 
programme of plant breeding, and that, while most such resources in the form of wild 
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 plants and old land races are to be found in developing countries, training and facilities 
for plant survey and identification and plant breeding are insufficient or even not available 
in many of those countries; 
(c) plant genetic resources are indispensable for the genetic improvement of cultivated 
plants, but have been insufficiently explored and are in danger of erosion and 
loss”(Resolution 8/83, FAO Conference)  
However, the international legal climate was shifting. The CBD got adopted in 1992, followed by 
the international minimum IP protection standards of the TRIPS Agreement two years later. These 
developments urged for an adaptation of the international agricultural community to the new legal 
landscape. Not only did the IU’s provisions need adaptation, but the insufficiency of a non-binding 
international text to ensure the facilitated flow of agricultural germplasm also created a 
“constructive unison” between both developed and developing countries, the seed industry and 
non-governmental organisations
1112
.  
On account of these postulates and the need for regulatory action, the Commission on Genetic 
Resources for Food and Agriculture ignited the re-negotiation of the legal component of the FAO 
Global System. This re-negotiation took “six and a half arduous years, from the First 
Extraordinary Session of November 1994 to its Sixth Extraordinary Session in June 2001”, mostly 
because of the polarisation between developed and developing countries
1113
. The debates initiated 
before the UN Food and Agriculture Organisation came about as “heavily politicised, with 
concerns about intellectual property rights and national germplasm embargoes” that were set up 
through other international instruments
1114
. Adopted by the Conference in November 2001, the 
International Treaty on Plant Genetic Resources for Food and Agriculture (“ITPGRFA”) 
came into force in June 2004
1115
.  
 The objectives of the Treaty “are the conservation and sustainable use of plant genetic 
resources for food and agriculture and the fair and equitable sharing of the benefits arising 
out of their use, in harmony with the Convention on Biological Diversity, for sustainable 
agriculture and food security” (ITPGRFA, Art. 1§1).  
In its conservation angle, it advocates an “integrated approach to the exploration, conservation 
and sustainable use” of agrobiodiversity, where both in situ and ex situ efforts are equally 
acknowledged (article 5§1). Applied to agricultural biodiversity and especially crop genetic 
variability, the terminology and conservation techniques involve additional dynamics. Ex situ 
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conservation of agricultural plant genetic resources is realised through what is referred to as gene 
banks, following different techniques focusing either on the storage of dried seeds, or on the 
management of crops in fields as living collections or concerned at last with in vitro conservation 
under slow growth conditions
1116
. While the importance to preserve genetic diversity in living 
collections cannot be questioned, their activities have not been sufficient to neither ensure better 
productivity, nor provide for wider genetic bases within varieties used in modern agriculture
1117
. 
Nonetheless, the steady development of crop germplasm preservation in gene banks since their 
launch in the 1920’s with N.I. Vavilov’s efforts may also have undermined the pivotal role of 
farming systems producing the initial germplasm used by institutional breeders. Because ex situ 
centres have put greater emphasis on major crops, tending to neglect those having localised 
importance, they have been at times accused to further expand genetic uniformity worldwide
1118
. 
That is why in situ conservation, designating the management of varietal and genetic diversity on 
farm, has been granted mounting importance. This approach targets the management of 
biodiversity used in agricultural cultivation or as sources of genes directly in habitats where they 
arose and continue to grow
1119
. By allowing plants to dynamically adapt to their environment, on-
farm diversity management allows for the gene exchanges necessary for the enrichment of crop 
varieties
1120
. Farmers themselves depend on the survival of local genetic diversity in order to fully 
meet their ecological needs and to protect their cultural traditions, while modern agriculture also 
depends (even if to a lesser extent) on the existence of what has been called ‘exotic germplasm’, 
whether found in cultivated fields or in the wild
1121
. However, in situ conservation also has 
shortcomings, as domesticated plants may neither possess natural habitats as such but the farm, nor 
survive in cohabitation with their wild relatives
1122
. Furthermore, suspicions on the reliability of 
on-farm management, the impracticability of returning to primitive agriculture
1123
 and the 
availability of the diversity thereby created for plant breeders and users
1124
 corroborates the need 
for an all-encompassing approach to agrobiodiversity conservation.  
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 That is why Article 5 of the ITPGRFA relates to both, by urging Member States to  
“(c) Promote or support, as appropriate, farmers and local communities’ efforts to manage 
and conserve on-farm their plant genetic resources for food and agriculture;  
(d) promote in situ conservation of wild crop relatives and wild plants for food production, 
including in protected areas, by supporting, inter alia, the efforts of indigenous and local 
communities;  
[and also to] (e) cooperate to promote the development of an efficient and sustainable 
system of ex situ conservation, giving due attention to the need for adequate documentation, 
characterization, regeneration and evaluation, and promote the development and transfer 
of appropriate technologies for this purpose with a view to improving the sustainable use of 
plant genetic resources for food and agriculture” (ITPGRFA, Art. 5).  
This double feature is complemented by a requirement to use diversity in a sustainable fashion, 
enshrined in the Treaty’s Article 6, which notably promotes policies  
“(a) pursuing fair agricultural policies that promote, as appropriate, the development and 
maintenance of diverse farming systems,  
(b) strengthening research […] for the benefit of farmers, especially those who generate 
and use their own varieties and apply ecological principles in maintaining soil fertility and 
in combating diseases, weeds and pests;  
(c) promoting, as appropriate, plant breeding efforts which, with the participation of 
farmers, particularly in developing countries, strengthen the capacity to develop varieties 
particularly adapted to social, economic and ecological conditions, including in marginal 
areas;  
(d) broadening the genetic base of crops and increasing the range of genetic diversity 
available to farmers;  
(e) promoting, as appropriate, the expanded use of local and locally adapted crops, 
varieties and underutilized species” (ITPGRFA, Art.6).  
These measures unmistakably highlight the broad understanding of “biodiversity” beyond that of 
biological material, by putting social, cultural and economic considerations at the central stage of 
the “sustainable use” notion. They also put great emphasis on the actors of PRGFA conservation 
and use, advocating the unequivocal recognition of their distinctive contributions to 
agrobiodiversity management, the need for greater participation, and the active promotion of 
conservation-oriented endeavours, especially that of farmers. Indeed, “the “sustainable use of 
agricultural biodiversity” is most simply thought of as all uses of agricultural biodiversity that 
contribute to its conservation and continued availability as an input to agriculture”, according to 
Biodiversity International
1125
. 
11.2.2. Public Domain and Intellectual Property Rights in the ITPGRFA 
Both the International Undertaking and the subsequent ITPGRFA have a very specific approach to 
property rights surrounding agrobiodiversity, especially agricultural plant genetic resources. The 
broader common heritage understanding of the former has had to be replaced by a more 
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constrained view taken into account not only the proliferation of exclusive individual rights but 
also of sovereign rights over these resources.  Both approaches nonetheless embody a clear 
commitment to ensure the greatest rate of availability of plant biodiversity.  
Common heritage understanding of the International Undertaking 
The clearly instrumentalist and anthropocentric approach focusing on the potential uses of 
agrobiodiversity of the International Undertaking was built upon  
“the universally accepted principle that plant genetic resources are a heritage of mankind 
and consequently should be available without restriction” (International Undertaking, 
Art. 1)
1126
.  
According to Philippe CULLET, it is the “common ownership or common management of a given 
resource is referred to as common heritage of mankind [… ], which implies that all states have 
equal access to the resources but also that all states should benefit from the exploitation of a given 
‘common resource’, whether they actually participate in the exploitation or not”. The negotiations 
however showed that proponents of strong intellectual property heavily contested that such 
“universal status” be given to all plant varieties or their components, including improved 
germplasm
1127
. This stance was echoed in the non-binding nature of the text and the important 
reservations made with regards to its content. The Undertaking, signed by one hundred and 
thirteen States, was still considered “a partial victory for the developing countries”1128. Three 
interpretative resolutions to the International Undertaking were adopted in 1989 and 1991 in order 
to level out overarching concerns and reservations voiced by signatory parties, while also trying to 
attract outsider core industrial States. The first resolution recognised the consistency of plant 
breeders’ rights with the provisos of the Undertaking in order to re-assure breeders that their 
prerogatives would not be waived by the “common heritage” status. The second, adopted 
concomitantly, set the groundwork for the recognition of “farmers’ rights” to participate in the 
benefits derived from improved PGRFA. The Undertaking thus also addressed equity concerns 
raised by the sentiment that, while breeders were compensated through royalty payments 
stemming from intellectual property titles, farmers, viewed as the initial germplasm providers, 
were not
1129
. By re-affirming the prospect of exclusive intellectual property rights within a 
“heritage” understanding, these two resolutions were considered by the Conference as foundation-
layers for a lasting equitable global system for sharing the costs and benefits attached to 
agricultural biodiversity, on a background of unhampered access to genetic resources
1130
. The 
Undertaking is a non-binding system that attempts to carve principles around the access and use of 
agricultural plant genetic resources. It strives to make sure these resources are made available for 
“for the purposes of scientific research, plant breeding or genetic resource conservation”, but that 
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 they are also exchanged in an unrestricted fashion, to corroborate the international dependency of 
agrobiodiversity flows.   
In this context, “Governments and institutions having plant genetic resources under their 
control to allow access to samples of such resources, and to permit their export, where the 
resources have been requested for the purposes of scientific research, plant breeding or 
genetic resource conservation. The samples will be made available free of charge, on the 
basis of mutual exchange or on mutually agreed terms.” (IU, Article 5)  
 An internationally coordinated network of national, regional and international centres was to 
be created “under the auspices or the jurisdiction of FAO, that have assumed the 
responsibility to hold, for the benefit of the international community and on the principle of 
unrestricted exchange, base or active collections of the plant genetic resources of particular 
plant species” (IU, Art. 7).   
In an attempt to bring clarity to the nebulous legal web and to give substance to the 
aforementioned principle of “unrestricted exchange”, the CGIAR centres signed the so-called “in-
trust agreements” with the FAO in 1994, reaffirming the place of their gene collections within 
the IU’s “international network of ex situ collections”1131. The centres had to ensure that recipients 
of their material did not claim any ownership over exchanged genetic resources, while hazily 
pondering on the extent of (or lack thereof) prerogatives for all further uses and improvements on 
their material. To this end, they reiterated the 'common heritage' status of resources held within 
their auspices and adopted guidelines trying to ensure these resources remained in the public 
domain
1132
.  The materialising practice nonetheless failed short of effectively acknowledging the 
specificity of agricultural biodiversity in a context of commodity-oriented international legal 
landscape.  
The multilateral access and benefit-sharing mechanism of the International Treaty 
While its predecessor, the 1983 International Undertaking, considered agricultural plant genetic 
resources as a “heritage of mankind available without restriction”, the 2004 ITPGRFA has had to 
adopt its approach to the precepts of international trade and environmental law. The Treaty’s first 
articles are noticeably silent about the legal status of agricultural plant genetic resources. The issue 
is rather addressed indirectly, since its article 10§1 goes on to state that Contracting Parties  
“recognise the sovereign rights of States over their own plant genetic resources for food 
and agriculture, including that the authority to determine access to those resources rests 
with national governments and is subject to national legislation” (ITPGRFA, Article 
10§1).  
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Gone is therefore the “common heritage” understanding from the vaults of the FAO legislative 
tools, to be replaced by the overarchingly binding recognition of State sovereignty over natural 
resources, and also exclusive individual rights over innovation products and processes. It is by 
exercising such sovereign rights that the ITPGRFA signatories do nonetheless espouse the idea of 
a multilateral system for access and benefit sharing (“MLS”), as an  
“efficient, effective, and transparent, both to facilitate access to plant genetic resources for 
food and agriculture, and to share, in a fair and equitable way, the benefits arising from 
the utilisation of these resources, on a complementary and mutually reinforcing basis” 
(ITPGRFA, Article 10§2).  
This proviso acts as the cornerstone through which a genetic resources commons is established
1133
. 
Consensus was almost spontaneously reached on the specificity of agricultural plant genetic 
resources, and the impracticality of CBD-like bilateral mechanisms for agricultural germplasm. 
Compared to other fields of biodiversity use like pharmaceuticals for instance, the bargaining 
positions of developing countries was indeed weaker for resources used for agricultural purposes. 
Not only did they “lack the scientific and technological capacity to capture the benefits of 
agrobiodiversity themselves, [but it was also impossible or unfeasible to apportion] benefits 
fairly”1134. It was unquestionably accepted that bilateral negotiations would infuse heavy burdens 
into the initial stages of research and development, as crop improvement remained inherently 
incremental in nature
1135
. Furthermore, it was also extremely difficult, maybe even impossible to 
trace back the origin of agricultural plant genetic material, due to the inherently international 
interdependency and intertwined resource exchange patterns. This characteristic was successfully 
put forward during the negotiations, especially on account of efforts undertaken by the FAO and 
the Commission on Genetic Resources for Foof and Agriculture
1136
. Studies regarding the patterns 
of accessions in gene banks corroborated the finding of interdependency, showing for instance that 
more than eighty per cent of accessions requested by Uganda and Kenya before the CGIAR 
network between 1980 and 2004 were mostly collected in other continents
1137
. Another study 
revealed that the network did create a so-called “multiplier effect” that did not solely consist of 
South to North exchanges but rather enjoyed a multi-tiered nature
1138
. Another crucial element 
related to the difficulty to determine the country of origin of agricultural plant genetic resources 
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 beyond those Vavilovian centres of genetic origin (viewed often times as being overly 
simplistic
1139
). This difficulty was heightened on account of the complex genealogical trees of 
improved plant varieties’, attributed to the multiple crosses made by farmers and breeders to 
develop them
1140
. The analysis of new varieties' pedigrees, such as the Sonalika wheat, a product 
of the Green Revolution, showed that modern crop improvement was a product of the combination 
of genetic resources from all over the world and did not rely on a limited number of raw 
materials
1141
.  
Addressing biopiracy issues was therefore not the main urge for regulation, trumped by the 
specificity of agricultural research and development. The main perspective revolved around the 
need to maintain a widest possible public domain, used to promote social welfare enhancing 
PGRFA uses, all the while permeating such domain with equity considerations and recognising 
thereby the ancestral contributions to agrobiodiversity conservation and knowledge. In spite of 
valid biopiracy claims, the dissemination of knowledge and technology from CGIAR centres and 
the inherent features of agricultural production heavily attenuated the issue of biodiversity 
misappropriation. Knowledge dissemination indeed stemmed not only from the essence of the 
living and reproduction-based plant breeding science as such, but also due to the role and approach 
of agricultural scientists to questions of access and ownership. Scholars pointed out in this regard 
that the practice of international research programs may have held the acquisitive aspect of 
biological collections, but did not hold the exploitative side attached to their colonial roots
1142
. 
Evidence for this argument stems from the analysis of germplasm flows from the CGIAR centres 
to the developing world, suggesting that international gene banks actively contribute to 
agricultural development in these countries by providing them the breeding lines of the wild 
genetic diversity collected by the centres. These transfers enhance agricultural research in these 
“resource-rich and cash-poor” countries by reducing the cost of national crop development 
programmes (that would otherwise need to invest to identify the exact gene pool and the parents of 
these genetic resources).  
Even with such consensus and seemingly less-tensed negotiating standpoints, intense debates 
lingered on the materials that would be subject to the MLS set in motion, the extent to which 
intellectual property rights could condition material obtained from the MLS, and the reach of 
farmers’ rights that would be exported from the IU’s interpretative resolution as a counterpart to 
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the recognition of potential IPR titles
1143
. The basic tenets of the“Multilateral System of Facilitated 
access and Benefit Sharing for using and conserving the listed major food crops within the public 
domain for research, breeding and training” was espoused in Articles 10 to 13 of the Treaty. In 
this context, the first hurdle was to determine the material that would be infused in such system. 
As a result of tedious and complex negotiations, the pool of genetic material falling within the 
MLS is determined extremely unstraightforwardly.  
The MLS “covers the plant genetic resources for food and agriculture listed in Annex I, 
established according to criteria of food security and interdependence” (ITPGRFA, Article 
11§1), but “includes all plant genetic resources for food and agriculture listed in Annex I 
that are under the management and control of the Contracting Parties and in the public 
domain” (11§2), those material “held in the ex situ collections of the International 
Agricultural Research Centres of the CGIAR” (11§5) while “Contracting Parties also 
agree to take appropriate measures to encourage natural and legal persons within their 
jurisdiction” (11§3) who hold potential MLS material to put it within the system1144.  
The pool of genetic material falling within the MLS covers thirty five crop species and twenty nine 
forage species upon which the world is interdependent and which are critical to food security, and 
are mostly held by governments and the International Agricultural Research Centres of the 
Consultative Group on International Agricultural Research. Indeed, the latter have signed so-called 
“Article 15 Agreements” with the Treaty Secretariat in order to make all their germplasm available 
under the MLS1145. The restrictions of the MLS to only those crops listed in Annex I, which was set 
up on political grounds rather than scientific rationale, has effectively side-lined major crops such 
as soy bean, strategic vegetables such as tomato or pepper, and other cash crops like agroforestry 
or ornamentals
1146
. It has been widely and quite vocally criticised as undermining the reach of the 
system. The total number of accessions secured under the MLS represents “is close to the twenty 
three per cent of the almost five million accessions of Annex I crops” worldwide, and is mostly 
attributed to international gene banks’ and to national contributions, such as the Canadian 
Department of Agriculture
1147
. Notwithstanding its inherent limits, by facilitating access to a 
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 number of genetic resources, the MLS does still attempt to create a genetic resources 
commons
1148
, as a “core norm” of the ITPGRFA1149.  
Notwithstanding its inherent interpretative limitations, the MLS renders any ad hoc bilateral 
negotiations between providers and recipients irrelevant
1150
 for a total of sixty-four species listed 
in Annex I of the ITPGRFA, and triggers (at least in theory) benefit sharing through the provisions 
of the standard Material Transfer Agreement
1151
 (sMTA) to be used at the entry to the MLS and 
throughout its navigation.  
Access to MLS material, which should be “provided solely for the purpose of utilisation 
and conservation for research, breeding and training for food and agriculture, [… and 
most of all should be] accorded expeditiously, without the need to track individual 
accessions and free of charge, or when a fee is charged, it shall not exceed the minimal 
cost involved” (ITPGRFA, Article 12§3).  
Such access is nonetheless conditional to a number of rights and obligations set out by the sMTA. 
These obligations evidently aim to implement the ITPGRFA provisos, especially with regards to 
benefit-sharing, which should be executed  
“fairly and equitably through the following mechanisms: the exchange of information, 
access to and transfer of technology, capacity-building, and the sharing of the benefits 
arising from commercialisation” (ITPGRFA, article 13§2).  
The latter benefits are shared through a designated trust mechanism, to which the recipients 
contribute in the event that products are commercialised while incorporating material “in the form 
received”1152 and being “available with restriction”.  
Product-based commercial benefit-sharing is triggered “in the case that the recipient 
commercialises a product that is a plant genetic resource for food and agriculture and that 
incorporates material as referred to in article 3 of this agreement, and where such product 
is not available without restriction to others for further research and breeding, the 
recipient shall pay a fixed percentage of [0.77 per cent of] the sales of the commercialised 
product into the mechanism established by the Governing Body for this purpose” (sMTA, 
article 6§7).  
To be “available without restriction, a product should be  
“available for research and breeding without any legal or contractual obligations, or 
technological restrictions, that would preclude using it in the manner specified in the 
Treaty” (sMTA, Article 2), which designates the event of patent protection over the 
commercialised product or its components.  
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Notwithstanding the extremely conditional nature of such trigger, as well as the time needed for it 
to show its tangible effects in long breeding cycles, the principle of benefit-sharing under the 
ITPGRFA presents numerous additional flaw. Indeed, the mere reality that most countries do not 
allow for the patentability of plant varieties, and rather have recourse to plant variety rights, just as 
the additional sour reality that “larger ‘crop life’ companies are avoiding, whenever possible, 
accessing material through the multilateral system”1153, seriously puts the efficiency of this equity-
minded angle in jeopardy. This avoidance is also attributed to the very disparate interpretations 
that could be given to the notion of “availability without restriction”. Indeed, industry players tend 
to argue that only patents which do not include neither a breeders, nor a farmers’ exception would 
trigger such mandatory benefit-sharing, leaving the sui generis plant variety rights outside of this 
scope, even the titles awarded under the 1991 UPOV Text. Interestingly, the public sector also is 
of a similar view, arguing that patents, technological restrictions and contractual or license 
restrictions may trigger mandatory benefit-sharing, but plant breeders’ rights would not1154. 
However, certain commentators have argued that not only should patent protection be presumed to 
restrict access for research and breeding, but such premise should also include UPOV 1991-type 
plant variety protection, since these “impede informal exchange and sale of seeds, [reducing] 
opportunities for on-farm breeding, varietal improvement and selection by farmers” just as other 
technical means in the like of hybrids or genetic-use-restriction technologies should also trigger 
mandatory benefit-sharing under the sMTA1155. It is nonetheless extremely unlikely that the 
development of hybrids or even the grant of plant variety protection may be considered such a 
trigger in reality, seeing the already undeniable reticence of the industry and national research 
institutes in that regard.  
Other means of benefit-sharing are also provided for, namely the solution of “voluntary payments” 
(sMTA article 6§8), and more interestingly, the so-called African proposal of “crop-related 
payments under the sMTA” (sMTA article 6§11), triggering the payment obligation “as soon as 
the recipient sells any product of the respective crop”, without regard as to whether it incorporates 
material received from the MLS
1156
.  
Voluntary payments stem from the fact that “In the case that the Recipient commercializes 
a Product that is a Plant Genetic Resource for Food and Agriculture and that incorporates 
Material as referred to in Article 3 of this Agreement and where that Product is available 
without restriction to others for further research and breeding, the Recipient is encouraged 
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 to make voluntary payments into the mechanism established by the Governing Body for this 
purpose in accordance with Annex 2 to this Agreement” (sMTA, Art.6.8). 
Whereas the alternative option to mandatory payments stems from the assertion that 
“The Recipient may opt as per Annex 4, as an alternative to payments under Article 6.7, 
for the following system of payments:  
a) The Recipient shall make payments at a discounted rate during the period of validity of the 
option;  
b) The period of validity of the option shall be ten years renewable in accordance with Annex 3 
to this Agreement;  
c) The payments shall be based on the Sales of any Products and of the sales of any other 
products that are Plant Genetic Resources for Food and Agriculture belonging to the same 
crop, as set out in Annex 1 to the Treaty, to which the Material referred to in Annex 1 to 
this Agreement belongs;  
d) The payments to be made are independent of whether or not the Product is available 
without restriction;  
e) The rates of payment and other terms and conditions applicable to this option, including the 
discounted rates are set out in Annex 3 to this Agreement;  
f) The Recipient shall be relieved of any obligation to make payments under Article 6.7 of this 
Agreement or any previous or subsequent Standard Material Transfer Agreements entered 
into in respect of the same crop;  
g) After the end of the period of validity of this option the Recipient shall make payments on 
any Products that incorporate Material received during the period in which this Article 
was in force, and where such Products are not available without restriction. These 
payments will be calculated at the same rate as in paragraph (a) above;  
h) The Recipient shall notify the Governing Body that he has opted for this modality of 
payment. If no notification is provided the alternative modality of payment specified in 
Article 6.7 will apply" (sMTA, art.6.11).  
 
This article establishes a ‘crop-based’ modality of payment, as the recipient pays its contribution 
on the basis of the sales of products that constitute plant genetic resources that belong to the same 
crop of the MLS sample received and used.   
“Article 6.11 was proposed by the African Group during the negotiations leading to the 
adoption of the SMTA, as a result of its concern about the long period that would be 
normally necessary to develop new varieties that eventually incorporate materials from 
the MLS and the limited circumstances in which the obligation to pay might arise out 
under article 6.7 of the SMTA”1157. 
To this day, no money has come to fuel the Benefit-Sharing Fund of the Treaty from any of these 
options. Irrespective of the innovative benefit-sharing approach of the ITPGRFA, it also 
contractually bounds subsequent users through the viral license established by article 12§4, which 
commands that  
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“the provision that the recipient of the plant genetic resources for food and agriculture 
shall require that the conditions of the MTA shall apply to the transfer of plant genetic 
resources for food and agriculture to another person or entity, as well as to any subsequent 
transfers of those plant genetic resources for food and agriculture”. (sMTA, Article 12§4).  
Nonetheless “nothing in the text of the ITPGRFA and the SMTA [suggests] that their drafters 
intended to limit the freedom of the subsequent recipient to opt for any of the payment 
modalities”; the latter could thus “opt for article 6.11 of the SMTA even if the provider had opted 
for article 6.7, and vice-versa”1158. Epinous questions quickly arose at to the status of MLS 
materials transferred through the sMTA. The first one related to the fate of material “under 
development”, determining whether it could be possible to put restrictions on the further transfer 
of such material to a third party.  
“Plant Genetic Resources for Food and Agriculture under Development” means material 
derived from the Material, and hence distinct from it, that is not yet ready for 
commercialization and which the developer intends to further develop or to transfer to 
another person or entity for further development. The period of development for the 
PGRFA under Development shall be deemed to have ceased when those resources are 
commercialised as a Product”, (sMTA, Art 3).  
Both the Treaty and the sMTA establish as a principle that  
“Access to plant genetic resources for food and agriculture under development, including 
material being developed by farmers, shall be at the discretion of its developer, during the 
period of its development” (ITPGRA, Art. 12.3e, and sMTA, Art. 5c). 
In this context, the Provider is granted greater discretion, as he may also establish 
additional conditions, within “the right of the parties to attach additional conditions, 
relating to further product development”, including inter alia, the right to exclude others 
from using said material
1159
. 
The second challenge faced by the reach of the MLS was to determine whether material developed 
by the CG centres having signed agreements under the Treaty, or any other MLS user could be 
made available to farmers for direct use for cultivation with or without a sMTA1160.  
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 It has in this regard been “considered an accepted practice of the CG Centres, not altering 
the integrity of the Multilateral System, and a right of Contracting Parties, to make 
improved material they have developed from material acquired from the Multilateral 
System available to farmers for direct use. This is indeed a fundamental objective of the 
Multilateral System”.  
Intellectual property rights, the material from the MLS and plant innovation actors 
The system does display “characteristics of a global public good, in so far as Article 12 establishes 
that Parties to the Treaty are to provide access to those PGRFA held within the joint pool, to other 
parties and to legal and natural persons under the jurisdiction of any party” to the Treaty1161. The 
public domain fenced by the ITPGRFA in this regard also stems from its approach to intellectual 
property rights. 
Indeed, “recipients shall not claim any intellectual property or other rights that limit the 
facilitated access to the plant genetic resources for food and agriculture, or their genetic 
parts or components, in the form received from the Multilateral System” (ITPGRFA, 
Article 12§3d).  
In light of such a primordial yet purposely vague provision that represents “a careful compromise 
among the delegations”1162, there is nonetheless an urgent need to better define the scope of 
“genetic parts and components”, just as the notion of “in the form received”1163. Indeed, the 
divergent interpretations of negotiators and signatories on the exact reach of such restraint over 
private appropriation and the lack of subsequent agreement on the subject in the Treaty’s 
Governing Body meetings have considerably blurred the boundaries of the agrobiodiversity public 
domain. While developed country breeders tend to argue that the form of a variety received from 
the MLS is altered through deliberate crossings and especially biotechnological tools, “the donors 
of landraces and wild forms, […] argue that the operated transformation, even by biotechnological 
means, is of minor importance”, making them staples of the MLS1164. Numerous countries, 
including the European Union, have in this regard enacted interpretative declarations stating that 
“PGRFA or their parts or components having undergone innovation may be subject to IP 
protection”1165. The industry has also come up with its own interpretation of the provision, stating 
that 
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“It is possible to claim intellectual property or other rights that limit access to the genetic 
parts or components isolated or inherited from the material received, provided of course 
that the patentability criteria are fulfilled and in particular the utility one in case of patent. 
A genetic sequence as such, without proved industrial activity, should not be patentable. 
However, the rights granted should in no case limit access to the initial genetic 
material”1166.  
The threshold of “formal identity” between the material acquired through the MLS and the 
material where intellectual property protection is sought after could in this sense be “interpreted as 
allowing IP once significant, inventive manipulation has occurred”1167. But it cannot in any case be 
interpreted as preventing or curtailing the grant of exclusive titles on products or processes 
obtained by using genetic resources obtained through the ITPGRFA system.  
“Whether this provision means that no IPRs of any sort can be claimed or that IPRs could 
be obtained as long as those rights do not limit the facilitated access is still uncertain – an 
uncertainty that has carried over into the SMTA. There is further uncertainty as to what 
'parts and components' mean in practice and the extent to which IPRs may be claimed over 
them. Different parties have differing takes on what this provision means. Most developed 
countries interpret it as meaning that IPRs can be taken out on a product if some 
improvement or modification has been made, in other words if it is not 'in the form 
received' from the Multilateral System. However, most developing countries take the view 
that 'parts and components' implies that products containing parts and components of 
resources received from the Multilateral System, as well as derivatives, are covered by this 
provision and that it therefore prohibits IPRs over them. Parties fully recognise and admit 
these differences in interpretation and, it is hoped that the Governing Body of the Treaty 
will at some point in the future address the issue and give a definitive interpretation 
consistent with the spirit of the Treaty”1168. 
Furthermore, the contractual commons set out by the ITPGRFA is set out in a viral license-like 
fashion with regards to the obligation of sharing the benefits arising from the use of MLS material 
that is not made available without restriction for further research or breeding.  
“A Recipient who obtains intellectual property rights on any Products developed from the 
Material or its components, obtained from the Multilateral System, and assigns such 
intellectual property rights to a third party, shall transfer the benefit-sharing obligations of 
this Agreement to that third party”. (sMTA, Article 6.10) 
This objective is not only the conservation and sustainable use of agricultural plant genetic 
diversity as such, but also echoes to an additional aspect of the ITPGRFA that addresses the 
property regime of agrobiodiversity, i.e. the appraisal of farmers’ rights. The Treaty proclaims 
the so-called farmers’ rights in its Article 9, as a bundle of socio-economic rights including those 
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 related to seeds, as, amongst other rationales, a response to the evolution of the farmers’ privilege 
to save and exchange protected seeds into a clear exception to the exclusive rights of breeders, 
rather than an array of acts considered outside the scope of the IP title in itself
1169
. The substantial 
content of such farmers’ rights is not straightforwardly defined. A number of measures are 
nonetheless listed in order to protect and promote these rights, but their scope shall be defined 
within national legal orders. 
“The Contracting Parties agree that the responsibility for realising Farmers's Rights, as they 
relate to plant genetic resources for food and agriculture, rests with national governments. In 
accordance with their needs and priorities, each Contracting Party should, as appropriate, 
and subject to its national legislation, take measures to protect and promote Farmers's 
Rights, including: 
- The protection of traditional knowledge relevant to plant genetic resources for food and 
agriculture; 
- The right to equitably participate in sharing benefits arising from the utilisation of plant 
genetic resources for food and agriculture; and 
- The right to participate in making decisions, at the national level, on matters related to the 
conservation and sustainable use of plant genetic resources for food and agriculture” 
(ITPGRFA, Art.9.2). 
Linking the protection of farmers’ rights to traditional knowledge and insisting on the participatory 
aspects that accompany this bundle of rights, article 9 seems to further condition farmers’ rights to 
save or exchange seeds to national law and the “appropriateness” of the measures. Indeed, 
“nothing in this Article shall be interpreted to limit any rights that farmers have to save, 
use, exchange and sell farm-saved seed/propagating material, subject to national law and 
as appropriate” (ITPGRFA, Art.9.3).  
The Treaty Secretariat combines the “Submissions of Views and Experiences on the 
Implementation of Farmers’ Rights Submitted by Contracting Parties and Relevant 
Organisations”, to which unfortunately only three countries have contributed, namely Madagascar, 
Norway and Poland, while no less than ten non-governmental organisations have made 
submissions between 2012 and 20131170. As the notion of farmers’ rights is solely addressed in the 
international arena through article 9 of the ITPGRFA, which clearly states that the substantial 
content of such notion shall be granted by national law-makers, the exact extent of prerogatives 
that could potentially impact the PGRFA public domain remains unclear. It is nonetheless 
generally understood that its scope goes beyond the farmers’ privilege enshrined as an exception to 
plant variety (or even patent) protection in certain legal for a, since the main rationale is to “ensure 
sufficient legal space for farmers to continue saving, using, exchanging and selling farm-saved-
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seed and other propagating material” through all means necessary1171. Farmers’ rights may thus 
impact traditional IP regimes but also seed marketing laws, as well as subsidisation policies. 
CONCLUSION Principles of International Environmental Law: public domain and 
intellectual property rights  
National sovereignty claims were first declared at the level of the Untied Nations General 
Assembly, and then subsequently consecrated through global environmental conferences, in order 
to balance the ineffective and uneven distribution stemming from historical free access and 
exchange patterns
1172
. The developmental and biopiracy narrative was translated into a restriction 
of the biodiversity public domain through access and benefit-sharing obligations, coupled with 
parallel conservation objectives. The Convention on Biological Diversity builds a public domain 
that is restricted by a bilateral liability mechanism attached to the access to sovereign resources, 
which triggers ex ante or ex post benefit sharing. The International Treaty on Plant Genetic 
Resources for Food and Agriculture builds on the other hand an enlarged public domain that is 
only restricted through a conditional multilateral liability mechanism triggered either ex post from 
the award of titles restricting the availability of resources listed in the Treaty’s Annex I or ex ante 
through the so-called “African Proposal”.  
Faced with more interdependent and tangled genetic resources, negotiations were indeed carried 
out within the FAO mainly in order to address the property regime applicable to the public and 
common heritage held notably within CGIAR collections. These two sets of regulatory 
instruments have acquainted the international community with the principles of national 
sovereignty, benefit-sharing, traditional knowledge and farmers’ rights. Striving to conserve 
biological diversity and ensure the sustainable and equitable use of its components, international 
environmental instruments have further contributed to the commodification of biodiversity, 
advocating a regime shift in property rights, and a newly defined agrobiodiversity public domain. 
Just as the ITPGRFA grants facilitated access to germplasm for use “in training and research” in 
the multilateral system, the CBD, and most importantly the Nagoya Protocol recognises the 
specificity of non-commercial research. Furthermore, both instruments acknowledge the 
contributions of indigenous and farming communities, in terms of the knowledge attached genetic 
resources and their role in the conservation of biodiversity on site. The public domain of 
agrobiodiversity is also assorted by further bundles of rights pertaining to the protection of 
traditional knowledge and the recognition of farmers’ rights. International environmental law thus 
shapes the so-called “Plant Genetic Resources System” and reserves different rights and 
obligations to its stakeholders, fencing the public domain of upstream biological material. 
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 PART IV CONCLUSIONS. Salvaging international trade and environmental law through 
the public domain 
Since its inception, the international law of biodiversity, whether in its most general understanding 
or its specific agricultural leg, has been guided by a desire to ensure the conservation and 
sustainable use of natural and therefore also genetic resources. All entitlements awarded through 
these instruments should therefore in principle be viewed in such environmental lens. In this 
approach, sovereign rights, access regulations and benefit-sharing obligations have all been drafted 
through a conservation objective. However, the international legal regime’s reality is much more 
complex than such assertion, as most of its measures have also been adopted following economic 
and developmental considerations, including distributive justice appeals. Indeed, the conservation 
of biodiversity remains very much linked to biodiversity’s economic value and associated 
ecosystem services in international law. In this context, first the CBD and then arguably to a lesser 
extent the ITPGRFA have both hallowed the monetisation and the enclosure of biodiversity within 
a sovereignty-bound property approach, following the re-affirmation of developing countries’ right 
to development. The CBD system remains built around national sovereignty claims which aim to 
balance the ineffective and uneven socio-economic welfare distribution stemming from free access 
and exchange patterns, advocating both benefit-sharing and conservation obligations. Negotiations 
carried out within the FAO rather aimed to preserve the public and common heritage held notably 
within CGIAR collections, taking due account of the characteristics of intertwined agricultural 
germplasm flows and of the sequential nature of agrobiodiversity use.  
Notwithstanding their notional differences, these two sets of regulatory instruments have 
acquainted the international community with shared principles of national sovereignty, benefit-
sharing, traditional knowledge and farmers’ rights. Both agreements have contributed to an 
understanding of genetic resources as commodities, available, exploitable and officially tradable 
on markets, just as much as the international and national prerogatives which have carved the 
strong intellectual property paradigm. The principles of international environmental law have 
indeed built additional and equally solid fences around the PGRFA public domain. The reach of 
these instruments theoretically solely limit the status of genetic resources upstream, mainly on 
account of the sovereign rights that herald the obligation to share the benefits arising from the use 
of genetic resources. It also in parallel concedes terrain to collective rights attached to farmers and 
to traditional knowledge, while acknowledging the specific nature of scientific research or 
breeding efforts. In this sense, the new biodiversity public domain is not only affected by the 
extent of intellectual property prerogatives, its new boundaries depend upon a number of factors. 
The new public domain depends on the exercise of each Provider State’s sovereign rights to 
determine the conditions that surround the access to genetic resources and the modalities that have 
been set out in order to share the benefits deriving from their use. In accordance with the 
provisions of the Nagoya Protocol or as CBD compliant legislation, States need to establish 
whether they will seek out “prior informed consent” for those resources under their control. If they 
seek out such consent, a number of principles need to accompany the contractual framework of 
“mutually agreed terms”, triggering ex ante or ex post compensation for the use of genetic 
resources. Compliance mechanisms need to be put in place to ensure that such consent and terms 
have been sought for and respected by genetic resource users. States may sovereignly decide to 
take part in the ITPGRFA system, designating those Annex I crops that will be accessed under 
the terms of the “Multilateral System”, and the benefits of which shall be collected and shared 
under the terms of the “standard Material Transfer Agreement”. Benefit-sharing would be 
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triggered in the event the material is not made available for further research or breeding or through 
an ex ante crop-specific lump sum payment.Furthermore, no intellectual property right could cover 
the material “in the form received” from the Multilateral system, thus restricting the reach of the 
intellectual property paradigm in signatory countries. The new agrobiodiversity public domain will 
also depend on the national implementation of new collective rights enshrined at the international 
arena. The CBD obligation of States to “respect, preserve and maintain traditional knowledge”, 
and the ITPGRFA obligation of States to “realise, protect and promote farmers’ rights”.  
The adjustments operated to the agrobiodiversity public domain by international environmental 
law have not solely infused equity and sustainability into the management of plant genetic 
resources; they have at times also hampered the realisation of the distributive justice objectives 
they were set out for. Indeed, the bilateral approach of the CBD, through restrictive national 
stances to grant access to sovereign resources, or hardy negotiations over ex ante or ex post benefit 
sharing, has been accused of contributing to the creation of yet another “tragedy of the anti-
commons”. This time, the anti-commons effect is concerned with raw plant genetic resources, the 
access to which is completely depended upon the sovereign decisions of provider States, not even 
the users or maintainers of genetic resources. Nor are the sovereign prerogatives accompanied by 
requirements that may help carve a public domain, such as those related to the time limits, 
disclosure or liability rules that traditionally come hand in hand with intellectual property rights. 
Furthermore, the sovereignty-oriented access and benefit sharing debate is serving extremely 
diverging and inherently conflicting approaches, as for instance the desire to ensure the benefits of 
research and development are shared while restricting access to resource use in order to prevent 
biological piracy1173. In this sense, the regime established by the ITPGRFA considerably differs 
from the CBD approach, even though it is mandatorily based upon customary sovereign rights. 
The Treaty indeed is constructed as an enlarged public domain that is only restricted through the 
multilateral liability mechanism that sovereign States have decided to set up for a number of crops. 
Furthermore, in practice, the trade-bound legal instruments that regulate the formal seed market 
have in effect outplayed those instruments regulating the conditions of access to genetic resources 
and the sharing of benefits deriving from their use. The principles enshrined in international 
environmental law seem difficult to apply faced with a public domain that is growingly 
restrictively fenced in light of the new needs of agrobiodiversity innovation.  
However, and notwithstanding its inherent potentially hazardous anti-commons effects, 
international biodiversity law also presents vital tools that attempt to redress certain failures of the 
strong property paradigm vis-à-vis specific actors of plant improvement. In our view, the 
reassessment that such finding entails does not necessarily require the obliteration of the strong 
property paradigm as a whole, but can rather be found within its lines. Having due regard to the 
incorporeal nature of relevant innovations, the ease of reverse-engineering and the colossal 
investments required for their development, systems drawing from completely open source models 
or from such understanding would in our view fail to deliver significant portions of socially, 
agronomically or environmentally meaningful innovations. The recognition of intellectual property 
rights, even in their strongest forms, remains a beneficial and necessary tool for the development 
of easily replicated innovations that are neither incremental nor foundational. Instruments 
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 developed by the biotechnology-heavy plant variety improvement chain would require and 
benefit from such restrictive approach. However, the dominant bundle of rights may need to be 
revised and adapted to the needs and practices of other agrobiodiversity users, especially those 
“who produce information without intending to sell their output as a good […] such as 
universities, public interest organisations and individuals who communicate with each other either 
as “amateurs” or as professionals driven by internal motivations not by a profit motive”1174.  
These actors include public plant breeders and molecular biologists who strive towards the 
production of public goods, as well as farmers and gardeners who conserve and develop landrace 
populations”. Less obviously, it also includes commercial organisations and individual 
professionals that operate on a service model that provides free access to information around 
which the service is rendered, rather than the sale of information as product”1175, which arguably 
covers conventional plant breeders deeply attached to the breeders’ exception and plant variety 
rights.  
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PART V  ADJUSTMENTS AND SOLUTIONS TO THE PROPERTY PARADIGM 
BUILDING ON SOCIAL ORGANISATIONAL INNOVATION  
Intellectual property schemes have failed to achieve what they were initially tailored for in all 
agrobiodiversity improvement chains, i.e. fostering and supporting innovative endeavours. 
Dichotomies in economic development and excessively restrictive appropriation and diffusion 
rules have precluded certain actors of plant improvement from using the growth opportunities 
others have benefited from. Partly as a result of such developmental opportunity dichotomies and 
the uniformisation of plant improvement, the strong property paradigm has been permeated by 
both sustainability and equity pleas found in the much more disparate prerogatives of international 
biodiversity conservation law. Developing countries, and a number of industrialised nations, have 
embraced the opportunity to shift back the dominant trade regime so as to integrate the principles, 
norms and rules found in hard or soft law instruments governing natural and agricultural 
biodiversity
1176
. Both biodiversity provider nations and advocacy groups have pushed for a 
revision of the strong IP paradigm towards harmonisation with the CBD and ITPGRFA, and the 
accommodation of ABS rules, recognising traditional knowledge and farmers’ rights1177. Not only 
has the interface between the international rules of trade and environmental law been the focus of 
the revision of Article 27§3b of TRIPS, they have also been specifically coined “outstanding 
implementation issues [which would] be an integral part of the Work Programme” by the 
subsequent Doha Ministerial Declaration
1178
. These considerations led to a serious questioning of 
the TRIPS provisions, calling for its replacement by “alternate intellectual property paradigms”, or 
less intrusively calling to modify its interpretation or implementation
1179
.  
We will experiment with the in-built flexibilities of the global IP paradigm, to ensure that 
sustainability and equity pleas are addressed, and particularly to ensure that the needs of all plant 
improvement users and all socio-technological contexts of innovation are addressed in the national 
implementation of plant-related intellectual property rights. Critics and practice have both 
highlighted the genuine insufficiencies of the strong IPR regime in various areas, such as the 
disregard for in situ agrobiodiversity conservation, the tricky coexistence of patents and plant 
breeders’ rights, the difficult access to platform technologies, research tools or to private pools of 
improved seed varieties, the lack of protection of collective informal innovation or the little regard 
with regards to the misappropriation of public or traditional knowledge. However, due to their 
piecemeal nature, these critics have not yet produced a major shift in the paradigm. Nor have the 
proposed alternative solutions been able to impose themselves as valid and viable institutional 
mechanisms. What is missing in such piecemeal approaches to the institutional effectiveness 
and/or defects of the protection of agrobiodiversity-related intangibles, in our view, is the fact that 
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 solutions have not been grounded on the emerging and normative practices of relevant 
agrobiodiversity users. This fresh approach draws in from a systematic analysis of the impacts of 
the institutional paradigm of strong intellectual property rights on each of these groups. In this 
context, tailor-made innovative solutions can and should be used to overcome the deadlocks in 
implementing the general property principles of both the CBD and the ITPGRFA next to the need 
to provide artificial lead-time to worthy innovators. This exercise will assist policy-makers, but 
also stakeholders in reclaiming a PGRFA public domain that is sustainable, equitable and efficient, 
fostering both formal and informal innovation, accounting clear compensation for all knowledge 
contributors, while also preserving biodiversity for present and future generations. Furthermore, in 
the specific case of innovation based on natural resources that embodies inherent sustainability 
concerns, the need to draw on new modes of operations brought by novel configurations of actors, 
institutions and practices has increasingly been recognised, in innovation or transition studies 
alike1180.   
All the solutions that will be investigated in this study will rest within or around existing 
intellectual property rights instruments or management tools. They will however not be found 
within the development and prospectively extensive protection paradigm. They will rather reclaim 
the historical balance between monopoly rights and the public domain that was illustrated in the 
first chapter of this research. They will do so by incorporating the emerging social actor practices 
that make room for the principles of sustainability and environmental justice stemming from 
international environmental law. Our current intellectual property system can indeed provide 
sufficient flexibility so as to set up an equitable knowledge-based economy, accommodating the 
rights and needs of all actors involved in agrobiodiversity innovation, from the farmers to the 
public or private breeders, producers, microbiologists and consumers. Unfortunately, as 
acknowledged by the Crucible Group,  
“there has been a distressing lack of inventiveness in encouraging innovation. It is possible 
for a country, for example, to develop a sui generis IP system that varies the years of 
protection depending upon the species involved (as UPOV does), or excludes certain 
species (for example, some or all basic food crops). Sui generis national laws could vary 
the scope of protection for different biomaterial categories such as medicinal plants and 
food crops. The application criteria could also be adjustable depending upon the purpose of 
the invention or even its origin. It might also be possible to establish unique rules covering 
national treatment, national working, licencing provisions (compulsory or automatic 
licences), or a system that discriminates in its fee structure on the basis of nation of 
origin”1181. 
Acknowledging that no perfect trade-off between protection, access and diffusion can exist, those 
rights, privileges and use conditions inherent to the current patent and PVP paradigms could be 
adequately distributed into a coherent regulatory framework which would better address the needs 
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of all contexts of agrobiodiversity-reliant innovation. The adoption of an entirely novel intellectual 
property paradigm seems indeed at this point rather unlikely and perhaps not necessary. This 
reality holds true especially in view of the colossal task of reconciling widely differing actors' 
often conflicting interests and diverging research and development priorities. It is indeed national 
priorities that should drive any decision as to what, or if, IP systems are required in support of 
innovation. We therefore believe the task at hand hinges on experimenting in a more consistent 
manner with various models and emerging agrobiodiversity user practices that build partially open 
innovation systems grounded on the flexibility of informational property regulation. Stemming 
from one general premise; that IPR regimes “moderate their exclusionary principles with 
limitations and exceptions [that are] in part designed to construct a public domain of resources 
[and in part support uses that generate socially beneficial spillovers]”1182; what will be understood 
as flexibility in this research shall bear a multi-faceted dimension. It will first refer to the 
flexibility granted to Member States for the national implementation of international minimal 
standard of intellectual property rights, especially those deriving from the TRIPS Agreement. But 
it will also address the boundaries and accommodations provided for by international, 
supranational or national legal instruments to the benefit of actors concerned with and using 
protected plant innovations (innovators, researchers, licensees, farmers); whether these boundaries 
concern the protection scope, the extent of prerogatives awarded to right-holders, or the reach of 
sanctioned exceptional uses by third parties. At last, it will also investigate the institutional 
arrangements that may provide solutions for both the providers and users of protected innovations, 
as alternative and additional flexibility tools.  
The first type of flexibility is quite straightforward. It implies that international intellectual 
property rights conventions
1183
, and more particularly the TRIPS Agreement, are to be seen as 
prescriptive instruments without direct effect in national legal orders, indifferent to monist or 
dualist approaches to international law, but rather requiring (or permitting) the signatories States to 
adopt legislation
1184
. International conventions constitute in this context “minimum standards 
agreements”, or more subtly “backbones” of prescriptions addressed to Member States1185. This 
holds especially true in the internationally reified intellectual property paradigm. Indeed, none of 
the UPOV Conventions prevents their signatories from adopting more stringent legislation, as long 
as their tenets remain complied with. Just as article 8§2 of the TRIPS Agreement states that  
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 “appropriate measures … may be needed to prevent the abuse of intellectual property 
rights by right holders or the resort to practices which unreasonably restrain trade or 
adversely affect the international transfer of technology” (TRIPS Agreement, Art.8.2).  
In the specific context of plant-related international intellectual property rights, the international 
agreements also offer considerable flexibilities directly linked to the content and extent of 
prerogatives awarded to right holders and users. For instance, both “optional subject-matter 
exceptions” from patentability and the definitions of the relevant terms1186, such as the “non-
biological and microbiological processes” are referred to in article 27§3 of TRIPS. This flexibility 
allows for a multitude of choices in the optimal regulation and implementation of exclusive rights. 
As a result, the extent and reach of IPR may be limited. Just as national or actor-specific needs 
may also be accommodated through tools such as compulsory licensing and exceptions 
surrounding the possible negotiation-free use of the protected innovation. The last flexibility 
concerns institutional arrangements that could be developed by either the right-holders 
themselves (as in patent pools), or the end-users themselves (through technology transfer clauses), 
or through a combination of both (through enhanced participatory plant breeding for instance). 
These schemes allow actors to navigate within the IPR landscape. They provide ad hoc solutions 
to the obstacles set out by the strong IPR paradigm, which may preclude the initial development or 
subsequent use of market or social successes. Based on the idea that “community production” 
might be the best-suited solution to the free-rider problem of public goods production, these tools 
nonetheless bear the risk of becoming a “one-size-fits-all panacea approach in rivalry with 
privatisation, public subsidy and the public domain”1187. Exploring all rooms for manoeuvre 
between suffocatingly restrictive exclusivity and the insecurely spineless public domain should 
alleviate such danger.  
In order to efficiently address all coping strategies and emerging practices by experimenting with 
the flexibilities of intellectual property rights, we will, for each category of actors, illustrate and 
analyse practices of social organisational innovation coming either from the agrobiodiversity users 
themselves, or from external actors such as the judiciary or even to a certain extent policy-makers. 
This analysis will allow us to thereon discuss the legal and institutional propositions that could 
uphold these practices. The groundwork will eventually also break the obstacles stemming from 
“the inflexibilities of the flexibilities” of the TRIPS Agreement, which have been criticised as 
having been designed to make their use rather difficult
1188
.  
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 CHAPTER 12: ADJUSTMENTS FOR PUBLIC RESEARCHERS 12.
The future of plant improvement still largely depends upon the products of basic and strategic 
research, which, because of their long-run, uncertain payoffs and the difficulty of appropriating 
benefits, have more traditionally continued to be developed by the public sector
1189
. Furthermore, 
even if the entirety of genetic variability may not be accessible through gene banks, plant breeders 
still prefer to have recourse to these institutions, in order to not only gain access to the corporeal 
organism, but also to the primordial associated information stemming from characterisation and 
evaluation activities, making this agrobiodiversity source a much easier, quicker and less costly 
source than those collected on farms or natural habitats themselves
1190
. Public plant improvement 
is also more likely to develop so-called orphan crops, which will naturally be neglected by solely 
market-oriented choices of lucrativity and productivity, even though these crops feed more people 
than industrial agriculture1191. Hence strong public support for research, especially vis-à-vis basic 
and strategic research should be considered as one of the major stimulants to private investment in 
R&D, and thus to the successful use of agricultural biodiversity. Public researchers’ activities have 
nonetheless been considerably distraught by the strong agrobiodiversity property paradigm. The 
developmental approach to intellectual property and correlated practices has made access to 
interesting technologies and material impossible or considerably more costly or difficult. It also 
pushed public domain oriented institutes outside of their traditional open access oriented 
innovation schemes, all the while making them more vulnerable to commit biopiracy or be the 
victim of misappropriation themselves.  
The norms of communalism and independence, and the heavy appraisal of the public domain have 
nonetheless “continued to operate even as the science of molecular biology matured and the ease 
with which commercial products could be derived from the underlying science increased”1192. The 
partial breakdown or restricted access to research tools has in this sense been alleviated “because 
firms and universities have been able to develop “working solutions” that have allowed their 
research to proceed, [including] taking licenses, inventing around patents, infringement (often 
informally invoking a research exemption), developing and using public tools, and challenging 
patents in court”1193. These practices have been at times corroborated, supported or even triggered 
by adequate policy responses or through the practice of external actors, such as the judiciary. 
Indeed, “changes in the institutional environment, particularly new U.S. Patent and Trademark 
Office (USPTO) guidelines, and active intervention by the National Institutes of Health (NIH), and 
some shift in the courts’ views toward research tool patents”1194, appear to have further reduced 
the threat of breakdown and access restrictions, although the environment remains uncertain. The 
jurisprudential turns taken by the EPO Board of Appeals, as well as the gradual guidance given in 
the EPC Implementing Rules have also contributed to to ease the stresses felt by public 
researchers. As these stresses have almost exclusively felt within the more limited scope of the 
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 lenient patent system, social organisation has mostly been active in this particular front of the 
property paradigm, and not necessarily on plant variety protection1195. In this context, we shall 
describe the struggles and solutions brought up around the world of plant biotechnology and public 
plant breeding in a gradual fashion, according to their reach and also feasibility. Straightforward 
and more classical solutions indeed tend to reclaim the level playing field awarded in patentability 
and protection scope, including liability rules such as the research exception. More elaborate, and 
therefore trickier to reach consensus upon without encroaching competititon law principles, are 
those solutions playing with licensing mechanisms as such, whether aiming towards humanitarian 
uses or standardisation. A last type of adjustment requires even more favourable conditions in 
order to bloom and operate, as it involves setting up ad hoc institutional collaborations retaining a 
hybrid and semi-open nature, potentially leading to clearing-houses and patent pooling. 
12.1. Acting on IPR elligibility and protection scope  
The scope of intellectual property rights protection has considerably been enlarged with the 
implementation of the strong property paradigm, just as the criteria triggering protection, 
especially that of patents, have been loosely interpreted in order to foster innovation in the highly 
lucrative burgeoning green biotechnology industry. As a result of such trends, it is the cradle of all 
inadequacies, i.e. the reach of patent protection, which has predominantly challenged public 
researchers involved in molecular biology or plant breeding. In this context, the reach of patent 
protection is characterised by both the delineation of patentability, i.e. patent eligibility, and also 
the extent of prerogatives awarded to right-holders, predominantly to control the subsequent uses 
of protected inventions. In this context, both public researchers, acting directly by challenging 
broad claims or advocating legislative change, and external actors such as the judiciary or patent 
offices, have been trying to recalibrate the extensive reach of artificial monopolies. They have 
done so to address a few shortcomings at a time, namely to avoid biopiracy claims, just as to 
ensure that public results are not misappropriated, and also to warrant that patented technologies 
can be accessed and used by public research entities without considerable hurdles. These 
adjustments mainly address the shortcomings caused by a single trend of the strong property 
paradigm, the enclosure of cumulatively incremental innovation. They thus try to better delineate 
the boundaries between original and subsequent innovators, providing for adequate compensation, 
yet also enough manoeuvre for inspiration, building on the shoulders of giants. 
12.1.1. Patent eligibility for plant varieties and “non essentially biological products of nature”:  
inventive step, novelty and exclusions 
As aforementioned, research in the life sciences is closely linked to the realm of scientific 
discoveries regarding the genetic basis of various biological functions
 1196
. The patentability lines 
of novelty, utility and non-obviousness have therefore been actively shifted towards a pole 
dangerously close to the fruits of basic research and discoveries in this field so as to provide 
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artificial lead time to industry players investing heavily in most generally uncertain products. This 
shift has mainly operated under the impetus of the developed world in order to boost private sector 
involvement in the field of biotechnology, where products self-replicate and are thus easily 
reverse-engineered, and where sunk costs remain very high. Notwithstanding the need to provide 
enough incentives for private actors to innovate in this peculiar field, there is nonetheless an 
equally pressing need to address other consequences linked to the nature of cumulative innovation. 
Contrary to the trend that has lowered patentability requirements in order to include biotechnology 
related innovations within the scope of patent protection; the need to allow public sector 
agrobiodiversity innovation advocates stricter patentability requirements to be set up, in order 
to avoid anti-commons landscapes in molecular research tools. Especially with regards to the 
essential assessments of novelty, inventive step and utility criteria, a rigorous approach to 
patentability could avoid broad formulations or reach-through claims detrimental for future 
innovative prospects, and prevent the protection of subpatentable innovations. Numerous 
professional organisations have openly and quite vocally been opposed to broad patents in the life 
sciences, such as the Biological Innovation for Open Society, the American College of Medical 
Genetics and the College of American Pathologists in the biomedical field. This wide-ranging 
inquisition has as a result impacted public researchers active in molecular biology, green 
biotechnology or public breeding, first indirectly, but also directly, as they have often grabbed the 
chance to advocate higher standards of patenting in their own fields. This debate has even pushed 
the large pharmaceutical firm Merck to argue against “locking up the basic structural and 
descriptive elements of the genome by narrowly held patent protections”1197. The approach of 
applied biotechnology firms has nonetheless remained in the defense of patentability « in the 
context of producing things », as opposed to those entities with business models mainly focused on 
DNA sequencing and patenting, such as dedicated start-ups. 
Novel, “real” and non-essentially biological inventions  
Notwithstanding the challenges posed by the brave wide world of green biotechnology and 
genomics in terms of inventiveness and industrial application, patentability assessements have step 
upon the trick of novelty in this inherently cumulative and incremental innovation context. The 
novelty threshold is indeed tricky to properly assess, as it essentially requires one to determine 
whether follow-on innovations are worthy of protection, despite the fact that they will almost 
inescapably constitute an incremental contribution to the initial invention. This particular issue 
echoes at different levels when it comes to patents covering molecular research tools and living 
organisms. It refers to the need to rigorously establish the existence of prior art vis-à-vis previous 
discoveries or inventions stemming from both the private and public sectors, while also addressing 
the issue of biological piracy or the appropriation of products of nature or naturally occurring 
products or processes. In cumulative innovation chains such as biotechnology, the number of 
forward citations, i.e. the citations received by subsequent patents, just as the number of 
backwards citations, i.e. those references to patents significantly raise the rate of opposition to 
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 patents, at least according to a study operated before the European Patent Office
1198
. That is why 
the criterion of prior art has to be broadly yet meticulously assessed in all legal orders. This 
evolution is based on the premise that when widely available yet never published knowledge 
comes to be patented, the monopoly rights granted to titleholders are considered to not “generate 
research or advance knowledge in any way, [but rather] impose a societal cost, without any 
corresponding benefit”1199.  
The threshold of novelty has also been quite controversial in biotechnology related patents, 
because its compounds and processes are, as aforementioned, quite close to natural phenomena. 
That is why lack of novelty has often been brought before opposition procedures in patent offices 
or in judicial proceedings, arguing that claimed compounds occurred naturally and therefore 
neither novel nor constitute a non-obvious invention in the sense of patentability requirements. 
Even though the products of nature doctrine remained an essential milestone of patent protection, 
the United States judiciary, especially the “Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit began shaping 
the law in a manner that allowed patents on naturally occurring phenomena as long as the 
applicant included the phrase ‘isolated and purified’ in the specification”1200.  This shift has ignited 
a recalibration of the product of nature doctrine, which lost its echo in the criteria of “invention”, 
rather than novelty in patents related to living organisms or processes1201, as the new product ough 
to to have a different function than the natural product it derived from in order to fall under the 
“high-water mark” of patentability1202. The debate over the stretch of the western understanding of 
an “invention” faced with living organisms has struck an age-old cord in the discussions over 
patent eligible subject matter, which rules out in principle the protection of abstract ideas, laws or 
products of nature, as well as naturally occurring things1203. Its traditional definition seems to suffer 
when confronted to living material, urging legislators to try to shape its contours more precisely.  
Faced with the difficult task of transposing European Directive 98/44/EC on the protection of 
biotechnological inventions, the Belgian legislator attempted to define an invention as   
“clearly distinguishable from the pure discovery of an element, which exists independent of 
human intervention, and which can take different shapes, more specifically: a new 
application, a new method for the creation or isolation of something new or existing, a new 
product, a new combination of new or known means, and which serves as a guideline to act 
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in a certain way by the direct use of controllable natural phenomena to achieve the result 
that is predictable out of the causes”1204.  
The definition was rejected in the text that was finally adopted, following the advice of the High 
Council for Industrial Property and the Council of State, as it strayed away from a literal 
transposition of the Directive and probably disallowed the flexible interpretation that could prevail 
before the European Patent Office1205. As a result of this clear reticence to define the boundaries of 
patent eligible inventions in statutes, the essential criterion of “invention” itself has been rather put 
to the dissection table of patent offices and the judiciary faced with biotechnology patents, as 
aforementioned. The “law of nature” exception has been thoroughly used in cases regarding green 
biotechnology patents before the judiciary. A prominent case before the United States Supreme 
Court was asked to consider “a composition patent that claimed a mixture of naturally occurring 
strains of bacteria that helped leguminous plants take nitrogen from the air and fix it in the 
soil”1206. The ability of the bacteria to fix nitrogen was well known, but it could not be used in all 
crops. The patent applicant combined several nitrogen-fixing bacteria that did not inhibit each 
other into a single inoculant and obtained a patent. The Court held that the compositionwas not 
patent eligible because “there was “no way in which we could call [the bacteria mixture a product 
of invention] unless we borrowed invention from the discovery of the natural principle itself ”1207 
The line that has been crossed by the currently applicable patent paradigm between discoveries 
and inventions is showing even more cracks with regards to isolated and purified nucleotide 
sequences, even in the United States, more lenient towards the technical nature of patentable 
inventions. The aforementioned Myriad Genetics ruling of the United States Supreme Court
1208
, 
read togather with Mayo vs. Prometheus, show the ongoing re-assessment of broad claims that are 
dangerously close of natural laws and phenomena. The Promotheus ruling was concerned with a 
process patent, a method that optimised drug dosage, while Myriad’s claims covered the “isolated 
sequences of the relevant gene along with isolated subsections” and “cDNA”, which does not 
normally exist in the body but are rather naturally created through retroviruses. Adopting a parallel 
reasoning, the Court ruled that the claims involved in these product patents could simply not be 
viewed as inventions. The initial questions asked in the petition introduced by the Association of 
Molecular Pathology were indeed whether “humans genes [were] patentable?”1209. Petitioners did 
introduce their action because Myriad was granted “a monopoly on clinical testing of ITS genes, 
which was then blocking avenues of scientific inquiry and creating barriers to scientific progress 
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 and medical care”1210. Already in its dissent to the Court of Appeals judgment, Judge William 
Bryson had raised concern that “broad claims to genetic material” like those of Myriad could 
become “a significant obstacle to the next generation of innovation in genetic medicine”. 
Considering the merits of the case, and  
Considering that “the central dispute among the panel members was whether the act of  
isolating DNA—separating a specific gene or sequence of nucleotides from the rest of the  
chromosome—is an inventive act that entitles the individual who first isolates it to a patent; 
the Court “merely holds that genes and the information they encode are not patent eligible 
under §101 simply because they have been isolated from the surrounding genetic 
material”1211. 
The aforementioned Myriad ruling, read in combination with the Mayo stance, clearly show the 
new critical approach of the highest United States judiciary to the question of patent eligible 
subject matter in innovation heavily relying on living organisms or biological processes, to the 
dismay of more traditional patent commentators and practitioners
1212
.  
In a parallel fashion, the lack of inventive step or non-obvisousness has also been successfully 
advocated in different judicial fora. This particular gauge was especially put to good use with 
regards to the infamous case of Taq polymerase. While the Australian patent office invalidated all 
claims related to such polymerase, as well as all DNA polymerases from any other Thermus 
species that would act as thermal re-agent in the PCR process, the European Patent Office 
followed suit and recognised the lack of “inventive step” for the claims held in the similar 
thermostable enzyme patent
1213
. Both reactions based their findings on previous publications by 
scientists over the properties of such enzyme
1214
. In the United States, the issue of “non-
obviousness” in nucleotide sequences has been challenging the USPTO as early as 1988, where 
the Federal Circuit asserted that the question remained to determine whether an invention was 
'obvious to try' i.e. that it resolved to “explore a new technology or general approach that seemed 
to be a promising field of experimentation, where the prior art gave only general guidance as to the 
particular form of the claimed invention or how to achieve it”1215. The test of non-obvisousness, 
and especially the role played by the content of prior art was later re-clarified by the District Court, 
which asserted that if such prior art only suggested an infinite number of possible nucleotide 
                                                                    
 
1210
 “Are Human genes patentable”, Editorial of the New York Times, April 14th, 2013.  
1211
  United States Supreme Court, Association for Molecular Pathology v. Myriad Genetics, Inc., No. 12–398, June 
13, 2013, Opinion of the Court. 
1212
 Critcism heavily arose on the nebulous interpretation of §§101, 102 and 103 of the patent act by the Supreme 
Court, as it “specifically ignored the Government’s objective, reasonable and until today correct assertion that any step 
beyond a statement of a law of nature transforms the claim into one that displays patent eligible subject matter, with 
issues of whether those steps are known to be properly resolved by 102 and 103”, see GENE QUINN, "Killing Industry: 
The Supreme Court Blows Mayo V. Prometheus," IP Watchdog 2012.. 
1213
  CARROLL and CASIMIR, "Pcr Patent Issues," op.cit.,  p.12. 
1214
 The publications mentioned in the decisions belonged to Russian public scientists KALEDIN, SLIUSARENKO, 
GORODETSKII, “Isolation and properties of DNA polymerase from extreme thermophylic bacteria Thermus 
aquaticus YT-1”, Biokhimiia, 45 (1980), pp.644-651; which built upon the work of CHIEN, EDGAR and TRELA, 
“Deoxyribonucleic acid polymerase from the extreme thermophile Thermus Aquaticus”, J. Bacteriol., 127 (1976), 
pp.1550-1557.  
1215
 United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit, In Re O'Farrell, 853 F.2d 894, 898 (1988); but also 
POLYAKOV and GORYUNOV, "(Non) Obviousness of Claims to Genetic Sequences: Finding the Middle Ground," 
op.cit., pp. 7-8. 
PART V. Social Innovation Adjustments and Solutions  
 290 
sequences, the claimed gene sequences could not be obvious1216. In 2009, the U.S. Patent and 
Trademark Office decision to reject the claims to cDNA encoding the human “Natural Killer Cell 
Activation Inducing Ligand” (NAIL) protein, which was grounded on obviousness based on the 
combined teaching of an existing patent and an academic publication, was challenged before the 
US Distrct Court1217. The judiciary confirmed the Patent Office’s approach, which had asserted that 
the DNA and protein sequences could be obtained by conventional methodologies known to one of 
skill in the art, and it found that obviousness required a “reasonable expectation of success from 
previous teachings”. The gauge of the inventive step was also put forward in the Myriad case. 
Indeed, the first plaintiff Institut Curie claimed that the gene sequence that was patented was partly 
based on information from public genome databases, and it would therefore not fill the shoes of an 
inventive step
1218
. These rulings clearly show the critical shift taken by the judiciary of developed 
and biotechnology-savvy countries faced with the tricky task of qualifying patent claims relying 
on living organisms or biological processes as inventions.  
The extent to which an invention relying on or consisting of biological material can be considered 
patentable has not only been addressed through the “positive” patentability requirements as such, 
but also in the assessment of the ad hoc exclusions from patentability that have for instance been 
carved in the European legal order. Determining the real extent of these exclusions has been at 
times more arduous than others, but their existence has been generally considered to provide an 
additional safeguard against the wrongful appropriation of discoveries and unjust provision of 
artificial lead time. These exclusions have at times been quite wide-scoped, extending to the entire 
range of plant improvement, as the strong paradigm merely dictates that plant varieties be 
protected through an efficient sui generis regime and that microbiological processes befall under 
patent protection. The Indian legislative order for instance foresees patent protection to processes 
including substances intended for use as food, medicine or drugs, all the while rejecting the 
patentability of the substances themselves, and also reducing the duration of the terms of 
protection in matters related to food, medicine or drugs
1219
. Other national legislators have 
activated the flexibility of TRIPS article 27§3(b) to exclude plants from patent protection 
altogether, such as the Andean Pact Countries. The Integration Agreement indeed stipulates that 
“the entirety or part of living beings as encountered in nature, natural biological processes, 
biological material existing in nature or which may be isolated, including the genome or 
germplasm of any natural living being”1220 shall not be considered inventions. 
These exclusions need to be carefully drafted in order to stey within the realms of TRIPS 
minimum standards. Indeed, denying patent protection to plant materials can only be compatible 
with the TRIPS Agreement provided that the exclusion does not extend to plants with modified or 
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 artificial plant gene sequences, which often significantly vary from naturally occurring 
substances and thus are properly classified as inventions1221. They have been primarily used in 
order to address the dilemma of orphan crops, where the absence of aggressive intellectual 
property portfolios may ease research and development costs involved in these forgotten acreages. 
However, the efficiency of such measure, without any additional formal incentive to invest time 
and effort in overlooked research fields, remains questionable. Indeed, the absence of exclusive 
rights over products or processes will not on their own trigger active investment in research and 
development, but it will rather merely contribute to easing the burden of actors that are already 
inclined to do so, such as public researchers, but also farmers themselves, as we shall tackle in the 
further course of this study. 
In regions with greater biotechnology industry presence, the main interrogation with regards to 
negative patent eligibility has been the exclusion of “essentially biological processes” from 
protected subject-matter. Especially in the European legal order, the challenge has been to 
determine whether so-called “native traits” were patentable. This trickier question has shed light 
on the necessity to grant a stricter interpretation of obviousness and those "essentially biological 
processes", in order to avoid that the results of a mere screening of wild germplasm carried out at 
the stage of “pure basic research” be subject to patent protection. In line with the flexibilities 
offered by the IPR paradigm, “essentially biological processes” indeed fall outside the scope of 
patent protection both in the European Patent Convention and the EC Directive 98/44, as 
aforementioned. According to the EPO Guidelines, “biological material which is isolated from its 
natural environment or produced by means of a technical process even if it previously occurred in 
nature” can fall under patent protection, just as “plants or animals if the technical feasibility of the 
invention is not confined to a particular plant or animal variety”, and also “a microbiological or 
other technical process, or a product obtained by means of such a process other than a plant or 
animal variety”1222. Recent decisions of the Enlarged Board of Appeal have nonetheless proven the 
complexity of practical realities
1223
. The issue especially arose with regards to molecular-assisted 
selection efforts that include complex and technical steps, which might be considered as non-
microbiological and thus patentable processes
1224
.  The standard definition of the term "essentially 
biological process stems from the so-called Lubrizol principles studied in Chapter 3 of this study, 
which views the qualification of a process as ‘essentially biological” on the basis of the essence of 
the invention, taking into account the totality of human intervention and its impact on the results 
achieved”1225. These principles were confirmed and further refined by the Technical Board in the 
1995 Plant Genetic Systems case
1226, which favoured an intermediate approach where “a process 
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involving at least one essential technical step which could not be carried out without human 
intervention and which had decisive impact on the final result would be patentable”. As a result, 
“a process claim was patentable because even though only the first steps in the production of the 
plant were to be considered ‘non-biological’ (e.g. recombinant DNA) these nevertheless had a 
decisive impact on the final result, notwithstanding the subsequent ‘biological’ steps of 
regenerating and replicating the plants and seeds”1227. The two infamous and eagerly awaited cases 
of “Broccoli and Tomato”12281229 both concerned breeding methods, respectively breeding broccoli 
with anti-cancerogenic effects, and tomatoes with a trait that allowed the drying of fruits on the 
vine, allowing for substantial savings, and ignited twenty four amicus curiae submissons to the 
EPO. The decisions adopted a surprisingly extensive interpretation of statutory exceptions, 
extending de facto their scope to all methods “which contain the steps of sexual crossing”, and 
seem to limit the technical step measurement to those steps that do not enable or assist sexual 
crossing. This means that all molecular-marker assisted breeding processes will fail to escape the 
EPC 53(b) exclusion. However, the rulings also clearly state that the claims on the plants obtained 
through these methods remained valid, if, as aforementioned, the claim is not confined to as 
specific plant variety. Urged by these rulings and growing discontent over the nebulous approach 
of the Biotech Directive taking its roots on the interpretative rule 23b(5) of the European Patent 
Convention, the European Parliament welcomed these decisions and adopted a resolution in May 
2012, calling on “the EPO to exclude from patenting products derived from conventional breeding 
and all conventional breeding methods, including SMART breeding (precision breeding) and 
breeding material used for conventional breeding”1230. It should however be noted that most 
national legislative orders are still heavily bound by the terms of Article 2.2. of the aforementioned 
Directive, which ambigiously states that “a process is essentially biological if it consists entirely of 
natural phenomena such as crossing or selection”. The recent Enlarged Board of Appeals’ 
approach to the European Patent Convention’s article 53 (b) seems to indicate that the second 
gauge of entirety should not prevail over the former. Such an interpretation would definitely 
immensely contribute to maintain a wider public domain in breeding techniques that are 
predominantly non-molecular and mostly rely on biological processes with few twists.  
Against broad and “undisclosed” claims 
Another challenge faced by public researchers relates to the risk of meeting broad patents in 
their freedom to operate assessments. They have in this regard highly benefited from the fact 
that when the uses of technologies are unknown, both legislators and the judiciary have recognised 
the urging need “to limit the scope of property rights to ensure the necessary balance between 
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 seeking to maximise the benefit to society while minimising the amount of property protection 
necessary to be an adequate incentives to creators”1231.  
In the United States, even though the statutory definition of patentable subject matter in section 
101 was considered in its broadest sense to include “everything under the sun”, the Supreme Court 
has nonetheless been generally reluctant towards patents awarded for inventions without known 
uses or too broadly defined utility. As early as in 1966, in Brenner vs. Manson, patent protection 
was denied to a working chemical process patent since the compound produced by such process 
had no known uses, acknowledging that protection would “confer power to block off whole areas 
of scientific development, without compensating benefit to the public”1232. The reticence over the 
patentability of inventions with little identified uses has been very much a global reality, leading to 
a strict approach to the patentability criteria of “utility” or “industrial applicability”. The main 
concerns over the threshold of utility in molecular biology related to the claim covering expressed 
sequence tags, even though it is extremely difficult to get a clear picture of the potential anti-
commons created by stacked patent rights1233, urging patent offices to adopt clearer guidelines with 
regards to DNA-related patents. The United States Patent office has in this regard renewed its 
utility guidelines in 2001, stipulating that the alleged use of the invention ought to be 
“substantial”1234. In a parallel yet a little more intricate fashion, the European Patent Office’s 
guidelines expressly state that  
“In relation to certain biotechnological inventions, i.e. sequences and partial sequences of 
genes, the industrial application is not self-evident. The industrial application of such 
sequences must be disclosed in the patent application” (European Patent Office Guidelines 
for Examination, The European Patent Application, Section 4.9, reprised in EPO 
Implementing Rule 29§3). 
These elements show the existence of a seemingly convinced trend that may slowly be inching its 
way towards the recalibration of standards for granting patents in biotechnology related fields. It is 
also being reinforced by a reflection on the notion and efficiency of “disclosure” in a field such as 
biotechnology where the person ‘notionally skilled in the art’ is granted tremendous weight in both 
assessing the inventiveness and novelty of proposed subject matter. There is indeed inherent 
uncertainty in molecular biology related patent applications and claims, as their drafting does not 
necessarily preclude the efficient disclosure of protected inventions.  
“The jurisprudence of the EPO shows that […] in cases where the breadth of the claims 
exceeds the invention disclosed, the court may apply a broader approach to ‘enabled 
disclosure’, seeking to include an equitable or ‘fairness’ standard, [within its reading of 
art.83 and 84 of the EPC]”1235. 
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However, these shifts in patent office practices have their own limitations, notwithstanding the 
diverging viewpoints on the need and extent to which patentability standards ought to be revised. 
Patent offices, cannot be asked to “second-guess technology trends” in order to accommodate the 
standards to the improvements of the technology
1236
. Even when one reflects upon patentability 
standards in order to adjust them to the needs of public researchers, this questioning fails to 
address the information deficit that is inherent to the patent system as a whole; a deficit that is 
particularly heightened when faced with complex and rapidly evolving technologies such as 
biotechnology. The diagnosis was harshened by findings that highlighted that the United States 
Patent office had “reengineered itself so as to declare its mission to be ‘to help its customers get 
patents’1237.  The bias, even if only in appearance, had to be redressed; just as the inherent 
information deficit and high uncertainty that characterise certain technologies, such as 
biotechnology, where there are high transaction costs involved in gathering information about 
patent applications and filing oppositions if need be. In this context, an interesting partial market 
and agrobiodiversity user-oriented solution has been to discuss the opportunity of “peer to patent 
projects”1238. This initiative acts as a community patent review mechanism, and has been the 
inspiration of the online pre-grant review process that is actively promoted by the USPTO, in order 
to sthrenghten the quality and validity of claims.  
« The proposal for open patent examination (nicknamed « peer-to-patent ») separates 
scientific from legal decision-making. By means of an online network, the scientific 
community provides what it knows best – scientific information relevant to determining the 
novelty and non-obviousness of a patent application. With her deep knowledge of the 
pertinent statutory standards, the patent examiner then uses that input to make a legal 
determination of patentability. In this model, the patent examiner remains the ultimate 
arbiter »1239.  
This enterprise is an active attempt to levy out the the detrimental consequences stemming from 
the legal fiction of the person having ordinary skills in the art, assessed in the isolated bureaucracy 
of patent offices, instead of expert ‘academical’ input, bringing the best of both worlds. It 
nonetheless has inherent shortcomings. 
Indeed, « inventors have to consent to review and anyone can be a ‘peer-reviewer’. Patent 
offices unlike top journals with respect to publications are in the business of making it 
easier for inventors to get patents. Competitors or the public do not bring the same ‘self 
correcting’ tensions that reviewers in science are expected to bring. It is therefore 
questionable whether lessons learnt from journals on removing conflicts of interest can be 
carefully mapped onto this new process »1240. 
Patent offices can nonetheless try to be attentive to the critical situation of the life sciences, 
without necessarily taking the mostly favourable but equally uncertain leap of peer patent review. 
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 This cautious approach has been favoured by the European Patent Office, through its policy of 
“Raising the Bar”, which gave particular attention to the standard of the “inventive step”. Even 
though the initiative “may give the impression of an intention to raise patentability standards, 
[…its] intention is, in implementing the Rule changes to the EPC of 1st April 2010, to achieve 
greater clarity as to the subject matter for which patent protection is sought at the earliest 
appropriate stage of the procedure in order to improve the focus of the search”1241.  
The burdens of further research on patented compounds seem to be generally alleviated when strict 
approaches are adopted to assess the qualification of the product or process as an “invention” or to 
determine prior art, while alternative uses of compounds are considered to comply with 
patentability requirements so as to foster due investment in costly research but avoid reach-
through monopoly rights. However, the legal demarcations concerning the artificial allocation of 
rights taking into account both initial and follow-on innovative efforts have not been and cannot 
ever be a linear and straightforward affair limited to the issue of patentability. Considering the 
inherent difficulties regarding the amendment or merely the strict application of patentability 
requirements in the life sciences, there may be “one reform where the public sector, academia and 
industry ought to be able to find common ground: establishing a research exemption from 
infringement on gene-related patents”1242. 
12.1.2. Bundle of fair patent rights: patent width and the research exception  
The most contentious issue that was raised by public scientists involved in biodiversity-related 
innovation, but also by private plant breeders, relates to the scope of protection and the bundle of 
rights that come with the grant of patents on research tools. Indeed, as aforementioned, if the scope 
of prerogatives and claims are too wide and all encompassing, there is a clear risk of creating anti-
commons effects on subsequent sequential innovation. The boundaries set out by the TRIPS 
Agreement nonetheless seem to leave enough manoeuvre margin to attenuate undesirable effects 
of enclosure in public green biotechnology and plant breeding. 
Protecting the claim, and only the claim 
A central challenge relating to the broadness of claims stems from the diverging principles 
surrounding the interpretation of patent claims itself. While the United Kingdom has been 
known to interpret claims quite literaly, Germany tends to interpret claims broadly especially when 
determining the existence of literal infringement, against the background of a flexible EPC 
doctrine of equivalents adopted through the “Protocol on the Interpretation of Article 69 of the 
EPC”. When a broad doctrine of equivalents is withheld, the balance of the patent paradigm shifts 
from the public interest to the protection of the inventor against subsequent alternative uses of his 
or her invention. That is why countries such as the United Kingdom have for instance developed a 
reading of the EPC favouring the latter public interest, through a formula of “purposive 
construction” that seeks all the elements of the claim in the alleged infringing product1243. In the 
United States, the Federal Circuits court unanimously recognised the validity of a reverse 
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equivalents defence against literal infringement allegations. This interpretation stems from the 
traditional doctrine of equivalents, which in essence states that if the patented invention and the 
alleged infringing one are nearly identical, patentability requirements would not be met. In this 
context, “an innovation may infringe a patented invention if the innovation performs substantially 
the same function as the patented invention in substantially the same way to obtain the same 
result”1244. 
Drawing from such precept, “the law acknowledges that one may only appear to have 
appropriated the patented contribution, when a product precisely described in a patent 
claim is in fact 'so far changed in principle' that it performs in a 'substantially different 
way' and is not therefore an appropriation”1245, upholding to the doctrine of reverse 
equivalents.  
This doctrine has been used to justify the white flag granted to an allegedly infringing DNA 
sequence that was “so far changed” from the patented sequence that it performed the function 
(whether the same or a similar one) “in a substantially different way”1246. Even though this 
construct allows improvements to be patented, it would nonetheless not affect the original 
patentee’s rights, who may use the patent as a “holdup right”, in order to “garner as much value as 
possible”1247. The doctrine of reverse equivalents stands on “an economic rationale for 
improvement patents [that] stresses their tendency to encourage bargaining between improvers and 
original patentees, [who would cross-license their technologies], to gain access to the improved 
[and cost-saving] technology”1248. The stretch of the doctrine with regards to the threshold of 
novelty in biotechnology patents is quite straightforward for follow-on users. The line that is been 
walked on is nonetheless quite a delicate one here, and relies heavily on claim interpretation and 
the role of equity in common law jurisdictions. 
In this context, the doctrine of patent misuse has a longstanding history, especially in common 
law traditions. It is generally accepted to occur when « the patentee has impermissibly broadened 
the physical and temporal scope of the patent grant with anti-competitive effect »1249. According to 
this doctrine set out first in 1964 in the United States1250, practices that extend the royalty term 
beyond the patent’s expiration do constitute per se misuse.  
« There has been a long-standing debate over whether the misuse defense should be 
available only in circumstances in which the patentee has violated anti-trust laws. Patent 
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 misuse case-law is largely, but not entirely, co-extensive with anti-trust doctrine ; certain 
conduct can constitute patent misuse but does not violate the antitrusr laws »1251.  
A number of lawsuits have been filed against Monsanto for “patent misuse,” but to date these legal 
claims have been unsuccessful, just as they have rather been concerned with allegations made by 
farmers and not public researchers or direct competitors, leaving the issue to be debated in the 
ethical realm 
1252
. Trying to limit rather than annihilate “reach-through” royalty seeking 
mechansisms, a number of countries have rather more straightforwardly provided for a purpose-
bound restricted protection to biodiversity-linked patents, especially that of genetic sequences. 
This response has been cast in statutes in Europe, where the ad hoc legislative framework has 
shifted to define the scope of enforceable rights by adjusting in effect the definition of protected 
subject-matter in patents covering living or replicating organisms. A report prepared by the 
European Commission in 2005 with the assistance of an expert group addressed the epinous  
“question of whether patents on gene sequences (DNA sequences) should be allowed 
according to the classical model of patent claim, whereby a first inventor can claim an 
invention which covers possible future uses of that sequence, or whether the patent should 
be restricted so that only the specific use disclosed in the patent application can be claimed 
(“purpose-bound protection”)”1253.  
Indeed, the text of the European Biotech Directive seemed to operate a distinction in its article 9 
for gene patents, since  
“the protection conferred by a patent on a product containing or consisting of genetic 
information shall extend to all material, save as provided in Article 5(1), in which the 
product in incorporated and in which the genetic information is contained and performs its 
function”.  
On this particular subject the Commission remained cautious, stating that even though valid 
arguments for a purpose-bound protection may be put forward in the name of the freedom of 
research,  
“it may be questionable whether attempting to further refine the scope of protection of gene 
sequence patents in the light of divergences between national legislations will have any 
significant effect on actors in the field”1254.  
The issue of purpose-bound protection was put to its widest stretch in a recent dispute opposing 
Monsanto and the Argentinian government with respect to round-up ready (RR) soybean, which 
was not protected under a patent in the Argentinian legal order but in the European Union and the 
United States. In a move that has been coined “a handbook case of the so-called ‘strategic 
litigation”1255, the company argued that the import of RR soymeal, even if not intended for 
cultivation, was infringing upon its exclusive artificial monopoly in the EU market since the 
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soymeal contained the DNA sequence that was the object of its patent claim. As the case was 
brought before the European Court of Justice, Attorney General Medozzi argued that 
“It seems irrefutable that Article 9 of Directive 98/44 is a rule for the extension of patent 
protection. That provision is based on the assumption that the patented DNA is protected as 
such, and extends that protection to cover also, in certain circumstances, the ‘material’ in 
which the DNA sequence is contained, provided that the DNA information is performing 
its function. Since it is common ground that, being only a residue, the patented DNA 
sequence does not perform any function within the soy meal, the additional protection 
under Article 9 cannot be relied on in the present case.”1256 
The Court followed suit, stating that “Article 9 of Directive 98/44 on the legal protection of 
biotechnological inventions is to be interpreted as not conferring patent right protection in 
circumstances such as those of the case in the main proceedings, in which the patented 
product is contained in the soy meal, where it does not perform the function for which it is 
patented, but did perform that function previously in the soy plant, of which the meal is a 
processed product, or would possibly again be able to perform that function after it had 
been extracted from the soy meal and inserted into the cell of a living organism. That 
interpretation is supported by the wording of Article 9 of the Directive, which makes the 
protection it provides for subject to the condition that the patented DNA sequence performs 
its function in the material in which it is incorporated.”1257 
Drawing from the drafting history of the Directive, authors have approached this reading of Article 
9 quite critically, since the extension of patentability was set out in order to “avoid exhaustion of 
the patentee's rights by first-sale exhaustion, the legislator needed to clarify that the patent 
protection should extend as long as the characteristics caused by the invention existed”1258. The 
Judgment also raised concern as “an accused infringer may deny infringement by simply asserting 
that the patented sequence does not perform its function at the time of alleged infringement 
because many geens are only temporarily functional or only functional in certain tissues or 
organs”1259. As a result of such approach, “the enforceability of patent claims directed to isolated 
nucleotides used as reagents, such as reagents in diagnostic methods, are also put at significant risk 
by the ECJ's opinion”1260. The author believes that such shift towards a purpose-bound protection 
does on the contrary counterbalances and prevents the vertiginous extension of patent protection 
scope in the strong paradigm. It may allow public researchers (but also private plant breeders) to 
develop new products or processes that could inadvertedly contain patented gene sequences 
without making active use of the patented function. The judgment has in this regard been praised 
as to its positive effects on Brazilian and Argentinian agriculture, questioning the licensing 
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 agreements that were imposed by Monsanto on a technology that was not protected by a patent, 
changing “the balance of power between national and international actors”1261.  
However, the actual reach of these adjustments focusing on claim interpretation and purpose-
bound protectional boundaries can easily be circumvented through new tactiques in the 
management of intellectual property portfolio, and proficient claim drafting techniques. Their 
impact can also be questioned in absence of a sound research or experimental use exception that 
would allow third party researchers to actually use the invention in their research and development 
programs in the first place.  
The experimental use or research exception 
One of the main and strongest defences that could be and has been used by public researchers to 
avoid infringing third party intellectual property in their endeavours indeed lies in the so-called 
research or experimental use exception. In legal frameworks where the research exception is 
absent from statutes or very strictly defined by the judiciary, follow-on innovators, or even 
scientists who wish to better understand the underlying mechanisms, or who wish to build mere 
knowledge upon protected inventions, can be completely stripped of latitude in their everyday 
actions. This has very infamously been the case the patents held by Myriad Genetics on the 
BRCA1 and BRCA2 compounds used in genetic tests and cancer therapy, as all testing on and 
with the inventions were disallowed, except for those conducted Myriad’s own laboratories1262. 
Uncertainties over the existence and exact reach of research exceptions remain extremely worrying 
in green biotechnology, since the essence of genomics science itself does not allow follow-on 
users and innovators to “work-around” the protected invention. Indeed, it is inherently impossible 
to find substitutes to compounds and even to a certain extents processes in biotechnology.  
“Exceptions are in their nature limitations on rights and so, one would have thought, 
replacing exclusions with exceptions involves replacing a rights-free environment with one 
in which rights are granted but are limited. Conceptually, that involves a necessary 
diminution of the public domain. Not surprisingly, therefore, advocates of the public 
domain in science have typically argued for exclusions”1263. 
That is why the adjusments warranted by public researchers have not only operated on the 
patentability exclusions as such, but also on the exceptions to the rights conferred. In this context, 
the opportunity to provide for either an ad hoc or a general research exception in the bundle of 
exclusive patent rights follows suit from Article 30 of TRIPS, which allows Member States to  
“provide limited exceptions to the exclusive rights conferred by a patent, provided that 
such exceptions do not unreasonably conflict with a normal exploitation of the patent and 
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do not unreasonably prejudice the legitimate interests of the patent owner, taking account 
of the legitimate interests of third parties” (TRIPS, Article 30).  
It should be noted that Article 30 exceptions should not result in "a substantial curtailment” of the 
patent owner’s exclusive rights1264. This strict interpretation has led scholars to conclude “the 
commercial acts allowed under a traditional breeders’ exemption would "conflict with a normal 
exploitation of the patent"
1265
 and would thus be inconsistent with article 30. As aforementioned, 
each national intellectual property system has its own voice on this particular subject, and 
positions remain patchy, even in Europe, where national laws have been considerably unified 
through the European Patent Convention and the late attempts to create a Unitary patent. In the 
United States, the research exemption is not even part of patent statutes, but has been rather 
restrictively carved by the judiciary. Arguably, this type of common law exception is also 
prevalent in Australia, where the 1990 Patents Act does not expressly provide for a general 
infringement defense for experimental uses1266.  
The existence and reach of the research exception is defined statutorily in certain legal orders. For 
instance, article 53 of the Andean Pact limits the scope of patent rights by leaving certain acts 
outside of the patentee’s monopoly, such as those  
“carried out in a private circle or for non-commercial purposes, exclusively to experiment 
with the subject matter of the patented invention, [and finally those carried out] exclusively 
for the purposes of teaching or scientific or academic research”1267.  
As for the European legal order, the reach of the research exception seems to follow the precepts 
enacted in article 27 of the Community Patent Convention, even though the instrument has not 
been ratified
1268
. Both the European Patent Convention and the EC Directive 98/44 on 
biotechnological inventions remain particularly silent on the subject, leaving the issue to be dealt 
with by the national legislator and judiciary. However, such civil-law-akin approaches to 
regulation have not in any shape or form prevented vigorous debates over the exact reach and 
strength of such exception.  
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 Even though there is seemingly “a general consensus that the exemption applies irrespective of 
the way the patented subject matter has been put into operation and the place of the 
experiment, be it a public laboratory, hospital or a private company, […] doubts arise about 
the scale, nature (experiments ‘on’ versus experiments ‘with’ the patented subject matter) 
and final purpose of the experiment (commercial versus non-commercial)”1269.  
A number of public science organisations have raised alarm bells as to the lack of certainty 
concerning the extent of the research exception, such as the Royal Society, a self-governing 
fellowship based in the United Kingdom, which urged governments “to consider clarifying and 
harmonising the existing exemptions for ‘private and non-commercial’ and ‘experimental’ 
use”1270. The reach of the exception is indeed extremely varied from one Member State to another. 
Belgium has for instance opted for a much wider understanding of such exception, as the 2005 
amendment of article 28§1(b) of the patents law has strayed away from “experimental use” 
vocabulary, stating rather that the bundle of patent rights does not extend to “acts accomplished 
for scientific purposes on and/or with the object of the patented invention”1271. This move came 
after an initial condemnation of the country by the European Court of Justice for failing to 
implement the so-called Biotech Directive, in an attempt “to regulate and curtail the (far reaching 
and possibly negative) effects of [biotech] patents, through the introduction of two additional 
measures which exceed the strict finality of the Directive
1272
. In Germany, the research exemption 
is provided for by Section 11 No. 2 of the Patent Act, which reads “the effects of the patent shall 
not extend to […] acts done for experimental purposes which are related to the subject matter of 
the invention”. The German Supreme Court has on another scale exempted “all experimental acts 
as long as they serve to gain information and thus to carry out scientific research into the subject-
matter of the invention, [even extending] to possible new uses hitherto unknown”1273. This 
approach focuses on the notion of “subject-matter of the invention”, and even though it is 
seemingly extended, it also highlights that the product or process may not be solely used as a tool, 
as these acts would not lead to dependent patents. In this reading, all uses that would fail to trigger 
another border of control and compensation for the initial patentee need to be left outside the scope 
of the research exception. 
On another note, the English Patents Court rather considers “whether the immediate purpose of the 
transaction was to generate revenue or not”1274. In light of “evidence from the United States that 
one out of six research projects is stopped or never started because of intellectual property rights”, 
but also because of the unclear nature of the research exception in national United Kingdom 
statutes, and the fact that such exception is “not widely used and in need of reform”; a consultation 
was launched in 2008 by the Intellectual Property Office
1275
. One of the models proposed was 
drawn from Switzerland, “which promotes the pursuit of knowledge about the object of an 
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invention, exempts only non-commercial purposes and specifically allows the use of the invention 
for teaching purposes”1276. A quite recent case before the High Court of England CoreValve Inc v 
Edwards and Lifesciences
1277
 appears to have broadened the research exception by permitting the 
unlicensed use of the subject matter of the patent until the breaking point of revenue 
generation
1278
.  
There seems to be a general European trend to enshrine a relatively broad research exception 
under national patent laws. However, the recently signed Unified Patent Court Agreement1279 has 
seemingly limited research exemptions narrowly to those required by EU Directives.  
The Agreement’s article 27 indeed deals with those “limitations of the effects of a patent”: 
“The rights conferred by a patent shall not extend to any of the following: 
(a) acts done privately and for non-commercial purposes;  
(b) acts done for experimental purposes relating to the subject-matter of the patented 
invention; 
(c) the use of biological material for the purpose of breeding, or discovering and 
developing other plant varieties” (Unified Patent Court Agreement, Art.27). 
This approach may lead to wider exemptions for national patents, as well as for European Patents 
that are not opted out of the Unified Patents Court when it comes into effect. Nonetheless, the third 
indent of the disposition does hint at a European-wide consensus on the need for a broader 
exception when faced patents in green biotechnology. This is especially good news for public 
researchers involved in plant breeding, even though the Agreement’s wording does not provide 
more legal certainty or clarity to public researchers active in molecular biology or genomics. The 
derogatory regime established for plant breeding extends to all product patents, since it is the 
exclusive right conferred by such patent that should not extend to the use of biological material for 
breeding new varieties. Therefore, patents on isolated genetic sequences or expressed sequences 
tags would not warrant royalties to its innovator at the stage of breeding. With regards to the more 
classical research exception, the gauge of experimentation “relating to the subject-matter” of the 
invention is maintained, together with its ambiguous yet also convenient boundaries. 
Other legal orders, generally those inscrive in common law traditions, prescribe a judicial 
exception as a defense mechanism against infringement. On the other side of the Atlantic, the 
position of the United States judiciary has been drastically reviewed to its lowest possible 
denominator in 2002, “reducing the effectiveness of the [experimental use] defence to next to 
nothing”1280. The Appellate Court has in Madey vs. Duke considerably limited the scope of the 
research exception to uses for “amusement, to satisfy idle curiosity, or for strictly philosophical 
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 inquiry”1281 which would be the only acts falling under the realm of the 35 USC statutory 
exceptions. The Court furthermore not only reversed the burden of proof of such experimental use, 
to be viewed as an “affirmative defence” where elements should be brought forward by the 
defendant, but it also considered that the “intent” element could not be solely satisfied through the 
non-profit status of the defendant
1282
. Evidence of the uses made with the patented invention and 
the subsequent gains ought thus to be considered when assessing the existence of infringement. 
The US Federal District’s restrictive approach to the two hundred years old judicially created 
exception has as a result been criticised in its characterisation of university research as “driven by 
business interest in competing for prestige, students and research grants”1283. The rule of “business 
furtherance” supported by the Madey decision in effect means that “scientists working in any 
institute that embraces a purpose for advancing the progress of even basic science will be expelled 
from the realm of experimental use”1284. In fields where no statutory exception such as the so-
called Bolar exception on early-on upstream research exists, this restrictive judiciary 
understanding means that an initial discoverer has the ability to control the entire stream of 
research and development down the patent line1285. It is nonetheless difficult to assess the exact 
reach of the experimental use defense when it is solely carved in judicial decisions. 
“Since experimental use becomes an issue only in infringement actions, judicial 
pronouncements on its reach address situations where patentees have found a defendant’s 
activities sufficiently annoying to be worth the trouble of pursuing a lawsuit. The factor has 
undoubtedly skewed the universe of experimental use decisions towards cases that 
implicate commercial interests. Within this universe, the experimental use defense is 
frequently raised and rarely sustained”1286. 
In light of the extremely narrow and also uncertain nature of this judicially created exception and 
its unavailability in most practical circumstances, some commentators have urged for its 
replacement by “a legislative exemption that carefully balances the competing policies behind 
the patent system”1287. They have urged Congress to overrule this threat to scientific progress by 
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amending patent statutes with a viable exception for academic and non-profit institutions
1288
. The 
National Academy of Sciences (NAS) has followed suit by recommending that Congress amend 
the patent statute to permit experimental uses of patented inventions in limited circumstances
1289
, a 
proposal that was also supported by the American Intellectual Property Law Association
1290
. The 
NAS report went on to state that  
“in view of the academic research community’s belief in the existence of such an 
[experimental use] exemption, and behaviour accordingly, there should be some level of 
protection for non-commercial uses of patented inventions. Congress should consider 
appropriately narrow legislation, but if progress is slow or delayed the Office of 
Management and Budget and the federal government agencies sponsoring research should 
consider extending “authorization and consent” to grantees as well as contractors, provided 
that such rights are strictly limited to research and do not extend to any resulting 
commercial products or services. Either legislation or administrative action could help 
ensure preservation of the “commons” required for scientific and technological 
progress"
1291
.  
This stance was supported by legal professionals, who “endorsed legislation which would serve to 
exempt from infringement research that is directed to any of the following activities: (1) 
evaluating the validity of the patent and the scope of protection afforded under the patent; 
(2) understanding features, properties, inherent characteristics or advantages of the patented 
subject matter; (3) finding other methods of making or using the patented subject matter; 
and (4) finding alternatives to the patented subject matter, improvements thereto or 
substitutes therefor”1292.  
In view of the vulnerability ignited by the current operation of the patent system when faced with a 
lack of potential of work-around possibilities, “providing a research exemption is in everyone’s 
interests – and is a low impact solution to a high impact problem”1293. The Congress, through the 
so-called Hatch-Waxman Act, provided for such a statutory research exemption in 1984, but 
limited its scope to research for the purposes of drug development, even though its scope has been 
viewed as quite broadly by the judiciary, stretching its range to the use of patented inventions in 
preclinical research the results of which are not included in an official submission
1294
. The 
reluctance of the United States Congress to draft a broader research exception similar to those 
recognised on the Old Continent is rooted in arguments raising against a wider interpretation of the 
judicial exception itself, and therefore against a statutorily carved right for follow-on users. These 
criticisms are not limited to such common law traditions, and have to a certain extent also resulted 
in a more global suspicious probe over the detrimental effect of the existence of a research 
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 exception itself. Some commentators assert "because academic institutions are increasingly 
benefiting from the patent system, they should also be held accountable when they infringe the 
patents of others"
1295
. But the main argument set forward by opponents of a broad research 
exception lie in the fact that such enlarged unlicensed use opportunity might diminish the incentive 
function of exclusivity granted to innovators who lack natural lead-time in the competitive 
marketplace. Reducing the incentive value of patents would then result in a decrease in innovation 
or a shift away from the disclosure of inventions, with greater resort to trade secrecy
1296
. This 
particular aspect is heightened by the fact the discernement of infringement with regards to 
research tools is particularly high, since these will not necessarily be present at the moment of 
commercialisation or in the final outcomes of research, unless the end products of scientific 
publications make express reference to the protected tools1297. 
Commentators have argued that a broad research exception should be accepted, except when the 
tools could be readily available on the market, whether sold through a catalogue or through other 
means allowing the transaction to occur in all anonymity, which as a result levy the obstacles 
raised vis-à-vis the access to protected tools1298. This approach would really highlight that the main 
rationale for the recognition of a broad experimental use exception lies in the acknowledged risk 
of anti-commons in an overly restrictive and aggressive patent landscape in complex, cumulative 
and incremental technologies. Other adjustments have also been advocated in order to 
counterbalance the disincentive occasioned by divesting a patent owner's injunctive remedy, 
notably by creating the opportunity for a sufficiently generous after-the-fact monetary award, as in 
the case of liability rules with reach-through provisions
1299
. Jerome REICHMAN designs an 
improved and rational set of liability rules, which would overcome the long-term disutilities that 
result from the progressive inability of ancillary liability rules to duly foster innovation by 
restoring the “historical buffer zone between IPR and free competition”1300. Such challenge would 
be managed according to the author by providing sufficient artificial lead time to the innovator, as 
well as allowing for the conditional reverse engineering of the innovation to develop socially 
desirable new products based upon former human advancement. Correcting the failures of 
traditional trade secret principles, these new rationalised liability rules would reward and stimulate 
innovators by overcoming the lack of natural lead-time available to them through a "limited, non-
exclusionary form of relief", enabling second-comers to use sub-patentable inventions to develop 
innovations of their own, "on the condition that they contribute directly or indirectly, to the first 
innovators' research and development costs"
1301
. The author believes that a carefully and clearly 
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drafted statutory research exception would achieve the same result, if designed to trigger a truly 
equitable and transparent liability rule mechanism. 
As aforementioned, acting both on the patentability of certain products or processes, while also 
addressing the issue of infringement linked to patent breadth, are both necessary when it comes to 
plant innovation, where the innovation environment and the implementation of intellectual 
property rights have proven detrimental for researchers carrying out their activities in a publicly-
funded environment. However, both these actions possess important shortcomings to address the 
“intertemporal externality of cumulative innovation where the first invention stems from basic 
research and constitutes a so-called research tool that is not directly of interest to final users”1302. 
These lacunas have been mainly demonstrated by economic analysis of IPR regimes
1303
, and have 
urged both legal commentators and policymakers to consider alternatives, such as compulsory 
licensing mechanisms or liability rules systems. Indeed, an internationally recognised wide-
reaching academic research exemption for biological research tools might not, according to certain 
commentators, properly discourage universities' institutional administrators from pursuing strong 
exclusive rights and licensing strategies
1304
. Strategies should therefore be envisaged on several 
fronts, ranging from more traditional legislative amendments to intellectual property rights 
legislation to indirect attempts on actors’ practices to enlarge the public domain, and having 
perhaps also recourse to more institutional solutions to the same end. 
12.2. Acting on licensing practices to facilitate access to patented technology and 
disseminate research results 
The award of monopoly rights does not in itself prevent the dissemination of technological 
advances at all. They are on the contrary designed to ensure that inventive solutions are disclosed 
and most of all, used by many, all the while compensating the innovator for its productive and 
socially beneficial ideas and investment. Reflexive practices can therefore guarantee the 
availability of the technology either through business partnerships, broad corporate licensing 
practices, adaptive licensing strategies or a sensible restraint in filing lawsuits against infringing 
researchers. Such guarantee could even survive under an increasingly shrinking or at least 
extremely uncertain doctrine of experimental use in patent laws in the United States, the European 
Union, or elsewhere
1305
. This reality reinforces the premise that it is mostly the aggressive 
practices of rightholders, along with the defensive proliferation of exclusive titles, which have led 
to the breakdown of the agrobiodiversity property paradigm for certain agrobiodiversity actors. 
The inherent balance of intellectual property rights may thus be reclaimed through licensing 
practices, and various actors have indeed cultivated such open-minded strategies. Notwithstanding 
its inherent limitations, the need for action on licensing relies on the shared sentiment that the 
commitment to exclusive licenses in foundational research tools such as transformation methods, 
selectable markers and constitutive promoters greatly impairs the constitution of a “public sector 
                                                                    
 
1302
 GIANCARLO MOSCHINI and OLEG YEROKHIN, "Patents, Research Exemption, and the Incentive for Sequential 
Innovation," Journal of Economics & Management Strategy 17, no. 2, 2008. 
1303
 JERRY R GREEN and SUZANNE SCOTCHMER, "On the Division of Profit in Sequential Innovation," The RAND 
Journal of Economics, 1995.  
1304
 LEI, JUNEJA, and WRIGHT, "Patents Versus Patenting: Implications of Intellectual Property Protection for 
Biological Research," op.cit. 
1305
 WESCHLER, "The Informal Experimental Use Exception: University Research after Madey V. Duke University," 
op.cit. 
CHAP.12. Adjustments for Public Researchers 
307 
 tool box of enabling technologies”1306. United States public institutions that hold numerous gene 
patents have in this context for instance evolve towards less exclusive licensing in the past ten 
years
1307
. Facing a considerable anti-commons landscape in upstream research tools in light of 
strengthened IPR monopoly rights and subject-matter expansions, efforts have been put forward 
by social actors to “bring conceptual unity in a re-evaluation of the public domain or intellectual 
commons”1308, leading to the creative commons and open-source biotechnology movements. 
These movements have been triggered and corroborated by emerging agrobiodiversity user 
practices, doctrinal commentary, and legislative changes all reclaiming a broader or simply 
differently constructed public domain with regards to the availability of protected inventions to 
third parties. 
12.2.1. Compulsory and humanitarian licensing  
The first prospect of broadened licensing agreements stems from an opportunity directly provided 
for in the TRIPS Agreement. Compulsory licensing, a mechanism provided for in Article 31, 
affirms that the subject matter of a patent may be used without the authorisation of the right holder 
in certain circumstances, according to national law, “including use by the government or third 
parties authorised by the government”. This particular liability rule that may allow the broader use 
of protected inventions therefore requires the express action of public authorites. The basic proviso 
is that such State-led authorisation “shall be considered on its individual merits”, where public 
authorities themselves will negotiate the conditions of compulsory licensing on a case-by case 
basis with the rightholder. This negotiation may occur following unsuccessful efforts of the parties 
to reach a licensing agreements with “reasonable commercial terms and conditions”, usually in 
cases of dependency. However, a waiver to the obligation to enter into preliminary negotiations is 
admitted in cases of “national emergency or public non-commercial uses”. These “non-exclusive” 
and “non-assignable” licenses’ “scope and duration shall be limited to the purpose of which it was 
authorised”, while the rightholder “shall be paid adequate remuneration in the circumstances of 
each case, taking into account the economic value of the authorisation” (TRIPS, Art.31).The same 
opportunities do also, as aforementioned in Chapter 3, exist within plant variety protection laws, 
surrounded by similar boundaries, and could thus be triggered to address the dilemma of orphan 
crop distribution, although this issue has been less challenging in light of adequately funded strong 
international public agricultural plant breeding efforts.  
Compulsory licensing opportunities are considered by some commentators to be “preferable to a 
wide-ranging statutory exemption in order to ensure that the uses of biotechnology research tools 
remain reasonable and do not encroach too much on the innovators’ expected returns on costly 
investments”1309. Even though the need for wider public domain approaches such as the one 
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offered by compulsory licensing is greatly expressed in public upstream molecular research, there 
has been relatively little recourse to this peculiar antidote to the shortcomings of the patent 
system1310. This lacuna can perhaps be attributed to the fact that the products of green 
biotechnology protected by patents have been controversial in their own right, and have not been 
viewed as a straightforward answer to the issue of food security as is the access to clinically 
proven drugs to combat a specific disease. It has also been attributed to the wording and scoping of 
this liability rule in the TRIPS Agreement, which would have been shaped differently, if the initial 
goal of the agreement were to really make sure access to generic medicines, or any other product 
of biotechnology, became a reality1311.  The limited recourse to this tool can furthermore also be 
explained by the lack of centralised authority and therefore of clarity and legal certainty, and the 
perception that the recourse to or the threat of having recourse to this peculiar tool may inevitably 
act as a disincentive to innovation1312. 
The recourse to compulsory licensing remains nonetheless interesting to address the bumpy 
scenario where access to a particular protected product or process is denied by a rightholder to a 
competitor having developed a derived product. A few examples exist with regards to health 
policies and have been mostly implemented for the purchase or local production of antiretroviral 
medicine following the Doha Declaration, respectively in 2002 in Zimbabwe following to the 
urgency of the AIDS epidemic in the country, and in 2004 in Mozambique and Zambia1313. In the 
field of public health, the United Nations Development Programme, in its Human Development 
report, has recommended that independent and semi-judiciary administrative systems be 
established in order to assess the need to grant compulsory licenses and ensure their negotiations 
and tracking1314. A number of alternative or hybrid systems have been also advocated, such as a 
“compulsory licensing mechanism with reach-through royalties”; where the monetary contribution 
would be calibrated on account of the contribution of patented subject matter to the final research 
result, taking as a result their actual value in consideration
1315
. This option would arguably be 
more tempting for patentees who tend to regard compulsory licensing schemes with little 
conceived mistrust, since it seemingly provides greater royalty collection opportunities. The 
mechanism nonetheless opens the door to other potentially contentious issues, common to 
compulsory licensing as a whole, that of determining the exact extent of the contribution of one 
innovation to the development of another, as well as the intervention of public authorities in the 
sphere of contractual autonomy.  
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 Given the resolved unlikeliness of seeing compulsory licensing schemes activated by national 
authorities in the field of green biotechnology, upstream molecular biology tools have rather been 
subject to a plethora of voluntary public releases of information and IPR donations. This trend 
is especially noticeable in the case of molecular markers, which are extremely lucrative since 
absolutely necessary to the development of molecular plant breeding. Indeed, as aforementioned, 
“the opportunity to tag a fast mutating – repetitive – sequence motif as a simple polymerase chain 
reaction marker represents the ideal resource for the development of a valuable, if not the most 
important, marker class to be applied in practical plant breeding, particularly in species otherwise 
characterised by low levels of genetic diversity”1316. Simple sequence or microsatellite markers 
(SSR markers) are also “particularly useful for gene mapping and marker-based selection since 
they are amenable to high-throughput analysis and are informative in many types of genetic 
crosses”, especially in programs using “a genetically narrow gene pool” such as rice1317. An 
important number of these SSR markers for rice were first made available by Monsanto in 2001 
through a public release of six thousand six hundred and fifty-five SSR-containing DNA 
sequences, which allowed thereafter the development and release of two thousand two hundred 
and forty new SSR markers for rice by the joint contributions of nine international research groups 
to the so-called “International Rice Microsatellite Research Initiative”1318.  
There are other “well-publicised news stories of donations of intellectual property rights for 
technologies patented in the Europe, the USA and other rich countries, such as Golden Rice, and 
virus-resistant potatoes, sweet potatoes and yams for use by poor farmers in developing 
countries”1319. In the case of pro-vitamin A-enriched ‘Golden Rice’, the seventy patents were as 
aforementioned seemingly relinquished to allow the variety to find its way towards farmers
1320
.  
“Although they could be used in the laboratory under the so- called “experimental use” 
exemption to patent exclusivity, once the rice left the lab, the force of all the IP rights came 
into play. Paying to license each technology would make the rice far too expensive for its 
target market. Although some firms have waived their rights or negotiated reasonable 
agreements, even one holdout could stop the use of the rice”1321. 
The said freedom to operate was actively attained in 2001 in this particular project, as a private-
public partnership between the inventors and the agrichemicals company Syngenta was 
formalised, thereby "facilitating access to a number of key technologies held by multiple private 
actors through the signature of material transfer agreements"
1322. “After much negotiation and 
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high-profile media attention, all the license holders agreed to grant free use of their intellectual 
property for distributing the rice to farmers who will earn less than ten thousand USD from 
growing it”1323.  
IPR donations have not always been absolute, invoking the full public release of information or 
inventions themselves. They have also been borne moderate characteristics. Examples range from 
the reticence of prosecuting public researchers for fear of public image backlash or fear of 
straining indispensable good relationships between scientists, and relaxed licensing strategies for a 
particular technology. The mere loosened licensing strategy from the PCR technology holder has 
for instance infamously helped ease the past temptation of actors wishing to run the chain 
reactions to circumvent the intellectual property protection and find un-infringing approaches 
around the terms of the patent. Greater availability thus prevented the prominent inducement of 
free riding. The example of another enabling technology, “constitutive promoters, i.e. genetic 
regulatory elements required to drive the expression of selectable marker genes and specific 
transgenes” 1324, the patents of which were not fiercely prosecuted by right-holders, also shows 
that only partial or moderate humanitarian stances may at times also be very efficient. It also 
highlights the vulnerability of an approach solely relying on the voluntary release of information. 
The said promoter fell under patents that defined the sequence regulating gene expression in a 
functional manner in the hands of Monsanto Company in the United States and Japan “directed to 
chimeric genes containing the 35S or the 19S promoter controlling a heterologous gene”, and also 
the Rockefeller University in the United States, “directed to the DNA sequences of the individual 
subdomains of the 35S promoter, combinations of them, and the use of B subdomains in particular 
to form tissue-specific promoters”1325.. Even though “the most common constructs using the 
cauliflower mosaic virus (CaMV) 35S promoter derived from a viral genome is owned by 
Monsanto, many alternative promoters that confer constitutive gene expression were developed in 
public sector organisations and are either in the public domain or can be licensed for nominal 
fees”1326. This development was made possible mainly because patent owners have generally not 
shown interest in prosecuting academic users of the promoter, even though injunctions were 
sought after private actors
1327
. Restraint in prosecuting public researchers for patent infringement 
has a result also been considered beneficial for plant improvement advances in general, yet the 
shaky nature of such practice is not difficult to grasp.  
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 The reach of such occasional leaps of generosity can only go so far in a competitive market 
environment, without completely undermining the ethos of awarding artificial lead time to 
deserving innovators. Not only do they depend on the “individual idiosyncrasies, whims and 
caprices”1328 of States and companies, they can also “lead to an unduly sanguine assessment of 
corporate generosity with respect to IPR”1329. Experimenting with innovative or loosened licensing 
schemes may therefore address the shortcomings related to the anti-commons landscape created in 
molecular research tools or other foundational technologies, as well as the distributional dilemma 
in technology transfer rebuttals, but it may not address all of them with the same efficiency. For 
instance, the cost of PCR applications for the developed and developing worlds was substantially 
reduced on account of the 'generic' status of the Taq enzyme and the expiration of the core process 
patents on PCR technology
1330
. The new prices will probably help spread the use of the technology 
in fields neglected in the past or set off its entrance into new fields of research, such as tropical 
plant breeding. 
12.2.2. Model or standard contracts with emphasis on the public domain 
The dilemma of addressing the communal nature of public research, the disregard of orphan crops, 
or the use-blocking licensing practices cannot be all addressed through actor-led humanitarian 
attitude or State-led unblocking intervention. That is why IPR flexibilities bearing subtler 
interventions in contractual autonomy have been also used, rather attempting to play on the 
content of licensing terms themselves, or by drawing up standard material transfer 
agreements. Several actors have as a result been trying to come up with a sound and more open IP 
management strategy as a whole. In order to do so, they have drafted model licensing agreements 
attached to their own protected technology so as to make enough room for the norms of science 
and the proviso of public goods production. They have also drawn material transfer agreements or 
model clauses fit for their own understanding of exclusive rights and innovation distribution for 
unprotected technology and the transfer of tangible research material as such. A number of 
standard terms have been enacted, drawing at times from the world of information technologies, 
but also from the public domain set out in the ITPGRFA, with the hidden or little conceived 
objective of creating new agrobiodiversity commons and related institutions. 
In order to overcome the hurdles of the strong property paradigm on public research, doctrinal 
commentary has been unanimous in recommending the establishment of “model license templates 
to facilitate agreements on mutually-beneficial terms and obviate the need for difficult and 
protracted negotiations on a case-by case basis, or, indeed, the need to revert to compulsory 
licenses at all”1331. Legislators have advocated this approach as well. In the United Kingdom, the 
Intellectual Property Office has for instance published informal and little interfering guidelines on 
“How Licensing Intellectual Property can help your Business” in July 2008 in order to protect the 
licensor and ensure that socially beneficial inventions were actually licensed on reasonable 
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terms1332. The OECD, following the findings of its 2002 report on “Genetic Inventions, Intellectual 
Property Rights and Licensing Practices”1333, has come up with “Recommendations on Licensing 
Genetic Inventions” in 20061334. Although limited to the licensing of genetic inventions used in 
human health care, these guidelines’ state that licensing practices should 
“1. A […] foster innovation in the development of new genetic inventions related to human 
healthcare and should ensure that therapeutics, diagnostics and other products and services 
employing genetic inventions are made readily available on a reasonable basis.  
1. B […] encourage the rapid dissemination of information concerning genetic inventions.  
1. C […] should provide an opportunity for licensors and licensees to obtain returns from 
their investment with respect to genetic inventions”. (OECD 2006 Guidelines for the 
Licensing of Genetic Inventions, Principe 1). 
Furthermore“The Best Practices also suggest that, to ensure a strong research base and as a 
supplement to competition law, licensors should consider licensing those genetic inventions 
that comprise base or platform technologies broadly. Mechanisms such as patent pools, 
patent clearinghouses or standard contractual provisions may be of assistance in 
implementing this best practice. Once again, licensors and licensees must be aware of 
limitations on such arrangements contained within competition law”. (OECD 2006 
Guidelines, Principle 47). 
Indeed, competition law imposes sound boundaries to the establishment of standard contractual 
provisions (and also with regards to the institutional solutions that shall be tackled in the next 
section of this Chapter)
1335
. It is nonetheless useful to say at this point that “new anti-trust policies 
may have reversed an antipathy to licensing that had long given strength to antitrust defences 
against patent infringement actions”1336.  
A number of “open-source” licensing practices have tried to draw from the experience in the 
world of information technologies, which has “overcome strict IP laws by harnessing aspects of 
the system itself – a jiu-jitsu manoeuvre of the law, whereby the opponents’ strength is used 
against him”1337. There are numerous examples of open-source licenses, mostly stemming from the 
software world. Notwithstanding their inate differences as to the “extent to which they allow 
public-domain property to be mixed with private property rights”, they share “the fundamental 
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 trait that their use is placed in the public domain”1338. The first license of this kind is the 
infamous General Public License, implemented through the “Free Software Foundation” as a 
“copyleft license” where users can rightfully copy the software1339. However, open source 
biotechnology is “a model for open source patenting or free biotechnology [which] presents a 
constellation of legal issues not typically found in previous open source licensing”1340. Attempts at 
using patent protection somewhat counterintuitevely have nevertheless seen the light of day. Even 
though comprehensive open-source licensing schemes, as understood within the realms of 
copyright, have not been set up in the world of green biotechnology patents, a number of standard 
licenses and model contracts have nevertheless been trying to reclaim the inherent balance of IPR, 
all the while having regards to the newfound obligations stemming from international biodiversity 
law.  
When faced with the need and will to draft licenses allowing for greater research operational 
freedom, the actual cost of using patented technology will be determined on account of the license 
agreements’ terms, especially those relating to the new crosses or variants that may be developed 
by the licensee or its sublicense, if faced with an indirect sublicense. The choice in this regard 
usually stands between upfront paid-up licenses or royalty-bearing licenses on each sale, or can 
also warrant the re-negotiation of the license when research shifts to display a commercial stance. 
The inherent struggle to distinguish experimental and commercial research endeavours resonates 
here once more, echoing the need for clear identification in the terms of the licensing agreement. 
In the particular example of the "gene gun incident", the University of Cornell was pushed to 
reconsider its practices and drafted a clearer IP policy. It preferably opted for non-exclusive 
licensing deals, spelling all the while out specific provisions regarding the philanthropic use of the 
inventions within all contracts, ensuring the "diligent use and development of Cornell technologies 
for any and all crops in any geographical region"
1341
. The licensing agreement preffered to set up a 
hybrid system of lump-sum payments, owed by the licensee at certain milestones (such as trials, 
approvals, first sale), the amount and time of disbursement of which are predetermined in the 
license agreement
1342
.  
In the same vein, but stretching the open-source approach a step further, the Australia-based 
CAMBIA (Centre for the Application of Molecular Biology to International Agriculture) grants 
non-commercial researchers in non-profit settings a cost-free licence on the basis of its exclusive 
rights to b-glucuronidase (GUS). As a result, this enabling research tool was “widely used by 
researchers in non-profit organisations who ultimately moved to corporations and continued using 
GUS”, at which point fees have been charged for using the technology in commercial research1343. 
This move was not only preempted, but also taken into account to build an effective scenario of 
limited commons, since the license agreement drew the boundaries of appropriation clearly at the 
moment of access. Indeed, under the BiOS license, patents that are awarded on improvements to 
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the technology to create transgenic plants need to be “granted back” and have to be made available 
to other users of the commons. Indeed, article 3 of the BiOS license states: 
“In partial consideration for the rights granted to BiOS LICENSEE, BiOS LICENSEE 
grants to CAMBIA, a worldwide, non-exclusive, royalty-free, fully-paid license, with the 
right to sublicense to other BiOS Licensee, under the Improvement Patents, for use which 
is within the scope of the Licensed Patents, and a worldwide, non-exclusive, royalty-free, 
fully-paid license, with the right to sublicense to other BiOS Licensee, to any 
Improvements not protected under the Improvement Patents, any Technology Data and any 
Improvement Material provided by BiOS LICENSEE to CAMBIA and necessary to 
practice Improvements”1344.  
Standard contracts have also at times taken the form of material transfer agreements (MTA), 
which generally operate when tangible material is exchanged next to an adjunct (and generally 
viral) license to be negotiated further down the line. Just like licensing clauses, these standard 
clauses may be utilised to prevent the dilemma of public knowledge recycling, all the while 
upholding the traditional norms of science in the strong appropriation environment. Many 
examples of such a meticulous approach exist, and most of them do not rely on a standardised 
license, but build the boundaries of material and innovation sharing at the exchange of material, 
through viral contracts that open licensing negotiations at a defined threshold of product 
development.  
An example, amongst many others, of model clauses bearing a more open stance relates to the 
Commonwealth Scientific and Industrial Research Organisation (CSIRO) standard terms and 
Guidelines that have been set up with regards to the MTA for biological material comprising gene-
silencing vectors. CSIRO scientists have discovered an important research tool in green 
biotechnology, elaborating a method to silence gene expression in plants using RNA interference, 
publishing their research in 1998. “CSIRO has embarked on a broad licensing strategy to provide 
access to this powerful technology”1345. The MTA for the vectors is available online but “only for 
the transfer of the material to educational and research organisations for internal research 
purposes”, as material contain GatewayTM recombination sites that are Invitrogen’s proprietary 
technology
1346
. If the recipient does not qualify for such criteria, a license needs to be negotiated 
with Invitrogen. In the case of public researchers, this easy-to-use ad hoc research MTA facilitates 
greatly the access and use of proprietary technology that has been developed hand in hand by 
public and private actors, even though the interpretation of the terms “internal research purposes” 
may put freedom to operate in jeopardy for institutes with more astute hybrid structures.  
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 The most notorious standardised material transfer agreement in plant improvement remains the 
sMTA, which constructs the “limited compensatory liability regime”1347 set up by the 2004 
International Treaty on Plant Genetic Resources for Food and Agriculture. As 
aforementioned, the sMTA remains a private contract between the provider and the recipient of 
germplasm (as a fixed plant variety a landrace, or material in development), which settles a 
compensatory liability that enters into play at specified moments. Compensation can either be 
ignited when the recipient commercialises a PGRFA product that incorporates the material that has 
been transferred while not making it available for further research and breeding (in accordance 
with article 6.7 of the sMTA), or it can take the shape of a lump-sum payment negotatied under the 
terms of article 6.11 of the sMTA). This internationally reified standard contract is mainly used by 
gene banks, and especially by the Consultative Group on International Agricultural Research, 
which also extends its reach outside of crops listed in Annex I of the ITPGRFA. The CGIAR, 
having faced the strong paradigm’s sour sword upon their shoulders with the Golden Rice 
incident, was nonetheless pushed to adopt a new stance on intellectual property and reflect further 
on the use of the sMTA. Even faced with the crude realities of the Bayh-Dole Act, only a handful 
of the sixteen CGIAR centres have sought patent protection for their inventions1348. This means 
that the only real bargaining chips in the hands of the CGIAR remain its “goodwill, access to local 
institutions involved in the generation and transfer of technologies, and non-designated 
germplasm, in the form of breeding lines”1349. But its cross-licensing opportunities and bargaining 
power has been considerably altered with the enactment of the 2004 ITPGRFA public domain. 
That is why the Consultative Group has had to radically rethink its approach to agrobiodiversity 
related intellectual property rights. The CGIAR Principles on the Management of Intellectual 
Property Assets were adopted in February 2012, reiterating a “vision to reduce poverty and 
hunger, improve human health and nutrition, and enhance ecosystem resilience”, while “intended 
to be consistent with both the ITPGRFA and the CBD”1350. Restating that “the CGIAR regards the 
results of its research and development activities as international public goods” and therefore 
adopting the “prompt dissemination of research results” as a rule, the Principles do nonetheless 
acknowledge that in certain limited cases, more restrictive licensing agreements may see the light 
of day. Restrictions on global “free access” can as a result be restricted through limited exclusivity 
agreements, restricted use agreements and IPR applications. This might seem at first sight as a step 
back from the traditional public domain oriented approach of the CGIAR and the precepts of the 
sMTA, but in reality these ostensible restrictions have been drawn up in order to avoid that the 
products of the IARC’s research be misappropriated by complete enclosure oriented parties.  
Indeed, “multinationals pick up Center technologies, traits, varieties etc. freely, package 
them in proprietary combinations, charge what they want ("what the market will bear") and 
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effectively restrict access. […] In addition, as National Systems are under increasing 
budget pressure, they are licensing to multinationals materials they receive "freely" from 
Centers with no benefit returning to the originating Centers »1351. 
As a result, the Principles seem to indicate that, in very exceptional conditions, CGIAR centres 
may protect their own varieties or technologies through intellectual property rights, just as they 
may need to restrict their use because of other considerations, if they for instance wish to restrict 
their use by third party private distributors, or if they need to incorporate proprietary third party 
technology in their products. In this context,  
“The Centers shall carefully consider whether to register/ apply for (or allow third parties 
to register/apply for) patents and/or plant variety protection over the Centers‟ respective 
Intellectual Assets. As a general principle, such IP Applications shall not be made unless 
they are necessary for the further improvement of such Intellectual Assets or to enhance 
the scale or scope of impact on target beneficiaries, in furtherance of the CGIAR Vision” 
(CGIAR Principles on Intellectual Assets, Art. 6.4.2). 
Furthermore, limited exclusivity agreements can be signed by CGIAR centres in accordance with 
article 6.2 of the Principles states that such limit has to be  
“Necessary for the further improvement of such Intellectual Assets or to enhance the scale 
or scope of impact on target beneficiaries, in furtherance of the CGIAR Vision”, and also 
be “as limited as possible in duration, territory and/or field of use”. Furthermore, the 
agreements need to ensure that the technology is available, i.e. that is accessible “free of 
charge (except for actual costs or reasonable processing fees) or at a reasonable cost)” 
within both a “research” and an “emergency” exception. While the former extends to “non-
commercial research carried out by public sector organisations, i.e. government entities, 
such as national governments, national agricultural research institutions, publicly funded 
international agriculture research centers, and publicly funded educational institutions”, 
the latter is triggered by a “food security emergency declared by a national government or 
a multilateral and internationally recognised institution based on generally accepted 
benchmarks of the Integrated Food Security Phase Classification” (CGIAR Principles on 
Intellectual Assets, Art. 6.2). 
The Principles have also been set up so as to allow the centre to use proprietary third-party 
technology that are indispensable to produce socially beneficial and relevant plant varieties. In this 
scenario, the centres may enter in “restricted use agreements” in accordance with the terms of 
article 6.3, if  
“They are, to the best of their knowledge, unable to acquire equivalent Intellectual Assets 
from other sources under no or less restrictive conditions, […and] the Consortium and/or 
the Centers shall use their best efforts to ensure that such third party Intellectual Assets 
are only used in relation to, or incorporated into, such intended products/service” (CGIAR 
Principles on Intellectual Assets, Art. 6.3). 
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 Furthermore, one can also imagine that the standard material transfer agreement operates next to 
a predetermined license. This option has been hailed and developed within the auspices of the 
infamous Creative Commons initiative, which has set up a “Model Patent License”, “intended to 
provide a simple standard model license to make patents that are being held for defensive purposes 
available for other uses—outside of those for which they are being maintained for defensive 
uses—on reasonable and non-discriminatory terms: preferably free of charge and without 
unnecessary field limitations”1352. Even though “there is currently no legal equivalent that can act 
alongside the patent system for protecting inventions to ensure that they are opened up, […] an 
offshoot of Creative Commons called Science Commons was designed to try to devise just such a 
mechanism”1353. The main impetus behind this project was to reduce transaction costs involved in 
accessing proprietary or non-proprietary technology through the creation of “a voluntary and 
scalable infrastructure for rights representation and contracting representied by use standard 
agreements, web-based meta data and ‘human-readable deeds’”1354. The organisation has actually 
come up with a flexible range of options, all the while adhering to the core principles articulated 
by the National Institute of Health and its 1995 “Uniform Biological Material Transfer 
Agreement” and the shorter “Simple Letter Agreement”1355. The Science Commons team acted on 
a simple premise: 
“Discussions with stakeholders reveal a number of recurring problems. Supposedly 
uniform agreements are actually "customised" in time-consuming negotiations, although all 
players would benefit if they could bind themselves to restrict choices to a more limited set 
of standard options. Even the "short form" version agreements are perceived as too long 
and too complex. The agreements themselves are hard to interpret and scientists often find 
them mystifying, (or ignore them altogether as a result.) Finally, there is no connection 
between efforts to streamline the legal process for clearing materials, and efforts to 
streamline the practical process of actually fabricating and transferring the materials 
themselves”1356. 
In the Science Commons material transfer agreements, the user is generally free to “use the 
materials for research that [he/she] supervises, allow others under [her/his] supervision to use the 
materials, publish the results of [his/her] research”, but may do so under the following conditions: 
“the use of the materials is restricted by fields of use, [he/she] may not use the materials for 
clinical purposes, and [he/she] may not use the materials in connections with the sale of a product 
or service. The organisation’s revolutionary idea was to not only come up with a agrobiodiversity 
user-ignited consensus on contractual terms, but also to link the legal documents to the metadata of 
biological material. This process would allow, “in some areas at least, […] to click right from the 
description in the literature of an experiment using a DNA sequence, to a cheap "print out" of that 
sequence ordered online from a low cost intermediary, applying the terms of the standard 
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MTA”1357. A pilot project was launched within the iBridge Network, but since then the Science 
Commons project has been re-integrated within the Creative Commons organisation and seems to 
have dried down from 2011 onwards. 
Designed to pursue the double benefit of protecting the results of public research against its 
misappropriation without compensation, all the while ensuring the dissemination of inventions, 
especially for the advancement of science, model and standard licensing agreements and material 
transfer agreements have been extensively used to levy out the strong property paradigm’s 
shortcomings faced with public good oriented research. The move from the CGIAR, long 
committed to the goals and precepts of the ITPGRFA and the sMTA, towards even partial 
restrictive stances is one of the many social practices that show how much standardisation efforts 
towards a PGRFA commons are a long and bumpy road. This is especially true in the reality of 
molecular plant breeding, which needs to actively incorporate agrobiodiversity users that strive in 
the strong property paradigm. The great dependency that continues to exist reciprocally between 
public researchers and private molecular developers, whether integrated giants or patent oriented 
start-ups, makes the resort to one (or a few)-sizes-fits-all licensing approaches difficult to achieve 
in green biotechnology.  
Along with compulsory licensing schemes warranting State intervention and voluntary 
humanitarian IP donations, licensing standardisation efforts operate within the flexibilities of the 
TRIPS propelled paradigm. They do try to act on the problematic of enclosing cumulative 
innovation as such, and do so to arguable success. They also try to levy out the inadequacies of the 
paradigm with regards to less-endowned nations and individuals, all the while allowing for 
facilitated access to protected inventions. However, these licenses generally possess a static 
structure where the distinctions between public and private domain are determined ex ante, which 
may not always suit the needs of complex inventions where improvements and uses may lead in 
diverse and unanticipated directions1358. The design of clear and careful provisions is key; yet again 
they ought also to provide enough flexibility to users so as to attract a wide array of actors. 
Standard contracts are as a result in dire risk of setting the ground for ever greater re-negotiations 
between parties, which at the end of the day, will prevent them from achieving what they were 
tailored for, i.e. facilitating the access to patented information or to non-proprietary biological 
material.  
12.3. Building institutions to facilitate access to innovation 
Challenges experienced by public researchers with regards to the proliferation of patents, 
increasingly aggressive licensing strategies, along with the more metaphysical shortcomings of the 
strong IP paradigm regarding the norms of communalism and cooperation in public research, 
cannot solely be addressed through licensing schemes. That is why public researchers have 
attempted to build truly “open and collaborative research” architectures, emphasising rather “the 
organisation of production and what is done with the results of production, rather than details of 
licenses”1359. The shortcomings of the strong property paradigm could in this sense be, and have at 
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 times been, remedied through institutional mechanisms that facilitate the licensing, sharing 
and production of knowledge and innovative products or processes. Different models target 
collaboration either within the public or private realms, or within a hybrid public-private 
configuration. They can either be based on the economic principles of an ‘intellectual property 
clearinghouse’, including data sharing and patent pooling at the edge of product development, still 
dependent on pre-existing exclusive titles, or can be more concerned with research architecture as 
such, in the form of partially open collaborative research partnerships at the outset of research 
endeavours. An important number of institutions have been committed to building a financially 
secure public domain, combining both public and private actors. The latter generally view 
monetary or non-monetary contributions to the public domain as « property pre-empting 
investments », made to counteract the strength and reach of competitors’ property rights. When 
such investments are combined with strictly non-profite ventures, they can constitute, in Robert 
MERGES’ view, partial ‘self-correcting’ mechanisms of intellectual property rights1360. These 
mechanisms are crucial since they rely on private action and not just government policy to address 
the excesses of intellectual property law much more effectively1361.  
12.3.1. Accessing Patented Innovation through clearing houses and cooperative pooling 
Walking the thin red line very similar to standardised licensing mechanisms, a number of solutions 
have attempted to bridge the gap between proprietary technology and its users by building 
cooperative institutions, either gathering information about patent-holders, or bringing them 
together. These efforts resonate with what has been advocated by eminent innovation economics 
scholars such as Paul DAVID on the reconstruction of scientific research commons through 
“cooperative pooling and open-access cross licensing of research tool-sets”; providing an 
“institutional remedy for the harms that can result from the expanded use of IPR protections and 
the market as a means to promoting the production of international public goods that take the form 
of scientific and technical information”1362. These institutional remedies may take very different 
forms, but generally all remain difficult to ignite at first, as most of them “may emerge only when 
upstream patents pose a keen threat to the core interest of a class of businesses, thus making a 
collective defense desirable”1363. It is also difficult to successfully run them, as stringent boundaries 
are established through competition law requirements, just as all involved agrobiodiversity 
improvement actors need to continuingly share aligned goals and interests. Amongst technology 
access and/or transfer systems, clearing-houses (although finding their origins in banking law) are 
used to describe mechanisms that try to pair up developers and users of technology or biological 
resources1364. Some may ‘merely’ provide information with regards to the patent landscape that 
ascends before researchers; others may operate to ease access to technology, whether in the 
aftermath of a standard license negotiation or on a basis of open access1365, complemented by 
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different mechanisms such as “honest-brokerage”, royalty collection mechanisms or patent pools. 
Within this landscape, institutions can either operate between patent holders themselves, or rather 
be set up as an independent, usually State-led or charity-led mechanism1366.  
Information clearing-houses 
Amongst the institutional solutions that may help navigate patent landscapes that public 
researchers are confronted to, the most basic and perhaps equally elemental remains those striving 
to gather information on such landscapes. Without attempting to negotiate access to the 
technology itself, these initiatives can be nevertheless extremely useful to assess the reach of 
claims to which rightholders have been warranted a temporary monopoly. Some may even provide 
for explanatory notes next to claims, allowing the innovator to grasp a better understanding of 
what has been indeed invented, as well as valuing the actions that he or she would be allowed to 
do with the material or process with and without the rightholder’s authorisation. As 
aforementioned, a major hurdle of the strong property paradigm relates to the nebulous and costly 
nature of information costs in the first baby steps taken to determine one’s freedom to operate in a 
particular research area.  
“For non-legal professionals, a problem common to all the existing databases is the 
interface, which caters to individuals with expertise in intellectual property. Another issue 
is the limited number of searchable fields. Unlike the indexed scientific literature at the 
National Library of Medicine, patent publications are not indexed, forcing a text-based 
search. While many would not be put off by the need for a text-based search strategy, the 
language used in writing patents is very stylistic and to some extent codified by the 
drafters. A patent title may bear faint resemblance to the subject matter. For example, 
many published patent applications lodged at the World Intellectual Property Organisation 
(WIPO) office bear the title Secreted human proteins”1367. 
In order to respond to this epinous challenge, numerous mechanisms have been put at play. 
Amongst others is the Convention on Biodiversity’s Clearinghouse Mechanism set up to 
promote technical and scientific cooperation, as well as facilitate the exchange of scientific, 
technical and legal information regarding biodiversity, in accordance with article 18.3 of the CBD. 
The mechanism functions as a network of national public focal points and authorities, but does not 
extend to proprietary information, and most of the links provided on the website solely concern the 
biodiversity conservation strategies or projects; some links are no longer attributed1368. Other more 
patent oriented databases exist as well, such as the European Patent Office’s Espacenet, which 
nonetheless does require at least a certain amount of familiarity with IPR language, Google Patent 
Search, and other fee-based databases like Delphion, Dialog or Micropatent1369. 
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 Completely independent information clearing-houses exist as well. The Global Biodiversity 
Information Facility is in this context an initiative triggered by debates in the OECD’s Global 
Science Forum, but set out as an independent international organisation in the form of a “federated 
data repository”1370, indexing information on species and specimens, allowing users to search all 
the data at once1371. The approach of the flexible GBIF Memorandum of Understanding to 
intellectual property is quite straightforward, as all data that is gathered by the Facility is openly 
accessible, while data providers maintain their exclusive rights on the information, and can as a 
result impose use restrictions both to GBIF itself, and to those accessing and using the data 
through the Facility as well1372. This iniative’s success can be attributed to several characteristics, 
which in parallel make it difficult to apply to a gene patent clearing-house per se. Indeed, the data 
gathered by the Facility is of little commercial value. Just as the clearing-house, it does not try to 
link material users and providers, nor does it stand on strongly enforceable legal ground. Indeed, 
compliance is based on a non-binding and therefore flexible Memorandum of Understanding, 
which “may not be sufficient in the highly charged area of gene patents”, just as it is grounded on 
“moral suasion common to scientific endeavours, to enforce its data-use and data-provider 
agreements”1373. 
In the specific field of biotechnology patents, a solution has been drawn by the aforementioned 
non-profit CAMBIA organisation, which has set up a completely text searchable engine, coined 
the “Patent Lens”, pulling together information from ninety different jurisdictions. A completely 
independent initiative, the Lens also gives a number of explanations for most patents that are 
included in the database, as well as granting some background assistance for the “naïve user”. 
“Powered by eight busy software engineers, and funded by a patchwork of foundations and the 
Queensland University of Technology in Brisbane, Australia, […] it will work best when it has 
cultivated a wiki-style following of users willing to take the time to annotate content, develop tools 
and share analyses”1374. 
In light of the fact that “data sets, standards compliance and analytical tools must be 
improved—in particular, data sets and analytical tools must be made openly accessible—in 
order to provide a basis for effective decision making and policy setting to support 
biological innovation. [The Lens acts as] a web-based platform that allows such data 
aggregation, analysis and visualization in an open, shareable facility. Within 'The 
Biological Lens' facility, the sequence database currently holds 147,565,858 million 
nucleotide and amino-acid sequences disclosed in 323,721 global patent documents 
comprising both applications and grants. Of these sequences, 67% are repeated at least 
once in the corpus. Some level of redundancy is to be expected, as the same sequence may 
be either referenced in a single patent document for different purposes or mentioned in 
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many related or unrelated patent documents. Although a majority of patent documents list 
only one or a few sequences, a substantial number list thousands or even millions of 
sequences. For example, US Pat. No. 7,777,022 discloses 4.2 million sequences. As 
millions more sequences become available, patent offices face a difficult challenge to 
render that information accessible to and useable by the public”1375. 
This enterprise will not only allow officer from patent offices in jurisdictions with limited 
budgetary capacity or limited experience with intellectual property rights on living organisms to 
gather information in a less costly and perhaps even more efficient manner, raising as a result the 
quality of patents awarded worldwide. It will also be of tremendous use to those researchers facing 
“entry barriers that disadvantage small-to-medium enterprises (SMEs) and innovation-focused and 
impact-driven public sector and philanthropy”1376. The organisation has also undertaken the 
colossal task of building patent landscapes for numerous technologies related to green 
biotechnology, namely with regards to the Agrobacterim-mediated transformation of plants, to the 
promoters used to regulate gene expression, the antibiotic resistance genes and their uses in plant 
genetic transformation, the resistance to phosphinotricin, positive seletion, and bioindicators1377. 
The organisation’s efforts have been praised as a means “to return to the bargain at the root of the 
patent system, and to use the computational and social-media tools at our disposal to publicise 
inventions, rather than obscure them”1378. 
Technology-exchange clearing-houses 
Going further than the precept of data mining and knowledge sharing, intellectual property and 
technology exchange clearing houses could be imagined as a step smoothing the navigation of 
complex patent landscape and the so-called “patent thicket”. Institutions have indeed been 
designed to not only make information regarding exclusive informational rights owned by public 
research institutes, including universities, available to researchers around the world, but also 
theoretically them smoother access to protected inventions
1379
. The idea of brokerage needs to be 
present in these institutional solutions, really bringing together the users and providers of protected 
inventions, even though effective access to the technology will not be granted by the clearing-
house itself but through either the ad hoc or the standardised licensing agreement entered into 
between the licensor and licensee1380. These strategies will be particularly “important in the future 
for sharing access to key enabling technologies, to enable innovators to develop and deploy the 
trait technology projects of the public sector”1381. Already in 2001, the UNDP Human 
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 Development Report directly refered to a potential intellectual property clearing-house as a viable 
and efficient solution to the developmental divide created on account of the TRIPS-propelled 
strong property paradigm:  
“Identifying and accessing individual patent claims for research in agricultural 
biotechnology is complex. A fairer and more efficient global trade in patented genetic 
materials, germplasm and applied technologies would be made possible through a 
clearinghouse. By identifying all relevant intellectual property for a given technology, 
indicating what is available for use and how, establishing a pricing scheme and monitoring 
and enforcing contracts, the clearinghouse could be an important step towards solving the 
collective problem of agricultural research”1382. 
Technology-exchange clearing-houses should thus be seen as facilitators, with different degrees of 
congegration and access facilitation. They have been designed either to provide open access to 
protected inventions, or to warrant access through standardised licenses. 
“Agricultural biotechnology IP clearinghouses could bundle together sets of 
complementary patents from different patent holders into complete biotechnology or 
agronomic systems contracts (thus providing upstream technology aggregation). Through 
active pursuit of such syndication strategies it would be possible to create customised 
licenses that could greatly increase the use of inventors’ technologies and make multi-
patent technology systems readily available and affordable to researchers”1383. 
Several efforts have tried to establish actual technology exchange clearing houses in the field of 
agricultural biotechnology, unfortunately to no global avail and limited success. Perhaps the most 
infamous of all such endeavours is the Public Intellectual Property Resource for Agriculture 
(PIPRA), designed in 2004 to integrate fragmented IP portfolios held by public institutions 
through collaborative management and a standard license1384. The independent organisation was set 
up as a consortium of universities and public research institutes, regrouping forty-six institutions 
from thirteen countries, but mostly from the United States, “accounting for approximately fifty per 
cent of the public/non-profit patented agricultural technologies”1385. Mildly ambitiously, but to 
great success, PIPRA was also involved in more “classical” capacity building exercices, building a 
much needed integrated structure of “scientific and legal skills [to provide] expertise, talent and 
resources that enable the delivery of a wide range of services”1386. Together with the Oxford-based 
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Centre for Intellectual Property Management in Health Research (MIHR), which is designed as a 
non-profit IP management organisation with a developmental focus, PIPRA has also developed an 
extensive handbook on best practices in licensing, available online free of charge with great 
practitioner’s insight and advice for all involved actors1387. More innovatively, challenged by the 
Rockefeller Foundation, the initiative “bundled public sector institutions’ licensed and unlicensed 
technologies in “shared technology packages”, in an attempt to make them more readily available 
to member institutions for commercial licensing or for designated humanitarian or special use”1388. 
The attempt was also quite unique in the fact that PIPRA actively maintained “collaborative 
working relationships with the owners of displayed technologies”, and went as far as to develop a 
pilot project on “Enabling Technologies for Plant Transformation”, acquiring and testing 
“complementary technologies required for the transfer of foreign genes into plant cells” in a made-
for-purpose laboratory1389. Trying to establish easier freedom to operate paths for gene transfer 
with different promoters, PIPRA explored the possibility of consolidating the patent rights to the 
enabling technologies it had identified in a convenient one-stop shop system1390. This evolution 
slowly turned PIPRA into a timid patent pool.  
“Technology providers agreed that all component technologies would be valued equally, as 
the patents, collectively, were more valuable than any individual patent and any commercial 
revenues would be shared among the technology providers in proportion to the number of 
technology components they provided. To decrease transaction costs, technology providers 
strongly supported the administration of the patent pool through a single entity which had 
proscribed permissions to sublicense third-party patent rights. Since PIPRA is not a legal 
entity, the University of California, serving as the host institution, manages and licenses the 
technology pool on behalf of PIPRA-member universities”1391. 
Very similar in institutional organisation and also unfortunately in fate is the Public Intellectual 
Property for Agricultural Biotechnologies (EPIPAGRI) initiative, which also had governmental 
support from the European Commission. Aimed at encouraging public intitutes to collaborate in 
the management and promotion of their IP portfolios, the project’s aim were very ambitious  
“EPIPAGRI will result in an information system composed of a database over agricultural 
biotechnologies patents and know-how, including histories and statuses, and a software 
package designed to help technology transfer experts in collecting, extracting, and analysing 
IP information. The second outcome from EPIPAGRI consists of patent pools ready to be 
proposed to internal and external PROs for joint management and industrial partners for 
technology transfer and commercialisation EPIPAGRI will also bring proposals of 
intellectual policy measures to national and European policy-makers aiming at preserving 
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 the rights for academic research to utilize public research results and facilitating access of 
industry, in particular SMEs, and developing countries to biotechnological innovations” 1392.  
Needless to say, no patent pools have emerged from these initiatives, in that the clearing-houses 
have not really morphed into such cooperative pooling. These pools have been formed for more 
than 150 years, especially in the United States, “either voluntarily or with the involvement of the 
USA Government to affect and shape industries”1393. They constitute « a voluntary agreement 
between two or more patent owners to license one or more of their patents to one another or third 
parties »1394. As a result, they are considered to be “the aggregation of intellectual property rights 
which are the subject of cross-licensing, whether they are transferred directly by patentee to the 
licensee or through some medium, such as a joint venture, set up specifically to administer the 
patent pool”1395. This particular construct is viewed as highly beneficial when faced with « truly 
complementary patents, [which makes] the patent pool desirable and procompetitive, but assembly 
of substitute or rival patents in a pool can eliminate competition and lead to elevated license 
fees »1396. Notable examples include the DVD or MPEG pools1397.  Patent pooling examples are 
nonetheless extremely hard to find in the world of green biotechnology, except for those 
aforementioned examples of the PIPRA enabling technology FTO roadmap, and the CAMBIA 
BiOS, which, when stretched to their outer limits, may be considered as patent pools. Indeed, as 
standard setting is not really an issue in biotechnology, the recourse to patent pools has not been 
necessary for industry to commercialise products and unlock tricky situations1398, while also 
making it difficult to assess which patents ought to be viewed as essential or complementary1399. 
Patent pools are furthermore extremely difficult to envisage in the world of green biotechnology 
and molecular plant breeding, because of these innovation chains inherent cumulative nature, as 
products developed upstream will not be well defined downstream1400. This premise is exacerbated 
by the fact that patents are more important in biotechnology than in other research fields, making 
participation to pools that may limit financial (through greater royalty rates) and technological 
(through cross-licensing and bargaining opportunities) gains less probable1401. 
Other attempts have, less comprehensively than traditional technology exchange clearing-houses 
or patent pools, all the while retaining an immense utility, set up brokerage institutions to access 
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technology, especially with a view to address to developmental divide. The International Service 
for the Acquisition of Agri-biotech Applications (ISAAA) for instance exemplifies one facet of 
institutional developments towards a facilitated university-industrial collaborative knowledge 
complex. This service negotiates the terms of access to private sector technologies for the 
improvement of subsistence crops and/or the transfer of technology and know-how. It has 
successfully acted as a broker of technology-transfer for a research project aimed at the 
development of maize streak virus-resistant varieties in Africa
1402
.  
«ISAAA operates primarily as a facilitator, matching available technologies to meet 
identified needs, brokering technologies, and building capacity by transferring knowledge 
and know-how between companies in developed countries and the public sector in 
developing countries. ISAAA also addresses other constraints in biotechnology transfer, 
such as regulatory and public perception issues »
1403
. 
The other more recent and equally successful brokerage example of the Rockefeller Foundation 
led African Agricultural Technology Foundation (AATF) reinforces arguments for the creation of 
less extensive but more collaborative clearing-house mechanisms. The AATF is furthermore quite 
unique in the sense that « it is prepared to in-license technologies from the private sector, which it 
then sub-licenses to its partners in Africa, and more importantly it strongly focuses on downstream 
activities, including the creation of local, national and regional markets for the products pro- duced 
from transferred technologies »1404. The AATF was particularly built with transgenesis products in 
mind, which include additional regulatory aspects and therefore require stewardship efforts that 
can be more easily performed by a non-proft intermediary, better endowed to endorse civil 
liability, in comparison to less experienced and trained institutes. Amongst other projects, they 
have successfully negotiated “through a royalty-free patent license, a gene conferring resistance to 
the maruca pod borer in cowpea, and is facilitating strict bio-safety regulatory compliance for its 
development and deployment in West Africa”, with the aim of developing disease resistant 
cowpea varieties that would not require expensive pesticide use1405. 
Our analysis shows that information clearing-houses are vital for the navigation of complex patent 
landscapes, and are quite easy, yet costly to set up and maintain up to date. Independent initiative 
like the CAMBIA Patent lens should receive greater support, in order to continue ensuring the 
level-playing field in information gathering. Capacity-building initiatives with greater emphasis on 
the educational voids are also primordial and effective, just as brokerage insitutions with firm 
emphasis on human and economic development. More encroaching open access or managed 
technology clearing-houses may be effective in certain very “well-defined niches”, especially for 
developmental use and technology transfer to less endowned nations, but is still rather costly to 
develop, with very limited applicability1406. Even though it seems difficult to establish a technology 
exchange clearing-house or even patent pools in its most extensive sense in public agricultural 
plant improvement, agrobiodiversity user practice seems to indicate that steps are being taken to 
build similar systems.  
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 12.3.2. Developing partially open collaborative research partnerships and triple helixes 
Cooperation in the field of molecular biology and plant improvement has not only been attempted 
in a landscape where exclusive titles had already been granted. Given the tremendously difficult 
task of bringing together agrobiodiversity use actors, either solely public, or both public and 
private, at the closing stages of research endeavours, collaboration have intuitively tried to build 
bridges at their outset, to great success. The fairly novel research tools that have arisen on account 
of the infusion of molecular biology into plant breeding science constitute the new core of crop 
genetic improvement, as an indispensable input for further research, side by side with both 
improved and exotic crop varieties that represent the operational background of crop research. 
Indeed, tools such as molecular markers, high-density genetic maps and structured mapping 
populations provide breeders with the ability to "simultaneously define gene action and breeding 
value at hundreds of loci distributed relatively uniformly across entire genomes"
1407. These tools’ 
position at the groundwork of the innovation process in modern biotechnology, whether applied to 
conventional plant breeding or to transgenesis, elevates the conditions surrounding their 
appropriation and further use as an essential issue in shaping agrobiodiversity research. The 
existence of partially open collaborative research partnerships, joint ventures or other institutions 
is therefore has in this sense been crucial for follow-on or fellow innovators trying to pursue their 
research and development efforts more publicly within an aggressive property paradigm.  
Open or partially open upstream research collaborations  
Examples of public-private collaborations that emphasise openness are numerous in the world 
of green biotechnology. Non-market actors focusing on fundamental research, such as public 
sector research programs or universities continue to play an essential role in the development of 
upstream molecular research tools. They have become privileged partners offering pre-competitive 
research and also for applied research in cluster fields with little private sector presence. With 
regards to applied transgenesis trials, the public sector has been shown to focus on those less-
commercial crops, targeting "commodities that are relatively neglected by the private sector but 
important to the mission of the public sector institution"
1408
, focusing on biotechnological 
innovations useful in specific agricultural landscapes, solving ecosystem problems related to both 
biotic and abiotic stresses
1409
. As for pre-competitive collaborative research models, the Seed 
Biotechnology Centre of the University of California in Davis for instance conducts numerous 
collaborative research programs for the development of breeding tools per se, together with 
consortiums of companies, for instance in terms of whole genome mapping in pepper and lettuce 
or the constitution of a genome database in carrots. Providing "fee-for-service work" for both 
academics and industry, or collaborating within more structural agreements, these public entities' 
inherent strategy remains to guarantee "that the results of [their] research consumers, by actively 
seeking to grant licenses for patented inventions"
1410
, instead of using these licenses as powerful 
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commercial credence. Straightforwardly, this role is far more crucial for the traditional business 
model, which relies on seed sales and licenses obtained on the basis of plant breeders rights for 
income, and does not have sufficient biotechnological capacity to keep up with the international 
pace. However, the second business model encompassing such capacity within its realms is no 
exception to the new rule of collaboration, often availing itself of non-market actors through close 
partnership agreements. For instance, the publicly-funded Flanders Institute for Biotechnology 
("VIB") has many research and development partners within the private sector, including a project 
carried out together with the University of Ghent and BASF Plant Science for the prediction of 
gene functions through novel bioinformatics tools, in order to find yield enhancing genes for corn 
and rice. This cooperation stems from the recent acquisition of Crop Design, a VIB spin-off 
focusing on trait discovery, by BASF in 2006. “Although much has been written about the 
possibilities for public-private collaborations in agricultural biotechnology research, [study results 
conducted in 2003] indicate that only a relatively small proportion (2.8%) of patents in this area 
have been jointly invented by collaborating private and public-sector researchers”1411. More and 
more, ‘interactive innovative processes” are being established in the field of molecular biology, 
where society profits from the existence of a rich innovation structure where institutional learning 
is routine
1412
. These processes include the concept of entrepreneurial university model
1413
 and the 
promotion of the so-called “triple helix” of interaction between industry, government and 
universities as a key feature of the knowledge economy
1414
. The example of the North Carolina 
Biotechnology Centre might in this regard be interesting. As an independent and financially self-
sufficient organisation, it indeed acts as co-ordinator between industry, government, universities, 
financial institutions and even the media. This successful recipe was taken over by the United 
Kingdom’s national biotechnology innovation system1415. This has also arguably been the case of 
the Egyptian Agricultural Genetic Engineering Research Institute (AGERI), which has developed 
molecular tools but also transgenic plants
1416
. 
Grand-scale research projects and partially open partnerships between actors that should in 
all likelihood not have deviated too far from the strong property paradigm are particularly 
representative of the desire of public researchers to affirm the communal nature of foundational 
research in biology. Much like the largely cited example of the Human Genome and the uproar 
caused by the "Craig Venter" intellectual property protection strategy pattern, controversies have 
surrounded research focusing on crop variety genome mapping. The particularly interesting 
research collaboration that is the International Rice Genome Sequencing project (as well as other 
international attempts at sequencing) demonstrates that socially useful innovation may not only be 
achieved and sufficiently incentivised through partially-open information systems, but that it 
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 actually also heavily relies on such partial open mechanisms. A condition for the success of such 
endeavours lies in the fact that all parties do recognise the role played by unpatented sequencing 
technology and access to other research teams' provisional research results in achieving the final 
research objective. Sequencing efforts are remarkable since the direct raw output of research 
activities is not subject to patent protection per se, as the technical step and non-obvious nature of 
the invention ought to be expanded in order to do so. However, their potential impact on further 
research remains immense, especially with regards to the rice genome, viewed as the "Rosetta 
stone of cereals", able to procure greater insight into the genetics of grasses and also all major 
cereals, such as maize, barley or wheat, sizable commercial markets compared to the seemingly 
less lucrative rice market in itself
1417
. Map-based sequence information grants knowledge over the 
location of all the genes in a genome, thereby extending the usefulness of molecular-marking 
technology, gaining in both accuracy and efficiency
1418
, while also providing greatly improved 
estimates for gene action controlling traits of interest
1419
. Sequence information therefore 
constitutes an absolutely essential instrument for preliminary mandatory research in molecular 
plant breeding and transgenesis. However, without further research aimed at their isolation and 
better understanding, as well as strong arguments as to their precise utility and their precise 
linkage to important crop traits, monopoly rights would typically not be granted over a simply 
mapped pair of gene sequences
1420
.  
Mapping efforts focusing on different rice genomes were undertaken around the same periods of 
time through a plethora of both public and private actors that were able to drive up the initial 
capital cost required to enter the sequencing business, costs mainly represented by trained 
personnel, royalty-bundling prices of laboratory instruments, specialised software, and licenses for 
the use of patented enzymes. The public actors involved represented powerful nations who could 
invest in such a gargantuan project, while also having a great social interest in doing so: igniting 
the race was Japan, with its "Rice Genome Research Program" dated as early as 1991, following in 
its footsteps was the current Beijing Genomics Institute in 1993 which boldly had further recourse 
to Craig Venter's time-efficient whole genome shotgun sequencing technology, and finally 
emerging was a consortium of publicly funded laboratories regrouped within the "International 
Rice Genome Sequencing Project", under Japanese leadership and a commitment on the release of 
research results into openly accessible databases
1421
. On the other side of the spectrum, two private 
agrobiotechnology giants initiated sequencing projects focusing on the same genomes examined 
by the public initiatives, with a commitment for proprietary mapping, even a prospect for the sale 
of resulting information to other biotech and seed firms
1422
. While Monsanto funded piece-by-
piece research conducted in the University of Washington in Seattle, Syngenta signed with Myriad 
Genetics, a high-end specialized laboratory, and the Clemson University of South Carolina, using 
the Venter shotgun technology. The dichotomy between the public and private approaches to 
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sequencing led to controversies at the publication of the draft sequences in 2002 by both teams 
having used whole genome shotgun approaches. Indeed, the private sponsored research results 
were not made available on public databases, but rather through the companies' own websites. For 
the sake of "the public benefit of bringing this important science out of trade secret status", an 
agreement was reached with Science, the scientific journal having published the provisional 
Syngenta results in 2002, setting up common conditions for the future use of "a gene's worth of 
data" in the partially assembled draft raw genome sequence for the purposes of research without 
need for negotiation, while large data requests or commercial applications required ad hoc 
conditional concession from the company
1423
. Even though criticism burgeoned
1424
, most 
researchers acknowledged that sequencing data was in reality being shared quite openly through 
all fronts, first by Monsanto through its strong University link in the project and the creation of a 
specific website allowing publicly funded researchers access to draft sequences, and then by 
Syngenta as well. Indeed, all private sponsored research results winded up in the international 
public consortium databases, either because demand for proprietary information remained too low, 
or through collaborations with public institutes who shared their sequences on GenBank
1425
. 
Specific contractual agreements were drafted in this regard, as the Member Institution Registration 
Agreement enlisted before WIPO and signed between Genoscope (the “Principal Investigator", 
representing the French consortium within the IRGSP) and Pharmacia Corporation, (representing 
Monsanto) shows. Information related to the draft genome sequences identified by the private 
sector-sponsored research division thus always remained of a partially open nature, further driving 
innovation. The complete rice genome sequence was made available through the NCBI database in 
December 2004, leading to the completion of the full map-based sequences for all examined rice 
varieties in August 2005. A similarly structured consortium, focusing on the post-sequencing field 
of "functional genomics", was set up in 2003, building an International Rice Functional Genomics 
Working Group, hoping this time to characterize more than half of the gene functions of the 
already sequenced genome. Along the same lines as the rice initiative, an "International Wheat 
Genome Sequencing Consortium" was established in 2005, including the traditional members of 
the scientific academic community and representatives of the public research institutes, but also 
those of the private sector, with companies such as Monsanto, Syngenta, KWS or Biogemma 
within their list of coordinating members. The consortium was created in an effort to facilitate 
international cooperation and thus advocate for the completion of complete mapped sequencing of 
the wheat genome, but it is also interestingly "committed to ensuring that the sequence of the 
wheat genome and the resulting DNA-based tools are available for all to use without restriction", 
exemplifying the instigating potential of partially open innovation systems in upstream research. 
More recently, the exclusively public "Potato Genome Sequencing Consortium" has published the 
entire genome sequence of two different potatoes, the highlight of which has been the 
identification of more than 800 disease-resistance genes having each the potential to be used in the 
fight against agronomically and socially devastating diseases such as the potato cyst nematode and 
the potato blight pathogen Phytophthora infestans, famous for causing the Irish potato famine of 
the 1840s.  
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 The value of open access to sequence data produced by the public sector has been embodied 
as an instrument putting considerable pressure on private organisations to release their sequence 
data (in the pharmaceutical sector, also pressuring all health agencies to release other information 
such as metadata about strains
1426
). Map-based sequence information grants knowledge over the 
location of all the genes in a genome, and thereby extends the usefulness of molecular-marking 
technology, gaining in both accuracy and efficiency
1427
. It also provides greatly improved 
estimates for gene action controlling traits of interest
1428
, and thus constitutes an essential 
instrument for preliminary mandatory research in molecular plant breeding. However, without 
further research aimed at their isolation and better understanding, as well as strong arguments as to 
their precise utility and their precise linkage to important crop traits, monopoly rights would 
typically not be granted over a simply mapped pair of gene sequences
1429
. The absence of 
intellectual property rights at the immediate end of the research and development chain did 
nevertheless not impede private investment for the map sequencing of the rice genome. The patent 
landscape completed by CAMBIA with regards to the United States legal order indeed shows that 
only zero point twenty-six per cent of the rice genome and less than 1 per cent of the coding 
sequence has actually been claimed in the one hundred and eighty-two patents granted by the 
USPTO, even though eighty-three per cent of these patents’ explicitly claim genome sequences. 
Patents have within this exemplary framework mostly enabled time gains, thrusting inquisitive 
minds to question the actual extent monopoly rights should continue to bear for the sole objective 
of providing lead time in an increasingly competitive market. The genesis and culmination of rice 
genome mapping thereby exposes that partially open information represents a prerequisite for 
further research and innovation within the world of high sunk cost bound specialized 
biotechnology research. Within the framework of hybrid upstream research streams, while the data 
produced by the consortium remains within the public domain, research efforts that achieve to 
single out the exact utility may nonetheless lead to patent protection over what shall unvaryingly 
consist of platform technologies, to which a solid door of access shall be maintained. Furthermore, 
the potential disregard or overlook for adequate rules of diffusion below the fence of raw research 
data still ought to be carefully considered. This assessment is nonetheless extremely difficult, since 
science commons are not organised through a strict differentiation between commercial and non-
commercial intent, but rather encompass activities that are “conducted under public domain-like 
conditions (without any ownership claims that would restrict access and use of the research results 
and basic research material)”1430. 
Meanwhile, and certainly building on the heritage of both the Human and Rice Genome projects, 
publicly available databases, especially those with a wide approach to data availability, have 
played an important role in the development of molecular plant breeding. For instance, PLEXdb 
(Plant Expression Database), an initiative of the US government, “is a unified gene expression 
resource for plants and plant pathogens. PLEXdb is a genotype to phenotype, hypothesis building 
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information warehouse, leveraging highly parallel expression data with seamless portals to related 
genetic, physical, and pathway data.”1431 In the world of foundational molecular research tools, the 
SNP Consortium also stands out through its very open approach to intellectual property. The 
Consortium brings together a “group of thirteen firms searching for single nucleotide 
polymorphisms (single base changes in the genome associated with diseases), which is not only 
publishing its discoveries but is also filing official paperwork with the PTO disclaiming rights to 
its “inventions”1432. “In facing a menace to their common goals and interests, competing 
pharmaceutical companies overcame high costs and created a public data pool to preclude SNP 
patents and to facilitate the exchange of scientific findings”1433. This organisation goes one step 
further than bringing together data sets and making them available to the public, and we shall try 
to underline the conditions needed to reach such higher level of aggregation in cooperative pooling 
in green biotechnology. There is nonetheless mounting evidence that sound and completely open 
biology movements are gaining importance. Such is the case of the “do-it-yourself biology” 
community, which is “emerging as a movement that fosters open access to resources permitting 
modern molecular biology, and synthetic biology among others. It promises in particular to be a 
source of cheaper and simpler solutions for environmental monitoring, personal diagnostic and the 
use of biomaterials”1434. This movement builds upon the 2003 registry of standard biological parts, 
through which more than three thousand and four hundred genetic building blocks were made 
publicly available. In 2010, “open-PCR DNA”, a kickstarter funded self-assembly machine 
capable of copying DNA. The previously mostly United States based community now has a 
European hub, which has been brought together through a website and advocates a completely 
open approach to molecular biology research tool development.  
Warranting actor participation in agricultural research 
Notwithstanding the importance of new open and collaborative research architectures to increase 
access to data or to research tools, these institutional structures may not always target and 
therefore not lead to the increased development of targeted innovation for developing 
countries1435. They will therefore come short of addressing the dilemma of orphan crops in public 
research playing the strong property game. There have in this regard been specific attempts to 
bring biotechnology more directly within the ambit of civil society in general and of resource-poor 
farmers in particular. A prominent example includes the Andhra Pradesh Netherlands 
Biotechnology Programme (APNLBP)
1436
. The Programme was an initiative funded by the Dutch 
government from 1995 forward and its approach was radically different from previous 
dissemination strategies, where remote research and development laboratories traditionally 
developed “a raft of new technologies” to distribute to developing world farmers, trying to solve 
the problems they were facing. These problems were however diagnosed in the ivory towers of 
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 national or international research institutes or universities. In the APNLBP model, “the emphasis 
was put on direct interaction with farmers and related actor groups such as non-governmental 
organisations”, in order to overcome the age-old understanding of technology development and 
transfer rooted on “a faith in the scientific method as the main source of improved technological 
practices for the poorest of the poor, relatively little attention paid to the tacit knowledge and local 
preferences of other groups including the farmers themselves”1437.  
The APNLBP model “followed an ‘interactive bottom up (IBU)’ approach, based on the 
principles of participatory technology development (PTD). All projects were to be 
formulated on the basis of local needs assessment and priority setting, to which end users, 
researchers, policymakers, government and NGOs should all be involved. In addition a 
central principle was to be constant interaction between farming communities and scientists 
in the process of technology development and adaptation. These interactions would be used 
to combine indigenous knowledge of people with both tacit stakeholder and modern 
scientific knowledge. […] Ownership is entrusted to a multi-stakeholder steering committee 
called the Biotechnology Programme Committee (BPC). The Committee consists of 
representatives from grassroot level NGOs, heads of developmental departments of the state 
government, representatives of the Department of Biotechnology (DBT) and the Indian 
Council of Agricultural Research (ICAR), Government of India (GOI) and scientists of 
national and international repute. [… Some project tracks were] isolating native genes by 
approaches of functional genomics, molecular mapping and wide hybridisations”. 
The success of the endeavour relied on a steady flow of information across agrobiodiversity user 
groups, including NGO’s, exemplify the benefits of thinking about agricultural plant improvement 
through a metaphor of innovation systems. It also exemplifies a desire from public researchers to 
break with traditional isolation behaviour and cooperate not only with each other, but also those 
using the produced public goods.This desire has been prominently felt in the CGIAR led IARC’s, 
which have supported the new era of “participatory plant breeding” (PPB) arguably since the 
beginning of the 21
st
 century1438. This rather recent approach to plant breeding involves scientists 
and farmers, but can also include consumers, vendors, industry or rural cooperatives in plant 
breeding research. Scholars generally operate a distinction between formal and farmer-led 
participatory plant breeding, where the former resonates more appropriately as an adjustment led 
by public researchers faced with the shortcomings of plant improvement research. It should be 
noted here that PPB does not solely respond to the shortcomings induced by the reification of the 
strong property paradigm, it has also appeared following critics regarding the lack of efficiency of 
public agricultural research, and also the aforementioned uniformisation critics directed at the 
Green Revolution1439. In this context, former-led PPB designates those programs where farmers 
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“merely” join in programs that are initiated, pursued and finalised by public research institutes1440. 
These can be of larger or smaller scale, covering different geographical locations, or just few sites, 
with different decision units to manage the project, where either the region or the local community 
may take the reign.  
Within its “Feed the Future” Global Hunger and Food Security Initiative, the United States 
Government has for instance set up “innovation labs” in a designated set of nineteen countries, 
with a common knowledge management program, the “Digest Project”. The intiative has for 
instance carried out a program with the lead contribution of Michigan State University, Cornell 
University and national agricultural research centres, a project “combining conventional, 
molecular and farmer participatory breeding approaches to improve Andeans beans for resistance 
to biotic and abiotic stresses in Ecuador and Rwanda”1441. Another example of collaborative 
research through a coalition approach relates to sorghum poultry in Andhra Pradesh India1442. In 
this particular example, a ‘network’ is established as participants voluntarily enter into the 
coalition to carry out mutual and joint activities, while remaining part of autonomous 
organisations.  
“Sorghum poultry coalition grew out of a long-standing partnership between International 
Crops Research Institute for the Semi-Arid Tropics (ICRISAT) and the private sector. 
ICRISAT played a nurturing role, often through informal networks, to the emerging private 
seed industry and relied, in turn, on them to ensure that the new material they developed 
reached farmers. In 2000, ICRISAT signed an agreement with eight private sector seed 
companies to develop sorghum hybrids whereby each company makes a grant to ICRISAT 
and the scientists then make their results available to all the companies in the consortium”1443. 
Although not completely vested in property rights concerns, these examples show that open and 
collaborative partnerships, even those including enclosure-oriented private actors, can still be and 
have been developed in order to overcome the pitfalls of growingly market-oriented plant 
improvement research. These endeavours, whether situated at the very end of the bargaining chain 
by incorporating developing country actors, or found rather at the very top of 21
st
 century plant 
improvement, i.e. in the production of molecular data; both need strict conditions to come about. 
Indeed, involved actors need common goals and concerns; they also arguably need to have had 
informal contacts with one another before the coalition or consortium’s genesis.   
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 CONCLUSIONS. Possible adjustments for public sector plant improvement and upstream 
research tool development 
Public researchers involved in molecular biology but also plant breeding face a number of 
backlashes stemming mostly from the patent component of the strong property paradigm reified 
under the TRIPS Agreement. Aggressive licensing practices, used as bargaining chips against 
public actors who seldomly possess strong negotiating powers, just as very constraining exclusive 
distribution agreements have both been experienced and seen as symptoms of an altered order of 
protection and production of knowledge goods by public researchers. The setbacks they have faced 
have nonetheless been addressed through several means, whether found in pure self-regulatory 
actions requiring social organisation efforts within their own cluster, or stepping further away than 
such cluster, by warranting regulatory action from third parties, mostly national or European 
legislators. All of these adjustments, whether confined to self-regulation or not, attempt to respond 
to the shortcomings of the strong property paradigm vis-à-vis their own informal norms and needs, 
which yearn for a slice of partially open innovation, and build and rely on a wider public domain. 
These adjustments have taken advantage of the inherent flexibilities of the property paradigm, 
allowing for eased access, development and dissemeination of increasingly crucial molecular 
research tools. They all face their own difficulties, whether in terms of realistic fulfilment, if for 
instance they require important legislative amendments, or rely on the exercice of contractual 
autonomy in unison so as to set up patent pools or other technology clearing-houses, or in terms of 
legal certainty and enforceability, when they for instance rely on third parties’ reluctance to 
prosecute infringements, or set up informal institutions that exist on the sidelines of the property 
paradigm.  
All of these adjustments do not address the same issues either, and a unique solution to the entire 
array of shortcomings experienced by public researchers cannot be vented like a magic wand, even 
though certain strategies may help ease a couple of issues at the same time. In order to include the 
norms of science within the equation of the patent age for instance, the majority of documented 
practice has targeted the licensing practices of all technology developers, whether entirely or 
partially waiving rights over certain products ex ante (at times within wide-scaled collaborative 
projects), or by pushing for developmental or humanitarian use terms, or setting up standardised 
contracts to perhaps even manage to form institutions like clearing-houses or pools. The setbacks 
stemming from aggressive licensing strategies have been addressed by these measures as well, but 
with an additional stress on more classical liability rules that act as compulsory licensing schemes 
with the active involvement of the State, acting as a broker between entities that have failed to 
reach an agreement on the use of inventions linked by dependent patents. The success of these 
initiatives rely nonetheless on the on the whims and caprices of individual companies. To address 
the inherent challenges stemming from the enclosure of products of cumulative and incremental 
innovation in itself, and not just aggressive licensing, action has generally required to go beyond 
mere self-regulation, as the latter has only gone so far as to “raise the patent bar” or ensure peer 
review systems in patent examinations to assess prior art. Public researchers have thereby tried to 
build on the eligibility of molecular inventions for patent protection, unvaryingly highlighting the 
need for extremely careful consideration in the qualification of the product or process as an 
invention, or in the assessment of the criteria of non-obvisousness, novelty and utility. The same 
kind of action has been concerned with backing literal claim interpretations and purpose-bound 
patent protection so as to avoir reach-through practices that allow initial discoverers to control the 
entire stream of downward innovation, especially in gene sequence patents. In order to counter the 
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profileration of broad patents in plant improvement related technologies, public researchers have 
also preached for other regulatory mechanisms that award enough space for fellow innovators to 
use protected inventions in the early, or even arguably later, stages of their research programmes; 
the main one being concerned with an experimental use or research exception that would be broad 
and legally certain enough to accommodate their needs. The loss of royalties that would be 
experienced by patent holders in this scenario will have nonetheless need to be assessed, even 
though this impact can be kept to a minimum if for instance an ex post liability scheme is clearly 
established so as to be triggered at the commercialisation stage. The deviance of the strong 
property paradigm has also been addressed by acting directly on licensing terms, establishing a 
clear preference for non-exclusive licensing, clearer terms for subsequent use through up-front 
payments, or much more open systems on the margins of strong exclusive rights. Most of 
agrobiodiversity user action and practice has focused around the end to navigate the new waters of 
enclosed cumulative innovation components, even though certain adjustments have also been 
enacted to address the issue of biopiracy, so as to avoid the misappropriation of sovereign 
biological material and traditional knowledge by public researchers. These adjustments have 
mainly concerned the re-evaluation of the notions of common knowledge or prior art in IPR 
applications, and also include institutional solutions, such as the integration of a wider array of 
actors within the research process, namely farmers and local communities. 
The account of social innovation propelled and guided by public researchers involved in plant 
improvement against the difficulties they have been growingly facing due to the strong property 
paradigm do show that solutions to these challenges can be found within the latter’s boundaries. 
However, as aforementioned, all of these solutions do not address the same challenges, and most 
of them require strong will-power and unity, either within the specific actor category concerned, or 
within the domestic or regional legal order these actors navigate in. Points of convergence and 
divergence ought thus to be assessed within the different strategies, and then ought to be weighed 
against the interests of all other actors of plant improvement.  
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FIG.6: Adjustments responding to the shortcomings faced by public researchers in molecular biology and 
conventional plant breeding confronted to the strong PGRFA property paradigm 
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 CHAPTER 13: ADJUSTMENTS FOR PRIVATE PLANT BREEDERS 13.
The development of science-based plant breeding is marked by the shift from unconscious mass 
selection towards conscious rational attempts at varietal adaptation, characterised by the use of the 
Mendelian heredity and segregation principles, and the recourse to controlled hybridisation, as an 
inheritance-focused selection method based on the phenotypic observation of plant varieties
1444
. 
Smaller-scaled private plant breeders, as entities trusting on variety licensing for their income, in 
this context rely on the widest access to both improved and wild genetic resources pools, and 
increasingly to patented molecular biology tools
1445
. Breeding programmes have been heavily 
affected by the strengthening of intellectual property rights. The resurgence of strong and broad 
patents, as well as the parallel extension of protection scopes have both put ever-growing 
limitations on plant breeders’ ability to use protected products, processes or varieties in their 
research programmes. The restrictions stemming from strong rules of appropriation with regard to 
the accessibility of improved genetic material, despite preserving the positive prospect of royalty 
income, have hampered the sacrosanct “freedom to operate” that breeders long for.  
However, the breakdowns created by the restricted access to proprietary yet fundamental research 
tools has been alleviated “because firms and universities have been able to develop “working 
solutions” that have allowed their research to proceed, [including] taking licenses, inventing 
around patents, infringement (often informally invoking a research exemption), developing and 
using public tools, and challenging patents in court”1446. Private plant breeders have also in parallel 
taken action to ensure that the exclusive prerogatives granted to them in order to recoup their 
initial investment and also reward their risky and innovative endeavours. The turmoil created by 
the Europe-wide support given to the recognition of a breeders' exemption within patent laws, 
reaching at times as far as demanding an extensive interpretation of the existing exemption under 
UPOV-like plant-variety protection at the commercialisation stage1447, coupled with the calls for 
better defined and balanced public/private research partnerships and other institutional solutions, 
all show the existing disquiet about the future of agricultural research and development within 
smaller-scaled private structures as well. Involved in a thorny conundrum, breeders have strived to 
establish a working balance between the reach of their own exclusive rights and the correlated 
promise of royalty income to recoup investment on the one hand, and need to control the 
transaction costs involved in the necessary use of genetic material and linked processes. 
13.1. Acting on the Patent and PVP scope  
Practical experiences have shown that smaller or medium scaled private entities that develop 
improved plant varieties are much less accustomed to the reality of patents than of plant variety 
protection, with the perhaps notable exception of those established in the United States, where 
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 plant patents have been granted since 1930. Indeed, the American Seed Trade Association has not 
published detailed position papers on the subject, concentrating rather on the expiration of 
biotechnology patents and the need to prepare the future of so-called “regulatory dossiers” and 
stewardship obligations for GM events1448. In other regions of the world, the trigger and reach of 
patent protection at the interface between these two protection tools have received more detailed 
attention from private plant breeders. The main objective here lies in ensuring legal certainty. It 
also focuses on the freedom to operate when constituting gene pools for breeding programmes, 
whether these are taken from the market of improved varieties, or prospected in the wild or in the 
gene banks. Breeders respectively face the conundrum of intellectual property rights navigation, 
and access and benefit-sharing legislation with its accompanying biopiracy claims.  
13.1.1. Patent eligibility and other protection requirements 
Plant breeders also face the adverse consequences of patent thickets present in molecular research 
tools and nucleotice sequences, just as much as public researchers, even if they may be more 
accustomed to negotiating licenses or playing on cross-licensing opportunities, while being 
generally less concerned with the dilemma of orphan crops or the issue of exclusiveness in itself. 
That is why much of what has been said in the previous section on possible adjustments on 
patentability requirements for and by public researchers will also serve the interests of private 
plant breeders. The confrontation with patents has nonetheless pushed the latter to re-assess the 
reach of patentable subject matter in their own terms, in an effort to limit its boundaries with 
regards to the strong biological link of all breeding activities and the existence of plant variety 
protection.  
Patentability requirements 
Numerous seed associations have vocally been advocating high patentability standards in 
agricultural biotechnology, influencing and welcoming the practices of patent offices and judicial 
authorities. The relatively newly formed French UFS, Union Francaise des Semenciers, has issued 
warnings against “broad claims”, wishing  
“claims be granted up to a limited extent only, so that other breeders are not unduly 
restricted in their capacity for innovation. This question is closely linked to the state of 
knowledge at the time of the submission of the application and also to the evaluation of the 
criterion of inventiveness. UFS would like to avoid any possible blocking or restriction to 
genetic variability”1449. 
In 2003, noting the need greater speed and quality in patent examinations, the ISF welcomed a 
number of trends, which mainly stood in line with the dominant property paradigm, safe for 
certain reserves: 
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« Sequences or partial sequences of genes are subject to the same criteria of patentability as 
in all other areas of technology (novelty, inventive step and industrial application) such that 
the industrial application (utility) must be disclosed in the patent application as filed. In 
other words, it is accepted that a mere DNA sequence or nucleotide without indication of a 
function does not contain any technical information and is not a patentable invention. It is 
accepted that a utility must be specific to the subject matter claimed, that it must be 
credible for a person of ordinary skill and be practical, meaning attributing a real world 
value to the claimed invention »1450.  
Private plant breeders, in their individual capacity, have been quite active in filing oppositions 
contending the lack of novelty of certain biotechnology patents, notably those related to nucleotide 
sequences or breeding methods, as aforementioned. However, along with all traditional 
patentability requirements, it seems that common consensus has been difficult to reach to interpret 
such criteria. Private plant breeders have been additionally quite concerned with the potential 
disclosure of origin requirements that may be infused into patent and PVP applications, much 
more so than public researchers. This common concern has led to the adoption of official industry 
positions. The apprehension of plant improvers vis-à-vis disclosure has generally not been voiced 
against its feasibility, but has been rather directed at the additional financial burdens and the desire 
to perceive this requirement outside of the strict scope of IPR regulations, as a parallel civil 
liability stream. One of the challenges of disclosure in plant improvement lies in the fact that the 
less rigorous “novelty” criterion that opens the door to plant variety protection is solely a market 
definition that does neither entail biological property nor a prior art search. It might as a result be 
difficult to oversee such search in PVP applications, which are generally handled by more 
technical oriented entities, generally found under the auspices of Agriculture Ministries. However, 
as aforementioned, “the lack of commercial potential for landraces and their immediate derivatives 
[means] this is not a significant concern”1451, even though the notion of “common knowledge” can 
be recalibrated in order to recognise the contributions of mass selectors, an approach that we shall 
tackle in the next section of this research. In the private plant breeders’ perspective, the issue has 
as a result mostly been raised with regards to patent protection. Contrary to integrated 
biotechnology giants and “big pharma”; private plant breeders have never been completely against 
the disclosure of available information on accessed genetic resources. However, due to the 
specificities of agricultural plant improvement and the historically tangled and interdependent 
germplasm exchanges, they have rather insisted on a principle of “declaration of source”, rather 
than origin
1452. As “seed companies cannot run the risk of using material they have not legally 
accessed – it may cost them a fortune –breeders have to write down in their notebooks what 
material they used. Disclosure of origin (in the sense of source) is not an extra burden for seed 
companies”1453. Indeed, imposing the disclosure of the source of the material, i.e., “that the 
applicant should be obliged to say from where the genetic resource was obtained » is a reality 
private plant breeders are willing to do.  
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 Indeed, « normally the applicant knows and is allowed to indicate this with the following 
possible exception: In the breeding community, one reason why the “source” could not be 
known is that the genetic material is a historical part of the breeder’s nursery and that there 
is no record of the original source »1454. 
Nonetheless, linking such disclosure to IPR protection requirements continues to create unrest 
amongst breeders. For instance, while UPOV “encourages information on the origin of the plant 
material, used in the breeding of the variety, to be provided where this facilitates the examination”, 
it “could not accept this as an additional condition of protection [as] in certain cases, for technical 
reasons, applicants may find it difficult, or impossible, to identify the exact geographic origin of 
all the material used for breeding purposes”1455. The International Seed Federation insists for 
instance that such disclosure be defined as follows:  
“ISF believes that if origin has the meaning of “country of origin” in the sense of the CBD, 
the disclosure of origin would be impractical and very often not possible. Indeed, it is 
extremely difficult and in most cases impossible to trace the origin of a biological resource. 
Moreover, it is also very difficult to determine when and where biological materials, in the 
form received, have developed these distinctive properties. ISF proposes to solve this 
problem by providing information on the “source” of the biological material, i.e. that the 
applicant should be obliged to say from where he/she obtained the material. Normally 
he/she knows and is allowed to indicate this with possible exceptions:  
In the breeding community, one reason why the source could not be known is that the 
biological material comes from the breeder’s nursery and that there is no record of the 
original source; 
Sometimes the biological resource has been received in the frame of a confidential contract 
and the disclosure of the origin would be a breach of that contract »1456.  
In this context, industry associations have advocated the potential disclosure requirements that 
may be infused into patent and PVP applications to be drafted as a declaration of source, the non-
compliance of which should befall in civil or crimimal law, and could be followed through a 
clearing-house mechanism. The ISF for instance provides that compliance with CBD legislation 
cannot be drafted as a « universal requirement to demonstrate Prior Informed Consent in 
intellectual property protection applications »1457. The European Seed Association has in this 
regard a more comprehensive opinion:  
« The disclosure of the “source” should be an administrative requirement only and thus, the 
failure to disclose, could not invalidate the title of protection. (The disclosure of the 
“source” would not be a criterion of protection). Non-compliance or fraud should be 
sanctioned by civil and/or criminal law measures. Misappropriation should be prosecuted 
by the provider country. To facilitate the disclosure process, ESA suggests a central 
clearing house process which would allow applicants with a single, standardized 
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declaration (similar to the declaration for biomaterial deposits under the Budapest Treaty) 
to satisfy the legal requirements for all countries. Ideally such clearinghouse should be 
associated to the WIPO ». 
Subject-matter exclusions 
Subject-matter exclusions from patentability reflect national and also regional specificities at their 
most contentious level. Indeed, North America has generally been more prone to warrant patent 
protection to plant varieties as a whole, whereas the Old European Continent has been reluctant to 
forego or diminish the hybrid protection offered by plant breeders’ rights on a particular variety’s 
phenotype. This distinction is not only present in pertinent legislation, it is also reflected in the 
viewpoints of industry associations. Private plant breeders have indeed showed greater reluctance 
towards patent enclosure possibilities in Europe, than in Canada, for instance, where it is 
considered: 
“Plant cell patents (also called plant variety and variety improvement patents) can be an 
important component of the Canadian IP toolbox. The protection afforded by these types of 
patents can encourage investments in locally adapted germplasm and can help move 
Canada further into a position of global agricultural leadership. In the absence of plant 
variety patents, companies may be more likely to focus on trait development without the 
complementary effort of germplasm/variety improvement”1458. 
This approach is not only explained by the fact that plant variety protection in Canada is 
considered to be weaker by plant breeders, following the precepts of the 1978 UPOV Convention, 
but also by the landscape of actors active in the country, which is reflected in the association’s 
membership1459. The European Seed Association, which regroups a much higher number of SME 
structures, has on the contrary been continuously supporting the subject matter exclusions 
provided for by European legislation in plant-related inventions. The French Seed Association 
UFS has also directly tackled patent claims covering nucleotide sequences, proclaiming an 
undisguised aversion to the patenting of “native traits”.  
“UFS calls native traits all characteristics (phenotypes) of a given plant, conferred by one 
or more genetic elements which is itself/are themselves: 
a) naturally present (i.e. exist in the nature, in one individual of the species or a 
very close species) and recombined in the given plant by a sexual combination 
(with or without use of DNA markers) or 
b) obtained by a traditional selection method (which include and are not limited to 
random mutagenesis using chemical agents or ionizing beams, “tilling” methods). 
To avoid uncertainty about the concept of “native feature”, UFS considers that it does not 
apply when: 
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 a) genetic diversity has been created by biotechnological means including, but not 
limited to, directed mutagenesis, or cisgenesis, 
b) introgression in the plant by means of sexual crossing only is not possible and 
needs to be facilitated by other means such as protoplast fusion, transformation, 
deletion enzymes.  
UFS considers that native traits and related native genes have to be excluded from 
patentability in order to preserve the use of genetic variability, and this with regard to the 
specificity of the profession, the basis of which is the recombination of native traits"1460. 
The UFS position is quite unique, in that it reflects on the need to better frame patents on genetic 
sequences, either within the inventive step gauge or in the assessment of essentially biological 
products if need be. There seems to be a lack of consensus on this particular issue within the 
International Seed Federation, whose position paper needs to reflect the views of the seed 
industry as a whole, including those integrated transgenesis giants that navigate and use the strong 
property paradigm without suffering its impediments, as smaller-scaled plant breeders do.  
The 2012 position paper of the International Seed Federation reflects the diverging routes and 
consequent lack of consensus within its wider membership, as its section on patentability openly 
recognises ongoing debates over the criteria triggering protection with regards to biotechnological 
inventions : 
« ISF believes that inventions relating to traits made by humans (generally described as 
traits introduced or modified in the genome by human actions such as human-made mutant 
traits or GM traits) and modern technologies should be eligible for patent protection. 
ISF is cognizant of the fact that the patentability of traits based on naturally occurring 
genetics assembled in the target plant by crossing and selection (“native traits”) and 
traditional breeding processes is currently debated. 
ISF firmly believes that, when addressing the question of patentability, solutions need to be 
found which maximize the innovation potential both for new varieties and patentable 
inventions. Solutions must recognize the specific needs of national or regional seed 
industries and their respective legislative systems and they must also reflect the need for 
global movement of seed »1461. 
The Federation does not delve into the shaky territory of analysing inherently national or regional 
patentability requirements. However, the consensus does reflect underlying tensions within its 
membership and associated differences of opinions. The European Seed Association, which also 
represents a wider range of seed industry actors, yet possesses a great proportion of SME’s within 
its ranks, has not been able to tackle the issue of patentability as such either, focusing rather on 
the scope of protection awarded through patents, by advocating purpose-bound protection and a 
clear breeders’ exception, where membership consensus seems to exist. Nonetheless, in its 
comprehensive 2012 position paper on intellectual property protection, ESA reiterated that  
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« both the European Patent Convention (EPC) of 1973 and Directive 98/44/EC of the 
European Parliament and of the Council on the legal protection of biotechnological 
inventions clearly stipulate that plant varieties as such as well as essentially biological 
processes for the production of plants are excluded from patentability.
 
ESA fully supports 
these exclusions »1462. 
With regards to the scope of such exclusions, ESA has maintained that  
« Breeding processes based on crossing and selection (i.e. essentially biological processes) 
are excluded from patentability. This principle must also be applied to biological material 
resulting from the application of such “essentially biological processes”. 
The effect of any product patent on biological material must not extend to any biological 
material which has the same properties, but has been produced by means of an “essentially 
biological process” and independently, i.e. without using the patented material »1463. 
ESA has also stated that the exclusion of essentially biological processes of Article 53(b) of the 
European Patent Convention should also extend to the products directly obtained by such process.  
“ESA is of the view that a claim directed to plants obtained by a non essentially biological 
process, such as, a process consisting of genetic modification, technically induced 
mutagenesis, protoplast fusion or another technical process not based on crossing and 
selection, is allowable even if the same plants could be obtained by an essentially 
biological process. However the effect of the patent protection granted on such plants 
should not extend to biological material obtained by an essentially biological process 
excluded under Article 53(b) EPC. Otherwise such exclusion would be meaningless”1464. 
The subject-matter exclusion should be viewed as a whole, and not be approached too 
restrictively, in order to maintain coherence in legislative drive and spirit. However, “plant 
varieties that are the result of a non-essentially biological process that is patentable, and each of 
the following generation of plants that possesses the same characteristics, will thus be 
patentable”1465.  
To a lesser extent, a number of actors have also attempted to correct the inadequacies of PVP 
protection in light of biotechnological advances. The most active in this respect has been 
CIOPORA, which, as aforementioned regroups members of the seed industry most prone to quick 
copying. It is in this context that they have been advocating  
“Some internationally accepted standards of “minimum distances” must be gradually 
implemented, species by species, by the UPOV Technical Committee if the sui generis 
system of protection instituted by UPOV is to be effective enough. Such standards should 
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 be applicable in all member countries of the Convention and should provide that every 
protected variety commands a certain “perimeter” of protection within which other 
candidate varieties cannot obtain a separate protection”1466. 
Interestingly, the new ISF view on intellectual property does not delve into the criteria opening up 
plant variety protection, but rather limits its analysis to the testing of distinctness, uniformity and 
stability. This seems to indicate that, except for a uniform approach to the possibility of disclosing 
the source of genetic material used to come up with improved plant varieties or patentable 
products and processes, there is little general consensus, or a least overall prudence amongst 
private plant breeders in advocating particular patentability requirements. Nonetheless, they are 
obvisouly influenced, and at times also directly influence, the debates over these requirements that 
are happening before the judiciary and also in patent offices. These stakeholders’ active 
involvement is however much more prominent when it comes to examining the bundle of rights 
that accompany temporary exclusive rights.    
13.1.2. Bundle of exclusive rights: essentially derived varieties under an evident breeders’ 
exception  
In parallel to the newfound reach in PVP legislation, conventional breeders increasingly began to 
be confronted with an unfamiliar and strong legal entitlement, i.e. patents, where relatively 
restricted room has traditionally been awarded to follow-on use possibilities vis-à-vis protected 
innovations, especially in active breeding programmes. Indeed, patent legislation worldwide 
extremely rarely provides for exceptions to exclude third parties with specific respect to research 
conducted within the protection innovation, or to breeding. As aforementioned, when both the 
patent and PVP systems are in interplay, “the highest level of protection afforded by patents for 
biotechnological inventions threatens the existence and weakens the functionality of the breeders’ 
exemption, which is an essential feature of any sui generis PVP system”1467. Non-integrated 
conventional plant breeders who rely on the sale of plant varieties for income have thus 
increasingly felt the urge to reclaim the breeders’ exception, all the while mitigating the reach of 
essentially derived varieties. In this context, they have been pushed to assess the contribution and 
opportunity of a breeders’ exemption in patent regulation, while also determining the extent of the 
threat in PVP systems should be carefully addressed, notably in light of the essentially derived 
varieties ("EDV") concept, and also of the inevitable co-existence of PVP with patents on the same 
material or within the product development chain as a whole. 
Lifting the veil of essentially derived varieties 
As aforementioned, there is an urgent need in plant variety protection to reassess the existing the 
need to maintain the incentive of protection in the era of the fast-paced genotype quest on the one 
hand, without resulting in an unwarranted upheaval of the breeders’ exception, which would 
dangerously hamper the operations of plant breeders on the other. It is perhaps interesting to note 
at this early stage of investigation that the concept of essential derivation has been maintained in 
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the Indian legislation, even though its general level of protection has not been viewed stringent 
enough to adhere into any UPOV Conventions. The 2001 statute provides for a bundle of rights 
similar to that of UPOV 1991, and likewise extends breeders’ prerogatives to essentially derived 
varieties, that are defined in the same language than UPOV 1991 and listed in a separate 
registrar
1468. The statute, allowing for the protection of farmers’ varieties in the first place, does in 
parallel also consider the situation where an EDV would be derived from such a landrace, and 
triggers benefit-sharing obligations with non-governmental organisations or individuals acting on 
behalf of a village or local community
1469
. 
The approach to the issue of EDV in the European Union, where our positive law analysis was 
rooted, has borne more traditional aspects, in parallel to other OECD countries, where the need to 
elaborate on the exact extent and definition of essential derivation in legislative texts has been 
unequivocally addressed, reinforced by self-regulatory social organisation initiatives taken by 
breeders’ organisations. Canadian Seed Trade Association, where the legislative framework is 
compliant with the 1978 UPOV terms, for instance advocates  
“Amendments to Canada’s Plant Breeders’ Rights Act to incorporate language around 
essentially derived varieties are important to provide a balance between access to and 
protection of initial originators of germplasm”1470. 
Some industry organisations have even gone so far as to acknowledge the limits put upon the 
breeder’s exception by the concept of the EDV, seeing such consequence as a sectoral need. This 
has been mostly the case of those entities active in the ornamentals industry, which are more prone 
to plagiaristic breeding than other fields. CIOPORA indeed considers “the EDV-concept does not 
constitute a limitation of the free access to germplasm, but it constitutes a temporary limitation of 
the exploitation of varieties, if they are EDV”1471. Acting with a legal framework complying with 
the 1991 UPOV terms, the European Seed Association more watchfully states,  
« The extension of the scope of breeders' rights from a protected initial plant variety to 
such essentially derived plant varieties forestalls both the unrightful appropriation of the 
intellectual property of the breeder of the initial variety and the misuse of the breeder’s 
exemption, i.e. the free access to protected varieties for breeding purposes and the 
possibility to obtain plant variety protection for the resulting new plant varieties. Therefore 
ESA supports the EDV concept as an instrument for addressing the problem of plagiarism 
(or me-too varieties) and an important tool for ensuring not only a balanced, but also an 
efficient protection of plant variety rights »1472. 
Breeders have also felt the need to address the complexity surrounding the EDV notion, 
highlighting the absolute necessity to ensure legal certainty in a breeders’ determination of his 
freedom to operate for the continuity of their activities. As aforementioned, the EDV concept 
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 indeed introduces numerous yet equally nebulous thresholds triggering compensatory 
obligations for subsequent breeders. Relying not only on the overarching concern to establish 
distinctness between plant varieties, EDV assessments adds in the conditional layers of 
‘derivation’ and the pursuit of ‘conformity of the subsequent variety to the essential 
characteristics’ of the initial variety. The latter criterion has proven particularly troublesome, and 
has been the central focus of both self-regulatory endeavours and judicial courts, based on a quite 
natural quantitative enquiry of the variety’s characteristics. Indeed, its definition in the 1991 
Convention text is unclear and “the enforcement of EDV policies requires standardised protocols 
to be applied in an internationally agreed framework”1473. The overarching condition of 
distinctness, as the subsequent tests of conformity and derivation, just as the additional 
consideration of limited dependence all need to be clarified either through straightforward 
legislation or interpretative acts. The diplomatic conference establishing the 1991 version of the 
UPOV Convention required that UPOV develop guidelines to assess EDVs, which are still in 
progress. The work on these guidelines started in 1991 and was put to a halt in 1993, where it was 
decided that further work was premature1474. Responding to a growing industry need, an 
explanatory note was prepared in 20091475, following six years of technical work, but important 
elements were still open to discussion, since the guidelines did not give proper guidance on the 
number of difference to be considered in EDV assessments, or on the relationship between the 
notions of “dependency, derivation and conformity”. The reach of essential derivation has not only 
been discussed by policy-makers, it has also, even if to a lesser extent, been interpreted by the 
judiciary. The aforementioned 2005 ruling of the District Court of The Hague has for instance 
adopted an interpretation of EDV favourable to the continuity of the breeders’ exception, but plant 
breeders who wished to ensure the capture of full benefits from their research programmes 
welcomed it with more prudence.  
Faced with a nebulous legislative and judicial context, industry associations have advocated 
eased conflict resolution solutions, in the likes of arbitration and the reversal of the burden of 
proof linked to an EDV presumption. They have tried to lead the way in determining species-
specific thresholds that would indicate a high probability of essential derivation between two plant 
varieties, establishing said presumption. The problem faced by breeders is that in the absence of 
specific tresholds, the determination of “predominant derivation” will prove to be a battle fought 
by legal muscle (which most SME’s lack), rather than objective assessment of innovative breeding 
practices:  
“With regard to me-too-varieties it is unclear, in what case a variety, which results from 
crossing and selecting, is predominantly derived from one of its parents. This question has 
to be answered on the basis of the genome of the varieties in dispute and it is up to the 
breeders of the specific species to determine a threshold, above which predominant 
derivation exists in these cases. As long as no such thresholds exist, the parties involved in 
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a dispute have to find solutions on their own or, if they fail to do so, the courts have to 
decide on the basis of expert opinions”1476. 
For instance, the ISF, in the vicinity of which an alternative dispute resolution system has been 
established through ISF rules on arbitration, spends considerable amount of time on the notion of 
essential derivation in its position paper on intellectual property. Most importantly, the Federation 
has also teamed up in order to come up with species-specific science-based technical thresholds 
and methodologies to establish distinctness between varieties and as a result help determine 
essential derivation.  
“The approach pursued in one of the protocols adopted by ISF, the one for perennial 
ryegrass, is that, if there is any doubt as to whether a new variety is an EDV of another 
variety (initial variety) - doubt based on the fact that the new variety ‘presents the essential 
characteristics of that initial variety’ - the genetic distance between the two varieties (the 
squared Euclidian distance) will have to be measured. If the distance is 7 or less, then there 
are grounds for seeking arbitration, where it is possible that the burden of proof may be 
reversed; the grower of the alleged derived variety would have to demonstrate that he did 
not derive that variety. In such cases, the breeding history would have to be tabled. Here, 
therefore, we see that the trigger point is that two varieties display the same essential 
characteristics. Whilst not stated explicitly, logic takes along that we are talking about 
phenotypical correlations. The genetic comparison is the next step. […] In the ISF 
Guidelines for 'EDV in Lettuce', there is a description of a method for genetic comparison 
of lettuce varieties. Probably also here phenotypical correlations form the trigger point for 
this comparison. While the principles behind this type of code is widely supported, it does 
not seem to be easy to reach agreement on acceptable codes for all the parties involved in 
relation to the most important species. ISF has adopted only a limited number of codes”1477.  
These protocols have been supplemented by interpretative resolutions trying to shed light on the 
reach of UPOV and national provisions extending the scope of PVP protection to essentially 
derived plant varieties. Associations have for instance attempted to clarify the notion of 
« essential » characteristics, highlighting that  
« The term “essential characteristics” in Art 14 (5) b) i) and iii) must not be limited to 
characteristics relevant for the marketing of the variety. Any such limitation would give 
rise to a very subjective evaluation and thus legal uncertainty. In the UPOV 1991 
Convention the adjectives essential, important and relevant in relation to variety 
characteristics are to be regarded as synonyms. »1478. 
Furthermore, numerous organisations have also advocated the reversal of the burden of proof 
faced with highly similar varieties, including the European Seed Association, which 
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 “Supports the reversal of the burden of proof in favour of the holder of the plant breeders’ 
right of the initial variety once a certain degree of genotypic similarity between the initial 
variety and a suspected essentially derived variety is reached. A scientific threshold 
triggering such reversal of the burden of proof needs to be determined for each species or 
group of species. Furthermore, such thresholds should not be set at too low a level in order 
to avoid that derivation is deemed too easily. Thresholds set at a too low level will lead to 
an increased number of unjustified edv court cases. Breeders taken to court would of 
course still have the chance to prove that they have not used the protected initial variety. 
But still these breeders would have to take time and cost to defend themselves in court. 
This could lead to greater reluctance of breeders in the use of germplasm of their 
competitors’ varieties and thereby to a factual limitation of the breeders' exemption. The 
validity of the scientific thresholds for individual species or groups of species should be 
regularly reviewed in the light of the most recent technical developments and if necessary 
be revised »1479. 
Responding to the numerous position papers drawn by industry organisations, but also to the 
scientific and technical work that allowed the adoption of different protocols before the ISF, 
UPOV authorities have reacted to at least consider working on more precise guidelines on the 
assessment of EDV. A seminar specifically dedicated to the concept of essential derivation was 
held in Geneva in October 2013, where the closing remarks from the UPOV Council President 
announced future work in this area. 
« Guidelines that embrace a broad spectrum of stakeholders and interests may be more 
credible and persuasive for the Courts. The international standing of UPOV may help in 
the use of guidelines by Courts. Alternative Dispute Resolution (ADR) mechanisms 
(Mediation, Arbitration and/or Expert Determination) could be useful tools for EDV. 
Publication of an anonymized summary of ADR outcomes could offer guidance and could 
lead to harmonisation”1480.  
Private plant breeders, mostly those activein the European continent, probably because of their 
historical attachment to plant variety protection, have welcomed the new trigger of essential 
derivation for collecting royalties on the basis of a new, uniform and stable plant variety rather 
positively. They have nonetheless attempted to resolve the resulting uncertainties and reticence to 
use improved germplasm, while also trying to correct aggressive commercial practices that have 
threatened legal action against competitors with similar yet not essentially derived plant varieties. 
In this context, they have advocated scientific thresholds to be established either to reverse the 
burden of proof or to determine the existence of essential derivation, while establishing specific 
arbitration rules for the smooth resolution of conflicts. It is yet to be seen how these informal 
thresholds will be used in the courts and plant variety protection offices, perhaps guided by the 
commentary of UPOV authorities, which would be most welcomed at this stage.  
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Reinforcing the breeders’ exception in plant-related IPR 
In parallel to the efforts to ensure legal certainty as to the actual scope of protection vis-à-vis 
essentially derived plant varieties, debates have concomitantly focused on the core of the issue of 
innovation diffusion, i.e. on the contours of the breeders’ exception. The breeders’ exemption, 
which stands out as an efficient liability rule operating under a “take now, pay later” 
understanding
1481
 has been seen as an efficient response to the shortcomings of the strong IPR 
paradigm to address the needs of molecular and conventional plant breeding, as chains producing 
inventions whose truly non-obvious and discontinuous character does not stand out as clearly as in 
“pure biotechnology”1482. These debates have not only taken place within the circles of plant 
variety protection itself, advocating at times an extension of the existing exemption under UPOV-
like plant-variety protection to the commercialisation stage, but it has mostly been highly debated 
in patent ‘circles’. Private plant breeders have nonetheless expressed great concern over the fact 
that the patent research exception does not specifically provide a viable defence against 
infringement when these breeders wish to use plant varieties containing patented genetic 
sequences
1483
. The contribution and opportunity of a breeders’ exemption in patent regulation 
has as a result been increasingly assessed in the light of the characteristics of product development 
in plant breeding.  
It is interesting to note in this regard that the existence of the breeders’ exception in PVP 
legislation, and the demands for its inclusion in patent laws, has not only been rooted in the 
cumulative nature of plant breeding, but it has also been rooted in compliance with international 
biodiversity law. Indeed, the fact that the phenotype of improved plant varieties is open for further 
research and even breeding has been advocated as a benefit-sharing mechanism in itself. The 
International Seed Federation has for instance affirmed its support for “a single international 
regime to govern the development of rules and regulations concerning access to all genetic 
resources for plant breeding”, where “the breeders’ exception would be recognised as benefit-
sharing”1484. Some organisations have gone as far as stating that the mere existence of the breeders’ 
exception as a benefit-sharing mechanism prevents the need to enact additional compensation 
mechanisms. CIOPORA, the International Community of Breeders of Asexually Reproduced 
Ornamental and Fruit Varieties, for instance states that  
“The free access to protected varieties for breeding purposes is a very important form of 
benefit-sharing and this approach is unique for the sector of plant breeding, no other 
industry knows this form of benefit-sharing institutionalized by law. Different from and as 
an advantage to simple monetary benefit-sharing it provides the potential to creating 
additional value. But the breeder’s exemption also reflects and acknowledges that 
unrestricted access to any kind of genetic resources as breeding material is essential to 
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 ensure future progress in breeding, which, again, is to the benefit of the society as whole. 
By additional ABS rules the strange situation would be created, that protected varieties (in 
which a lot of R & D has been invested) are freely accessible for breeding, but wild 
varieties would be not. For all these reasons CIOPORA agrees with UPOV that no 
additional ABS-regulations are necessary; otherwise additional barriers to progress and 
utilisation of genetic resources will be established”1485.  
While the author cannot be fully on point with such a restrictive approach to the compensatory 
legal obligations stemming from the new agrobiodiversity public domain of international 
environmental law, which would for instance disregard other technology transfer opportunities but 
also to a certain extent the recognition of farmers’ rights, the existence of a broad breeding 
exception as a means of benefit-sharing could be fully recognised as one means to uphold the new 
PGRFA public domain. While those breeders' exemptions recognising immediate rights over 
protected material for further use in breeding programmes remain the absolute foundation of plant-
variety-rights protection worldwide, these remain scarce in patent legislation. The TRIPS 
framework remains indeed tight-lipped and yet a handful of national legal orders allow for 
breeding-specific research possibilities outside negotiated licenses. In Germany, France and 
Switzerland
1486
 (and probably soon in the Netherlands), the PVP breeder’s exemption has found its 
echo in patent legislation, where breeding programmes could be initialised, even when the material 
contained patented traits, the consent of the patent holder needing to be sought at the 
commercialisation stage. As early as 2003, when commenting on the initial political consensus 
reached within the Council of the European Union on the reach of the “Community Patent”, the 
European Seed Association had already expressed concern over the limited reach of the research 
exception in patent legislation.  
The breeders’ exception “is crucial for plant breeding where using existing plant genetic 
resources, even in the form of protected commercial plant varieties, is an indispensable 
precondition to further genetic progress. The recent history of plant breeding has clearly 
shown the scientific and economic importance of this exception. It has enabled major and 
continuous progress in modern agriculture, e.g. the improvement of yields, strengthening 
resistances to diseases or adapting specific production to specific markets and climates. 
The fact that there is no equivalent provision under the patent system to the breeder’s 
exception under the UPOV system creates an ambiguous situation when a plant as such is 
protected via a patent as the research exception in the patent proposal is too restrictive for 
plant breeding purposes”1487. 
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This position has also been quite vocally advocated by national associations, such as Plantum, the 
Dutch Plant Breeders’ Association, which has been very active in this field. Drafted in 2009, their 
position paper on intellectual property goes as far as ascertaining: 
“As far as plant material is concerned, the publication of an invention or a deposit does not 
contribute in any way to the stimulation of innovation, and therefore represents no added 
value for society as a whole, if the protected material itself may not be made freely 
disposed of for the purpose of the development of new varieties. 
[To remedy this,] It is not sufficient to allow patented varieties to be used freely for plant 
breeding purposes whilst the trading in new varieties still requires a licence. As long as 
there is no guarantee that a licence will be obtained, it would be irresponsible to invest 
several millions in a plant breeding programme which may end up having to be abandoned. 
Therefore, no plant breeding takes place with patented material until the licence 
negotiations are complete. By the time it becomes clear whether a licence will or will not 
be granted, and hence whether further breeding will be possible, the patent holder has been 
able to completely monopolise the crop or the trait concerned. In view of the very long 
development period, it is no longer possible at that point to set up a competitive breeding 
programme »1488. 
The Association has in this sense been advocating an extended breeders’ exception, which would 
continue to operate at the time of the new plant variety’s commercialisation, at which point a 
system of “compulsory licensing” would enter into play. The Plantum wording has been taken on 
by the AIPH, the International Association for Horticultural Producers in 2010, concluding “the 
breeders exemption in its full reach should be maintained also when a patent right is included”1489. 
In 2011, the French “Union Francaise des Semenciers” followed suit, coming up with a similar, 
yet a little more restrained approach to a breeders’ exception in patent legislation. 
“UFS is strongly attached to the possibility of maintaining access to the genetic material of 
a variety containing a patented element. UFS supports the disposition introduced into the 
French and German implementation of the European directive on biotechnological 
inventions, which allows the breeder to use any variety containing patented elements free 
of duties on sale if in the end, the new variety obtained no longer contains these patented 
elements”1490. 
The issues highlighted by small and medium sized breeders seem to have found echo before the 
European legislator. Indeed, in its aforementioned strict stance over the patentability of 
essentially biological processes, the European Parliament has reiterated the critical importance of 
conventional breeding methods to modern plant and animal breeding, but it has also mainly 
highlighted that:  
“It is a fundamental principle of the international system of plant variety rights based upon 
the UPOV Convention, and of the EU system based upon Regulation (EC) No 2100/94, 
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 that the holder of a plant variety cannot prevent others from using the protected plant to 
promote use of protected varieties for further breeding activities […] it is important that a 
similar privilege should exist within patent law throughout the European Union”1491. 
These considerations have been taken up by the recent European Agreement on a Unified Patent 
Corurt, which in its article 27, deals with those “limitations of the effects of a patent”: 
“The rights conferred by a patent shall not extend to any of the following: 
(a) acts done privately and for non-commercial purposes;  
(b) acts done for experimental purposes relating to the subject-matter of the patented 
invention; 
(c) the use of biological material for the purpose of breeding, or discovering and 
developing other plant varieties”. (Unified Patent Court Agreement, Art.27, emphasis 
added by the author). 
This important move from the European Union, one of greatest players of the seed industry, will 
probably find positive echo in other legislative for a, especially in developing countries with wider 
SME presence. The lack of consent from the rightholders for carrying out active commercial 
research using the innovation is at first sight quite a positive departure from traditional patent 
protection, and its efficiency still needs to be tested
1492
. Early indicators show that such flexibility 
has, in practice, resulted in hostile reactions from competitors wishing to shut down on-going 
research activities. There are also extremely heated discussions on the extent that the breeders’ 
exception should have in practice, and the trigger point where licensing negotiations would need to 
be undertaken, if the patented element should still be present at the stage of commercialisation or 
not. The mechanism has been criticised due its discount of contractual freedom to license 
protected products or processes, based on a belief that transactional bottlenecks are likely to be 
overcome by so-called “repeat players” that frequently need to exchange rights1493.  
13.2. Acting on the enforcement of prerogatives 
The objective here lies in the full capture of prerogatives that come with plant variety protection. 
As aforementioned, plant breeders who rely on sales and royalty income from their stable and 
improved plant varieties are in dire need of fully capturing the benefits of plant variety protection. 
This need is inherent to the nature itself of plant innovation, which remains indissociable from 
cultivation. It also stems from the self-replicating disposition of the developed product, by farmers, 
researchers and competitors. But it has also been particularly exacerbated by the brave new world 
of molecular breeding, which allows competitors’ to speedily discover marketed varieties’ 
innermost riddles. In order to ensure that third parties duly respect the complete prerogatives of 
exclusive intellectual property titles, especially in light of the rapidly evolving opportunities 
offered by molecular technology, several options have been put forward by the community of 
                                                                    
 
1491
 European Parliament resolution of 10 May 2012 on the patenting of essential biological processes 
(2012/2623(RSP)), P7_TA(2012)0202. 
1492
 BLAKENEY, "Patents and Plant Breeding: Implications for Food Security  " op.cit. 
1493
 MERGES, "Contracting into Liability Rules: Intellectual Property Rights and Collective Rights Organizations " 
op.cit. 
PART V. Adjustments and Solutions for Actor Groups 
 354 
plant breeders and the State, if and when needed. Some measures target the use of protected 
varieties by farmers, and other initiatives are rather directed towards other plant breeders.   
They are all based upon an initial consideration, that  
“By loosing turnover and growing costs, also the calculated return on investment shrinks. 
In a worst case scenario this might force a company out of business, especially since it are 
often small and medium sized, family owned businesses, which are involved in breeding. 
But even without such a final consequence, a breeder who needs to calculate on a low (if 
any) return on investment due to improper IP-protection will not be encouraged to develop 
new varieties”1494.  
Acting on legislative flexibilities and opportunities 
One of the strategies put forward by breeders in order to protect their gene pools has been the 
recourse to trade secrecy, which obviously hampers the public domain in a considerable fashion. 
This solution has been particularly relevant for parental lines, which are crucial to the breeding 
business. Challenges were raised vis-à-vis the protection of parental lines of hybrid varieties way 
before the dawn of molecular science, and have been subject of much debate. These lines are 
indeed generally covered by trade secrets, and are not available in the market as such. Their 
protection has been vehemently fought for in courts, epitomised by the 1992 lawsuit brought by 
Pioneer to Holden Foundation Seeds, where the latter had to pay forty six million USD of 
damages
1495
. The judiciary did not assess whether genetic information could qualify as a trade 
secret, but rather showed that when such reality is undisputed for the parties concerned, this 
peculiar tool could effectively be used to protect breeding lines, side by side with patents and PVP.  
Trade secrets can be avoided through adequate incentivisation in national instruments carving out 
the protection of plant varieties, especially those with a clear and direct legal entitlement to act 
upon the detection of infringements. These entitlements are generally not only found in 
intellectual property rights legislation as such, but also in customs regulations as well. An example 
of the former action comes from Spain where “rural police are engaged in monitoring and 
inspecting growers and plant raisers to check on infringements”1496. In Italy, the legislation further 
provides for a reversal of the burden of proof with regards to harvested material obtained through 
the use of the protected variety’s propagating material, which are presumed to be illegal in the 
absence of proof to the contrary1497. With regards to customs action, the Europen Union has acted 
to strengthen potential actions that could be taken when faced with infringing goods1498.  
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 A number of other legislative actions have been pleaded for by industry organisations, such as 
« One competent EU court, possibly linked to the future EU Patent Court, or one per 
Member State for infringement cases regarding EU Plant Breeders’ Rights in order to 
create more expertise in the field of EU Plant Breeders’ Rights within courts; Similarly, 
one competent court per Member State for infringement cases regarding national plant 
breeders’ rights; In infringement cases where an expert opinion on variety identity and/or 
(lack of) distinctness is required a possibility for holders of plant breeders’ rights to apply 
for such an expert opinion to be carried out by CPVO examination offices »1499. 
Notwithstanding their usefulness in protecting innovative breeders against infringements, these 
solutions do not respond to the aforementioned issues regarding the need to collect the full range 
of royalties that would act as a sufficient trigger to foster greater investment in plant breeding. 
Action has to that end also been taking place in the legislative front, advocating the gradual 
restriction of the farmers’ exception in UPOV Conventions with a clear policy objective of 
enticing the private sector’s interest in plant breeding, especially in market segments with strong 
farm saving opportunities and practices. The issue of farm saved seed royalties is much more 
important in cereals where exploitations tend to be larger in size, and the financial return from 
eventual farm-saved-seed royalties to breeders is estimated to amount to sixty five to seventy five 
million EUR per year
1500
. First and foremost, this issue has been dealt with through direct 
legislative amendments. As aforementioned, the EU acquis was amended so as to condition the use 
of farm-saved-seed to a reasonable royalty rate. Indeed, under article 14 of Council Regulation 
2100/94, farmers are given the right to grow protected seed, but this right is subject to the payment 
of royalties to be determined by national authorities. In Australia, plant variety protection laws 
were amended in 1994 with a clear desire to foster private investment in wheat breeding, as the 
former 1987 statutes did not regulate farm-saved seed as strictly as breeders would have wanted, 
and especially did not condition its re-use to royalty payments
1501
.  
Institutional solutions to enforce IP rights 
Nonetheless, even with such legislative amendments, the problem of compliance and enforcement 
remained a persistent challenge. These challenges led up to interesting examples of institutional 
design and social innovation from plant breeders. It has for instance led up to the launch of 
“Operation Plant Breeders’ Rights” in Australia in 2004 “in an attempt to catch seed pirates who 
were […] costing the Australian seed industry three hundred million AUSD per year”1502. The 
submissions collected during this initiative largely “lamented the problem of enforcement, 
particularly as plant breeder's rights relate to self-replicating biological material and the difficulties 
of relying on small farming communities for evidence”. In the absence of absolute permission 
rules, farmers decide in effect whether and to what extent they will make use of the farmers’ 
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privilege under plant variety protection. This means that “an incalculable number of plantings are 
undertaken each year, so that the holder or, as the case may be, the organisation representing him 
are not in a position to uncover by themselves cases of planting which entitle them to 
remuneration”1503.  
When legal entitlements and compliance mechanisms are not clear enough or cannot be efficiently 
pursued, breeders have resorted to self-regulation. They have done so by putting their interests 
together and set up specialised entities to enforce their titles. That is how associations like the 
Anti-Infringement Bureau set up in 2011 have seen the light of day. This Brussels-based 
organisation is actively involved in fighting and pursing infringement cases in courts, either 
through “pilot enforcement projects”, as the one ignited in Italy in 2012, where its members were 
given legal and technical support to take legal action, or by directly representing them and taking 
appropriate action on their behalf. The same entity is also considering taking its actions one step 
farther, contemplating the possibility to set up a “collective European Union trademark for use by 
plant raisers who commit to respect production guidelines ensuring the traceability from seeds to 
plants”1504. This trademark would act as an “assurance that the plants delivered correspond to the 
variety ordered and are produced lawfully”. Even if industry peak bodies and licensing 
associations do exist in certain segments of the plant breeding industry, they are affected by the 
fragmented nature of the industry itself and may thus serve the benefit of wider scoped entities that 
possess greater financial interest and budgets to enforce titles. Agrobiodiversity users have in this 
instance “supported a central coordinating organisation which could represent breeders’ interests 
or provide independent investigation and specialist enforcement skills”1505. However, in Australia 
at least, where such stakeholder consultation was conducted, government action was not favoured, 
at least “unless sectors of the plant breeding industry come to an agreement on the structure and 
function of a central body and seek the Government’s assistance”1506.  
In order to fully capture the value of their protection inventions, breeders do not only have to fight 
infringements, they also need to collect the royalties that are triggered by the use of their 
products, especially in light of the new expansion of farm-saved-seed royalties and harvested 
material.  
“In the UK, the agency developed to organise and encourage these payments is known as 
Fair Play. This group was developed as a joint initiative between the British Society of 
Plant Breeders (BSPB) and the major farming unions in the UK in order to “combat farm-
saved seed evasion.” Farmers can pay these fees in two ways. If they purchase seed, the 
payment is included in the invoice sent by the seed dealer and these payments are then 
forwarded to the seed company. If the farmer saves seed, then the farmer must pay the fee 
directly to the BSPB. The system is not perfect, and some farmers avoid paying fees by 
claiming that they are planting non-protected varieties. However, an estimated 90% of the 
royalties are collected, in part because farmers who do not pay are in violation of British 
law. […] Breeders in the United States can, in theory, collect this premium when a farmer 
sells protected varieties but not when a farmer uses the protected variety himself. In the 
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 United States, the responsibility for collection lies with the owner of the IP right, and there 
is a perception among seed company executives that the costs associated with collection, 
both legal and reputational, are likely greater than the benefits”1507. 
Other collection agencies exist as well, but the British Society of Plant Breeders’ example proves 
interesting in the means through which the financial compensation system was established. The 
Society indeed set up a “Fairplay” campaign in 2005, where “plant breeders and the farming 
unions [worked] together to safeguard future innovation in plant breeding by tackling the gap in 
unpaid royalties on farm-saved seed”. Joining forces with the major farmers’ union, the BSPB has 
negotiated an efficient scheme to collect royalties either on tonnage or at a hectarage rate, in a 
unique formula that has been agreed upon between stakeholders. However, certain 
agrobiodiversity users do not consider this quite efficient royalty collection mechanism wide and 
proficient enough. Contract-based farm-saved seed royalty enforcement has become the norm 
and increasingly apparent. For instance, a UK-based company focused on cereals, Senova, acting 
on the premise that applicable legislation was insufficient in the European Union, has set up a 
contractual approach to better IP enforcement, through the concept of “Royalty Area 
Collection”1508. The institution’s actions are grounded upon the “structured contract approach”, 
based on the conditions of sale that surround the seeds of improved and protected varieties. The 
scheme acts under a unified royalty rate in each area, with guarantees of transparency and 
traceability, since the contract provide for a flat rate per hectare for each variety sown, the means 
of collection, and an obligation on growers to maintain sound records of seed usage, assorted with 
a right to inspect and audit. These contractual obligations go far beyond the prerogatives awarded 
under plant variety protection in the European Union, as the right to information on farm saved 
seed hectarage is not unequivocal in applicable laws.  For instance, in Belgium, it is generally 
considered that information on farm-saved seed ought to be obtained through or with the consent 
of the growers
1509
, whereas the German legal order looks into an array of evidence that may 
indicate that royalty payment is due, whether as a reasonable compensation in cases of PVP 
infringement, or an equitable remuneration in cases of farmers’ derogational uses1510.  
13.3. Facilitating access to research tools and patented foundational technologies 
In order not to be outstripped in an increasingly competitive market, plant breeding companies 
have had no choice but to include the biotechnological revolution within their innovation chain. 
They merely faced two options to do so, either develop their own applied research capacity with a 
reliance on public sector initiatives for fundamental research, or obtain licenses or contracts with 
companies which either specialise in biotechnology research or possess large strategic 
biotechnological capacity. Acting on the same rationale and solutions as public researchers, private 
plant breeders have for this purpose also entered into complex licensing but also other cooperation 
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agreements aiming to facilitate their access to molecular research tools and to patented 
foundational technologies. The molecular plant breeding innovation chain retains certain 
particularities that are difficult to surround by traditional IP tools, since there are often times 
multiple types of protection surrounding a single product, whether at the actual physical level of 
possession, or at the informational level of trademarked breeding methods or molecular markers, 
patented genetic construct components such as promoters, plant breeders' rights protected plant 
varieties or even trade secrets. The navigation of the so-called "patent thicket" that ought perhaps 
to be re-baptised the "control thicket" in plant breeding, is further challenged by issues regarding 
the freedom to operate upon which all agricultural crop genetic improvement remains based, a 
freedom that may seriously be jeopardised before the menace of royalty-stacking. Indeed, if the 
numerous right-holders over the different "components" of the final plant variety that a company 
wishes to commercialise state important up-front or sales-volume linked royalty payments, such 
commercialisation may quite realistically never take place, as it may cost more than it would bring 
in. 
Licensing solutions: cross-compulsory schemes and pro-rata protocols 
Royalty stacking undoubtedly threatens the development and commercialisation of new varieties 
by plant breeders in need of accessing molecular research tools, whether in the form of molecular 
markers, sequence tags, or non-essentially biological processes like haploid technology that may 
all allow for time and precision gains in their research programmes. The difficulties experienced 
even by the arguably strongest and most experienced private breeders, even those with integrated 
biotechnology capacity, enhance the need for such action. The argument that had long opposed 
Syngenta International AG and Monsanto Company on proprietary Agrobacterium-mediated 
transformation technology has for instance been resolved through a cross-licensing agreement. 
This particular solution nonetheless warrants the opposing entities to possess significant economic 
strength, an existing patent portfolio that is of interest to the other party, and an established legal 
expertise.  
Acting in specific regard to the negotiated uses of patented molecular research tools, the 
navigation of licensing practices could be facilitated and universalised through pro-rata protocols 
including provisions against royalty stacking or even prefabricated licensing provisions 
encompassing ex post compensatory liability rules. The adjustment of existing rights and 
obligations between technology developers, holders and users, but also of the necessity to foster 
innovation all the while maintaining access to information and scientific progress, indeed calls for 
a swift and equitable tailoring of license terms. A solution against the threat of royalty stacking 
and the difficulty of having mere recourse to traditional licensing or cross-licensing solutions 
could therefore lie within the development of such "pro rata sharing protocols", which may self-
adjust as the mosaic of involved actors evolves. As to the content of such license protocols, in 
practice, the buzz worthy “fair, reasonable and non-discriminatory” (FRAND) terms mainly 
used by a number of knowledge-intensive and competition-savvy industries for product 
compatibility could for instance be looked at, based on fixed fees payments, which could then 
combined with an added-value calculation pattern modifying the initial amount in accordance with 
existing repayments, trademark use or other incentives. The recourse to FRAND license terms has 
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 been specifically recommended for instance by the European Seed Association, which has 
“called upon holders of patent rights to follow FRAND (fair, reasonable and non- discriminatory) 
conditions in their licensing policies »1511. Other pathways for a solution might involve the recourse 
to shrink-wrap licenses or bag labels in seeds, with a common denominator established for 
instance through the submission of model agreements to those institutions governing applicable 
international treaties, such as the CBD's COP or the ITPGRFA's Governing Body.  Just like the 
aforementioned examples of standard licenses in the case of public researchers, the recourse to 
such model terms nonetheless presents inherent difficulties, including the wall of competition law, 
a necessary uniform motivational impetus from all active actors, and arguably also training for all. 
A number of prominent actors have in the meantime come up with facilitated licensing 
mechanisms, such as Syngenta’s electronic licensing platform, where theoretically even the 
toughest competitors will not meet refusals to access patented technology. The online platform 
brings together a number of technologies, from promotors regulating gene expression to 
techniques of plant transformation, where the user can find technology categorised either as a 
“native trait” or as an “enabling technology”, not shying away from contentious wording1512. The 
technology pages thereafter provide detailed information on the product or process, as well as 
patent information and financial terms attached to the license, usually fixed at a flat rate or a 
signature fee that will rise depending on the company size, including compensation for associated 
trademark licenses when applicable. The type of product of processes covered by patents is an 
important element to assess the feasibility and interest in facilitated online access, whether such 
access is provided directly by a single right-holder, or by several ones through an alternative 
institutional solution:  
“Two relatively rare types of patents, however, do have qualities that should make them 
more conducive to online promotion. The first are those few patents that cover highly 
important general-purpose research methods, for which a winning marketing strategy 
would be to grant as many routine nonexclusive licenses as possible throughout the entire 
industry (which was the licensing strategy for the famous Cohen-Boyer patents of UC-San 
Francisco and Stanford). Holders of such general-purpose patents would benefit greatly 
from the low transaction costs of online promotion and distribution. Second, more 
numerous patents protecting highly specific and well-defined incremental improvements to 
familiar downstream products or processes could also be distributed online. These kinds of 
inventions are often most valuable when exclusively sold or licensed to the one specific 
potential user who values that innovation the most. Holders of these patents would benefit 
from the ease of finding and notifying a potential buyer and from the low transaction costs 
for executing a routine transaction. Finally, however, the bulk of patents that fall 
somewhere in between these two examples, either in terms of importance or in terms of 
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generality of application, will likely be difficult assets to transact in the online exchange 
environment”1513. 
Moving aside from pure self-regulation, licensing has been used as a formal tool to overcome 
lethal shortcomings linked to the co-existence of PVP and patent titles. The bottleneck regarding 
the implementation of the breeders’ and the farmers’ exception was for instance solved in the 
European Union through a formal mechanism providing for cross-compulsory licensing in certain 
blocking scenarios. Article 12 of the Biotechnology Directive 98/44 indeed allows breeders to 
obtain a license for the use of a patented biotechnological invention, if the acquisition or 
exploitation of plant variety right is not possible without infringement. According to the criteria of 
Article 31 TRIPS, such licensing should trigger appropriate royalties and be conditional to the 
demonstration of an unsuccessful application for contractual license. Interestingly, the criteria 
stemming from patent law, which requires the plant variety to constitute “a significant technical 
progress of considerable economic interest” was also taken over in the European Union’s scheme 
for plant variety protection. In the past, EC Regulation 2100/94 only considered compulsory 
licensing in the case of public interest, and has now enlarged its scope to allow patent holders to 
use plant varieties that contain patented component.  
“On application, a compulsory licence for the non-exclusive use of a protected plant 
variety pursuant to Article 12(2) of Directive 98/44/EC shall be granted to the holder of a 
patent for a biotechnological invention, subject to payment of an appropriate royalty as 
equitable remuneration, provided that the patent holder demonstrates that (i) he/she has 
applied unsuccessfully to the holder of the plant variety right to obtain a contractual 
licence; and (ii) the invention constitutes significant technical progress of considerable 
economic interest compared with the protected plant variety. 
Where, in order to enable him/her to acquire or exploit his/her plant variety right, a holder 
has been granted a compulsory licence in accordance with Article 12(1) of Directive 
98/44/EC for the non- exclusive use of a patented invention, a non-exclusive cross-licence 
on reasonable terms to exploit the variety shall be granted, on application, to the holder of 
the patent for that invention,  
The territorial scope of the licence or cross-licence referred to in this paragraph shall be 
limited to the part or parts of the Community covered by the patent” (EC Regulation 
2100/94, new Article 29 as amended by EC Regulation 873/2004).  
Such a double cross-licensing efforts creates legal certainty for breeders who are worried about 
their freedom to operate, albeit through a complex administrative system whose efficiency still 
ought to be tested. Notwithstanding the inherent difficulties to assess when technical progress may 
be significant enough to trigger it, enlarged cross-licensing possibilities like the European solution 
do not address the issue of legitimacy of accessing protected genetic material during the 
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 development cycles of breeding programmes
1514
. Since such licensing schemes only provide for 
partial solutions when a new plant variety is developed enough to qualify for protection and has a 
determined value, they do not address the uncertainty braving around the initial stages of breeding 
programmes. This uncertainty could not be waivered without the inclusion of appropriate research 
exemptions into all patent systems
1515
.  
Any action solely affecting individual licensing practices, whether with the intervention of the 
legislator, or in a solely self-regulatory stance, in order to allow access to technology through 
cross-compulsory or fairer schemes, or facilitating diffusion through online platforms, bears 
inherent limits. They may quite easily not only hit the wall of self-interest, but also competition 
law. This type of adjusments will furthermore solely operate with regards to certain types of 
inventions, whether these are linked to a specific actor’s material, or possess characteristics that 
make more relaxed access opportunities more profitable and interesting for right-holders; pushing 
as a result for wider and potentially more global and durable collective solutions. 
Institutional solutions to affect information and transaction costs in the access to upstream 
tools 
Considering the high costs of developing a comprehensive biotechnology laboratory, cooperation 
agreements have emerged not just between private and public entities, but also within the private 
sector itself, as the successful business endeavour that owns the AFLP fingerprinting technology, 
Keygene, exemplifies, with its four strategic shareholders (Enza Zaden, Rijk Zwaan, Vilmorin and 
Takii, which are all within the top ten best-performing companies in the vegetables seed sector) 
who wished "to create synergy and higher efficiency in their molecular genetic research programs 
and thus improve their breeding efforts"
1516
. Next to this collaborative model stand specialised 
laboratories, often times start-ups having emerged from within academic entities, selling extremely 
high-end biotechnological tools. Extensive collaboration agreements and research partnerships 
also do exist vis-à-vis these specialised independent entities, as the extensive patent-holder Mendel 
Biotechnology exemplifies, an applied biotechnology research market actor with associative 
endeavours with both Monsanto, which possesses exclusive royalty-bearing licenses to Mendel 
technology in certain crops, as well as with Bayer Cropscience, aiming at the development of 
further chemical products that regulate plant stress tolerance
1517
. In this specific regard, solutions 
have also been envisaged in order to encourage the recourse to formal agreements between 
breeding institutions based upon partially open innovation systems, discouraging the patenting of 
research tools while fostering their common development and use.  
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Just as the dilemmas faced by public researchers with regards to licensing-based solutions to the 
nebulous patent clouds in agricultural biotechnology, private plant breeders, who are even less 
prone to using standardised terms, have also attempted to come up with independent and actor-led 
institutional solutions to anti-commons scenarios. The UFS for instance highlighted that 
information clearing-houses may be of primordial value to private plant breeders navigating the 
complex patent landscape of agricultural biotechnology. 
“Transparency concerning the link variety – patent(s) is therefore essential for the use of 
genetic variability, as it is needed in breeding. In order to move towards more transparency 
about the status of varieties, and also to clarify certain legal questions, UFS declares itself 
in favour of a public information policy: 
The creation of a database containing, for each variety put on the market, the link to 
publicized applications for patents and to any relevant granted patents the breeder knows 
of. 
This data should be consultable on a website where each breeder can view the situation of 
any variety marketed, if concerned by the presence of any patented elements”1518. 
It is in this context that, in 2012, « in order to improve transparency of patent information ESA 
proposes the setting up of a web- based database allowing breeders better information and 
thus a more informed decision regarding the material they use. Therefore, ESA calls upon 
patent holders to put information on the patented status of their varieties in a public 
database available on their own company websites at the moment when the relevant patent 
application is published. Furthermore, ESA proposes and will actively support the creation 
of a portal containing links to all relevant company websites for facilitating access to 
information to breeders »1519. 
The notable ESA patent database, coined PINTO (Patent Information and Transparency On-
line), is continuously being shaped, being updated every six months, and has begun to operate on a 
simple and free registration-based website.  
“ESA’s unique project provides the link between a plant variety and a patent, information 
which is currently not available elsewhere. The primary goal of PINTO is to allow breeders 
to make a more informed choice when deciding on the varieties to be used in a breeding 
program. Nevertheless, PINTO can prove to be a useful and valuable tool also in the daily 
work of farmers, growers, researchers or any other interested party. The main feature of 
PINTO is the search tool function which allows users to look through the content of the 
database on the basis of a number of search criteria such as variety denomination, species, 
patent number, patent holder or keyword”1520. 
Social innovation stemming from plant breeders themselves has not to this day yet produced 
further-reaching institutional arrangements, thrusting us to conclude that the conditions to go 
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 beyond information clearing-houses, such as patent pooling, are so far not met in the sector, even 
more so than in the field of public plant improvement related research. This could be explained by 
a very strong attachment to the breeders’ exception, a mechanism that inherently diminishes 
transaction costs linked to access to protected technology, and thus by the fact that the main 
concerns concern the informational transaction costs related to the patent landscape navigation. 
CONCLUSIONS. Possible adjustments for non-integrated private conventional plant 
breeders  
The needs of “conventional plant breeding”, in a small-scaled private yet cumulatively incremental 
innovation context comprised of a multitude of breeders of different size and assortment, are not 
completely catered for by the strong intellectual property paradigm. Faced with the growing threat 
of easy reverse-engineering possibilities that the multiple scientific breakthroughs today offer their 
competitors, private plant breeders have attempted to rebuild enough protection and ensure that 
their exclusive rights are dutifully enforced. At the same time, they have fought hard to maintain 
their sacro-sanct freedom to operate, acknowledging the peculiar nature of plant improvement, 
even when it is as knowledge intensive and profit and productivity-oriented as it has become 
today. A number of initiatives have also attempted to respond to the rules embedded in the 
PGRFA public domain by international biodiversity law, addressing issues regarding prior art 
assessment and advocating the recourse to a “declaration of source” obligation triggering if need 
be, civil or criminal proceedings under biodiversity conservation legislation. Yet the main concern 
of private plant breeders has been to seek the proper balance between ensuring adequate reward 
for resource-intensive and uncertain innovative efforts, and safeguarding the essence of plant 
breeding, which continues to rely on the widest possible gene pools to create new diversity. In this 
regard, protection has been mostly ensured through the endorsement of the double reality of plant-
related IP, considering all exclusive titles as necessary in their own right. It has also been 
translated into support for the extension of certain protection scope, notably with regards to 
“essentially derived varieties” in accordance to which compensation should be granted for those 
varieties retaining those essential characteristics of protected initial varieties that have been used in 
plant breeding programs under the UPOV 1991 rules. Action has in parallel been prominently 
attempted to maintain royalty collection prospects at their highest levels possible, not only before 
competitors who use protected varieties to come up with too similar plant varieties, but also before 
farmers and growers who save those varieties. Advocating for a legal basis for such farm-saved-
seed royalties, breeders have also set up clearing-house like mechanisms to collect said royalties, 
coupled at times by contractual prerogatives allowing for greater control over the variety’s use by 
growers. Designed so as to fight plagiaristic breeding, the extension of protection that is the 
concept of “EDV” has nonetheless demonstrated the limits put upon accumulation and the use of 
improved genetic diversity, especially in view of aggressive litigation tactics utilised against 
similar varieties that might create unwanted competition.  
These trends have led to question whether plant breeding under the governance choices made 
under the strong paradigm still warrants all plant-related “improvements”, even those minor in 
substance, which could produce beneficial public goods. Coupled with the newfound reality of the 
nebulous and aggressive clouds of plant-related patents, private plant breeders have tried to extend 
the opportunities available to use plant material and processes. Within plant variety protection, 
actors have tried to address such imparity by setting out arbitration opportunities, but also science-
based protocols to determine the trigger of essential derivation, advocating in parallel a reversal in 
the burden of proof once a significant threshold of similarity has been observed. Unwilling to 
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address issues linked to patentability requirements themselves, or at least extremely timidly, 
smaller-scaled plant breeders have nonetheless unanimously recognised the need for a wide 
reaching research exception, or even better, a purposefully tailored breeders’ exception in both 
plant breeders’ rights and patent legislation. Acting also as a benefit-sharing mechanism upholding 
the new PGRFA public domain, the nearly unequivocal support for the breeders’ exception in IPR 
legislation stands out as the most beneficial result of the clash between the strong property 
paradigm and plant breeders relying on plant variety sales and royalties as their primary source of 
income. Even though maintaining a strong breeders’ exception remains the cornerstone of smaller-
scale private plant breeders’ actions, due attention has also been given to negotiated licensing 
terms in order to ensure that socially beneficial innovation, in the form of better performing or 
adapted varieties, is distributed and not locked out by unacceptable conditions set out in a highly 
competitive marketplace. 
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FIG.7: Adjustments responding to the shortcomings faced by private plant breeders confronted to the 
strong PGRFA property paradigm 
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 CHAPTER 14: ADJUSTMENTS FOR MASS SELECTORS, FARMERS AND 14.
HOME GARDENERS 
The role of farmers’ innovation in the preservation of agrobiodiversity, operating with the support 
of traditional or more modern seed exchange networks, is warily undisputed. Even though there is 
an unquestionable “lack of knowledge about how to maintain or enhance the socio-ecological 
resilience of local seed exchange networks, […] intuitive sense [upholds] that not intervening may 
be preferable to many of the well-intended seed improvement programs of the past”1521. 
Nonetheless, the absence of formal policy intervention has its own limits, and it especially cannot 
be interpreted as leading to the absence of legal amendments. Mere “laissez-faire” cannot and does 
not redress the detrimental impacts having accompanied the dominant policies that have dressed 
the lawful contours of seed production, use and dissemination. Landrace diversity is highly 
threatened by the “inadvertent consequences of the variety and seed certification system associated 
with the establishment of plant breeders’ rights, which remunerate seed companies for the costly 
process of creating modern cultivars”1522. As aforementioned, farmers and their informal networks 
have been heavily hit by both formal seed regulations in the form of restrictive compulsory 
certification, but also by the exclusive prerogatives that accompany the widening and numerous 
intellectual property titles over plant varieties, their components or affiliated breeding processes. 
Regulatory exceptions to the principle of free competition need in their essence to strike a delicate 
balance between individual prerogatives and societal costs. Farmers have regrettably suffered the 
most from this balancing act’s failures, as they have been pushed outside of the plant improvement 
realm, into forced illegality.  
In light of the drastic changes operated upon the scheme of agricultural production first through 
the technological revolutions that have instilled new high-performance inputs on farm, and then 
through the novel regulatory frameworks that have constructed boundaries on the use of such 
inputs, farmers were gradually compelled to drastically rethink their traditional production chain. 
They have had to reclaim the rights and obligations appointed by international environmental law, 
and have tried to give greater substance to the loosely fenced public domain drawn by the CBD 
and the ITPGRFA. Farmers’ role in the conservation and sustainable use of plant genetic diversity 
has indeed been steadily recognised in both instruments, proclaiming the need for in situ resource 
conservation efforts, all the while acknowledging the contributions of traditional knowledge and 
conceding the socio-economic bundle of farmers’ rights. These idioms and principles are 
unfortunately not echoed in clear entitlements, and have in effect been trumped by the strong 
intellectual property paradigm. Farmers, in their more traditional or contemporary institutional 
forms, nonetheless reclaim approaches to environmental justice that are attached to distributive 
and equity-ridden aspects. Doctrinal thought is increasingly putting emphasis on the more-
encompassing nature of environmental justice, highlighting a conception that would go beyond 
“equity in the distribution of environmental risk”, by also “recognising the diversity of the 
participants and experiences in affected communities, and participation in the political processes 
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which create and manage environmental policy”1523. Alongside the desire to actively push for local 
community participation into the exchange, the more traditional front of building participatory 
environmental justice is concerned with the inclusion of these networks and communities in 
political decision-making. These networks at times also act as more traditional advocacy groups 
pushing for legislative amendments, and push to be recognised as experts in the legislative 
process, or to be included in environmental management decisions through for instance 
participatory plant breeding schemes. Arguably, the ever-widening range of the environmental 
justice discourse has moved it into a “new realm, where environment and nature are understood to 
create the conditions for social justice”1524. Emerging practices and coping strategies of seed 
exchange networks and local seed banks fulfil, or at least aim to fulfil these goals. 
14.1. Maintaining access to wild material and landraces: institutions for conservation and 
sustainable use 
The desire of seed savers and exchangers to preserve agricultural biodiversity and revive old lost 
varieties is self-evident. They pursue activities that are not engraved in a productivity-driven and 
resource-depleting market economy. This approach remains the core norm that brings participants 
together, as “seed saving is a set of practices valued by growers and consumers interested in 
supporting more sustainable socio-natural systems”1525. The pivotal role of the preservation of 
agricultural diversity to tackle the world’s biggest challenges in food production is being widely 
recognised. Indeed, diversity is said to be the key not only to develop sustainable agricultural 
practices, by putting less pressure on the natural environment, but also to ensure food security in 
light of the world’s bitter realities of hunger and malnutrition, as reflected in the Millennium 
Development Goals
1526
. Sustainable agricultural practices, striving to achieve high production 
levels while being environmentally sensitive and safeguarding the social structure of rural 
communities, diminish the pressures of cultivation on agricultural biodiversity itself
1527
. It is in 
this sense, through the ingenous continuity of their activities, that both traditional and modern seed 
exchange networks challenge the precepts of the strong property paradigm and uphold the new 
PGRFA public domain shaped by international biodiversity law. 
14.1.1. Conservation and sustainable use of agrobiodiversity  
The preservation of genetic resources lies at the heart of the practice of seed saving and exchange. 
These practices’ contribution to biodiversity conservation is loudly advocated for by certain 
initiatives, especially in Europe, where seed exchanges are organised as “planned activities with 
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 the explicit aim of preserving agrobiodiversity”1528. These organisations are numerous, from 
Arche Noah, Kokopelli, Pro Specie Rara, Red de Semillas, Reseau Semences Paysannes to Rete 
Semi Rurali, amongst others. The conservation aspect is also present in all networks, which 
provide seeds for free or for relatively low prices that are only meant to incur maintenance costs. 
For instance, the 1981 established Biau Germe farmers’ group in France provide seeds with an 
extremely clear purpose of preserving biodiversity and fighting genetic erosion. Most of the larger 
networks and organisations tend to go one step further and set up local seed banks and farms 
where the material to be distributed is multiplied in designated fields or maintained in gene banks 
through formal agreements with institutes possessing the technical capacity to do so. The French 
network "AgroBio Périgord, Maison de la Semence" for instance disseminates a technical book on 
the multiplication and selection of maize and sunflower on farm, based on the principles of mass 
selection. In order to conserve non-proprietary agricultural biodiversity, this network of two 
hundred and fifty growers located in Western France allocate a portion of their own land to local 
populations or 'landraces', which are maintained on a range of six hundred individuals in order to 
avoid degeneration and maintaining so-called "security stocks" to minimise loss risks. The 
experiment, which started in 2001 on a collective initiative, now receives support from regional 
institutions as an in situ biodiversity conservation project. Perhaps the widest and oldest seed 
exchange networks, the United States based Seed Savers Exchange (SSE) was established to 
“preserve our garden heritage by collecting and distributing thousands of samples of rare garden 
seeds to other gardeners”, and have set up an eight hundred and ninety acre “Heritage farm” in 
Iowa. Interestingly enough, they also store their varieties in back-up locations through so-called 
“black box deposits”, where the property of seeds remains with the donator, especially before the 
USDA Seed Bank. The SSE has also quite controversially sent about two thousand varieties to the 
Svalbard Global Seed Vault in Norway in 2008. In light of the complex links of the “Vault” to the 
ITPGRFA, as part of the Global Trust yet not the Benefit-sharing Fund, this move has attracted 
criticism as to the possible misappropriation of varieties by the private sector. Even though the 
likelihood of such event remains to be discussed, the controversies that have arisen in this regard 
clearly show the networks’ focus on agrobiodiversity conservation outside of the formal seed 
market, as well as the sensibilities that are still present vis-à-vis the phenomenon of biopiracy and 
correlated pleas for equitable compensation.  
In its recent report focusing on the need to shift from an approach focusing on mere conservation 
to the crowning of a sustainable use approach to agricultural genetic resources, the European 
Commission highlights that  
“Breeding activities are required at farm level on underutilised species, traditional and 
local breeds and crops. This requires the setting-up of Union-wide networks to valorise 
such material so as to promote the role of agriculture in the development of rural areas, 
maintenance of traditions and traditional farming practices, and the provision of 
environmental public goods. Action is needed to enable farmers to recover traditional 
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knowledge and to provide them with the necessary skills and know-how needed to work 
with local breeds and crops, while taking account of changing climatic conditions”1529.  
The key role of informal seed networks and of farming communities in achieving such sustainable 
use is not only paramount in developing countries where such communities outnumber industry 
players, but also in developed countries that possess not only a solid seed industry but also larger-
scaled professional farmers. This regulatory stint, or rather this undeniable acknowledgment of the 
importance of traditional farming relying on informal seed exchange mechanisms, stems from the 
aforementioned regime shifting operated by international environmental agreements. But it also 
stems from the realities of the ground and the crucial needs of plant innovation. Indeed, farming 
and mass selection practices which traditionally rely on informal seed exchanges undisputedly put 
less pressure on soil, water and ecosystems than industrialised agriculture. The maintenance and 
creation itself of local seed banks is a means in itself to create an alternative to the globalisation-
led “destruction of the local environment, culture and sustainable ways of living”, against the 
annihilation of a livelihood and different communities’ ways of life1530. Fighting so-called genetic 
erosion and the considerable loss of plant varieties worldwide, both traditional farmers and 
contemporary seed savers, do cultivate, reproduce, save and exchange seeds to avoid the demise of 
varieties that may not respond to the postulates of today’s market. Indeed, farmers or gardeners 
who mostly produce crops for their own subsistence or to exchange on local markets and other 
social networks “are more likely to maintain a genetically diverse spectrum of plant species and 
varieties because it is more affordable and less risky to do so”, as their practices are not dictated by 
the global market that prefers uniform harvests
1531
. The active cultivation of a wide range of 
varieties or populations, all the while traditionally using less chemicals because of cost, access or 
other intrinsic motivations, dynamically contributes to the conservation objectives set out both by 
the CBD and the ITPGRFA.  
The notion of sustainable use also craves consideration for future generations, it asks for 
biodiversity to be used through the lens of inter-generational equity and social stewardship. Most, 
if not all seed exchange networks put an emphasis on the need to preserve biodiversity, socio-
cultural conventions and traditional knowledge for the sake of future generations. In this regard, 
the notion of “heritage” is heavily heralded by numerous initiatives. The Central European seed 
savers association is meaningfully baptised “Arche Noah”, while the infamous SSE’s farm and 
language heavily insist on the preservation of “their garden heritage”.  Several (if not all) projects 
also focus on the dissemination of knowledge on seed saving techniques and experiences, much 
reminiscent of early public agricultural research initiatives, without perhaps their colossal budget. 
Organisations produce technical leaflets, frequently asked questions and other factsheets to 
disseminate knowledge. Most importantly, networks distribute their seeds to either the participants 
to the exchange, their “customers” and anyone who asks for them. Several projects (especially the 
larger ones) work on the basis of catalogues, such as Real Seeds UK, SSE or Kokopelli. The latter 
also has a special programme focusing on “seeds without borders”, which disseminates their seeds 
to the poorest rural communities “in countries that are assassinated by the West through 
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 starvation”. The benefit-sharing that is clearly provided for by seed exchange networks is non-
monetary or in kind, i.e. in the access to the genetic resources and attached knowledge, but it also 
brings in the participatory feature of fairness, equity and justice.  
14.1.2. Malleable institutions to support conservation activities  
However, given the “complexity and social contextuality of biodiversity, […] sustainable use 
projects must be as diverse as the ecosystems they are meant to conserve, and their success 
depends crucially on the fate of local societies”1532. This inherent feature makes not only the 
enactment of strictly regulatory efforts extremely difficult and seldom efficient, it also pushes for 
the adoption of broader yet malleable institutional solutions, at times backed by supporting 
policies. A noteworthy institutional solution comes from Brazil, where the government has set up a 
creative “Zero Fome” (Zero Hunger) Food Acquisition program, through which agroecological 
farmers are given fair prices and incentives when purchasing food. In parallel, Brazil’s National 
Supply Company (CONAB) also ensures the “distribution of local seed varieties to farmers, 
strengthening local seed systems and empowering the community-based organisations with whom 
they worked”, both buying and redistributing seeds from and to local farming communities1533. 
More classic in its inception and content, a European Community programme was launched in 
2004 “on the conservation, characterisation, evaluation and use of genetic resources in agriculture 
established conservation activities, both in-situ and ex-situ” and successfully implemented 
seventeen different projects1534. A specific project was dedicated to the in situ conservation of crop 
diversity, assessing different conservation techniques and advocating in its concluding remarks 
“the promotion of landrace management on farm [in order to] maintain a seed supply system that 
would increase the resilience of agricultural production by increasing the number of independently 
managed breeding populations in Europe”1535. Under the new Horizon 2020 programme, the 
European Commission has launched funding opportunities for ninety-three million EUR for the 
“management and sustainable use of genetic resources”, including inter alia, the promotion of 
traditional and/or underutilised crops, and economic benefits for farmers, other types of SMEs and 
regional economies through the expansion or creation of new products and markets1536. Local seed 
exchange networks have and will in the future continue to be supported by such over-arching 
biodiversity conservation and rural development policies. Some initiatives reach beyond this 
global approach though, and also attempt to bridge the gap between product development and 
local initiatives. Launched in 2012 and inspired by the Access to Medicine Index, the Access to 
Seeds Index is sponsored by the Dutch government as an initiative encouraging global seed 
companies to bridge the gap with the small-scale farmer1537. The first index, the methodology of 
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which is currently being developed by an independent foundation, the Access to Seeds 
Foundation, based in Haarlem, The Netherlands, is planned to be published by the end of 2014, 
acknowledging positive actions that have in the past led to better interaction between farmers and 
the seed industry.  
Perhaps more practically and straightforwardly, the development of so-called “participatory 
plant breeding programmes” should also be seen through such lens of sustainable 
agrobiodiversity use and community empowerment, embedded in the overarching goal of 
biodiversity conservation. Farming communities, local seed banks and exchange networks are 
increasingly included in crop development and environmental management projects. There is 
undoubtedly a growing need and interest in “integrating community-level seed collections with 
existing local seed exchange networks”1538, thereby adding value to efforts undertaken to build 
extensive seed collections, as these would not be preserved in a vacuum, but in a network of 
transactions and cultivation decisions”1539. The rather new but promising approach of 
“participatory plant breeding” not only recognises the role of these communities in biodiversity 
conservation, it also appoints them back into the plant improvement landscape and biodiversity 
management policies. Concomitantly, it goes beyond the too simplistic opposition between those 
traditional and more modern agricultural ecosystems, which should rather be understood as 
complementary tools responding to different needs than a perpetual wrangle
1540
. Participatory 
plant breeding initiatives come with the promise of bringing the best of both worlds for the benefit 
of cultivators.  
What is interesting in this specific section is what has been coined “farmer-led participatory plant 
breeding”, where  
“Researchers or other professionals in farmer-led programs are expected to facilitate a 
process in which farmers establish breeding objectives. Farmers bear the main 
responsibility for and, often, the costs of conducting experiments, selecting materials for 
seed multiplication, and dissemination of these. Researchers are expected to take a support 
role in this process. Farmer-led PPB has the objective to provide varieties or 
populationswhich suit the specific local environment and local preferences and any broader 
applicability beyond local circumstances is fortuitous”1541. 
As farmers become researchers alongside plant breeders in most participatory schemes, they are 
involved in priority setting, screening, testing but also distribution activities1542. It may however 
prove efficient to choose enthusiastic and well-trained farmers who can spread the benefits of 
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 participatory plant breeding through seed exchanges or community plots1543. Numerous 
commendable examples exist, including the recent release of a sweet potato cultivar in Uganda, 
under the auspices of the Ugandan National sweet potato Program
1544
. In a project run in Rwanda 
on local bean selection, farmer-experts were asked to rank different breeding lines for traits of 
interest and take the best to grow next to their traditional mixtures; not only was an increase of 
eight per cent witnessed in average yields, the selected lines were also still being grown by more 
than seventy per cent of farmers six planting season later, often used to create new mixtures and 
thus new diversity1545.  
14.2. Fighting Forced Illegality and Disregard  
Mass selectors relying on informal seed networks have increasingly been pushed towards forced 
illegality. First through extremely stringent seed certification regulations, which do not provide 
adequate manoeuvre margins to allow farmers to commercialise, or even merely exchange, their 
unstable yet locally adapted and biodiverse plant variety populations. Secondly by intellectual 
property titles covering protected improved varieties and built-in products or processes. 
Nevertheless, these reluctant outlaws have been exploring solutions to emerge from their prickly 
situation. They have notably adopted innovative practices circumventing existing restrictions, and 
advocated (at times successfully) regulatory action to accommodate their needs. A number of seed 
exchange initiatives indeed possess clear political lobbying components, directly advocating 
changes to both seed marketing and intellectual property legislation. Arche Noah members indeed 
“contribute to more diversity through cultivation of threatened varieties, shopping awareness and 
political commitment”1546. Kokopelli clearly advocates the “liberation” of seeds. Also in France, 
the CNDSF (“Coordination Nationale pour la Défense des Semences Fermières”) has infamously 
refused to pay farm-saved-seed royalties; a boycott that has notably led to the creation of a 
European-level alliance against these royalties, through the “Union Européenne des Semences et 
Plants de Ferme’1547. The Réseau Semences Paysannes has a “legal watchgroup” which follows 
legislative developments and issues detailed statements. More recently, twenty-four organisations, 
including several European informal seed networks have recently gathered around a “Joint 
Statement on the Proposal on legislation about plant reproductive material”, i.e. the new European 
seed laws, asking “farmers and gardeners to be able and allowed to produce and exchange their 
own seeds and propagating material”1548. The rhetoric found in pamphlets and official documents 
translates the strong presence of a politically active citizenship stance in the face of their 
precarious legal situation, coupled with an inventiveness used to curb infringement accusations. 
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14.2.1. Seed legislation: circumventing restrictions or advocating regulatory change 
In developed nations and the European continent, regulatory action has heavily pushed informal 
mass selection dangerously close to the formal seed market in the name of productivity. In 
developing countries, age-old seed improvement and distribution paradigms have been disturbed 
in the sake of economic development attuned to the needs of international trade. In these contexts, 
the inclusion of traditional farming communities and seed exchange networks into decision-
making operates on different fronts, mostly outside the market. Although quality control 
mechanisms have been today made compulsory for seed provided by the formal sector in the wide 
majority of countries, the informal sector and traditional methods of seed provision did not 
disappear. This holds true even in developed countries where formal channels have taken over 
seed supply. The mass selection socio-technological innovation context survived; it did so by 
carving out room for themselves in restrictive regulatory environments, or by advocating 
legislative changes, often times successfully.  
Self-regulation and voluntary labelling 
First and foremost, these networks, that remain open to anyone who wishes to contribute to the 
exchange and preservation efforts, have been actively trying to remain outside of the market 
realm in its most classical sense. This trend draws in from the fear that “drawing Amateur and 
Conservation varieties into the market is likely to further purify (and reduce the genetic 
heterogeneity of) these older cultivars, [which rather need continued saving and circulation to 
allow genetic heterogeneity—rather than ‘‘seed purity’’—to be maintained]1549. In more 
institutionalised networks, “seed donations” are always and unequivocally welcomed, although a 
number of initiatives have been obliged to change their structure into “private clubs” so as to avoid 
infringing on third party intellectual property rights or on stringent seed legislation. The Real 
Seeds UK initiative has for instance been morphed into a not-for-profit company relying on 
membership to ship heirloom seeds listed in their catalogue or accept new stocks. By charging a 
single penny of the first order for a year’s membership, they avoid selling their seeds to the 
'public'. The issue is a little trickier for more traditional exchanges operating around local seed 
markets, especially in developing countries. Informal rules cannot be insitutionalised that easily. 
Several case studies have highlighted that the decision to take part in seed exchanges or to accept 
an individual to the “free-handover of seed” is heavily influenced by the presence of relatives and 
socio-cultural ties between the farmers
1550
. At times big farmers willingly exclude smaller ones 
from the network, as documented in Peru for potato seed ware
1551
, or new material is only offered 
in “handfuls” to close friends or important neighbours, outside of the local markets in Rwanda for 
beans
1552
. Staying in the outskirts of the formal seed market has as a result its inherent limitations, 
and the line will remain blurry for most initiatives and networks.  
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 Another front of action of informal mass selection has thus been the advocacy of legislative 
change, bending seed certification to the needs of farmers-innovators and allowing for the lawful 
continuity of seed exchange and improvement networks. The advocacy element has been 
particularly vital in developed countries with very strict legislation, but also strong civil society 
involvement in policy-making processes. Indeed, as aforementioned, in developed countries where 
seed certification is voluntary, like the United States, informal seed exchange networks have not 
been confronted to major hurdles in the exchange or commercialisation of their plant varieties. 
This reality has urged commentators to advocate such voluntary certification approach 
worldwide1553. Indeed, the “truth-in-labeling” approach, which operates under established 
standards with respect to germination rates and physical purity that need to be accurately describe 
by the seed producer on the label, is notably used in the USA and has been used extensively in 
India1554. 
“One solution to the dilemma of controlling marketed seed while allowing farmers' seed 
systems to thrive is to adopt a voluntary system of variety and seed controls instead of 
compulsory variety release and seed certification and testing. The voluntary system can 
support the private sector while leaving room for local initiatives. In this way, seed 
producers have the choice to have their varieties officially recommended and their seed lots 
certified and tested or not, while farmers have the choice to buy seed with or without an 
official certification label. This system operates in several parts of the United States, where 
the seed laws merely regulate the labelling requirements in the seed trade ('truth-in-
labelling'), whereas in other areas seed association rules ‘de facto’ introduce a kind of 
compulsory quality control system. Farmers may rely on branded seed and thus on the 
information and trustworthiness of the seed company”1555.  
However, this loose approach relying on the regulatory functions on the markets does have its 
shortcomings, as it may fail to address the inherent informational asymmetry that is particularly 
addressed in seed certification schemes. This challenge especially resonates when applied to 
informal mass selection products, where seed producers seldom possess any labelling or marketing 
training, particularly in developing countries. Indeed,  
“Opponents of this approach point to the lack of competition in the seed market in most 
developing countries. This leads to a lack of incentive to provide quality seed. Also, 
illiterate farmers may not be able to understand the information on the label and be misled. 
Voluntary seed controls may thus facilitate fly-by-night seed suppliers”1556. 
To support such schemes, it is necessary for farmers to be educated regarding what 
different labels and seed categories represent so that they can make informed judgements 
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when buying seed. It also requires an enforcement system that penalises violations of the 
regulations”.1557 
Much in line with their inherent informal nature, seed exchange networks and mass selection 
initiatives have attempted to exist outside of the formal seed market, by drawing such lines as 
clearly as possible. However, such contouring is not always possible, and fails to address the 
blatant illegality in which detailed regulation (as opposed to market mechanisms) have put them. 
Self-regulation and voluntary labelling can indeed only go so far and cannot restore selection 
networks in the regulatory landscape.  
Tailored compulsory regimes 
In light of the shortcomings of purely voluntary redress, alternatives have been drawn up in order 
to include varieties or populations exchanged and developed by informal networks within a 
differently and appropriately defined compulsory system. As the main issue pertaining to seed 
registration legislation remains the stringent and the discriminatory nature of official catalogue 
systems based on criteria solely responding to products of modern plant breeding chains, the first 
solution to be sought could work around a possible moderation of the DUS criteria in the seed 
marketing framework. Indeed, variety registration systems based on both DUS and VCU criteria 
are designed with solely the formal system in mind, thereby targeting “varieties that are tested in a 
mono-cropping system under high-input agriculture, […not catering] for the real diversity in 
farming systems and are not suited to low-input agriculture”1558. Such moderation would lead to 
the development of mere seed quality control, setting aside certification mechanisms based on 
varietal identity and purity control, or variety release mechanisms validating the value of the 
variety in question
1559
.  
Alongside the rather weighty choice of relaxing the formal system so as to include a wider array of 
plant varieties and actors, the establishment of derogatory regimes in the form of book logs or 
flexible national (or regional) registers of uncertified seed could be options worth considering. 
These regimes could not only take farmers’ innovation out of illegality, but also provide a 
“defensive protection system […] against acquisition and exploitation by third parties”, 
documenting indirectly the traditional knowledge embodied in landraces
1560
.  Other options that 
have been raised by commentators relate for instance to the establishment of “different lists or 
categories of marketable seed, with lower requirements and controls for certain kinds of 
varieties”1561.  
In this context, “another strategy is to establish a category of seed below certified seed (e.g. 
“standard seed”) that may or may not be subject to some minimal quality control 
                                                                    
 
1557
 REICHMAN and UHLIR, "A Contractually Reconstructed Research Commons for Scientific Data in a Highly 
Protectionist Intellectual Property Environment," op.cit.pp.60-61. 
1558
 LOUWAARS, "Seed Regulations and Local Seed Systems," op.cit. 
1559
 "Seed Laws: Biases and Bottlenecks," op.cit., notably citing ROBERT TRIPP, New Seed and Old Laws: Regulatory 
Reform and the Diversification of National Seed Systems  London: Intermediate Technology Publications, 1997. 
1560
 GEERTRUI VAN OVERWALLE, "Protecting and Sharing Biodiversity and Traditional Knowledge: Holder and User 
Tools," Ecological Economics 53, 2005: pp.596-597. 
1561
 LOUWAARS, "Seed Laws: Biases and Bottlenecks," op.cit. 
CHAP. 14 Adjustments for Farmers – Mass Selectors – Home Gardeners 
375 
 regulations, although in practice this type of classification is used principally for seed of 
lower priority crops or during seed shortages”1562.  
“The formal seed sector [can be] regulated while avoiding interference with farmers’ seed 
systems. Indonesia has a specific exemption for farm-produced seed that is marketed within 
the village, providing at least an opening for local seed production and dissemination. In 
some countries, the law applies to packed and certified seed only, leaving the farmers’ seed 
system untouched. They basically protect the seed label and reserve it to truly controlled 
seed: seed should not be sold as 'government-certified seed' (Korea) or 'government-tested 
seed' (Botswana). In fact, the Morocco law reserves the word 'seed' for controlled seed 
only”1563.  
These solutions are based in effect on a dual approach that involves catalogues or mere logs for 
both improved and conservation varieties, accompanied by adequate exemptions, without 
undermining the main commercial system, nor blocking marketing possibilities for “un-
traditional” models, such as the complemety informal sector or the organic, and biodynamic 
markets. Restricting seed marketing laws to a specific number of crops could be envisaged, as 
provided for in Bangladesh, just as a specific “commercial seed” category could be created, 
warranting greater productivity and uniformity without necessarily restricting the assortment of 
releasable varieties
1564
. In the same vein, networks of seed-exchanging and selecting farmers could 
formally remain outside the scope of seed marketing laws, an exoneration that would strictly need 
to be included in the appropriate laws, combined, with derogatory or restrictive conditions as to 
the scale of farmers or the varieties concerned, if necessary. Examples of such exceptional regimes 
do exist in the developing world, for instance in Brasil and Peru. In Brazil, the 2003 law provides 
for a legal definition for « local, traditional or creole cultivars », defined as “all varieties 
developed, adapted or produced by small farmers […] with consideration for the social, cultural 
and environmental describers”, not just agronomical or economic criteria1565. Furthermore, the law 
establishes a double exemption from registration into the official catalogue, first with regards to 
cultivated varieties, as local cultivars are not to be reprised in the National Registry of Cultivars; 
and secondly with regards to specific actors, as family farmers, agrarian reform settlers and 
indigenous peoples do not need to be registered either1566. However, the latter exemption only 
targets individuals, and not organisations, and is conditional to the fact that the multiplication of 
seeds for distribution, exchange or sale has to occur amongst them. This exemption therefore 
targets those farmer-led mass selection efforts, but cannot extend to those selectors interested in 
low-input breeding or commercialisation opportunities.  
In developed countries, where informal exchange networks are more modern in form than 
traditional, concerns for low-input breeding, commercialisation and decentralised biodiversity 
conservation opportunities are more present, calling for an adequate differentiated approach. It is 
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in this context that many European countries have already developed seed laws allowing the 
maintenance and marketing of landraces and "obsolete" varieties.  
“The Swiss agricultural policy on varieties and propagating material is one of the first to 
have introduced a derogation clause that allows the commercialisation of non-certified 
propagating material and non-registered varieties in a national catalogue. In 1999, the list 
contained sixty landraces of cereals and about seventy landraces of potatoes. Requirements 
for derogation are quite simple: the demand must be accompanied by basic information 
about the applicant and the variety. Registration, for the time being, is free. Finland is 
establishing a different model with certain positive features. According to its proposal, the 
farmer applies for the registration to the Seed Testing Department for which the farmer 
pays a fee. This process is based on the methods and guidelines of UPOV, even if the 
variety does not fulfil uniformity or stability criteria. Less attention is also paid to the 
ability of seeds to germinate and species purity and old varieties are accepted. Some less 
positive aspects of this proposal is that it creates a relatively strict and inflexible regulatory 
framework governed by the Seed Testing Department. Other European country regulations 
provide little hope for local varieties. In France, legislation has maintained the DUS criteria 
and charges high registration fees (two hundred and twenty-one Euros per variety). 
Furthermore, in order to register, the plant variety must be shown to be more than twenty 
years old; a challenge for locally used varieties not collected from commercial catalogues 
or mentioned in historical archives”.1567 
The establishment of a derogatory “light catalogue” has been the way forward in the European 
supranational legal order, through Directives 2008/62 and 2009/145 on conservation varieties, to 
the dismay of both commentators and politically active farmers’ associations1568. Several research 
projects were funded through the FP6 European Research Framework, known as Farm Seed 
Opportunities (FSO, 2007-2009), in order to overcome the inherent difficulty of uniformly 
regulating quite diverse farm-innovation systems. Targeted to support the implementation of seed 
regulations on conservation varieties, these projects also proposed complementary seed-regulation 
scenarios, the utility and effect of which may need further consideration. To all intents and 
purposes, opening the Catalogue to conservation varieties remains a means of reducing genetic 
erosion and preserving varietal heritage, even though critics have argued that such move entails 
the risk of undermining the main commercial system, and may potentially block completely open 
marketing possibilities for non-industrial models of agriculture such as organic farming or bio-
dynamics in light of additional administrative obligations
1569
. This differentiated approach has also 
been to a certain extent mirrored by the new Regulation that is today being discussed at European 
level, which also aims to correct its shortcomings. The European regulatory machinery, aiming at 
the simplification of its seed marketing laws, has published the groundwork of its new “Seed 
reform” in November 2012 through a Regulation proposal, projecting to considerably alter the 
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 regime for farmers’ varieties1570. The proposal states that market regulation “should not apply to 
material intended to or maintained in gene banks, and networks of conservation of genetic 
resources or organisations associated with gene banks”, but leaves those in situ seed exchange and 
conservation networks within the seed marketing realm.  
The text has since then been re-amended and the current proposal provides an extremely 
interesting example of both restrictions of actions in the name of quality control, and of flexibility 
in the requirements for mass selection efforts, for all countries that have adopted the road of 
compulsory seed certification. As aforementioned, the European Union has developed legislation 
from 2008 onwards to taken into account the specificities of so-called “conservation or amateur 
varieties”. Its legislation was challenged by mass selectors and modern seed exchange networks 
that were pushed forcefully into the illegal sidelines of the seed market. Yet the derogation-based 
but productivity-oriented regulatory framework was considered legitimate and proportionate in the 
aforementioned Kokopelli ruling of the European Court of Justice
1571
. Such ruling should be 
analysed in light of the fact that instruments targeting conservation varieties were not in force at 
the beginning of the proceedings, although the national Court has been invited to take account of 
such legislative development. The Luxembourg based Court indeed suggested that the forced 
move of Kokopelli into illegality and unfair competition has been remedied by the enactment of 
this parallel regime. Were it to be the case, the imposition of geographical, quantitative and 
packaging restrictions by the derogatory rules of the “conservation varieties” catalogue would 
seemingly not undermine the recognition of mass selection efforts, according to the ECJ’s 
approach to the issue, although it might actually minimise their impact in practice. However, the 
tides are turning once more, and the European seed legislation is undergoing a major facelift. The 
twelve Directives that constitute the EU’s seed legal web shall now be forged under the umbrella 
of a single Regulation currently under the European Parliament’s review1572. Even though the 
proposal has been vehemently opposed by a number of farmers’ or other civil society 
organisations, the text itself seems to provide a certain degree of flexibility for the informal seed 
sector, at least at first reading. Indeed, the proposed Regulation interestingly provides for a new 
criteria in registration, that of  
“sustainable value for cultivation, in order to support sustainable development, direct 
plant breeding and meet breeders', producer and consumer demands concerning that type 
of development”1573.  
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This concept, defined in the proposed Article 59, warrants taking into account the contribution of 
varieties  
“characteristics, taken as a whole, at least as far as susceptibility to pests, input of 
resources, susceptibility to undesirable substances or adaptation to divergent agro-
climatic conditions», indicating the delicate turn taken away from a solely market oriented 
approach to seed laws.  
The proposal also provides for a number of flexibilities that could accommodate the need of both 
traditional and more modern seed exchange networks and linked innovative endeavours. Firstly, it 
targets “professional operators”, a concept designed to “exclude private persons”1574, 
encompassing “any natural or legal person carrying out as a profession, at least one of the 
following activities with regards to plant reproductive material: producing, breeding, maintaining, 
providing services, preserving, including storing and making available on the market” (Article 3 
(7)).  
According to its Preamble, it also inter alia excludes reproductive material “intended solely for 
testing, scientific and breeding purposes, to gene banks, organisations and networks 
devoted to the exchange and conservation of genetic resources (including on-farm 
conservation), or to reproductive material exchanged in kind between persons other than 
professional operators »
1575
 (emphasis added by the author).   
Further derogations are established to the benefit of farmer-innovators not only through the fact 
that the Commission may introduce “delegated measures” concerning heterogeneous material, 
which does neither fulfil the definition of a variety nor satisfy the sustainable use criteria for 
cultivation. These varieties will still be produced and made available on the market without full 
registration obligations, taking into account their “contribution to increase the genetic variability 
of agricultural crops, the genetic resource basis and biodiversity in the Union, as well as to the 
sustainability of agriculture and thusto the adaptation to climate change”.1576  
Article 14§3 does nonetheless state that a number of minimal rules could be envisioned for such 
heterogenous material to be made available on the market
1577
. The proposal does not stop there, it 
also creates a “niche market” that is formally exempted stems from an affirmed need to establish 
« proportionate and sustainable rules for small scale activities concerning plant 
reproductive material, which is adapted to local conditions, and made available on the 
market in small quantities »
1578
. This ad hoc derogation from registration for “niche market 
plant reproductive material » set out in Article 36 of the proposal exempts  “plant 
reproductive material made available on the market in small quantities by persons other 
than professional operators, or by professional operators employing no more than ten 
persons and whose annual turnover or balance sheet total does not exceed EUR 2 million” 
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 from registration although some basic rules on labelling and traceability of the material 
may be laid down
1579
.  
The exemption concerns « e.g. farmer-breeders or gardener-breeders whether being professional 
operators or not », and is designed to “prevent undue constraints to the making available 
on the market of plant reproductive material, which is of lesser commercial interest, but is 
important for the maintenance of genetic diversity”.  
A long-awaited breath of fresh air for mass selectors, this measure is nonetheless conditioned in 
order to avoid abuse and ensure that the derogation is “only used by professional operators which 
cannot afford the costs and administrative burden of variety registration”.1580 Its provisions 
therefore concern material made available on the market in a defined size of packages by 
professional operators employing a small number of persons and with a small annual turnover. 
Such restrictions, along with the record-keeping obligations that have been set out by the legislator 
may potentially raise the cost of mass selection efforts and may not be possible to comply with in 
extremely informal exchange environments, but they still have the merit of specifically leaving 
farmer or gardener innovators outside of the formal seed sector, which is subject to considerably 
stricter traceability obligations. It should be noted that this “niche market” may concern the entire 
range of varieties produced by mass selection or even more science-infused breeding efforts, 
including potentially new varieties developed through participatory breeding for instance. The 
flexibilities allowed do not stop there, as the draft legislation also targets  
« old varieties, such as conservation varieties (including landraces), or so called 'amateur 
varieties', (for which) less stringent requirements should continue to be laid down in view 
of promoting their on farm conservation and use as currently regulated under the 
Directives 2008/62/EC and 2009/145/EC »
1581
.  
Not only does the new text abolishes currently applicable quantitative restrictions, even though 
georgraphical criteria ought to be catered for
1582
, it also lightens up the registration procedure of 
these particular varieties, which will continue to operate under an « officially recognised 
description » for which DUS examination is no longer obligatory. The description needs to address  
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« the specific characteristics of the plants and parts of plants which are representative for 
the variety concerned and make the variety identifiable, including the region of 
origin »
1583
.  
The material shall be identified through a « label indicating that this variety is identified by an 
officially recognised description and the region of origin », made available as «standard material ». 
All of these welcomed flexibilities, whether found in the definition of professional operators or 
varieties, the addition of « sustainable cultivation value », the consideration of “heterogenous 
material”, the creation of a niche market for locally adapted varieties, and the renewed and relaxed 
stance on old conservation varieties provide, especially when viewed cumulatively, extremely 
valuable manoeuver margins for those involved in mass selection. Rendering solely a biodiversity 
conservation objective rather than an innovation fostering and institutional capacity-building 
mind-set, the proposal unfortunately also fails to acknowledge the socio-economic reality of mass 
selection and its integral part within the seed system as a whole. Crticis have been voiced over the 
content of this European reform. Reactions from farmers’ organisations duly pointed out this 
unwarranted development and viewed it as “an attack on subsistence agriculture and small-scale 
food production, as well as the rights of peasants and farmers to exchange and sell their own 
seeds”1584. The outcry has been also backed by the European Greens and resulted in the 
introduction of high numbers of amendments into the proposed text. The main concern of such 
criticism was first directed towards the complete disregard of the informal seed sector and the 
modern exchange networks in the initial proposal. This worrying character was palliated by some 
“last minute additions to the text” that accommodated or at least addressed such reality. 
Nonetheless, this effort remains insufficient in the eyes of many, mainly due to the general stance 
that has been favoured, i.e., to view the informal seed sector as a “niche”. Such “strategic niche 
management approaches” that have been advocated by economy scholars long before the 
European Commission proposal
1585
 tend to underplay “the importance of identities, community 
dynamics and power relations in grassroots innovation”1586. 
In this tensed context, mere relaxation and adjustment has not always been considered enough, 
especially for the needs of developing countries. Acknowledging the inherent difficulties of 
establishing official catalogues, but also recognising the importance of different approaches to 
variety development and release, some actors have tried to rethink the principles of seed quality 
control from scratch. An alternative has for instance been constructed by the FAO, “particularly 
designed for countries with limited resources, which is less demanding than full seed quality 
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 control systems but yet guarantees a satisfactory level of seed quality”1587. The “Quality 
Declared Seed System” was presented in 1993 and revised quite recently in 2006, in light of “the 
changing circumstances and needs in the seed sector”, clarifying the role of national seed policies, 
the accommodation of local varieties into the QDS, the enlargement of its crop coverage and the 
adoption of standardised procedures to facilitate its operation
1588
.  
“The QDS system offers considerable advantages for managing seed quality control where 
regulatory resources are severely constrained (as is the case in almost all African 
countries). But (as with any regulatory regime) it requires good administration and 
consistent enforcement in order to function properly”1589. 
“In some countries, the certification agencies take a stand that their role to promote seed 
quality prevails over their control functions. The Seed Certification and Control Institute in 
Zambia, for instance, promoted the introduction of 'quality declared seed' in its regulations. 
This allows them to relax the certification procedures and interpret the seed quality 
standards more flexibly. Unfortunately however, seed certification organisations in many 
other countries stick to the rules that they have been given and cannot play a role in 
promoting new initiatives, but the Zambian example is now followed as well in other 
counties (e.g. Sri Lanka, Thailand)”1590. 
The bottlenecks of restrictive compulsory seed legislation that have been increasingly strangling 
mass selectors may be addressed in a plethora of ways. Amongst them lies the most liberal 
approach of voluntary marketing and labelling, which warrants for social actors to be accustomed 
to greater levels of self-regulation and education. Staying within the realms of compulsory 
certification so as to correct the inherent informational assymetries inherent to seed trade, a 
number of flexibilities can be drawn in to put informal mass selection within the realm of legality, 
with the risk of over-regulating and “niching” social organisation that in essence relies on socio-
cultural norms that are difficult to embrace in technical marketing rules.  
14.2.2. Intellectual property rights legislation: pushing for innovation-specific modalities 
Aside from the choking effects of restrictive compulsory seed legislation, the innovative activities 
of mass selectors have also been affected by the expansion of the scope and multiplying presence 
of intellectual property titles. Viewing them as mere cultivators and customers, rather than 
innovators in their own right, the strong property paradigm has considerably shrunk the farmers’ 
privilege that characterises plant variety protection and addressed the needs of this peculiar 
innovation context. The surge of patents within the proprietary landscape, coupled with restrictive 
contractual terms, has also considerably reduced mass selectors’ range of action. Contractual 
clauses further serve the expansion of protection and the distinctive principles regarding the 
exhaustion of rights that have been put in motion with regards to harvested biological material. A 
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number of legislative and judicial practices have nonetheless attempted to correct these 
bottlenecks, often pushed to do so by farmers’ organisations themselves. Ensuring the 
development and conservation of landraces thus entails a review of existing intellectual property 
regulatory tools, not only to be addressed through parallel legislation but also reconsidering 
existing flexibilities aimed at in situ biodiversity conservation within the strong paradigm, such as 
the farmers’ exemption and those regulatory takes on farm saved seed. 
Farmer’s privilege in sui generis PVP and patent protection 
The farmers’ exception found in intellectual property titles is a regulatory necessity to uphold 
mass selection, since it not only allows farmers to resow protected varieties for their own socio-
economic subsistence needs, but also may allow them to use the improved germplasm in their 
selection efforts. The latter concern is nonetheless more inconsequential, especially for hybrid 
varieties that will not maintain fixed characteristics the following seasons, rendering the selection 
of best-performing individuals less meaningful. Notwithstanding such drawback, the ability to use 
germplasm to generate new biodiversity is still an inescapable predicament of the PGRFA public 
domain set out both by traditional intellectual property rights and international biodiversity law. 
That is why the ad hoc defences against infringements or “statutory compulsory licensing” 
mechanisms such as the breeders’ rights or the farmers’ privilege need to be maintained. Both 
mechanisms have been criticised due to the resulting lack of contractual discourse after the grant 
of IP entitlements, if one trusts that transactional bottlenecks are likely to be overcome by so-
called “repeat players” that frequently need to exchange rights1591. However, farmers, except 
maybe for the larger actors of the developed world, are not likely to become real “repeat players”. 
Indeed, most farmers will be ill equiped to negotiate in all equity faced with professional plant 
breeders in an oligopolistic seed market. That is why the need to sustain, reinforce and especially 
clearly define farmers’ privilege in both PVP and patent laws is very much a genuine necessity. 
Here, the approach to reward mass selection-based innovation and contribute to the sustainable use 
of biodiversity on farms is to situate the “traditional practices of farmers as exceptions to the 
exclusive rights of plant breeders under existing IPR tools”, precluding breeders from demanding 
payment from farmers who save and plant seeds saved from prior purchases, or informally 
exchange purchased seeds
1592
. From judicial interpretations to restrictive regulation, 
aforementioned legal developments have pushed to question whether and to what extent the 
farmers’ privilege should be recalibrated in order to maintain its initial rationale and ensure the 
survival of mass selection endeavours.    
There is a definite need to envisage the contours of the farmers’ privilege with much greater clarity 
and precision within plant variety protection for the sake of all actors concerned. Given the 
inherent flexibility of Article 27§3b of the TRIPS Agreement, allowing for any type of sui generis 
protection for plant varieties, as long as there is one, countries retain the right to draft PVP 
legislation with greater room for the so-called farmers’ privilege. This prerogative was particularly 
highlighted in light of international and national development policy, which may warrant for the 
tailoring of plant breeders’ rights to the specific needs of countries still undergoing the economic 
development process, whether at its tail or its edge. The need to include a complete farmers’ 
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 exemption for the benefit of the mass selection chains’ future and the conservation of 
agrobiodiversity cannot be disregarded. In order to balance out the incentive to innovate for 
breeders, such exemption can however only extend to seed-saving practices and exchanges within 
local communities, excluding thereby the sale of protected varieties. This option has indeed been 
followed in numerous countries, such as Brazil, where non-commercial exchanges of saved 
improved varieties are allowed except for sugar cane, or in Vietnam, Trinidad and Tobago, the 
Philippines, where exchanges are allowed for non-commercial purposes and for reproduction in 
farmers’ own land1593. Countries’ margin of manoeuvre is nonetheless wider. It has also led to the 
CoFaB covenant initiative, which clearly took the defence of farmers, stretching as far as the 
establishment of a farmers’ rights fee to be levied by breeders “for the privilege of using 
traditional plant varieties either directly or through the use of those varieties in breeding 
programmes”1594. The 2001 Indian PVP law, which largely draws from CoFaB owing to virulent 
NGO advocacy, did establish a “farmers’ rights’ regime in addition to and distinct from the 
farmers’ privilege regime” that follows the perspective of the 1978 UPOV text1595.  
Within the more restrictive realm of the UPOV Conventions, the evolutive withdrawal of 
farmers’ privileges in recent legislative amendements has also triggered adverse and fervent 
reactions from lawmakers. For instance, Norway still refuses to adopt the 1991 UPOV terms. 
However, the country’s relatively minor influence in the global seed industry, and its active 
political attachment to benefit-sharing principles, may maintain this particular practice as rather 
marginal progress. As aforementioned, the shrinking evolution of the farmers’ privilege may have 
been the source of the recognition of farmers’ rights within the FAO system as a bundle of socio-
economic rights including those related to seed as such, as asserted by article 9 of the 2004 
International Treaty for Plant Genetic Resources for Food and Agriculture
1596
. This provision 
nonetheless conditions farmers’ rights to save seed to national policy decisions, and therefore 
cannot be wholly viewed as an absolute international prerogative granted to farming or gardening 
communities. A number of UPOV 1991 compliant national legislations have however tried to 
introduce the notion of a true-to-word “farmers’ exemption” for the benefit of small farmers. 
Farmers who produce less than ninety-two tons of cereal in the European Union for instance are 
allowed to re-use the purchased seed without any payment, including for experimentation 
purposes, selecting material on their own farm, but without participating in seed exchanges. This 
prohibition to exchange has nonetheless been viewed as inconsistent with the aforementioned 
practices of farmers who exchange seeds for purposes of crop and variety rotation and 
selection
1597
. Furthermore, within the UPOV system, a reasonable compensation could be provided 
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to safeguard the “legitimate interests of the breeder”, which has been for instance specifically 
defined in the European Union so as to trigger a balancing exercise that should be adequately 
carried out: 
“The legitimate interests shall not be considered to be safeguarded if one or more of these 
interests are adversely affected without account being taken of the need to maintain a 
reasonable balance between all of them, or of the need for proportionality between the 
purpose of the relevant condition and the actual effect of the implementation thereof” 
(Commission Regulation 1786/95 implementing EC Regulation 2100/94, Art. 2).  
Even if minor in their essence, these engagements nonetheless reclaim the public domain uses that 
have been enshrined in international environmental law. They have remained minor due to the 
concern that a largely unrestricted approach may in the long term have detrimental effects on other 
actors of plant improvement, namely private plant breeders, whether small or larger scaled. A 
clear-cut mechanism for the determination of the reasonable compensation stemming from farm-
saved seed should be stipulated in applicable laws or decrees. These could provide for adequate 
procedures with satisfactory representation from both sides to reach an agreement on the rate or 
percentage of farm-saved-seed royalties, or could also directly fixate such rate in its text, 
according to crops if necessary. Legal certainty and clear implementation guidelines should in our 
opinion prove satisfactory for both royalty payers and collectors.   
However, reflecting on the scope of the farmers’ privilege under UPOV-linked or stand-alone 
plant variety protection only goes half the way to ensure its maintenance. As aforementioned, the 
inherent concern of the PVP system vis-à-vis farmers is not omnipresent within patent laws as 
such. Indeed, the latter tend to remain abstract in their nature, seeing that they are not designed to 
solely apply to agrobiodiversity-reliant innovations as PVP legislation is, with its inevitable links 
to loftier issues such as food security or environmental protection. As aforementioned, the patent 
system confronts farmers with even more restrictice terms, viewing them as sole licensees, and not 
as cultivators that form an integral part of the intrincately intertwined greater food system. In the 
United States, where the principle of independence between different IP systems did not warrant 
the adoption of specific rules addressing the co-existence of patents and plant variety rights, case 
law points towards the prevalence of patents. The legal challenge of multiple protection was 
epitomised by the wide array of enclosing instruments surrounding Round Up Ready canola, 
protected all at once through process and gene patents, plant variety rights, trademarks and the 
private contract that is the “Technology Use Agreement”. In 1998, an infamous case opposed 
Monsanto to Percy Schmeiser
1598
, a Canadian canola farmer who replanted the seed he saved from 
batches of Round Up Ready canola seeds he had bought from the plaintiff. Although he argued 
that he was cultivating his own traditionally bred canola seeds, and that the batches were 
unknowingly contaminated with Monsanto’s technology on account of cross field breeding by 
wind or insects, he was found to be infringing patents by using technology without a license
1599
. 
The principle of independence between exclusive titles was reiterated in 2002, where farmers’ 
right to save seeds of plants protected through plant variety protection was once again viewed not 
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 to convey the right to do so for patented technologies or plants
1600
.  
To counter such negative effect, certain countries have equipped themselves with patent legislation 
recognising the close knit of green biotechnology patents with food security, and acknowledging 
the differences that may exist between licensees in its most classical understanding, and farmers. 
This has been the case in the European legal order and its made-to-purpose Directive 98/44/EC, 
which addresses solely biotechnology-related patent protection. The text makes room for a 
farmers’ privilege in domestic patent systems in its rather unique article 11§1, allowing farmers 
to retain material grown on his own farm for the following years, under the same terms warranted 
to the privilege in plant variety protection
1601
.  
“By way of derogation from Articles 8 and 9, the sale or other form of commercialisation 
of plant propagating material to a farmer by the holder of the patent or with his consent 
for agricultural use implies authorisation for the farmer to use the product of his harvest 
for propagation or multiplication by him on his own farm, the extent and conditions of this 
derogation corresponding to those under Article 14 of Regulation (EC) No 2100/94” 
(Directive 98/44/EC, Art. 11.1). 
Even though this instrument has no direct effect in Member States’ national legal orders and 
allows for restrictions of these rights awarded to farmers, it still acknowledges the specificity of 
agricultural innovation, just as more recent legislative endeavours have also been doing in other 
fora.  
While the so-called “Doha round” and its Ministerial Conventions have seemingly failed to 
fashion a viable consensus on the terms of a new World Trade order, they have yet strengthened 
regulatory determination to include such privilege within domestic patent regulation. Discussions 
have for instance led to the 2007 amendment of the Swiss Federal Patents Act so as to include a 
farmers’ privilege, limited to those uses of the patented material within the same farm1602. 
However, even though a farmers’ privilege has been appearing in patent legislation, especially in 
the European continent, the increasingly restrictive approach to farm saved seed under plant 
variety protection has growingly restricted this statutory use’s position within the strong 
intellectual property paradigm
1603
. The relatively rare recourse to the exception within patent 
legislation could be entrenched in a textual TRIPS interpretation, in accordance with which the 
recognition of such a privilege to farmers might prejudice the legitimate interests of the monopoly 
holders under Article 27
1604
. The feasibility and conformity of such exceptions in patent legislation 
has yet to be tested before the judiciary or the WTO dispute-settlement mechanisms, but we 
believe that the flexibilities inherent in the Agreement and its rationale may allow for the 
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recognition of the farmers’ exception. Other commentators have in this regard highlighted the 
possibility that the existence of compensation in return for the right to use, save and exchange the 
protected material might actually encourage the doctrine of compulsory licensing, viewed as a 
“statutory license”, rather than as a classical exception to IPR protection as grounded in Article 30 
of TRIPS
1605
. Such a mechanism nonetheless warrants the further use of legal muscle by actors 
unaccustomed to these practices. 
Farm-saved seed, harvested material and exhaustion 
The possibilities offered to mass selectors to save, use and exchange seeds have been directly 
limited by the non-existence or restrictive implementation of the farmer’s privilege in applicable 
UPOV legislation and co-existing patent protection. They have in parallel also seen their reach 
diminish through the extension of the scope of protection awarded by the two main plant-related 
IPR titles. Indeed, as UPOV was extending the breeders’ rights to harvested material in 1991 in 
order to ensure efficient protection to innovators of self-replicating and easily reverse-engineered 
technologies, the same logic was applied to the doctrine of exhaustion of intellectual property 
rights.  
As aforementioned, plant variety protection under UPOV has been extended to harvested 
material in the 1991 text through its article 14, where the authorisation of the breeders has also to 
be sought for certain acts, such as production, reproduction or sale of “harvested material, 
including entire plants and parts of plants, obtained through the unauthorised use of propagating 
material of the protected variety [..], unless the breeder has had reasonable opportunity to 
exercise his right in relation to the said propagating material”. This extension directly impacts 
farmers active in territories where national laws have not established a farmers’ exception. But it 
may also impact those active in Member States that have incorporated the optional exception 
since, subject to Articles 15(1) and 16 of the UPOV 1991 text, “unauthorised uses” would refer to 
acts that do not comply with the reasonable limits and the safeguarding of the legitimate interests 
of the breeder provided in the optional exception”1606. Such premise reinforces mass selectors’ 
absolute need for a farmers’ exception within PVP legislation in order to continue conserving and 
selecting agrobiodiversity, even if these provisions only concern improved and stable protected 
plant varieties. However, the extension of protection scope has made it extremely difficult for 
farmers to truly assess their rights and obligations with regards to protected varieties. In this 
nebulous context, plant breeders have furthermore been increasingly drafting stringent contracts in 
order to fully capture the added value of their improved varieties in royalties. The difficulties 
surrounding the farmers’ privilege are not only attributed to legislative changes, but also relate to 
the practices surrounding the negotiation of royalties, both for harvested material and for farm-
saved seed. Farm-saved seed royalties can be determined for each species through agreements 
between individuals or representative organisations from both parties to the transaction. Such 
agreements exist notably in the United Kingdom and in Germany, and seem to function well 
enough. Uproar did generate in France for instance, as the CNDSF (“Coordination Nationale pour 
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 la Défense des Semences Fermières”) refused to pay royalties and called for a boycott of farm-
saved-seed royalties
1607
.  
The aforementioned reference to the European Court of Justice for a preliminary ruling of the 
European Court of Justice in Geistbeck v Saatgut1608 has shed some light on the interpretation of 
Community Regulation in this aspect, as the Bundesgerichtshof’s questions trigger the core of the 
need to calculate the amount of “reasonable compensation” owed by a farmer who uses protected 
propagated material outside the scope of the farmers’ privilege. The issue here was to determine 
whether the “reasonable compensation” that ought to be paid when faced with an infringement of 
the plant variety right should be considered as equivalent to the “equitable remuneration” that 
breeders can ask for in the derogative yet lawful uses of protected material on farm
1609
. The 
answer of Luxembourg provided an interpretation favouring the breeders’ interests, since the acts 
perpetrated by the farmers were considered to be “unauthorised”.  
“In so far as Article 94 of Regulation No 2100/94 is intended to make good the loss 
suffered by the holder of a plant variety who is the victim of an infringement, it must be 
held that, in the case before the referring court, since the Geistbecks cannot rely on the 
‘farmer’s privilege’ – namely, the derogation from Community plant variety rights allowed 
under Article 14(1) of Regulation No 2100/94 and as provided for in Article 14(3) of that 
regulation – that loss amounts to at least the fee that a third party would have had to pay for 
a C-Licence. 
Consequently, in order to determine, in the circumstances of the case before the referring 
court, ‘reasonable compensation’ as provided for under Article 94(1) of Regulation No 
2100/94, it is appropriate to take as the basis for that calculation an amount equivalent to 
the remuneration payable for licensed production” (ECJ, Geistbeck v Saatgut, para.36-37). 
The Bundesgerichtshof had also asked the Court whether the breeder should recoup the cost of 
royalty collecting schemes, asking whether “special monitoring costs of an organisation which 
protects the rights of numerous holders to be taken into account in such a way that double the 
compensation usually agreed, or double the remuneration due under the fourth indent of Article 
14(3) of the CPVR Regulation, is awarded". The Court here held that the compensation had to be 
solely be interpreted within the realm of intellectual property law, therefore precluding the warrant 
of larger damages.  
“It is sufficient to note that Article 94(1) of Regulation No 2100/94 does no more than 
provide for reasonable compensation in the event of unlawful use of a plant variety, but 
does not provide for compensation for damage other than that connected to the failure to 
pay that compensation. 
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In those circumstances, the answer to the third question is that the payment of 
compensation for costs incurred for monitoring compliance with the rights of the plant 
variety holder cannot enter into the calculation of the ‘reasonable compensation’ provided 
for under Article 94(1) of Regulation No 2100/94”. (ECJ, Geistbeck v Saatgut, para.50-51). 
Faced with a very restrictive farmers’ privilege, mass selectors who wish to replant protected 
material therefore ought therefore to be extremely carefuly not to step outside of such privilege 
without adequately informing and compensating plant breeders, even though no additional 
damages should be calculated on the sole basis of plant variety rights legislation. In practice, 
royalties may be typically obtained from either the grower or trader purchasing the initial 
propagating material, or through a so-called “end-point royalty” from the grower, under 
contractual terms defined by the volume of harvested product. It is therefore of primordial 
importance for farmers to be aware of the limitations surrounding the re-use of protected material, 
and challenge them if need be. In 2012, Brazilian farmers brought together as a consortium of 
syndicates, have successfully and very vocally sued Monsanto for two point two billion of unfair 
royalty collection on the basis of its technology use agreements that were linked to technology 
that was no longer under patent protection1610. However, this particular scenario is not as likely to 
occur as the collection of dueful royalties under license agreements. The recourse to such lawful 
contracts nonetheless does bear negative effects on growers, especially smaller-scaled ones. In this 
context, the challenge to be addressed is to assess whether contracts can annihilate or diminish the 
scope of the farmers’ privilege provided for in national legislation or farmers’ rights? On the 
flipside, could the farmers’ privilege warranted by national legislation be seen as a prerogative 
limiting contractual autonomy? Could the international biodiversity PGRFA public domain and 
the consecration of farmers’ rights in the ITPGRFA also serve the same purpose? The answer to 
the latter question is most probably to be framed negatively, as the content of article 9 of the 
ITPGRFA, as aforementioned, has not been considered to bear any direct effect in the European 
legal order, and its conditional nature would prevent such conclusion to be drawn in other legal 
orders as well.  
The former interrogation stands therefore at the core of establishing possible limits to contractual 
freedom when it comes to the collection of royalties on farm-saved-seed. To counteract the 
detrimental effect of contractual extensions of royalty collection on the scope of the farmers’ 
privilege, certain national legislative instruments have introduced interesting provisions into their 
plant variety protection laws. This has been the case of Switzerland, where, according to article 8 
of the Swiss federal plant variety protection law:  
“any agreement which restricts or annuls the exceptions to the right to protection for the 
varieties referred to in art. 6 and 7 [which relate to the farmers privilege] shall be deemed 
to be null and void”.  
In the absence of legislative amendment, alternative arguments have been put forward. The very 
active farmers’ organisation Via Campesina states that the “legal basis for contracts allowing for 
vertical integration in the supply chain is dubious and may not comply with the UPOV 
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 Convention, in particular with the principle of exhaustion of the breeder’s right”1611. However, 
the turn taken in the interpretation of the principle of exhaustion in patents granted on self-
replicating material does not present itself as a good omen to allow it to be used so as to limit 
contractual autonomy and allow farm seed saving. The exhaustion of patent and plant variety 
protection, especially the United States’ judiciary’s approach in patent rights indeed today rather 
present a major hurdle that restricts the actions of mass selectors. In 2006, the Federal Circuit
1612
 
was asked to consider by a Mississipi farmer, Mitchell Struggs, whether Monsanto’s practice with 
regards to the replanting of seeds constituted patent misuse, or could be covered by the patent 
exhaustion doctrine.  Struggs argued that the contractual license restrictions imposed by Monsanto 
on both seed distributors and growers impermissibly broadened the scope of exclusive rights 
awarded through patent protection. The Court held for the technology developer, as it considered 
that "applying the first sale doctrine to subsequent generations of self-replicating technology 
would eviscerate the rights of the patent holder”, and sided with Monsanto, “as the new seeds 
grown from the original batch had never been sold”.  
The ruling was applauded by some commentators, who argued : 
« A Federal Circuit holding that patent exhaustion eliminated Monsanto's rights to future 
generations of seed would have significantly harmed incentives for investment in self-
replicating technology and likely encouraged the use of genetic restriction technologies, 
thus shifting control of intellectual property rights out of the hands of the public and into 
the hands of private entities. […] While it is true that limiting the doctrine of patent 
exhaustion and prohibiting seed saving leads to higher prices, this economic argument 
focuses exclusively on the economic position of the farmer and completely ignores the 
larger economic framework in which many other parties play a role. While it may be 
beneficial in the short-term for the farmer to exact the most profits from his crops by means 
of saving seed, Monsanto and similar companies need the broader scope of rights to profit 
from their investment »1613. 
This approach is held of great value for technology developers since « contract law does not 
provide patentees recourse against unauthorised downstream users of second-generation seed, who 
are not in privity with the parties to the license and technology agreement »1614. However, others 
recalled : 
« What is an unequivocally good decision for intellectual property rights holders is not 
necessarily in the best interest of society as a whole. Considering the effects of Monsanto’s 
no-replant policy on the agricultural industry, on farmers, and on consumers _held here to 
be within the bounds of Monsanto’s patent rights_, [...] Congress will likely need to 
respond to allegations of unfairness regarding the benefits conferred upon biotechnology 
patent holders by this decision »1615. 
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This does not seem to be the case yet. Indeed, the aforementioned most recent and very similar 
Bowman ruling held the patent exhaustion doctrine to be inapplicable for self-replicating 
technologies1616. One possible interpretation that could be brought to the table to allow for patent 
exhaustion to play a role in the continuity of certain seed saving practices is to construct the 
actions of Hugh Bowman as “impermissible making”. Indeed, one could argue that it is when he 
“sprayed his commodity crop with herbicides with the intent of creating glyphosate-resistant seeds 
[that] he impermissibly constructed the patented article”1617. Had he not used such practice directly 
linked to the patented element, he would have arguably not recreated the product, thereby 
exhausting patent protection. However, the stretch is not likely to be made, neither in the United 
States, nor in the European Union.  
Arguably, mass selectors pursuing their activities in the latter jurisdiction will not be adversely 
affected by this stretched understanding of the bundle of patent rights in self-replicating 
technologies, in light of the farmers’ privilege, but also the aforementioned purpose-bound 
protection awarded in its realms. In the European legal order, the issue of exhaustion has been 
directly addressed by Article 10 of the aforementioned Biotechnology Directive 98/44/EC, which 
contains in effect a standard exhaustion of rights provision, applying the Silhouette/Davidoff 
ruling of the European Court of Justice1618, has also aligned itself to the principles of exhaustion 
prevailing in plant variety protection1619:  
“The protection referred to in Articles 8 and 9 shall not extend to biological material 
obtained from the propagation or multiplication of biological material placed on the 
market in the territory of a Member State by the holder of the patent or with his consent, 
where the multiplication or propagation necessarily results from the application for which 
the biological material was marketed, provided that the material obtained is not 
subsequently used for other propagation or multiplication” (Art.10, Directive 98/48/EC). 
This provisions, along with other articles of the Biotech Directive relatin to the scope of protection 
in biotechnological inventions, provide for instance the basis of the German Patent Law’s Article 
9c, which purposefully states that a farmer who has produced second generation seeds may 
continue to use them for replication in his own business, as long as this use matches the purpose 
for which the seeds were originally marketed, subject to reasonable compensation mirroring the 
farmers’ privilege in UPOV 1991 compliant plant variety protection1620.  
Faced with the wide-reaching intellectual property titles that accompany improved plant varieties, 
the range of action of mass selectors to informally continue saving and exchanging seeds had been 
substantially reduced. Even though the challenge goes beyond farmers’ capacity to innovate or 
conserve biodiversity and tackles also deeper socio-economic concerns, a number of mechanisms 
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 found within the IPR system can be adequately used to restore the lost balance. The 
quintessential flexibility that farmers need to be able to rely on relates to the so-called farmers’ 
privilege, which not only perdures age-old traditions, but may also counterbalance the need for 
technology and variety developers to recoup their investment. A clearer farmers’ privilege, even, if 
need be, accompanied by reasonable yet distinctly established compensation for larger sized 
growers, could indeed level out the impediments of aggressive contractual royalty collection and 
an extensive protection scope striving to go beyond harvested material and the principles of 
exhaustion of rights. 
14.3. Fighting Misappropriation, Protecting Landraces and Traditional Knowledge 
The recourse to seed saving of protected improved varieties cannot sustain the farmers’ innovation 
model in its own, even though better clarity on the contours of farmers’ privilege would definitely 
contribute at encouraging seed saving and exchange networks by levelling fears of prosecution. 
Indeed, “the cost advantage of saving seed is eroded by the deterioration of saved seed, causing 
yield losses over time”1621. The mere possibility to use improved seeds does not adequately foster 
mass selection efforts, which rely on observations for mass selection of individuals or populations 
and not so much on deliberate crosses between varieties, where improved germplasm shows its 
best potential. Even though improved farm-saved-seed is of tremendous importance in terms of 
subsistence, this solution cannot in any case be viewed as sufficient enough to foster innovation on 
farm and maintain exchange networks built around non-proprietary varieties. This is why legal and 
institutional solutions ought to be carved in order to nurture mass selection innovation, and protect 
its products against all kinds of misappropriation that might be operated by third parties without 
compensation. Such need is transcribed in the new PGRFA public domain enshrined in 
international biodiversity law, through the obligation to protect traditional knowledge, ensure the 
continuity of farmers’ rights, and at last ensure that the benefits arising from the use of genetic 
resources are shared equitably. However, the main question at stake here lies in a more global 
debate on the approach through which the international consecration of traditional knowledge and 
farmers’ rights should operate at the national level. In this context, two opposing streams confront 
each other, especially when its implementation is viewed in a purely Western oriented intellectual 
property rights understanding:  
“Restricting ownership of [traditional] knowledge and placing it in the public domain 
because there has been no easily identifiable “original” contribution”, which “may simply 
be a different form of effrontery [or] refusing to recognise traditional knowledge holders’ 
intellectual property interests as valid merely because to do so conflicts with the received 
wisdom of western intellectual property systems.” If we consider that “the aims of 
intellectual property are confined to those customarily recognised by the western systems – 
preserving democratic participation in the creation of meaning, fostering creative output for 
public consumption and rewarding creators – then the property interests of traditional 
knowledge holders apparently must yield before them. If however, we expand the goals to 
include distributive justice for traditional knowledge holders and acknowledge the ways in 
which the structure of western intellectual property systems prevents the economically 
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disadvantaged from realising such goals, then recognising new forms of property in 
traditional knowledge may be appropriate”1622. 
Whichever understanding prevails, the vital role of seed exchange networks and related farmer 
communities ought to be recognised as contributors to the distributive equity goals of international 
biodiversity law that aim to correct the “ecological debt” of follow-on plant genetic resource users. 
This acknowledgement has today come a long way, and takes centerstage on the desks of 
international and national IP policy-makers. While legislative drafting is under prolific way before 
the World Intellectual Property Organisation1623, underlying doctrinal debates have on the one hand 
tried to determine how existing intellectual property titles may accommodate the issue of 
misappropriation through their inherent protection criteria and other mechanisms, in a “defensive 
protection” mindset. They have on the other hand also tried to determine how to best protect the 
results of mass selection and correlated information as such in order to trigger compensation, 
either through traditional IPR schemes, or more innovative approaches to collective rights and 
liability rules, enscribed in a “positive protection” approach.  
14.3.1. Acting on the validity of intellectual property titles 
The most straightforward means of action to ensure that landraces or low-input plant varieties are 
protected against misappropriation is to use the existing flexibilities of the IPR system with 
regards to the validity of protection titles. This entails two different yet compatible solutions, 
regarding first the assessment of novelty and prior art or common knowledge in plant variety and 
patent applications, and second the potential recourse to a disclosure of origin in such applications, 
either to defy the gauge of novelty, or to trigger parallel civil liability procedures under 
biodiversity legislation.  
Tackling novelty and inventive step 
As aforementioned, the gauges of novelty and inventive step (or non-obviousness) that need to be 
taken into account in patent applications, just as the novelty and common knowledge thresholds 
that generally open up UPOV-like plant variety protection, seldom encompass an exhaustive 
analysis of existing landrace populations and associated knowledge. A number of practical 
solutions have been advocated to cater such limitation, whether entirely self-regulatory or 
warranting formal intervention vis-à-vis the interpretation and implementation of applicable 
protection standards. With regards to the latter, it has been argued that 
“The novelty requirement should be carefully defined under national laws so as to avoid 
the misappropriation of traditional knowledge or knowledge that is already in the public 
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 domain. Such definitions could involve the inclusion of all public domain knowledge – 
national and international – within the notion of prior art so as to avoid, for example, the 
use of prior art from a foreign country being used as the basis for a patent application.”1624 
It is in this context that large campaigns have, often quite successfully, been launched by farmers’ 
organisations or non-governmental organisations dedicated to environmental conservation or food 
security and equality issues. The distributional impulses of seed exchange networks have also 
transpired into the legal arena, whether in patent follow-up and opposition procedures or the 
establishment of traditional knowledge logs. Biopiracy and misappropriation claims have found 
an important echo in contemporary international law, and also in the actions of seed exchange 
networks, which have actively fought against the misappropriation of their products and 
knowledge. Biopiracy campaigns were for instance led by the Indian Navdanya
1625
 against patents 
granted by the European Patent Office for the fungicidal properties of the neem tree, several 
characteristics and breeding methods for basmati rice and the traditional Indian “Nap Hal” wheat 
variety. These campaigns have infamously led the Office to revoke or make serious amendments 
to these prior art violating patents respectively in 2000, 2001 and 2004. Another representative 
case relates to turmeric, for the healing properties of which were patented in the United States in 
1995 by two expatriate Indians working at the University of Mississippi Medical Centre. The 
Indian Council for Scientific and Industrial Research (CSIR) filed a case with the US Patent Office 
challenging the patent on the grounds of "prior art", proving existing public knowledge through 
written documentation claiming traditional wisdom in an ancient Sanskrit text and a paper 
published in 1953 in the Journal of the Indian Medical Association
1626
. The patent was thereon 
cancelled by US Patent Office, along with several other applications that were pending for 
turmeric. Let us also recall the aforementioned Xa21 patented resistance gene from a variety 
developed by IRRI on the basis of traditional knowledge held by Malian communities. In this 
particular case, the UC Davis, who had patented the Xa21 resistance gene, established an 
International Fund for Plant Genetic Resources. The lump sum payments reached 52.000 USD for 
the first company and 30.000 USD for the second
1627
. This mechanism allowed the contribution of 
a traditional rice variety identified and conserved in Mali, which was later developed into a 
uniform cultivar by IRRI, which contained a patented resistance gene, to be taken into account in 
the complete life-cycle of the variety. A recent controversy is today shaking the European Patent 
Office, with regards to a patent (EP 2140023) granted to Syngenta on 8
th
 May 2013 for “insect-
resistant sweet pepper plants”, which were produced by crossing a wild pepper plant from Jamaica 
with commercially grown pepper plants, carrying the insect resistance attached to the wild variety. 
This move has triggered a European wide alliance regrouping thirty-two non-governmental farmer, 
breeder and environmental organisations from twenty-six countries to file an opposition to the 
patent1628. All aforementioned successfully litigated or readily initiated misappropriation cases 
show that the patent and PVP systems both provide for mechanisms that allow for 
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misappropriation cases to be redressed. Nonetheless, these challenges remain extremely onerous 
and cannot always be followed all the way through by all agrobiodiversity users, especially 
indigenous or precarious communities. Pakistani rice growers were for instance thwarted in 
September 1999 from challenging Rice Tec's patent on basmati rice when American lawyers 
demanded a deposit of 300,000 pounds to initiate proceedings
1629
.  
That is why additional means of pressuring wrongful titleholders need to be and have been drawn 
up in parallel. Situated solely within the realm of applicable exclusive IPR appropriation systems, 
self-regulatory attempts to protect what essentially covers a body of environmental knowledge 
held by indigenous communities have mostly been concerned by the establishment of listings that 
would serve as “novelty-defeating prior art”1630. Adding an obligation to screen prior art around 
the globe for patent offices, together with a mandatory acknowledgement of the source of the 
knowledge or just the material in question could in this regard facilitate the mechanism
1631
, even 
though its feasibility raises suspicions in terms of administrative burden and realism in a field 
where plant varieties are the result of hundreds of material crosses. Numerous initiatives are in this 
context found in India, which has been quite active with regards to traditional knowledge, 
especially because of its ancestral medicinal knowledge. Amongst these are the village-wise 
Community Biodiversity Registers (CBRs) that document all knowledge, innovations and 
practices, coupled with People’s Biodiversity Registers (PBRs) in different districts, or the 
Kalpavriksh: 
« The members of the Beej Bachao Aaandolan— (Save the Seeds) a network of local 
farmers, who have been involved for a number of years now in reviving and spreading 
indigenous crop diversity, actively collaborated with the Kalpavriksh members. By mutual 
agreement between Kalpavriksh and the villagers, it was decided that a copy of the register 
would be kept in the village and another copy would be kept by Kalpavriksh, and that all 
the information in the register can be used and distributed only with the consent and 
knowledge of the villagers »1632. 
Another prominent and very successful example relates to the infamous “Honey Bee Network”, 
established in 1988 as a “database backed by scouts who develop, sustain and reward grassroots 
innovators, without diminishing the value that the invention has for the inventor”1633. The premises 
upon which the network operates go beyond a traditional knowledge log, since it also has built-in 
benefit-sharing considerations and protective approaches.  
“First, people must be given credit for whatever knowledge they share with the network; 
they should not become anonymous. Second, the shared knowledge should be used only 
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 after the inventor has given his or her Prior Informed Consent; inventors have a right to 
know what we do with their knowledge. Third, inventors should be able to dip into the 
network’s shared knowledge through their own language; we should not require inventors 
to learn English in order to participate actively in the network. Finally, if we get any 
income, including a consultancy or award, through exchanging or disseminating the 
knowledge, some reasonable share of that income shouldgo back to the source”1634. 
Policy-makers have at times backed these initiatives. This has been the case of the Indian National 
Traditional Knowledge Library, which acts like a bridge between informal logs and patent 
examination offices. Active within the auspices of the Council of Scientific and Industrial 
Research, and overseen by multiple ministerial entities, it effectively translates local language in a 
format that is understandable and also very importantly searchable, for patent offices 
worldwide1635.  
Debating the disclosure of origin in IPR applications 
Using the conventional means to challenge patents has only been one side of the defensive 
strategies drawn up by indigenous and farmers’ communities’ advocates. A number of 
commentators and biodiversity rich countries also consider that the rights and obligations that have 
been assigned to the PGRFA public domain by the CBD warrant the disclosure of the origin of 
genetic material in intellectual property rights applications. However, a major point of discord in 
this specific topic relates to the strength to be awarded to such disclosure requirement. Indeed, it is 
not really clear whether such disclosure should be considered as an additional procedural 
obligation within patent or PVP applications, or whether its compliance should be effectively 
verified before the grant of exclusive titles, or whether it should be viewed in isolation of all 
intellectual property requirements. 
Most of currently applicable laws that have given room to the issue of “disclosure of origin” have 
approached it as an optional requirement that is not linked to patentability as such, especially 
in the “North”. In this context, recital 27 of the EU Biotech Directive 98/44/EC seems to establish 
such a moderate yet very much present consideration for the indication of origin in biodiversity-
related patent applications:  
“Whereas if an invention is based on biological material of plant or animal origin or if it 
uses such material, the patent application should, where appropriate, include information 
on the geographical origin of such material, if known; whereas this is without prejudice to 
the processing of patent applications or the validity of rights arising from granted patents” 
(EC Directive 98/44, recital 27). 
The binding power of recitals is heavily debated in doctrinal thought, as some consider their 
authority rests in their reproduction as articles within the adopted text itself, and others consider 
them binding unless they are trumped by overrinding considerations that would disallow their 
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implementation
1636
. National implementations of this recital are also very varied. For instance, the 
first Belgian bill drafted to ensure compliance with the EU Biotech Directive required that 
inventions related to biological material or any biological material obtained by a technical process 
should comply with the precepts of the CBD, even though the second draft dropped the idea in 
order to avoid “discrepancies in the legislation of Member States”1637. The Belgian patent law’s 
article 15 now prescribes applicants to include a statement on the geographical origin of the 
biological material of plant or animal origin on the basis of which the invention was developed, if 
known, making it merely a formal prerequisite sanctioned by the non-admissibility of the 
application until such statement is introduced
1638
.  
However, from the point of view of non-governmental organisations actively defending farmers 
and indigenous people’s rights, such moderate approach to disclosure does not go far enough, and 
disregards the new public domain enshrined in international biodiversity conservation law. 
Analysing the 2004 proposal to amend Swiss patent law, the Berne Declaration went on to state 
that  
“The true objective of the article should be to exclude from patent recognition any 
invention that is based on genetic resources or traditional knowledge acquired illegally, i.e. 
in violation of the provisions of the Convention on Biodiversity. Under CBD rules access 
to genetic resources always requires prior informed consent and an agreement for the 
equitable distribution of benefits derived from such resources”1639 (emphasis added).  
Considerable amendments would be required in international, European and national patent and 
plant variety protection legislation in order to implement this approach. Indeed, it would de facto 
lead to the adoption of an additional patentability requirement, the contours of which would have 
to be drafted very carefully so as to comply with the minimum standards approach set out by the 
TRIPS Agreement. A number of proposals have nonetheless been put forward, such as requesting 
“for inventions based on biological or genetic resources under Art. 2 of the CBD or on materials of 
human origin: a written declaration by the owner/user of resources confirming his prior informed 
consent and the conclusion of an agreement for reasonable compensation”1640. The 2002 
amendments operated on the Indian Patent Act mirror such comprehensive defensive mechanism 
triggered by disclosure requirements in filings. The country’s biodiversity law has indeed further 
constrained the grant of exclusive property rights, since any application “by whatever name called 
in or outside India for any invention based on any research or information on a biological resource 
obtained from India without obtaining the previous approval of the National Biodiversity 
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 Authority”1641 shall be excluded from patentability. This is also the case in South Africa, where 
the 2005 amendments warrants the applicants to “lodge with the registrar a statement in the 
prescribed manner stating whether or not the invention for which protection is claimed is based on 
or derived from an indigenous biological resource, genetic resources, or traditional knowledge 
[and further imposing] to furnish proof as to his or her title or authority to make use of the 
material”1642.  
The challenges of reconciling the two views, i.e. either seing disclosure as a mere declaration of 
source triggering civil liability proceedings under biodiversity legislation, or seeing disclosure as a 
means to ensure compliance within the IP systems themselves, triggering not only civil liability 
but also disallowing the grant of exclusive rights without proof of prior informed consent and 
mutually agreed terms, have profoundly tainted the ongoing debates before WIPO. Indeed, in the 
latest version of the draft articles on the protection of traditional knowledge, provisions 
regarding the scope of protection that are linked to origin disclosure are still in brackets, and 
reflect the general unease in balance-setting: 
The first option for Article 3 reads: [Member States]/[Contracting Parties]/[This instrument] 
[should]/[shall] confer(s) the following [exclusive] [collective] rights on the beneficiaries, 
as defined in Article 2: […] 
 (d) [to be informed of access to their traditional knowledge through a disclosure 
mechanism in intellectual property applications;]  
(d 
bis
) [require the mandatory disclosure of the identity of the traditional knowledge holders 
and the country of origin, as well as evidence of compliance with prior informed consent and 
benefit sharing requirements, in accordance with the national law or requirements of the 
country of origin in the procedure for the granting of intellectual property rights involving 
the use of their traditional knowledge.]  
While Option 2 more moderately reads: [[Member States]/[Contracting Parties] should provide 
[adequate and effective] legal, policy or administrative measures, as appropriate [and in 
accordance with national law], to:  
(a) discourage the unauthorised disclosure, use or other uses of [secret] [protected] 
traditional knowledge; 
(b) where [protected] traditional knowledge is knowingly used outside the traditional 
context: 
(i) [acknowledge the source of traditional knowledge and attribute its 
beneficiaries/holders/owners where known unless they decide otherwise]; […] 
 [(c)  facilitate the development of national traditional knowledge databases for the 
defensive protection of traditional knowledge; 
(d) facilitate, as appropriate, the creation, exchange and dissemination of, and access to, 
databases of genetic resources and traditional knowledge associated with genetic resources; 
(e) provide opposition measures that will allow third parties to dispute the validity of a 
patent by submitting prior art; 
                                                                    
 
1641
 The Authority may through this process impose benefit-sharing obligations on the applicant, ANTHONY TAUBMAN, 
"Genetic Resources," in Indigenous Heritage and Intellectual Property: Genetic Resources, Traditional Knowledge, 
and Folklore, ed. SILKE VON LEWINSKI, Kluwer Law International, 2008., p.247. 
1642
 Ibid., p.248.  
PART V. Adjustments and Solutions for Actor Groups 
 398 
Only time will tell which approach will finally prevail in international policy-making. It is 
however undeniable that a sound requirement for the disclosure of origin in IPR applications 
concerned with biological material or any biodiversity-related invention may contribute to 
defensively protect the fruits of mass selection efforts all around the world. Just as much as stricter 
stances on prior art and novelty, ideally backed by searchable and complete traditional knowledge 
and landrace registrars that could also double up as informational or technology exchange 
clearing-houses. The onus of farmers’ contribution to the conservation of biodiversity, coupled 
with the need to compensate for such contribution, has greatly flourished on account of the new 
boundaries of the PGRFA public domain carved by international biodiversity law. However, its 
relation with applicable exclusive IPR appropriation systems remains shaky and challenging, 
disallowing the efficiency of the defensive protection means against misappropriation. The 
adjusments proposed by farmers’ organisations or policy-makers indeed merely transcribe a 
growing propensity to protect what essentially covers a body of environmental knowledge held by 
indigenous communities through for instance listings that would serve as “novelty-defeating prior 
art”1643. Indeed, farmers’ knowledge cannot ever or extremely seldomly qualify as “state-of-the 
art” knowledge that opens the way to exclusive rights, thereby considerably devaluating local 
people’s innovations1644. The inherent shortcomings of such defensive stance, notwithstanding the 
lack of consensus amongst its possible reach, thus call for more pro-active actions.  
14.3.2. Protecting Traditional Knowledge  
Carving out protection rules in the form of “sui generis IPR style compensation rights” for the 
discovery of wild genetic material can effectively create the economic incentive needed for the 
preservation of the resources’ natural habitats, and also remedy the biopiracy and misappropriation 
concerns raised over the subsequent use of genetic resources by third parties without 
compensation
1645
. This option, when accompanied by a necessary rethinking of seed certification 
mechanisms, would effectively ensure the survival of the specific socio-technological context that 
is mass selection. In this context, the link that is maintained between traditional knowledge and the 
actions of mass selectors is anchored on an understanding of the former not solely as “age-old 
knowledge, where creativity and innovation are generally lacking, [but rather as] knowledge held 
and generated within ‘traditional’ societies”, inevitably adapting to the needs of new 
generations1646. This approach does not emphasise the “antique” nature of knowledge, but rather 
the way in which it is acquired and used, building on “the social process of learning and sharing 
knowledge”1647. Considering the inherently collective, informal, and also unproprietary nature of 
the knowledge developed by farming communities on environmental and agricultural aspects of 
plant varieties and ecosystems, it is quite difficult to find adequate room for its positive protection 
against misappropriation under a dominant exclusivity oriented property paradigm. While certain 
authors and policy-makers have tried to provide adequate room in existing IPR titles, other have 
tried to design new mechanisms to the same end.  
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 The traditional IPR route 
Focusing either on the “collective community”1648, or the “traditional”1649 aspect of protection 
mechanisms, or on an extension of “farmers’ rights” into a protective tool1650, law-makers need to 
considerably alter the thresholds that we are accustomed to seeing in informational protection tools 
if the IPR route is taken to positively protect landraces and associated traditional knowledge. 
Indeed, initial protection requirements, as well as the scope, nature and extent of the rights 
awarded and the management of these prerogatives by appropriate institutions, all need to be 
suited to accommodate traditional agricultural knowledge and farming systems
1651
. These sui 
generis regimes, which can legitimately be argued for under the TRIPS Agreement, provided they 
are “effective” when covering plant varieties, have not yet been developed a great deal by 
countries. Besides the inherent need for regulatory construction and policy-making capacity, this 
setback also plays on account of the conservatism pushed by the existence of the non-contentious 
UPOV system and the lack of reward for regulatory innovation in this field, the so-called “chilling 
effect” infusing status quo on potential collective rights1652.  
When taking the protection route of existing IPR-based protection mechanisms, one of the options 
held by farmers’ communities consists of relaxing the DUS requirements in seed certification 
legislation and in the UPOV system to allow for landrace protection and use. The International 
Law Association Committee on the International Law on Biotechnology in this regard suggests the 
creation of mechanisms facilitating access to international or national biological material 
collections for smallholders, and also "examining whether the UPOV system should be partly 
adapted and relaxed to allow protection of improved farmers' varieties that result from controlled 
on-farm breeding processes"
1653
. The recognition of biodiversity-related collective intellectual 
property rights in the hands of local communities has been pushed forward within the Indian legal 
order, through a system where property rights are granted on landraces yet shared with 
governmental authorities in an attempt to fill the gap in perception and ensure greater 
compliance
1654
. The 2001 Indian Act on the protection of plant varieties and farmers’ rights not 
only requires the declaration of origin of the variety accompanied by pedigree details, but also 
provides for rewards for the contribution of farmers to the development of improved varieties by 
allowing for PVP protection for farmers’ varieties. The 2001 Indian PVP Statute, allowing for the 
protection of farmers’ varieties in the first place, does in parallel also consider the situation where 
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an EDV would be derived from such a landrace, and triggers benefit-sharing obligations with non-
governmental organisations or individuals acting on behalf of a village or local community
1655
. 
There have been other attempts to protect traditional knowledge within existing IPR titles. Trying 
to adapt patents to farmers’ innovations has been slightly precarious. Nevertheless, commentators 
have argued that “second-tier” or “petty” patents may serve a parallel purpose in protecting 
innovations stemming from informal communities1656.  Designed as early as the 19
th
 century to 
address inventions that would not qualify for the strict boundaries of patent monopoly, as another 
case of legal hybrid, they reward “technical proficiency” but not the idea or process behind1657. 
Through its relaxed approach to the inventive step criteria, petty patents may recognise the worth 
in seeing a local variety protected, allowing “a given farmer or farmers to acquire a measure of 
control over follow-up innovations derived from their variety”1658. Other initiatives have also 
attempted to bring farmers’ innovations within the realm of intellectual property rights. Amongst 
these lies the infamous case of the Basmati rice, where the landrace originating from Northern 
India and Pakistan, is actively trying to be protected under Indian national legislation on 
geographical indications1659. However, geographical indications remain protection titles that are 
closely linked to quality and marketing policies. As a result, they grant protection solely against 
denominations that unduly use the indication. They do not in any means protect rightholders 
against the infusion of the genetic resources or knowledge in a research programme without 
compensation. Other proposals have a result tried to adapt the worlds of trademarks and 
geographical indications to biodiversity innovation, through for instance an alternative indigenous 
‘biocultural heritage indication’ (BCHI)1660. But this approach is also limited to the use of names as 
such, and not knowledge attached to the biological material. 
Furthermore, actors active in grassroots innovation have advocated more wide-scoped 
institutional solutions that would complement whichever protection mechanism is finally adopted 
at the international or national level. Indeed, just as much as public researchers and private plant 
breeders, mass selectors would benefit from information but also technology-exchange clearing-
houses. In this context,  
“SRISTI, the institutionalised extension of the Honey Bee Network, has evolved into a 
very forceful voice to protect the intellectual property rights of both individuals and 
communities. SRISTI has discussed many policy reform proposals at meetings of the 
World Intellectual Property Organization, and has campaigned for an International 
Network for Sustainable Technological Applications and Registration (INSTAR). Such a 
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 registry has yet to evolve. If implemented, however, this registry would allow people in 
one part of the world to learn from creative people in another part and would provide a 
low-cost clearinghouse for connecting innovations with investment and entrepreneurial 
support”1661. 
It should nonetheless be mentioned that grassroots innovations that are repertoried within the 
HoneyBee Network are mainly attributed to and claimed by individuals, which makes them more 
eligible or closer to patent protection1662. An element that is far too rarely present in the majority of 
activities involved in the development or maintenance of environmental and agricultural 
knowledge linked to biodiversity.  
Amending principles related to protectable subject matter in the strong property paradigm would 
imply far-reaching changes in rationale and attitude, notably because of the inherently variable, 
non-uniform and collective nature of farmers’ varieties1663. Indeed, the subject matter requirements 
of the existing strong-IPR approach relate to new and clearly distinguishable plant varieties, and 
thus “often cannot accommodate the contributions of individual farmers using more informal 
methods to select for better crops or sought-after plant characteristics”1664. Furthermore, even 
though the contribution of farmers’ varieties to the development of improved varieties by both 
public and private institutions is recognised, it remains extremely modest and is difficult to 
quantify. Indeed, science-based breeding does put the emphasis on crosses operated amongst elite 
cultivars, with known market successes, and advanced lines developed by public institutions
1665
. 
On the contrary, local cultivars are “in some ways always a work in progress, [which] include 
incremental contributions of group participants who are not easily defined as individuals”1666. The 
difficulty to allocate with exactitude a person’s or even a community’s contribution to the 
development of a farmers’ variety is the greatest challenge when attempting to design 
appropriation mechanisms to foster such development. The identification of appropriate 
communities or individuals that would raise proprietary claims remains tainted by “heroic 
assumptions” as to the feasibility of such endeavour, in light of the large and dispersed areas of 
production and development of traditional varieties
1667. Besides, as farmers’ varieties remain 
inherently local products that are highly unlikely to be commercialised even in neighboring 
countries or regions (unless the variety presents an extremely specific resistance that might save 
the day faced with unprecedented biotic or abiotic stresses like diseases), the IP realm might not be 
an adequate forum to address the issue of farmers’ innovation. In this context, “even the seemingly 
positive benefits of granting intellectual property rights to local communities may lead to 
unintended consequences”, not only with regards to the difficulties of assigning property rights to 
individuals or user groups, but also due to the fact that failed recognition of rights in too formal 
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environments may facilitate the appropriation of exclusivity by external actors at the end of the 
day1668. Furthermore, the aforementioned FAO Treaty’s recognition of “farmers’ rights”, to be 
viewed as a “retrospective equity” rather than economic incentive1669, would, if translated into an 
intellectual proprietary perspective, not generate all expected socially desirable returns. Indeed, it 
has been argued that stringent requirements on consent to use farmers’ varieties and compensate 
through licensing arrangements might very well adversely affect the development of new varieties 
by breeders
1670
. Not only would their returns be reduced, but they would also face restrictions on 
access to genetic material without the breeders’ exception included in PVP laws and patent 
legislation, when applicable.  
Alternative protection? Registrars, Liability regimes amd Institutional solutions 
In an attempt to responds to the inadequacies of exclusive or strong IP tools to protect the fruits of 
farmers’ innovation, other more collective minded tools have been put forward by different 
commentators and countries
1671
. Both in legal and realistic terms, advocates have voiced 
preference for environmental measures or rural development programs encompassing a plant 
diversity conservation and improvement angle
1672
. However, these solutions do not address the 
property regime of landraces and do not as a result bow down the challenge of misappropriation. 
That is why a number of alternative regimes, mostly in the form of liability rules, have been 
drawn up. These solutions build on the premise that the design of reciprocal liability rules might 
prove really effective in providing compensation to selectors in case their varieties are used in 
commercial breeding programs and subsequently marketed. This solution has been advocated for 
by numerous scholars1673, as it provides an efficient trade-off between the recognition of 
entitlement to mass selectors, and the continued conservation, use and exchange of 
agrobiodiversity in the inherently cumulative and interdependent realm of plant improvement.  
In this context, the aforementioned solution in seed marketing legislation, i.e. the constitution of a 
“light registry for farmers’ varieties”, could be used as a starting point of a minimalist liability 
rules regime. Landrace registrars may either bear a declarative nature, close to the 
aforementioned defensive protection mechanisms, or possess a “constitutive” nature, which 
attaches a number of exclusive rights to the registration process1674. The registry option could as a 
result provide not only a protection against misuse through official entitlement, but also may 
provide for a modest royalty rate to be forfeited by variety borrowers
1675, similar to the “equitable 
remuneration” perceived by patent or PVP right holders on farm-saved-seed. Taking due account 
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 of national or regional stages of rural and economic development, liability rules may effectively 
counter the trend to limit mass selectors’ activities to the realm of exceptions, reducing farmer’s 
privileges to a “basic trickle of rights”1676. Farmers’ communities may benefit from the 
establishment of a parallel regime for local varieties either in the form of a book log or a flexible 
national or regional register of in situ conservation of uncertified seed that could trigger a double-
tier liability regime. If a parallel ad hoc protection regime for uncertified farmer seeds is 
privileged, special attention should be given to its contours, especially with regard to equity but 
also feasibility concerns, not undermining conservation or innovation along the plant improvement 
pipeline. Indeed, protection should only concern varieties in themselves, and not extend to their 
genotype, as it should allow for the acknowledgement of the efforts lying behind mass selection, 
that are often collective, while also reflecting on the adequacy of the “exclusivity” approach within 
such communities, where open licensing and remuneration systems might prove better-fitted
1677
. 
Indeed, regulators should take notice that the allocation of exclusion rights to mass selectors 
refutes the rationale upon which this rather unique partially open innovation system is built.  
If such a compensatory liability regime is to be envisaged, this option would however also need to 
contemplate the tricky issues of designating the rightful interlocutor, addressing whether similarity 
or “substantial difference” thresholds should be established in the assessment of follow-on 
innovation, and whether litigation could be avoided through mediation mechanisms. It would also 
need to address whether compensation should be integrated into institutional frameworks such as 
participatory plant breeding schemes where contractual reward for subsequent commercial use 
could be envisaged at the start of the project. Parallel solutions for compensation, especially in the 
form of lump sum payment negotiations for contributions of traditional agricultural knowledge 
could in this regard be sought, as was the case for the contribution of a traditional rice variety 
identified and conserved in Mali, which was later developed into a uniform cultivar by IRRI, 
which contained a patented resistance gene
1678
. The compensatory angle of such reward regime 
might require an in-depth analysis of synergies with benefit-sharing obligations deriving mostly 
from international environmental but also agricultural legal instruments. In any case, this double-
tier liability regime would warrant the creation of a supranational organisation for collective 
rights’ interested in the use of the final product, monitoring the use of landraces and associated 
knowledge, such as (or within the auspices of) the Plant Variety or Seed Certification Offices that 
exist today.  
The participatory plant breeding approach also has, or could easily have, the benefit of 
apportioning clearer property rights in seed exchange and conservation initiatives. Indeed, 
those involved in mass selection rarely address issues of ownership, as they remain bound by the 
informal rules that surround exchange practices. As the aforementioned example of the Seed 
Savers Exchange and its black box deposit with links to the International Treaty shows, they might 
also be very averse in playing the rules of the game that is still felt as being dictated by the strong 
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IP paradigm. While this non-exclusive and elusive approach is commendable and inherent to all 
mass selection efforts, including those enscribed in low-input or organic marketing prospects, its 
also prevents selectors from maintaining associated knowledge and resources within the protected 
public domain that is built through property rights. Participatory plant breeding may serve in this 
context as a cooperative means to build adequate boundaries against the misappropriation of mass 
selection efforts, just as it has been viewed as an efficient prospect to build different PGRFA 
commons that reclaim a wider yet still adequately fenced public domain. Indeed, a number of 
commentators have referred to participatory plant breeding as a future “BioLinux”1679.  
“A biolinux model will also be based on the logic that farmers are both users and 
innovators of technology, coupled with the idea of Copyleft. A biolinux model can be 
applied for the development of plant varieties, agro machinery and sharing of information 
and knowledge. A biolinux model for a new variety developed using participatory plant 
breeding will be as follows. The variety will be made available with a GPL or a similar 
document explicitly stating rights and claims. The varieties will be in the public domain or 
covered under plant breeders’ rights without restricting the rights of others to experiment, 
innovate, share the seeds or exchange seeds. There will be no restriction on using this to 
develop new varieties or to experiment with but it is essential that the variety derived from 
this should also be available without any monopolistic claims and restrictions on further 
development.  
Implementing such an idea can be done in many ways. There can be an agency, which can 
coordinate such activities and act as an agency for bringing together breeders and farmers 
and for guiding farmers on aspects related to IPRs. There could be a common pool to 
which farmers can contribute and from which they can ask for samples; and this common 
pool of germ plasm can also exchange materials with others under Material Transfer 
Agreements (MTAs). There can be crop specific agencies which collect information, 
support innovations and provide support to breeders and farmers working in participatory 
plant breeding”1680. 
In this context, the exchanges of material within the community would be done through a 
standardised material transfer agreement, which, much like the aforementioned attempts to 
create open-source biotechnology spaces, could operate under terms similar to those of the Free 
Software Foundation’s Global Public License. Jack KLOPPENBURG argues for a mechanism 
building on the background of participatory plant breeding, where material from the germplasm 
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 pool would be transferred according to the terms of a standardised material transfer agreement, 
the “General Public License for Plant Germplasm” (GPLPG)1681: 
“To paraphrase the “four freedoms” specified by the Free Software Foundation, the 
GPLPG  establishes a legal framework within which farmers can maintain: 
1. The freedom to grow the seed, for any purpose. 
2. The freedom to study how the seed works, and adapt it to their needs. 
3. The freedom to redistribute the seed so they can help their neighbors.  
4. The freedom to improve the seed, and release improvements to the public, so that the 
whole community benefits.  
The flip side of these freedoms is responsibility (and under the GPLPG, the obligation) to 
grant others within the collectivity the same freedoms; no one is entitled to impose 
purposes on others or to restrict the range of uses to which seed might be put. In the face of 
increasing restrictions on their degrees of freedom to access and use seed – patents, PBRs 
[plant breeders’ rights]– application of the GPLPG offers a means for farmers to create a 
semi-autonomous, legally secured, “protected commons” in which they can once again 
work collectively to express the inventiveness that has historically so enriched the 
agronomic gene pool”1682. 
To this day, no such far-reaching and open source participatory plant-breeding project has been 
initiatied to the author’s knowledge. Nonetheless, associations such as MASIPAG, “Farmer-
Scientist Partnership for Development, Inc”, established in 1985 in the Philippines, have 
advocated this solution
1683
, and at times been viewed as the potential fora to try to create 
“Landrace Commons”. Comparing farmers’ active within the organisation to that of “hackers”, 
Boru DOUTHWAITE writes: 
“Some farmers are seed "hackers." Although their source code-the DNA coding-is closed 
to them, nature itself or human intervention generates new "hacks" by crosses and 
mutation, and farmers select hacks that they judge beneficial. The tantalising prospect 
opens up that [participatory plant breeding] might be able to capture the power of the 
"bazaar" development model in the same way that the open-source software movement 
has”1684. 
What is undoubtedly sure is that “the protected commons might seem attractive in some abstract 
future, but there is a severe threshold constraint to be overcome. A functional protected 
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commons capable of innovative and fecund production requires a significant population of 
participants and a stock of quality material on which to work”1685.  
Furthermore, as plant-related information is less easily codifiable than source code, it needs to rely 
on an established communications and information platform before seeing the light of day. It also 
more problematically needs a mechanism of “quality control” and dispute resolution mechanisms 
between various contributors and follow-on users1686. It is nonetheless just as evident that the 
development and support of participatory plant breeding is an immense step towards a major 
adjustment that would both recognise the contributions of mass selectors to overarching goals of 
conservation and sustainable use of agrobiodiversity, while also disallowing the misappropriation 
of landraces, associated genetic resources and knowledge by other actors, whether corporate or 
public. This major adjustment has the great advantage of remaining within the lines of the strong 
property paradigm, creating a “protected public domain oriented commons” possibly through a 
standard material transfer agreement, but it nonetheless supposes that enough flexibility is granted 
within such paradigm to allow for informal seed exchange to operate. Indeed, if practices 
embedded within participatory plant breeding or other institutional approaches are considered 
illegal, these solutions will be doomed to fail from their inception.  
The outlines of protection regimes for mass selection and landrace revival networks should be 
assessed in general terms but also with due regard to national specificities, in order to safeguard 
centuries-long seed-saving and exchange practices, distancing oneself from the reductionist 
perception that farmers merely cultivate biodiversity developed off-farm by breeders. National 
regulatory frameworks should in all accounts consider innovation stemming from mass selection 
as a parallel yet different (and not necessarily derogatory), seed-production scheme, raising 
different predicaments than dominant vertically integrated molecular plant breeding, and requiring 
incentives within a dual sui generis system for both modern and farmers’ varieties. 
CONCLUSIONS. Possible adjustments for actors involved in mass selection 
Seed exchange networks, both in their traditional and more modern forms, in developing and 
developed countries alike, clearly act in a common-property approach to the intangible world of 
genetic resources. They act in the clear absence of individualised or exclusive control over these 
resources and the information contained therein, but fence and control their diffusion through 
informal norms of conservation and exchange. Their informal regulation mechanisms, embedded 
in emerging practices and coping strategies, embrace, support and validate international 
sustainability and environmental justice norms alongside (and at times against) the rigid formal 
seed markets that unequivocally exclude them. While sustainability aspects are unanimously found 
in all small-scale farming or gardening coalitions, emphasis may be pointed either on the 
conservation of genetic resources (especially in the seed saver, gardener or organic farmer model), 
or on their use (chiefly in subsistence farmers’ informal networks and local seed markets). Farmers 
are also increasingly pushed to fight against misappropriation, praising by this means options to 
protect their traditional knowledge but also the genetic resources and landraces they conserve and 
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 develop. Throughout their struggles, they also strive to maintain their practices within the new 
boundaries of lawfulness. Within the more general framework of successful agrobiodiversity use, 
local small-scale innovation and production stemming from mass selection endeavours comes 
across as a necessity, in as much so as improved varieties stemming from plant breeding efforts. 
The regulatory framework should therefore reward innovation stemming from mass selection, as a 
parallel but different seed production scheme, raising different predicaments than the dominant 
vertically integrated molecular breeding innovators.  
Legislative action is absolutely needed to redress the suffocation of informal seed exchanges by 
restrictive compulsory seed legislation, and to a lesser extent also intellectual property laws. This 
necessity is quite a departure from the adjusments that have been identified for other actors of 
plant improvement, as it warrants clear and unescapable intervention from policy-makers. Self-
regulation cannot indeed suffice to replace legislative interference, which is a challenge that 
preoccupies mass selection more warily than other agrobiodiversity innovation actors. With 
regards to the impediments created on the actions of mass selectors by intellectual property rights, 
most can be addressed through the recognition of the so-called farmers’ privilege in both plant 
variety and patent protection, as is the case of the European Union. In the absence of such 
privilege, farmers’ ability to re-sow protected varieties or build on them will be significantly 
weakened by extensive scopes of protection reaching to harvested material and circumventing 
exhaustion.  
Some very welcomed interactions can nonetheless be identified within adjusments that attempt to 
redress forced illegality or misappropriation issues. For instance, a legal order that stays within the 
realms of compulsory certification so as to correct the inherent informational assymetries inherent 
to seed trade, can adjust its rules either by infusing a number of flexibilities or express derogations 
for informal seed exchange and even commercialisation, or by creating a parallel yet looser 
registrar not only for old conservation varieties but also new landraces. This log can afterwards be 
used so as to recognise the innovative contributions by mass selectors, within a liability rules 
scheme warranting compensation (or other kinds of benefit-sharing) if used by third parties in a 
research and development programme. This potential opportunity would nonetheless be lost if the 
issue of forced legality is merely addressed by voluntary marketing and labelling.  
Furthermore, the recognition of farmers’ contribution to agrobiodiversity-related knowledge and to 
the maintenance and development of genetic resources can also be achieved through alternative 
means. First, through the defensive stance of challenging patent applications for lack of novelty 
and prior art, either directly before patent and PVP offices or indirectly by the establishment of 
knowledge listings. Secondly, through the positive protection of ‘traditional knowledge’, either 
through relaxed and possibly more collective-minded intellectual property rights titles, or through 
flexible liability rules, possibly backed by institutions such as participatory plant breeding. 
 
 
 
 
 
PART V. Adjustments and Solutions for Actor Groups 
 408 
TRENDS SHORTCOMINGS 
SOCIAL INNOVATION, EMERGING PRACTICES and 
COPING STRATEGIES 
Self-regulation Beyond self-regulation 
Restrictive 
seed 
legislation 
Status as actors of 
plant improvement 
Redefine networks in a 
conservation and sustainable use 
context (access and conservation 
through cooperative exchange 
programmes) 
Rural development policies – 
Reputational index 
Illegality of activities 
Voluntary seed certification – 
truth marketing 
Outside of formal seed market 
Clear permissive stance in 
compulsory seed certification 
schemes:  
either through complete 
exceptions, derogations,  
or dual catalogue approaches 
IPR 
proliferati
on / 
extension 
Shrinking and 
nebulous farmers’ 
privilege 
 
Sui generis PVP protection 
outside UPOV - CoFab  
Farmers’ privilege in PVP and in 
patent legislation 
If royalty collection, not for 
selection, small-scale subsistence 
and legal certainty 
Fate of harvested 
material 
 
Farmers’ privilege in PVP and in 
patent legislation 
Exclusive 
individual 
rights 
Misappropriation of 
TK (Defensive) 
Challenging patents for lack of 
novelty 
Establishing Traditional 
Knowledge Logs 
Information/Technology 
Exchange Clearing Houses 
Strict prior art assessment in 
patent applications, reference to 
TK registrars in rules of 
procedures 
Support for registrars – official 
status 
Lack of protection of 
landraces and TK 
(protective) 
Participatory plant breeding with 
clearly apportioned property 
policy - 
Entry point of open-source plant 
germplasm movement and 
development 
Relaxed IPR titles, either PVP, 
petty patents or geographical 
indication 
Double-tier liability regime, 
possibly based on landrace 
registry or other 
variety/knowledge log 
FIG.8: Adjustments responding to the shortcomings faced by mass selectors confronted to the strong 
PGRFA property paradigm 
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PART V CONCLUSIONS. Adjustments to the strong property paradigm building on its 
flexibilities exploited through social innovation 
Numerous adjustments have been presented for the different needs of the different actors of plant 
improvement. The flexibilities that directly stem from the content of the strong property paradigm 
typically ask for greater regulatory intervention, requiring most of the time direct legislative 
amendments or other types of interventions from public authorities. They are entrenched in 
national legislative texts but nonetheless complexify the rules that govern agrobiodiversity 
management. Given the wide array of plant improvement actors and the major differences that 
separate their approaches to innovation, there are a number of evident but also indirect conflicts 
between the adjusments they have advocated. These problematic areas will have to be carefully 
studied and assessed by policy-makers and self-regulators, so as to allow them to make adequate 
choices responding to local, national or regional needs for economic development, social welfare 
and environmental conservation, in accordance with their own political priorities.  
Maintaining the farmers’ privilege in plant variety protection laws and infusing it within patent 
laws is essential to avoid the prosecution of mass selectors. However, if the privilege extends to 
far, it might impede the promotion of private plant breeding, since it may seriously reduce the 
promise of royalty collection that acts as the main incentive to protect plant varieties. That is why 
it is absolutely necessary to assess whether a liberticide approach to the farmers’ privilege will 
really foster farmers’ innovation, or whether it will act as recognition of customary and 
international principles of farm seed saving, supporting broader socio-economic, rather than purely 
innovation-related issues. In light of such assessment, it is essential for the balancing role of IPR 
regulation, to complement the privilege with moderate royalty payments, when faced with the 
latter diagnosis as to the purpose of the farmers’ privilege. In this context, negotiation-based 
collection institutions with fixed rates and complete transparency will support both the needs of 
smaller-scaled private plant breeders without flocks of lawyers, and also the wishes of farmers 
who replant protected seeds. Agreements between breeders and farmers organisations should 
nonetheless provision the payment of royalty to the effective sale of re-sown protected varieties, 
since the replanting should fall under the breeders’ exception if perpetrated solely for selection or 
conservation purposes.   
Even though liability rules embedded in the researchers’, breeders’, or farmers’ exceptions aim at 
clarifying the range of authorised uses by third parties, they may also ignite legal conflicts where 
those entities with greater legal stamina will likely be privileged. Disputes concerning the exact 
reach of prerogatives awarded to rights-holders are extremely likely to arise, questioning the 
ability of an untrained judiciary to settle complex rows. 
Conflicts between the need to protect landraces and associated traditional knowledge from 
misappropriation with a protective rather than defensive tactic may considerably restrict the 
PGRFA public domain that is essential for the conservation and sustainable use of 
agrobiodiversity. The protection regime carved in this context ought to provide as much diffusion 
rules as the patent and plant variety paradigms, and cannot be sustained on a solely sovereignty-
oriented perspective. Public researchers and private plant breeders must continue to have 
equitable access to those farmer varieties, as much as they have for improved germplasm. 
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But the picture we have drawn of plant improvement regulation is abolsutely not all gloomy. 
Synergies indeed also exist within the diverse range of adjustments advocated by social actors of 
agrobiodiversity innovation, either in their own sphere of action, or even better, vis-à-vis other 
plant improvement actors. These synergies could therefore constitute priorities of action for 
policy-makers and self-regulators, so as to allow positive strokes to ensure the conservation, 
sustainable use and equitable improvement of agrobiodiversity. A number of solutions and 
adjustments can be used to address several shortcomings that are experienced by a specific 
category of actors: 
Quite straightforwardly, public researchers may benefit doubly from less lenient patentability 
requirements, as such move would not only address the impediments arising from the enclosure of 
cumulative innovation (addressing anti-commons issues), it would also soothe the risks of 
misappropriation of public and traditional knowledge. In the same vein, compulsory or 
standardised licensing schemes may ease the need to reclaim the public goods dimension of public 
research, all the while providing a means to offset aggressive licensing practices that characterise 
the strong property paradigm.  
With regards to plant breeders, the quintessential adjustment needed remains a viably clear and 
efficient breeders’ exception, in both plant variety and patent protection, as this would address the 
many impediments felt by private breeders on account of aggressive licensing practices, all the 
while soothing the tensions linked to the misappropriation of public and traditional knowledge.  
Notwithstanding the delicate conflicting balance that stems from the recognition of the farmers’ 
privilege, this tool remains nonetheless an exemplary solution for mass selectors faced with 
growing IP titles. These actors fortunately also benefit from less controversial and “doubly 
beneficial” adjustments. Derogatory landrace and low-input plant variety registrars with relaxed 
requirements and few administrative burdens may indeed not only remove mass selectors from the 
dangerous realm of illegality, eliminating the Damocles sword threatening their existence, they 
may help them fight misappropriation. Within a well-articulated liability rules system, these 
registrars may also serve as a starting point to recognise and compensate both conservation and 
improvement efforts made by mass selectors, and upon which plant breeders have relied on, even 
if to a lesser degree than improved germplasm, easier to manipulate and acquire. They may also be 
used by PVP and patent offices to establish prior art and common knowledge in applications, 
effectively contributing to raising the bar of quality in awarded exclusive titles. Legal certainty 
over the possibility to use landraces will not only comply with the new PGRFA public domain 
enshrined in international biodiversity law, it will also address the shortcomings of the strong 
property paradigm itself, disregarding completely a whole range of plant improvement actors.    
More ambitiously, a number of adjustments may not only benefit one, but two, and even all 
three of agrobiodiversity innovation actors that have been left partially or completely outside of 
the strong property paradigm.  
For instance, the strict interpretations of patentability requirements, including wide prior art 
searches for molecular research tools, especially enabling technologies and nucleotide sequences, 
will not only benefit public researchers active in molecular biology or plant breeding, but also 
private plant breeders.  Indeed, most of the adjusments targeting the anti-commons created by 
the proliferation of patents and the aggressive licensing practices that accompany them will benefit 
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 both of these actors.  The creation of information clearing-houses falls within such win-win 
scenario, as would a technology exchange clearing-house that would manage to draft a common 
licensing or material transfer agreement with a thorough delineation of commercial and non-
commercial research and clear rights and obligations, that would be acceptable for both public and 
private technology providers and users. To a certain extent, both actors would also benefit from a 
loose yet explicitly contoured liability rule targeting research and development, which would need 
to include plant breeding.  
Another win-win situation for numerous agrobiodiversity innovation concerns the opportunity to 
create participatory plant breeding projects encompassing ex ante delineation of property rights, 
within a proprietary but preferably open mindset. The BioLinux rhetoric effectively merges the 
standard license based clearing-house and open biotechnology movements in both public 
biotechnology and plant breeding with participatory plant breeding opportunities, which would 
be profitable for public researchers, private plant breeders and mass selectors. Drawing a 
common license or material transfer agreement allocating ex ante the property rights of the 
decentralised plant innovation scheme, and delineating clear rights and obligations of participants, 
can be used to create a viable and efficient “commons” that would address the needs of all plant 
improvement actors. Not only does this scheme serve to address the communalism inherent to 
public research, it may also effectively fight misappropriation accusations that have tainted public 
research and private plant breeding, all the while additionally providing a means to “positively” 
protect and foster in situ biodiversity conservation and mass-selection based plant improvement, 
all the while addressing the socio-economic realities of subsistence farmers and the dilemma of 
orphan crops. 
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PART VI CONCLUSIONS  
We hope our modest attempt to trace back the evolution of the agrobiodiversity public domain and 
to thereon identify the practices that reclaim new boundaries towards sustainability and equity for 
all plant improvement actors will prove beneficial for doctrinal thought, but also for policy-makers 
and the users of plant genetic resources. The management and control of agricultural biodiversity 
is still very much a contemporary and extremely contentious issue. As mentioned in the 
introductory section to this thesis, the specific implementation of solutions to these issues will very 
much co-evolve with the strategic choices made by society, including but not limited to policy-
makers, with regards to the postulates of the agriculture of the future. These postulates, which will 
be determined in light of soaring population growth, resource scarcity, developmental divides and 
the changing climate, will indeed greatly impact the means and extent to which the shortcomings 
of the property paradigm will be redressed for the different categories of actors of plant 
improvement. This redress will nonetheless operate in a global context of “stark difference in 
economic interest between certain developing countries, in which the great bulk of PGR’s are 
found, and developed nations where the universities, biotech companies and life science concerns 
wishing to develop them are overwhelmingly located”1687. Indeed, all intellectual property rights 
legislation, which is inherently national, is carved by States so as to advance individual State 
objectives, while being influenced by the powerful actors of the scene that represent the largest 
portions of their national or regional plant improvement landscapes1688.  
Our analysis leads us to an inevitable need to recognise the role played by other arguments, 
beyond the social and legal arguments developed in this thesis, when making regulatory decisions. 
It also leads us to recognise the inequitable and conflictious power plays and influence games that 
lie behind the use of flexibilities offered by intellectual property rights, and the extent to which a 
broader diversity of plant improvement actors finds voice and weight in policy negotiations. 
Furthermore, broader contextual values and collective decisions will play a role in the choice of 
the most adequate framework in a given society, such as the broader social choices to be made in 
order to tackle the challenges posed by climate change for world food security. These challenges 
can lead to opt for increased investments in transgenetic technologies on the one hand, or in global 
collaborations for experimental low-input breeding on the other. Our argumentation does not 
advocate one or another of these positions, but this short disclaimer does point to the fact that the 
choice of the most optimal regulatory regime for agricultural biodiversity in a given society will 
depend on such deeper democratic debate, beyond the technical analysis of the legal, social and 
economic rationales alone. Indeed, our analysis has the primary purpose of presenting a toolbox 
comprised of a wide array of TRIPS-compliant flexibilities that can be used in the enactment of 
national laws in order to not only ensure the respect of international environmental legal 
obligations, but also mend the shortcomings that may be experienced by certain actors of plant 
improvement. Its genuine contribution lies in its grounding on existing social organisational 
initiatives stemming from different only socio-technological contexts of plant improvement, which 
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 recalls and highlights that legal regimes tailored to foster innovation apply to extremely different 
realities, which should be acknowledged when the policy bargaining operates.  
Short overview of the results of our research 
Agrobiodiversity innovation is profoundly linked with basic human rights to food, development or 
to a healthy environment, and constitutes the elementary livelihood of both small-scale and 
industrialised farmers. Its products, plant varieties, and the information contained therein, present 
characteristics of public goods. Their direct and indirect social and economic impacts cannot be 
minimised. Their diffusion, both within and far from the innovation frontier is thus of primordial 
importance. Private appropriation presents in this context great risks, just as much as it has been 
viewed a necessity. Improperly balanced, exclusiveness, whether in the form of intellectual 
property or sovereign rights, can prevent the diffusion of innovative biological materials, products 
and processes, and inevitably instigate the under-production of socially beneficial innovation. 
Informational exclusive rights may produce diffusional challenges by considerably raising the cost 
of accessing technology. By conditioning research and development activities to the right holders' 
authorisation and to often arduous negotiations, it may wither both public and private plant 
breeders’ sacrosanct freedom to operate in this inherently cumulative and incremental innovation 
context. It also may undermine the production of international knowledge goods possessing less 
certain commercially and socially lucrative value per se. In this highly pressurised context, the 
boundaries of the PGRFA public domain need to reflect the institutional, social, economic and 
legal needs of all actors involved in plant improvement, just as it needs to uphold its sustainable 
use and conservation for present and future generations. These boundaries need to adjust to 
regional, national and local specificities.  
In this context, our analysis merely provides concrete yet flexible guidance to operate much 
needed adjustments within the strong intellectual property paradigm that has been enshrined in 
world trade law. It instigates means to revive the notional balance of the public and private 
domains in intellectual property laws, ever since their first enshrinement in the 16
th
 century, taking 
into account the technological strides but also legal changes that influence the operations of all 
plant improvement actors. The issue of patenting of life forms took central stage in the policy 
agendas of industrialised countries that trail-blased the Gene Revolution. This proprietary 
instrument is today extensively used to control molecular research tools and processes that are 
later used to control plant hybridisation efforts. It is also used to protect those products and 
processes that constitute the nucleus or the outcome of DNA recombination. While the plant 
variety protection system has rather been viewed as a means to protect small advances in plant 
breeding at the variety level, patent regimes tentatively offer adequate protection for big leaps in 
technological achievements
1689
. Patents offer protection for inventions broader than mere plant 
varieties and provide a stronger array of prerogatives. As a result, they enable the recovery of 
important research and development investment costs, while not completely obliterating 
technology transfer prospects. Provided minimum protection standards are complied with, the 
extent and restrictions attached to patentability requirements, as well as the range of prerogatives 
allowing right holders to exclude third parties to use protected inventions, are all settled in national 
statutory and jurisprudential choices. De lege rata analysis shows that there are important 
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differences from one legal tradition to the other, all the while demonstrating that patentability 
standards had to steadily be lowered in order to accept biotechnology and biological research tools 
within the realms of the patent paradigm
1690
. Mainly stemming from concerns with regards to the 
patenting of life forms, including but not limited to agrobiodiversity, the limits that have 
traditionally thereby put upon the intellectual protection paradigm have not sufficed to tone the 
controversies surrounding patents in plant improvement science down. Opponents still highlight 
moral dogmatic grounds, or the controversial scale of human intervention in the resulting final 
production of agrobiodiversity arguments to corroborate their standpoint
1691
.  
Our research in this sense has attempted to enshrine the boundaries of sound public domain 
elements of intellectual property law in their context of application, for each actor of plant 
improvement and also each specific type of innovation that is produced within a given legal order. 
The aim of this exercise is to ultimately show how the surprising lack of flexibility that national 
entities have shown in the implementation of the TRIPS-propelled agrobiodiversity property 
paradigm is not an immutable reality. Furthermore, it also strives to show that a definite shift of 
the paradigm has been advocated and sometimes successfully obtained by a plethora of actors 
actually involved in plant improvement. The delicate question that arises is to determine when 
these emerging practices and strategies may be considered strong or wide enough to warrant legal 
amendments or positive public policy changes. We are in our analysis not so much disposed to 
determine an eventual threshold that would trigger effective changes to the property paradigm 
outside of proven regulatory intervention. Indeed, as our analysis remains based on the 
documented shortcomings of the latter on certain agrobiodiversity users, we rather show that the 
regime shifting towards a looser public domain is already operating to different extents around the 
world, and that the “international environmental law public domain” is already espoused by certain 
categories of plant innovation actors and States. This espousal unescapably alters the balance of 
the strong property paradigm, pushing its metrical ticks closer to the pulse of overlooked plant 
improvers, especially farmer-selectors.  
The numerous strategies and tools that we have highlighted in the course of this study all regain 
different public domains to different extents. Indeed, some address the ontological domain, as for 
instance the push for less lenient patentability requirements of novelty and non-obviousness by 
public researchers, or for more established prior art searches by mass selectors. Other adjustments 
are rather concerned with the regulatory public domain, as for instance the debates on the reach of 
“essentially biological products and processes” exceptions by public researchers, the different 
exceptional use conditions warranted to researchers, breeders and farmers, or the discourse on 
harvested material and exhaustion principles. At last, most (if not all) of the institutional solutions 
that have been drawn up or proposed in fact represent a consented public domain, whether in the 
form of humanitarian or standard licensing practices, other forms of cooperative patent pooling, 
such as the establishment of technology exchange clearing-house. These last attempts, coupled 
with other institutional alternatives such as compensatory liability regimes, represent prime 
examples of “positive commons”, reshaping the agrobiodiversity public domain through another 
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 understanding of the allocation of rights between agrobiodiversity users. The innovative means 
through which these agrobiodiversity users address the dominant paradigm’s shortcomings should 
in this sense be viewed as solutions to adjust the paradigm and retrieve its inherent balance to the 
extent favoured or allowed by political will. This approach bears the advantage of being flexible 
but also high adaptable to national or local conditions and circumstances. It allows legislators and 
policy-makers to take into account the weight, strength and presence of relevant stakeholders in 
their own range of regulatory action. It allows the adoption of public policy to materially enhance 
the social welfare inducing public domain uses, favouring a wider domain to the uses of molecular 
biologists, plant breeders or farmers, or all of them to different extents. The absence of such 
threshold for a new property paradigm stems from the variety of options available to reclaim the 
public domain. Opening such domain in all fronts and thus applying all potentially balancing and 
welfare inducing solutions indeed bears the risk of undermining the rationale for the grant of 
intellectual property rights and occasioning the inherent challenges to produce public goods. 
Indeed, if both patents and plant variety rights become completely obsolete and non-favourable to 
industry players, developed technologies and precious information will not be disclosed or at least 
be available to a very lucky few, and therefore end up being lost to secrecy. In the same vein, both 
intellectual property rights and the sovereignty-ladden enclosing discourses of international 
biodiversity law, may shrink the different public domains to their weakest, hampering greatly not 
only with the impetus of general interest needed for innovative brilliance, but also overarching 
goals of sustainability and environmental conservation. 
Cross-cutting disciplines and further research 
Grounded primarily in its initial study of the PGRFA public domain defined in the framework of 
intellectual property and genetic resources law, our analysis may benefit from the further 
exploitation of other fields of legal scholarship and scholarly domains in order to seek means to 
carve a balanced, sustainable and equitable public domain. It could benefit from evident synergies 
or contrasts to better assist legislators in achieving lost equilibriums, and possibly address the 
conflicts that arise between different adjusments serving the needs of different plant improvement 
actors. With regards to legal analysis as such, the most prominent of these fields are civil, 
competition and human rights law. Even if these fields do not target the property regime of 
agrobiodiversity as such, they indeed may have an indirect yet efficient effect on public domain 
uses that need to be reclaimed by all actors faced with inadequate restrictions on their innovation 
actions. Furthermore, our analysis could also perhaps benefit from quantitative studies trying to 
assess the efficiency and need of advocated solutions, taking less traditional routes within law and 
economics analysis, accounting thoroughly for actor preferences and public good production 
opportunities. 
Civil law principles, especially those related to torts and contracts interpretation may, and have 
been used to redress the shortcomings of the property paradigm. These principles include the 
notions of “abuse of rights” or “liability thresholds”, which have been used mostly to the benefit of 
mass selectors, which are faced with restrictive seed production contracts. Both national and 
European case law has been steadily building around civil law principles to interpret obligations 
surrounding the farmers’ privilege in PVP legislation, balancing the interests of farmers and those 
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of the breeders, with those human rights to privacy and avoiding an abuse of rights on all accounts. 
As aforementioned, the interlocutory ruling of the tribunal of commerce of Huy, Belgium given on 
18 June 2004
1692
 has for instance considered that the information on farm-saved seed ought to be 
obtained through or with the consent of the growers. This assertion is based on several grounds. 
First it strives to protect the farmers’ interests residing in the avoidance of systematic invoicing for 
seeds that are saved but not used for sowing or multiplication purposes. But it also strives to avoid 
a potential abuse of rights by eluding other available remedies for information collection, without 
any indication as to the possible infringement of its rights, as asserted by the European Court of 
Justice in Schulin vs. Saatgut
1693
.  
“The provisions of the sixth indent of Article 14(3) of Regulation No 2100/94 on 
Community plant variety rights in conjunction with Article 8 of Commission Regulation 
No 1768/95 implementing rules on the agricultural exemption provided for in Article 14(3) 
of Regulation No 2100/94 cannot be construed as meaning that the holder of a Community 
plant variety right can require a farmer to provide the information specified in those 
provisions where there is no indication that the farmer has used or will use, for propagating 
purposes in the field, on his own holding, the product of the harvest obtained by planting, 
on his own holding, propagating material of a variety other than a hybrid or synthetic 
variety which is covered by that right and belongs to one of the agricultural plant species”. 
(para. 72, ECJ, Christian Schulin vs. Saatgut).  
Furthermore, the reluctance to adopt formal farmers’ privileges in patent laws themselves could 
also be overturned through jurisprudential liability thresholds, especially if national plant-
breeders’ rights recognise growers’ right to save and exchange seeds, as established before 
Canadian courts. Indeed, even though the aforementioned patent-infringing canola farmer could 
not benefit from the privilege enshrined in PVP legislation to save the seed, monetary 
compensation deriving from the infringement was overturned on the grounds that no financial or 
other benefit was generated by the technology
1694
. This argument could fuel the debate on the 
liability thresholds that might be introduced for re-use conditions. 
Competition law issues arise when faced with oligopolistic markets with monopolistic tendencies 
such as the biotech traits market, but also in light of joint venture and research partnerships, patent 
pools, or any other institutional arrangements that would merge existing or future intellectual 
property titles. “Antitrust concerns may arise if the industry is concentrated and the patent pool 
members account for a substantial share of sales or output in the industry or there are high barriers 
to entry in the market”1695. Furthermore, a patentee “may not impose the condition to 
impermissibly broaden the physical or temporal scope of the patent grant with anticompetitive 
effect, as such a broadening constitutes patent misuse”1696. The TRIPS Agreement itself concedes 
ample room for competition law boundaries to be used as a means to reclaim a public domain 
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 shrunk by the incumbents of artificial monopoly rights. Indeed, its article 8.2 recognises the need 
to adopt appropriate measures to disallow  
“practices which adversely affect the transfer of technology”, while it also further “controls 
the anti-competitive practices in voluntary licenses”, which “may have adverse effects on 
trade and impede [not only] the transfer [but also] the dissemination of technology” in its 
article 40.  
Following a case-by-case assessment of restrictive practices in order to determine whether these 
constitute “an abuse of intellectual property rights” with “an adverse effect on competition in the 
relevant market”, signatories of the Agreement can “establish policies to deal with technology 
pricing and other aspects of technology transfer transactions”, without a strong reified code 
establishing clear criteria for the assessment that needs to operate at national level
1697
.   
More concretely, competition law principles and rules may on the one hand hinder the adjustments 
advocated within the intellectual property paradigm, just as they may on the other hand, effectively 
provide for much needed adjustments themselves. With regards to the latter impediments that 
may be created by anti-trust principles on the IPR flexibilities, the most obvious ones relate to the 
strict conditions that surround the establishment of patent pools and to a certain extent clearing-
houses, especially those functioning around standardised licenses. On the other side of the 
spectrum, anti-trust defences may also usefully be advocated for in patent infringement disputes, 
even though the efficiency of such defences has been put to test with the shift towards stronger 
patent protection and greater sympathy towards licensing1698.  Notwithstanding its possibly limited 
reach, claims of “unfair business practices” may be successfully advocated when faced with 
monopoly extending practices such as “reach-through licensing” or other abusive clauses such as 
the “assign-back” or “exclusive grant-brank” provisions that may unlawfully limit the diffusion of 
innovations1699. Other scholars have advocated the use of the “essential facility theory” to 
overcome the hurdles imposed on downstream innovators by the upstream patenting of essential 
enabling technologies such as genetic sequences1700, even though Courts, and especially the 
European Court of Justice, have been reluctant to declare refusals to license as abusive in non-
exceptional circumstances1701.  
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Human rights instruments, if carefully understood and weighed, may also bring about a range of 
solutions to the issues faced by the aforementioned agrobiodiversity actors. Even though they are 
designed to pursue different objectives, both human rights and intellectual property rights have 
also been viewed as complementary to achieve human welfare and development1702. The 
shortcomings experienced by agrobiodiversity users, especially farmers, but also to a lesser extent 
public and private plant breeders, may be addressed in the framework of the right to food or the 
right to benefit from science. The former right to food is engraved in article 11 of the International 
Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (ICESCR), which, through its three tenets, 
requires States to “respect existing access to adequate food”, “to protect the right to food” and 
lastly “to fulfil the right to food”1703. The exact reach of such obligation and the correlated 
obligations that accompany its ratification and endorsement by signatories to the International 
Covenant are disputed1704, even though it is argued that,  
“the introduction of legislation or other measures which create obstacles to the reliance of 
farmers on informal seed systems may violate the obligation [to respect existing access to 
adequate food], which would deprive farmers from a means of achieving their livelihood 
[…] the current intellectual property regime is suboptimal to ensure global food security 
today”1705.  
The implementation of restrictive IPR may detrimentally impact the realisation of the right to 
food. However, the very same framework that suffers much discomfort may very well also provide 
roadmaps in order to reclaim a sustainable and equitable balance in informational exclusive rights 
granted over components and processes of biodiversity.  
“The decision to subject intellectual property decision making to adjudication within the 
trade system has led to overly restrictive interpretations that do not respect the intentions of 
the parties or the needs of intellectual property policy making. A human rights presumption 
[may] remedy these overly restrictive interpretations, as panels should consider and respect 
the purposes states attempt to achieve through intellectual property regulation and should 
give greater presumptive weight to state policies that seek to fulfill human rights and 
protect human health and dignity”1706. 
Scholars have not only attempted to adjust the “wrongdoings” of the developmental intellectual 
property paradigm in the right to food discourse. They have also delved upon both the right to 
education and research, and the right to access to science and culture respectively enshrined in 
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 Articles 26 and 27 of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, and Articles 13§1 and 15§3 of 
the ICESCR. Especially with regards to the shrinking margins of research exceptions,  
“The situation could be improved by resorting to human rights discourse and claiming that 
the right to research is a fundamental human right also in an IP context, which justifies the 
introduction of a mandatory, wide, and clear-cut experimental use exception in patent law 
on the international level”1707. 
The two above-mentioned human rights may serve best in filling the content of laws and policies 
targeting the conservation or sustainable use of biodiversity, trying to ensure food security, or 
fostering innovation. For instance, the constitutional protection of the right to food in India has 
been seen as the trigger of several legislative amendments on seed marketing rules, but also on 
intellectual property rights legislation, including but not limited to its wider recognition of farmers 
as more than cultivators1708. Whether such framework will allow for judicial redress in cases 
related to plant innovation and the implementation of exclusive IPR titles, based on sole 
contentions of human rights violations is however less certain.  
Aside from these strictly legalistic perspectives, the most manifest need to bring the study one step 
further is to implement the proposed adjustments and solutions of this thesis through a multi-
disciplinary field study, carving out the characteristics, motivations, needs and challenges faced 
by each agrobiodiversity user groups within a given locality, country or region. Policy and 
regulatory adjusments will indeed not only depend on a thorough analysis of a given regional, 
national or local socio-technological plant improvement context, its reach and impact would also 
benefit from a thorough identification of existing ecological, social, economic and political 
narratives that accompany but also condition their implementation. Grounded mostly on inter-
disciplinary social science approaches, notably those embedded in a “science, technology and 
innovation” background, there are numerous methods to establish such contextualised depiction, 
as well as to identify possible alternative or transitional pathways1709. Succesful policy deployment 
should rely on an all-encompassing and accurate picture of plant improvement. A picture that 
would identify not only the policy environment and dominant discourses but also highlight the 
socio-economic conditions that surround the development of biotechnology research tools and 
plant varieties by public researchers, those fostering or blocking private sector involvement, just as 
those anthropological and socio-economic considerations edging mass selector presence and 
proliferation in the identified area. The biodiversity found within national borders, the number of 
small-scale farming communities and their informal practices, the levels of State expenditure in 
public agricultural research, the existence and strength of a national private seed sector, may all 
influence the legal allocation of genetic resources and its corresponding property regime, just as 
much as the ratification and implementation of international agreeemnts that have an impact on the 
management of agricultural biodiversity. 
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